The Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance

A new interpretation of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

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The Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance

A NEW INTERPRETATION OF *TATTVACINTĀMAṆI*

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To The Memory
of
My Parents and Sister, Mira Roy

"Dhīrāḥ kuśāgramatayobhavataḥ praṇamya
Maulau nidhāya karavārirūhe samīhe
Vāṇīyamartharahitāpi viśṛṅkhalāpi
Sānugraheṇa hṛdayena vilokanīyā"

Preface

The book that follows is a sort of a commentary on a portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*; with this work its author, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, inaugurated the new age and movement in the school of Nyāya Philosophy. Exhaustive commentaries in Saṃskṛita on this source book of Navyanyāya (system of thought) had been written in the past. Translation and elucidations in English of different parts of this book are also available. Yet the sort of a commentary that follows had to be written; I shall say why. In this Preface I would also like to say how this present commentary differs from all that have so far been written on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Realism as it shaped itself in one of the realist schools of India, namely, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is among the most mature systems of philosophy. But its impact on the reading public or working philosophers of even India could not be fully felt. The reasons why this is so is also well known. All the original and major works by the Indian realists are in Saṃskṛita, but this language has ceased for a long time to be widely read or understood. No systematic attempt has been made to bring out standard translation of the major works. Most of the independent works which have been written on or about Indian realism in modern times contain, on the other hand, hardly anything more than an historical introduction to the subject or list of major tenets and arguments of the naiyāyika-s. However, need is there for works by Indian realists which alone can bring out the deeper concern

and commitment which defined Indian realism and gave it its distinctive character. The readers would know from such works what contributions the nyāya realists made to the world literature of realist Philosophy.

The book I wrote in 1984 was not a translation or elucidation of any Saṃskrita text. My aim there had been to understand and share the deeper concern and motivation the Nyāya realists had in ontology. For want of a better expression, I started describing this sort of work as "Study". I realised that in addition to translating the source books of Indian realism many more volumes of Study had to be written even in the single field of navyanyāya. (I myself undertook to write a few such volumes to reconstruct the comprehensive realism of Nyāya. In *Indian Realism*, A *Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics* I even announced my desire to write another book, dealing with some problem of philosophy of language. The purpose as envisaged was to bring out the characteristic realist concern in Philosophy of language A monograph has since been written to bring out the comprehensive realism which was developed in the school of Nyāya Philosophy.) Around the time I was writing my *Indian Realism* Professor Karl Potter approached some of us in Calcutta to contribute summary in English of portions of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya, had already initiated some of his students to the task of reading through the whole of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Dīdhiti* before writing on any portion of it. Eventually I joined two of my colleagues in the Department and jointly started the "Studies in Navyanyāya and *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Rendition Project". The Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, adopted this as one of its research schemes and the then Vice-Chancellor of the University Professor Manindra Mohan Chakraborty, made provision for some funds in due course. The successive Vice-Chancellors endorsed this decision. I am beholden to all of them by a debt of gratitude.

The present work contains a protion of what has been written so far in partial fulfillment of the Rendition part of the above project. Notwithstanding the length of the work and the difficulty of writing it there was pressure to complete it within a stipulated period. For early completion of this work I had to postpone, at that time, the writing of the book I promised to write in my *Indian*

Realism in 1984. I presented the complete text of this work for publication in 1986.

Some portions of what has so far been written in fulfillment of the "Studies in Navyanyāya" part of the project are directly related to *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* These portions were meant to be included as part of the academic Introduction with which the reprints of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* and *Prakāśa* were to be brought out in the Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy series. Eventually the reprints did not include any academic introduction. Some other portion of the Study material is available in the form of an unpublished monograph entitled *Rationality Vs. Autonomy: Indian Realist's Concern in the Philosophy of Language.* Insignificantly small portion from the rest of the Study material has been included in this Preface and in the "Notes and References" added to the main text.

The book that follows, however, is not simply a rendition or translation of (even part of) *Tattvacintāmaṇi* . Nor is it what may be best described as Study of navyanyāya as I understand the term. It is a sort of a commentary. There is much that is common between a commentary and a study. But a commentary keeps some single text in the focus of attention and attends to textual details more thoroughly than the sort of work called study is meant to do. This is my idea of the major difference between these two types of works. I, however, do not think it to be important or even really true that a study is an original work of an author whereas rendition and commentary are exposition of other's thought. Since studies in navyanyāya is expected to generate a healthy interest in the original works or source books such texts as *Tattvacintāmaṇi* should be made available to the readers if they are not already available easily or in translation.

A complete edition of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with or without translation was not to be had easily even in 1866 when Śriviṭṭhala Śastri wrote an article to request the scholars to make an effort to get this text published. He also remarked in that article that up to *Bādha* portion of *Anumānakhaṇḍa,* the second part of the four part *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* had been published from Calcutta and that this was of immense help for the Naiyāyika-s of Bengal who were very much interested in *this part of the work* ([Kalikātāsthā-

nām] *anumānabhaktatārkikānām*). Between 1884-1901 Asiatic Society, Calcutta published in its Bibliotheca Indica series the whole of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* along with a few independent but related tracts of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (14th Century A.D.). Kāmākhyānāth Tarkavāgīśa, the editor, added brief footnotes to this edition in which was included Mathuranātha's (16th Century) commentary, *Rahasya*, on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* or, where this was not available, *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara (15th Century A.D.) or *Dīpanī* of *Kṛiṣṇakāntasiddhānta* Vāgīśha (18th Century A.D.). The reprint of this work which was brought out in 1974 states that the Asiatic Society edition was first published in 1897. Potter has given the date 1884. Anyway even before 1884 and perhaps in response to Śriviṭṭhalaśāstri's request Bāla Śāstri began to publish in the pages of the *Pandit*, alternatively known as *Kāśīvidyāsudhāṇidhih* the monthly journal of the Banares College, Banaras, the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* or the last part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with the commentary *Prakāśa* of Rucidatta (15th Century A.D.). The first instalment was published in the November 1871 issue of the journal and perhaps with only one break, the publication continued up to February 1874 issue. In his Introduction published with the first instalment Bāla Śāstri wrote that the original text of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* was not receiving much attention. So far as the second part which deals with *anumāna* and is known as *Anumānakhaṇḍa* is concerned, almost exclusive attention was being paid to commentaries. With regard to the fourth and the last part known as *Śabdakhaṇḍa* even commentaries were not read; some independent tracts written by authors who were known experts in the field were being studied. Bāla Śāstri also said there with dismay that due to lack of attention and interest of the scholars a correct text of *Śabdakhaṇḍa* had already become unavailable at the time. In his concluding remarks added to the last instalment published in 1874 he noted that in spite of his best effort he could not find the last two or three pages of *Prakāśa* which on all probability Rucidatta wrote.

Apathy to theoretical heritage of India in general and to nyāya literature (especially the source material) in particular continued. Even around 1940s senior Paṇḍits of nyāya could be heard saying "What is there in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*? There are four sentences in

the section *Vyāpatipañcaka,* five sentences in *Caturdaśalakṣaṇī* and one in *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa.* How many things can one learn form *Tattvacintāmaṇi*? The glory of Nyāyaśāstra is the work of Raghunātha, Gadādhara and the like." Rāmānujatātācārya who testified to this fact commited himself to the task of making it possible for interested scholars to get themselves acquainted with the whole of *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* He edited the first part of it, i.e., *Patyakṣakhaṇḍa* with *Prakāśa* of Rucidatta and *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* on *Prakāśa* by Rāmakrisṇādhvarin. It was published in 1973. The second part or *Anumānakhaṇḍa* was published in 1982 with *Prakāśa* of Rucidatta and *Tarkacuḍāmani* on *Prakāśa* by Dharmarājādhvarin. Motilal Banarsidass had by now started bringing out the reprint of Asiatic Society edition of *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* In 1974 they brought out only the *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa* and in 1990 entire *Tattvacintāmaṇi* from *Pratyakṣa* to *Śabda* was brought out in reprint. Sampurnānand Visvavidyālaya has started reprinting since 1991 all the issues of the *Pandit* which had a life of about fifty years (1886 to 1917). By cutting out the text portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* from the Asiatic Society edition of the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* and preparing by pasting method a running text, a reprint of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* without any commentary has been brought in the Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy series. Preparation is continuining to bring out the reprint of the text of *Prakāśa* in the same way by cutting it out from the respective pages of the *Pandit.*

So far as the text of *Śabdakhaṇḍa* reproduced here in transliteration is concerned I have generally followed the reading of the Asiatic Society edition with minor corrections and change of some punctuations. First, I did not have any copy of the *Pandit* edition when the text portion of this book was written. Secondly editing a text like *Tattvacintāmaṇi* was never in the scheme of things I intended to do. That requires some special ability and facility. And any one who has read Sri Kamaleswar Bhattacharyay's 1989 paper, "Textual Observation on the Vienna Edition of Yajñapati Upādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprabhā* (Anumānakhanda)", will think twice before he attempts at editing a Saṃskrita text of Philisophical literature. Sri Bhattacharya listed some 725 difficulties in about 132 pages of the edited text even though the editor was one of the renowned scholars who worked with Frauwallner.

If we are to cater to the need for the original, interest in which is expected to be created by independent books and studies in English, and if we are not to lose sight of the original while paying (excessive) attention to commentaries and sub-commentaries, then the origianl is to be published with translation in English. The portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* translated here has not been translated before. Practically the whole of *Tattavacintāmaṇi* still remains confined to difficult Saṃskrita. Fortunately, however, a team of scholars have already started translating the whole of this text in English. A few *Prakaraṇa*-s have already been completed. There were another two reasons why I chose to translate this portion. In the first place I had at the time just finished my *Indian Realism* in which I reconstructed that part of comparehensive realism of Nyāya which could be properly called ontology. My plan was to publish next the study of navyanyāya philosophy of language. The most appropriate text to translate side by side was Gaṅgeśa's *Śabdacintāmaṇi.* In the second place I recalled, what I heard from dependable experts, that scholars were less familiar particularly with Gaṅgeśa's contribution in the areas other than *anumāna* or theory of inference. But having already made a preliminary survey through the whole of *Tattvacinatāmaṇi* I had convinced myself that due to almost exclusive attention to *anumānakhaṇda* scholars had formed a wrong idea about Gaṅgeśa's orientation. I wrote as much in my 1986 paper "Tattvacintāmaṇi–A Connected Story". So I resolved to start translating *Tattvacintāmaṇi* from the *Śabda* portion. Other scholars have since associated themselves to carry forward the work of translation through other parts of the text. Most of them belong to the National research network Prasthānamīmānsā either directly or indirectly. The combined research project of the network, Foundation and Methodology of Theoretical Sciences in Indian Tradition (FAMTSIT), which is being sponsored by D.S.T, Government of India, includes one project on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* itself.

India being a multi-lingual country, to ensure dialogue between advanced students who do not know saṃskrita very well and belong to different linguistic communities, texts are to be made available with translation in English. Again there are scholars and experts in different parts of this country and abroad who do not

know much about Indian philosophy in general or about Indian realism in particular. Some of them are, however, deeply interested in the sort of issues which are discussed in the original texts; they are even competent enough to contribute richly to the growth of Indian realism through their critical appreciation, penetrating questions and constructive suggestions. It is a sad truth that the only way for an Indian author to rich out to all such scholars even when they are Indians is to write in English though a foreign language is not the right medium to become fully expressive with ease and accuracy, let alone elegance. It may also be held that study type works would be best suited for this wider audience who are established experts in their own fields. They would have little need for merely expository work in English relating to some simple text. Though exposition of a text is somewhat different from exposition of certain view or idea, yet it is not very clear what it is for a work to be merely expository and what it is not to be so; clearer is the distinction between exposition of one's own thought and that of some one else's.

In recent times we often attach far more importance to exposition of one's own thought than to the exposition of another man's original work. This remains our attitude even when the latter type of work is incomparably superior to that of the former type, in consideration of rigour of presentation, profundity of thought and vigour of reasoning. But the characteristic Indian way of looking at things is different. The community of classical scholars of India in the past used to insist always on the inherent worth of a work rather than on whether it was an old work or a new one. For they would believe, as they said, "*puranamityeva na sādhu sarvam na cāpi kāvyam navamityavadyam.*" I had the fortune of knowing some scholars in modern India who lived this faith. They believed, in spite of being themselves extremely erudite scholars and great thinkers, that what ninety nine precent among the competent scholars can produce on their own today are incomparably inferior to what the great classical scholars left for us. The spill over of this classical scholarship was evident till 16th century which witnessed the emergence of kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma (1500 A.D.) who among the commentators of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi preceded the famous four and whose *Bhāṣāpariccheda*

and *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* are compulsory texts today for any aspiring student of navyanyāya who may want to be introduced to the subject.

If writing a book were not just a matter of enjoying freedom of speech or gratifying the natural inclination to express ourselves and share our thoughts with those who are similarly inclined but if it were rather a matter of enriching one's own understanding of the subject or enriching the subject itself by one's contribution then far less number of books would have been written which were not of the nature of close study of some past master. A "study" of a great philosophical work, consists in responding in different ways to the work being studied. The response may be in the form of critical rejection or critical defence; or it may take the form of reconstructing and further developing the insights of the author of the original work or his line of argument. Creative reconstruction and critical appreciation come more often from one who belongs to the same school of thought with the author of the original work; from one who, in our case, that is, when the original work is *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* is a naiyāyika himself. When a naiyāyika undertakes to study some work by a great master of nyāya tradition, what he produces is a commentary. (Same is true about works in other traditions). The best thing to do for many of us is to write commentaries on certain classical work available to us. This is why so many gifted philosophers of India, who had due confidence in their own capabilities but also great admiration for the past masters, chose to write commentarial work. Some of these commentaries became in their turn great classics and new sub-commentaries began to be written on them in due course.

In any case, commentaries in English had to be written or so I thought on classics of Indian realism including realism as it had shaped itself in the Nayāya school of thought. Such a work will be more than English translation of the original work or even simple elucidation of it in English which is so much needed by the beginners. A commentary should not be confused with exegesis. This is very often done, even though dictionary does not permit it strictly. A commentator, while he reconstructs and develops the thoughts of the author of the original work, finds opportunity to organise his own thoughts in the subject. I am not convinced

when any work in the field of Indian Philosophy whether by modern scholars who wrote in English or by the authors of sub-commentaries in Saṃskrita is described as exegetical. I adore exegetical work on major texts in any discipline by great masters. But the present work is meant to be and has been written as a sort of a commentary.

Why did I then give the work the look of an independent book, so for as the title is concerned ? Secondly the portion of the original work included here had to be translated because no translation was available ; but why instead of translating relevant portions of commentaries available in Saṃskrita I prefered to write one myself ? A commentary is distinguished both by its approach and by its content. In the recent past a national research network Prasthānamīmāṃsā has been set up with a view to foster among the Indians a collective commitment to rediscovering and furthering theoretical cultural identity of India through critical appreciation and creative use of India's past achievements in different theoretical fields. It has been conducting in different places of the country researches in the Foundations and Methodology of Therorétical Sciences in Indian Tradition. The approach being followed consciously by the members of the network is the distinctive approach of a commentator, the approach of Prasthānamīmāṃsā. A commentator reserves the right to be critical about past masters. But all his criticisms are from within the school to which these masters belong. This means that the commentator himself belongs to the same school. The sense in which he belongs to the school is that he is committed to the fundamental beliefs and practices which define that school. He distinguishes this approach of Prasthānamīmāṃsā from externalist approach and the approach of those who are freelance amateur thinkers. It is of no consequence whether such freelance thinkers speak approvingly or disapprovingly about the thoughts and practices current in a school. Free thinking in the sense of *ucchṛinkhala cintā* has always been discouraged in every school of thought in India. Philosophising had been a matter of commitment which did not make men dogmatic but determined their criticisms to be creative. Philosophers of different schools of India could be found in those days to be using creatively the criticisms and insights made available by the thinkers of some rival school. Reference to thinkers like

Vātsyāyana, Saṃkarāchārya, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Dharmakīrti have been made with due reverence even by philosophers who did not belong to the schools which these great masters represented. I have followed in this book the distinctive approach which is characteristic of any classical commentarial work of India and of the research network Prasthānamīmāṃsā. In consideration of its approach the present book is a commentary. So far as the content is concerned only a very small portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has been covered here. Though one whole section of an original work may consist of even one, two, three or four sentences and though part of a commentary is still a commentary yet I could not think of claiming this book to be more than *a sort of a* commentary because only a very small portion of the original work has been covered. Besides I know how difficult it is for me to attain the standard which the past commentators have set for such literature. I would have to be far more conceited if I wanted to claim even by implication that the present work is actually a regular commentary on a portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which could be even distantly compared with the commentaries of Mathurānātha or Rucidatta, in points of depth of vision and vigour of presentation. The work is indeed a sort of a commentary written in English so that even those who have no direct access to great Saṃskrita commentaries can have some taste of the spirit and style of such works. This may also be the best that I could produce, yet I did not want to make the faintest suggestion that it belongs to the same category with Mathurānātha's or Rucidatta's commentary. For this reason and also to draw the attention of the scholars to some deeper issues of Nyāya Philosophy of language I prefered the title which this work in print bears.

The readers would have completely missed the greatness of the standard commentaries and formed wrong idea about the scholarship of Mathurānātha or Rucidatta if I presented in translation only the relevant portions of *Rahasya* and *Prakaśa* on the small portion of *Tattavacintāmaṇi* that has been covered here. Secondly, a copy of *Prakāśa* on *Śabdacintāmaṇi* came to my possession only after I finished the text portion of this book, though I have used it since to a small extent at the time of finalising the 'Notes and References' added later to the text. Thirdly I could

not accept always what Mathurānātha had written on relevant points and I deviated from his line of interpretation often without announcement. Lastly, I was already made aware of the danger of losing sight of the original (due to too much reliance on and attention to commentaries) both by my teacher, who insisted on taking a fresh look into the source books of a tradition in their entirety, and also by the writers like Bāla Śāstri, Viṭṭhala Sāstri and Rāmānujatātacārya. The nature of interest, level of information and norm and power of understanding of both writers and audiance change from age to age. These necessitate new study of the same old classical work. The project of reviving the enterprise of navyanyāya, which has been given a formal shape in recent times by Shri Navjyoti Singh on behalf of Prasthānamīmāṃsā, had been to rescue *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, at least the *Śabda* portion of it, from the inattention of scholars and to rehabilitate Gaṅgeśa. This could not be done by translating centuries old commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, however, great those works might be. Till at least the time of Kṛṣṇadās Sāravabhauma, the usual practice with the major writers had been to write both sub-commentaries and commentaries. Respective authors of the five major commentaries on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's gloss, *Dīdhiti*, including Mathuranatha, wrote direct commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,

Though otherwise far inferior in respect of quality and coverage the present work will serve the need of the day much better than the commentary of Mathurānātha or Rucidatta. For it has been written in English and for the modern readers. There is one respect, however, in which this work is an improvement upon all the commentaries written so far. There is a problem which one meets when one tries to explain some classical text of Indian Philosophical literature such as Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Like any other great writers of India Gaṅgeśa would pressupose, on the part of the readers, knowledge of the views of some thinkers who were perhaps quite familiar in his time. For this reason and in keeping with the usual practice of the Indian authors in general, Gaṅgeśa, omitted from his work explicit references to the authors and the works he supported or criticised. Separtated as we are by centuries from those authors and from Gaṅgeśa we cannot easily

make out whose views are being referred to at any given portion of the text of *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* Often there is no indication in the writings of Gaṅgeśa which would enable us to decide whether he was expressing his own views or alluding to some one else's views. Even the great commentators like Mathurānātha and Rucidatta render very little help and that too only occasionally, in tracing in older literature the origin of some of the remarks and arguments of Gaṅgeśa. Contrary to what people think of them, the philosopher commentators of India usually took a logical rather than historical or even textual approach when they commented upon some work. To take an example, in the second sentence of his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa noted for the purpose of rejecting it after critical examination, the view that language (*śabda*) is no means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Apart from the logical question relating to the soundness or otherwise of the view, there is a textual question too. In which text of which school of thought, did Gaṅgeśa find this view ? Prompt came the answer from Mathurānatha who attributed this view to the Bauddha-s. Rucidatta credits the Cārvāka-s with the view and added a remark to the effect that some thinkers held that the Bauddha-s were the advocates of this view. The position which such great commentators enjoy in the tradition mislead us. We mistake their carelessness as confidence. They were perhaps honestly careless as they were interested only in the logical problems and not in the textual questions or historical identity of authors of different views. They did not mean to make any textual or historical point and they did not care to tell us in which text of the Bauddha-s or the Cārvāka-s they found the view in question ; they perhaps meant that the Bauddha-s or Cārvaka-s could have held such view. If their approach was different or if they were not careless or disinterested they would have mentioned the source which supported their conjecture, if it were one. It is unlikely that a commentator too could presuppose, as the author of the source book did, that the readers of his work would know in which text of the Bauddha-s or the Cārvāka-s the view in question might have been found by Gaṅgeśa. I have every reason to believe that Gaṅgeśa found this view stated in Uddyotakara's *Nyayabhāṣyavārttika* and Vācaspati Miśra told us that Uddyotakara cited this view as a logically possible alternative rather than as a view

held as a matter of history by some Bauddha or Cārvaka Philosophers. To take another example, while correctly identifying certain later passage of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* as reproducing certain formlulation of an inference given by Vallabhācārya, Rucidatta tends to make his readers believe that Vallabha there offered two separate reasons or grounds of inference. The fact is that Vallabha had offered only one inference or one *hetu* ; Gaṅgeśa constructed two out of it. It seems that instead of cheking up the relevant text of *Nyāyalīlāvatī* or verifying for himself the real position of Vallabha in the matter, Rucidatta guessed it from what Gaṅgeśa had written. This is another proof that Gaṅgeśa did not leave sure indication which could help us to trace the source from where he got the points he criticised, developed or defended at any given stage of his work. But he gave general indication in the very second verse at the beginning of *Tattavacintāmaṇi* that he would draw on past literature of both the Nyāya and Mimāṃsā schools.

In the present work I traced to earlier literature most of the views and arguments Gaṅgeśa propounded in the relevant portion of *Śabdacintāmaṇi.* Once I started the search for the sources in older writings, the task became fascinating. I am now convinced that till the sources where from Gaṅgeśa drew so many of his points are identified and his work is placed against the actual historical and textual context to which it belongs, fully authentic commentary cannot be written. We can improve upon earlier commentaries if we direct our attention to discovering sources of the original work in earlier literature. In standard commentaries such references to earlier literature are not usually traced or identified. Sometimes when the commentators traced the sources, they did it far less seriously than one would expect. In the present work I have tried to correct this defeciency to some extent. Before I made some progress I did not realise how difficult and interesting the search could prove to be, nor did I foresee what great help the result would render in clarifying the text. I am still not sure which made my work of writing the present commentary more difficult, the absturseness of Gaṅgeśa's thought or vastness of his scholarship. His scholarship was so vast and he drew from so many sources that it seemed practically impossible to understand what Gaṅgeśa had actually meant in any part of his work without

thorough knowledge of these sources. But tracing the sources to which no explicit reference was made and in the absence of index, bibliography and the like, absences which are to be found as a rule in the works by Indian Philosophers of the classical period, is extermely difficult a job. I have just begun to work in this direction. If one reads carefully through the 'Notes and References' appended to the main text one will find what great amount of labour had to be spent and also the value of the information acquired through such labour. I can say for myself that I enjoyed the work and immensely benifited myself from it. I could clearly see how unbroken had been the tradition of Nyāya for thirteen to fourteen hundred years at the least, from Gautama to Gaṅgeśa. If I discovered, while writing my *Indian Realism*, what a genius Udanācārya was, in course of writing the present work I discovered Vācaspati Miśra, the naiyāyika. I have convinced myself, that Vācaspati Miśra systematised the essential part of what we know today as nyāya philosophy of language almost all by himself. It is in his writing that we find for the first time the distinction between word and sentence, clear articulation of the concept of *vākyārtha* and so on.

For the purpose of commenting on it earlier commentators would take a book like *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as a wholly independent work and not as author's response to the views of the historically prior writers in the field. In this respect the great commentaries suffered from a sort of limitation. Their ahistorical and largely non-textual approach could have rendered their interpretations wrong and wide of the mark but for the fact that these commentators belonged to the same tradition to which the author of the work being commented upon himself belonged. The relevant views and how they were related were known accurately even when the historical identity of their authors or sources were not known. But the fact remains, that to do complete justice to the work by an author like Gaṅgeśa who combined in himself stupendous scholarship and limitless power of penetrating analysis, a commentary should adopt an attitude which is both historical and analytical. I have tried in this work to do that as best as I could. I also found very often that a passage of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* could not be interpreted except in the light of certain specific passages to be

found in earlier or later parts of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. In the standard commentaries reference to other parts of the text had not always been traced or made explicit. Many such passages have also been identified in the present work.

Apart from fixing textual context and perspective by identifying relevant passages in earlier texts or earlier or later part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* I have tried to do another thing which none of the major commentators could do. I have, to put it loosely but in familiar terminology, brought out contemporary relevance of the classical text under reference which was written about four to five centuries before. This does not mean that I have included some materials which could be termed comparative study in the sense that reference has been made to some similar views to be found in the contemporary literature of other culture. In my case the exigency arose in this way. When I succeeded in tracing to earlier literature almost everything which Gaṅgeśa had written in the small portion of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* which the present work covers I felt compelled to assert myself, now as a matter of verified truth, which many people have been always saying, namely that the majority of the Indian Philosophers down the centuries have been mostly repeating what their predecessors had already said in the matter. I used to think earlier that these people were biased and that is why they underrated the talent of the Indian Philosophers and held such view. I knew that many of them did not study Indian philosophical works at all or carefully. Instead of discharging the academic obligation of studying what the scholars of their own land had written on relevant subjects, they would accuse the authors of Indian Philosophical works of lacking originality. But now I found myself constrained to say that at least in this part of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa had been thoroughly repetitive, and this part may be representative of all other parts of the text. Around this time, I also came across a remark of Pandit Yogendra nath Tarkavedāntatīrtha, that Gaṅgeśa could add very little to what Udayanācārya had written on the subject under reference. I succeeded, it seemed at first, in pushing the history of repetition further back. Even Udayana (1050) could add very little to what Vācaspati Miśra (950) had written. Now I realised that what Udayana wrote about Vācaspati in the beginning of his sub-co-

mmentary (*Tātparyatīkā*) *Pariśuddhi* was not entirely hyperbolical. This discovery that Gaṅgeśa's indebtedness to his predecessors was total, created dismay in me. I could not bring me to believe that Udayana or Geṅgeśa had nothing to say themselves and took the trouble of writing voluminous books to report only what others had already said, or that the development of Indian Philoosphical thought, at least in the Nyāya school, had stopped as back as in the tenth century. It was no nationalist chauvinism of mine which created resistance to such suggestions. I was prevented by what little I had tested of the awe inspiring power of thinking and analytic ability of the stalwarts like Udayana and Gaṅgeśa. I had also seen with what great reverence and appreciation those who were in a position to know the truth, the great Pandits of the subject talked about these scholars. I thought, and my teacher instructed me as much, that if (Udayana and) Gaṅgeśa had only little to add to what his predecessors had already said in the matter, then that little we should be able to identify. The points added by them must have been too subtle and hidden in the great depth of very detailed and intricate discussions. In this search my acquaintance with the issues and discussions of the philosophy of language of the West particularly of the contemporary analytical period was found helpful. I have recorded elsewhere the exact way in which it had helped me and how in my thought certain concerns and problems, arguments and solutions of the two cultures came to be connected together without my consciously resolving to write some comparative stuff. In fine, what I have attempted in this work are rendition of a small portion of Gaṅgeśa's *Śabdacintāmaṇi* and an explanation of that portion in the light of the relevant passages of some earlier works and of other parts of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Light I have derived from these passages, once I succeeded in identifying them, and my acquaintance with certain contemporary Western trends of thought helped me to understand or reconstruct Gaṅgeśa's thinking in the matter far more deeply than I could do otherwise. The work of this nature proved for me too difficult and I shall think twice before I venture a second time to write a book of this kind even though I am fully convinced that many more such books should be written.

My difficulty was further enhanced by the constant pressure

to complete the work early as it was originally planned to be the sixth volume of the first series of Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy. Subsequent development did not fully justify the haste. For the publication work could not be assigned to a publisher before two to three years from the date of submission of the manuscript. Things bringhtened up when the Depatrtment requested our willing, competent and helpful colleague Dr. S. R. Saha to look after the Departmental publications. The manuscript of the *Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance* was the first of a number of manuscripts which were given to Compu-mark for laser setting and composing; and when after two years I am writing this Preface the work of composing is still continuing.

This dealy has caused me great pain. Because in the meantime my teacher passed away in June 1990 four years after the manuscript was handed over for publication. He would never forget to inquire about the publication of this book whenever I met him during these four years. He at times even suspected that I had a hand in the delay. I also lost my father and Pandit Panchānan Śāstri who would be glad to see the book in print. My second source of unhappiness is that I could not use this dealy to my advantage and improve the text in the light of the subsequent changes and improvement in my understanding of some major issues discussed here. For never could it be actually known when the composing of a portion would start or how quickly it would be finished in the new system of leser setting and composing. Only now I know that it had perhaps taken longer than it would have taken if everything were done manually.

Be that as it may, I must thank Professor Debabrata Mukherjee, of the Department of English, Jadavpur University who kindly accepted the request of the Department of Philosophy to go through a few manuscripts, including the present one, to be published in the Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy series-II, and improve the grammatical accuracy and stylistic elegance wherever necessary. In the translation portion particularly elegance or accuracy was most difficult to maintain. Two languages that are involved are so very different in nature. In a communication Prof. Strawson noted that presence of articles in English is one important point of difference. In a serious article P. T. Geach not only recalled

what prior called "idiotism of idiom", but also remarked about the "logical vacuity of articles." Even intuitions are unreliable. "The sentence that legend says Hearyk Hiż used in a lecture on English syntax, 'In English language common noun in singular number invariably has definite or idefinite article', got its message over. Incidentally, that message is false even, as regards standard English, for we say 'in the English language' but 'in English grammar'. Not only it is difficult to master the use of articles and idoms of a foreign language, it is extremely difficult to find suitable English expressions for some Saṃskṛta words or nyāya concepts. Our problem is moreover that we are not that easy with Saṃskṛta or Philosophical Saṃskrta either. No standard list of English synonyms of important terms of Saṃskṛta philosophy is there. At times I could not accept more familiar ways of translating some Saṃskṛta expressions, but what I substituted as logically more accurate may be found, aesthetically speaking, unacceptable. To one such expression at least my teacher, Professor Gopinath Bhattacarya drew my attention. I am grateful to one reputed scholar whose remark relating to the whole manuscript of the text portion is indeed very encouraging except for my use of the expression linguistic knowledge in the sense in which I used it. But since I stated explicity in the 'Introduction' and in 'Notes and References' the sense in which I used the term along with some explanation and justification which were not available to him at the time no change was found necessary.

In the matter of correcting the typescript I received some assistance from Srimati Madhu Kapoor to whom I am therefore grateful. Sri Chandan Kumar Goswami helped me at various stages, from correcting the typescript, particularly of the Notes and Refereance portion, through correcting proofs of the text. To him my debt is the greatest. I am grateful to Srimati Parboti Chakraborty also for she too rendered occasional help in comparing the typescript. My calleague Hiranmoy Banerjee consistently kept on pressing everyone concerned including the author for early publication of the book. Dr. Arun Bandyopadhyay of the Department of Modern History, University of Calcutta took great interest in this publication. I owe to both of them a great amount of gratitude. In innumerable other ways every member of

Prasthānamīmāmsā and FAMTSIT helped and inspired me directly or indirectly. I bear more than gratitude to all of them. Srimati Parboti Chakraborty supplied some references and Srimati Uma Bandyopadhyay made available some relevant arguments and issues. These have been duly acknowledged in appropriate places. I am also indebted to scholars like Professor Daya Krishna and Professor D.P. Chattopadhyay who never failed to take interest in my academic activities.

I would like to thank Shri Abhijit Goswami for his extremely decent manners and ready gesture of cooperation. But there have always been factors beyond his control otherwise composing could have been completed earlier. Thanks are also due to Messars K P Bagchi and Co. my old publisher. I regret to record that I cannot thank by name the typist who prepared the typescript long back.

To Shri Susanta Bhattacharjee I owe much more than customary thanks which are showered on publishers and printers as a matter of ritual. If any single person can be said to have taken the drudgery of seeing this book through the press it is he. I wish there were many more such good souls and hard working individuals in publishing concerns. His knowledge of everything related to printing and publishing including the most recent techniques and technology in the matter is laudable, though these qualities often go unnoticed because he is so modest.

The debt of gratitude I owe to my Department and University may be partly repaid if this work affords better and deeper understanding of the passages of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* discussed here and if it enables the readers to see this important text in a larger perspective.

Calcutta **P.K.M.**
July 1992

Introduction

This introduction brings out separately and in broad outline some of the more general philosophical and analytical contents of the text, a sort of commentary, that follows. One may lose sight of these amidst the textual, historical and logical details on which the author may be found to concentrate more in the body of the text. A work like the present one also demands that the author should put emphasis on details. Attempts have been made to minimise the danger in qustion, by adopting such measures in the text as résumé after every digression or interruption, summary of discussion each time after it has progressed beyond a reasonable limit either in consideration of length or in consideration of number of items introduced. Sometimes repetitions could not be helped.

The last or the fourth part of Gaṅgeśopadhyāya's book *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*TC*) deals with the problems of *śabda* (roughly language); so it is usually referred to as *Śabdacintāmaṇi* (*SC*). In the portion of *SC* which has been covered in *The Nyaya Theory of Linguistic Performance* (*NTLP*), Gaṅgeśa deals with three major topics or questions. (A) The first is definition of *Śabda*. The expression "definition of *śabda*" is usually taken to mean definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of *śabdapramāṇa*. There is reason for this. Each of the four major divisions of *TC* deals with one of the four sources or types of knowledge or, in Saṃskṛita, *pramāṇa*. The last of the four types of *pramā* is *śābda*; its source is called *śabdapramāṇa*; with this the final part of *TC* i.e. *SC* deals. So the definition of *Śabda* with which *SC* begins is understood as definition of *śābdapramāṇa*. The second chapter of *NTLP* where Gaṅgeśa's treatment of this topic has been discussed also bears

the title 'Definition of Linguistic means'. There is nothing wrong in it. But for reasons which will soon become clear I would like to describe the first major topic more vaguely as definition of *Śabda*. (B) The next major topic is the objection which has been raised by some philosophers that *śabda* or language cannot yield any knowledge and as such it cannot be regarded as a *pramāṇa* even though the naiyāyika-s admit it to be one. Chapter three of *NTLP* contains discussion of this topic. (C) The last major topic which has been discussed in the portion of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* covered here is one of the fundamental views of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers. According to them what is wrongly called *śabdapramāṇa* is actually a case of inference or inferential means. Unlike those who uphold the view (B) above the Vaiśeṣika-s admit that a hearer comes to entertain under favourable conditions appropriate belief on hearing the utterances of a speaker. This belief is however, derived from a process of inference which the hearer employs for the purpose. Last six or seven chapters of *NTLP* translates elucidates and comments on Gaṅgeśa's treatment of this topic. Textual details and details of the difficulties faced in interpreting the passages of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* where these topics have been discussed may be found in the body of the text of *NTLP*. Here I shall highlight some important philosophical issues and matters of principles which relate to some of the major topics just enumerated. But before that something should be said on a point which is still more general and equally important. (I) What is the exact relation between the theory of language and meaning on the one hand and the theory of *śabdapramāṇa* (linguistic means of knowing or the sort of knowledge derived from this means) on the other ?

(I) Philosophy of language has its own distinctive subject-matter. In addition it has brought into vogue a distinctive style of doing philosophy in the contemporary West. Emergence of this branch of philosophy is believed to have marked the end of the age of (at least old styled) epistemology. Epistemology which had been treated for long as the 'First Philosophy' has, in the contemporary age of analytic philosophy, yielded that place to philosophy of language. We should not confuse the theory of *pramāṇa* (including *śabdapramāṇa*) and theory of language and meaning as we have them in India with the epistemology and Philosophy of language respectively of the West which have between them the sort of relation just indicated. It would also

be wrong and hasty to conclude that Indian philosophies in general or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy in particular are not analytic in the sense in which analytic philosophy is distinguished from speculative philosophy. Indian theories of *pramāṇa* in general or the nyāya theory of *pramāṇa* in particular may be regarded as epistemology in so far as its central subject-matters include definition and classification of belief (*jñāna*), nature and varities of sources of knowledge, conditions of error including dream and illusion and so on. On the other hand the central concern of (Indian or) the nyāya theory of *śabdaśakti* i.e., lingustic meaning, makrs it out as philosophy of language and meaning. The intelligible and broad division of philosophy into epistemology and philosophy of language tends to become somewhat unclear when we concentrate on language. For language is both an item of knowledge and means of knowing on the one hand and bearer of meaning on the other. As a means of knowing, language comes within the purview of theory of *pramāṇa* or epistemology. Even meaning can have some place in epistemology when it is considered as an item of knowledge. But topics like definition and classification of meaningful expression (*sārthaka śabda*), definition of meaning and the like which are discussed in connection with the study of *śabda* (words or sentence) are not so much the subject-matter of epistemology. They constitite another field of inquiry viz., theory of language and linguistic meaning or of *śabdaśakti*. *Śabdacintāmaṇi* has two major divisions. The first division discusses epistemology of *śabda* or epistemological topics relating to language. The second division is devoted to matters of meaning. Whereas nyāya theory of meaning concentrates mainly on individual words or parts of sentences and their significance, their theory of *śabdapramāṇa* considers mainly those linguistic expressions which are called sentences or groups of words exemplifying certain special features.

The nyāya theory of meaning is primarily a theory of analysed sentences. The naiyāyikā-s think that the discussions of sub-sentential expressions and their significance belong more properly to grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*) and theory of meaning (*Śaktivāda*). Discussion on whole sentences, their 'meaning', if and what belief they yield, condition and nature of the truth which characterises such beliefs and the like constitute more properly the epistemological or *pramāṇa* theoretical part of nyāya theory of language. This part is usually known as *śābdapramāṇavāda* by

which we would understand that part of epistemology which deals with the epistemological problems relating to speech. Accordingly the first part of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* is sometimes referred to as *Śabda-prāmāṇyavāda* and the second part as *Śaktivāda*.

The Nyaya Theory of Linguistic Performance is a sort of a commentary on a portion of Gaṅgeśa's *Śabdaprāmāṇyavāda* yet we should be clear about at least the central topic of *Śaktivāda* and use of the term "*artha*" or "meaning". For otherwise it may be thought that whereas the naiyāyika-s deal with word-meaning in *śaktivāda* they specially treat sentence meaning in *śabdaprāmāṇyavāda,* and that the theory of *śābdapramāṇa* and theory of meaning or *śakti* are not as different as we have been trying to make out. This appears to be so, we hold, so long we fail to note or follow one very important point which the naiyāyika-s make. According to them we speak of both word-meaning (*padārtha*) and sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*); but the word "meaning" has different significance in these two occurrences. In the strict sense of the term only words or sub-sentential parts of a sentence have meaning. It is no wonder that such linguistic expressions form subject matter of grammar and theory of meaning or, as we understand them respectively, of *Vyākaraṇa* and *Śaktivāda*. *Śaktivāda* deals with *padaśakti* or word meaning and *Vyākaraṇa* discusses *padasādhutva* or correctness of word-forms. The expression "*pada*" should be understood to stand for any sub-sentential speech form which is well-formed in some specific sense. Consideration of truth and, if one likes, 'meaning' of sentences belong to the theory of knowledge or that part of it which deals with language not as an item of knowledge but as means of knowing. As items of the world word-meanings are things like chairs and tables whereas sentence 'meaning' is certain specific relation which obtains between word-meanings. Though relation between things bind them into fact and, in consideration of this, sentence-'meaning' or *vākyārtha* has been used interchangeably with *fact* yet the other way in which we rendered it not infrequently i.e., as relation obtaining between word meanings, is more accurate. We often abbreviated this as R^*

One way of highlighting the difference between the meaning which the proper or the well-formed parts of an atomic sentence have and the 'meaning' of a whole sentence is, according to the naiyāyika-s, to ask the question "How are these two types of

meaning known?" The meaning of a sub-sentential linguistic expression such as a word is the meaning which we non-linguistically know the word to have. A sentence 'meaning' on the other hand is what we come to know when we know linguistically. To put it otherwise, when we hear a sentence we come to entertain belief about certain fact; nothing but that sentence is the source of that belief. The fact or the things which we thus come to know from the sentence as source of knowledge is called sentence 'meaning'. One consequence of distinguishing in this way the meaning (*śakyārtha*) which only sub-sentential parts of a sentence can have and 'meaning' which only the sentences can have is the following. We cannot significantly ask the question 'How do we know what a sentence means?' For a sentence itself tells us what it means; it means what any competent user of the relevant language knows when he hears (and understands) that sentence. And it makes no sense to ask how do we know that which we are informed of by the utterance of a sentence by some speaker. It, however, makes perfect sense to ask how do we know what a word means. For what a word means is not what we are informed of primarily or usually by the utterance of that word. We are indeed reminded of by a word what it means, provided, however, we had earlier learned or known independently what the meaning of that word is; This sort of knowledge is ultimately derived from some non-linguistic means, primarily from inference, to be more specific.

Thus the study of sentences (*śabda*) considered both as item of knowledge and as means of knowing, is a part of epistemology i.e., *pāmāṇanaśātra, pramāṇavāda* or *prāmāṇyavāda*. Even the discussion of sentence 'meaning' cannot fall outside that part of *prāmāṇyavāda* which concerns senences and is known as *śabdaprāmāṇyavāda*. For unlike the expression "word-meaning", "sentence meaning" in a sense is a manner of speaking; as such it cannot belong to *śaktivāda* which deals with meaning proper, where the concept 'meaning proper' is understood in terms of a special type of relation called *vṛtti or saṃketa or samaya*. Each of these terms is often translated as meaning relation. Most of what have been said above from the point of view of the naiyāyika-s are acceptable to the vaiśeṣika-s also. They too would hold that only the sub-sentential linguistic expressions have meaning in the strict sense of the term, that we know what such an expression means primarily through inference, that when we hear a word

we are reminded of the meaning of it provided we had earlier learned the meaning of it and so on. They would also agree with the naiyāyika-s about the nature of meaning and the criterion to test whether an expression has meaning or what meaning it has. But they would not hold with the naiyāyika-s that a sentence 'meaning' is what we know from that very sentence as our means of knowing. Debate on this issue between the philosophers of the two schools of nyāya and vaiśeṣika is one of the oldest and most familiar debates in the philosophical traditions of India. Yet it can hardly be said to be one of the best understood problems of Indian philosophy. Last seven chapters of *NTLP* are devoted to elucidating Gaṅgeśa's contribution to this debate—its development, clarification and solution; contributions made to this controversy by other scholars down the centuries have also been noted. The second chapter of *NTLP* discussed the first major topic (A) mentioned above. The topic (B) received treatment in chapter three. Chapter one discusses how language as means stands to other means of knowing which have been admitted in the Nyāya school of thought. Some other preliminary matters such as 'What are the various disciplines which study language ?' and 'Whether Gaṅgeśa meant to record that he had performed *maṅgala*?' have also been discussed there.

(A) Gaṅgeśa is the acknowledged founder of the school of modern nyāya or *navyanyāya* . Some of the innovations Gaṅgeśa introduced in the nyāya tradition of thought were anticipated by some of his predecessors like Udayanācārya. But the credit should go to Gaṅgeśa for giving complete shape to navyanyāya. The definition of *śabda* with which his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* begins may, however, lead one to think that Gaṅgeśa was more orthodox and more close a follower of Gautama, the founder of the school of classical nyāya *(prācīnanyāya)*, than any known naiyāyika of the modern period. The standard way in which the modern naiyāyika-s define *śabda* may be found in the writings of the authors like Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma, the author of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* who is often confused with Viśvānath Nyāyapañchānan. (The only scholar known to this author, who in recent times has defended Viśvanatha Nyāyapañcānan's authorship is Pandit Pañchānan Śastri). The feature of Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabda* in question has not been properly noted or studied closely. The best way to tackle this delicate situation is, it seems, to offer the hypothesis that Gaṅgeśa and his followers

have not given us different definitions of the same thing; they rather offered us definitions of two different things. The other more familiar way of tackling such situation is to demonstrate that the two definitions given respectively by Gaṅgeśa and his followers differ only apparently and only in words, materially the definitions are the same. This will be clear if Gaṅgeśa's definition is read slightly differently by adding a little interpretation. To resort to this second line of explanation at the very beginning is not particularly helpful in bringing out if and what special reason Gaṅgeśa had for defining *śabda* in the way he did. Secondly, it is logically or rationally indefensible to change the reading of the text by adding interpretation of one's own unless one had already shown convincingly that there is need for it. Besides the interpreter must be sure that the way he defines the thing is the correct way and also that the other definition left to itself means such and such. Till one knows all these one cannot be sure as to what change is to be made in the reading and what interpretation is to be added. Anyway, without undue eagerness and haste to defend any one of the definitions we sould endeavour to understand the difficulty involved and try the first hypothesis as a better way of tackling the delicate situation in question, at least to begin with.

The situation is this. *Śabda* has been defined differently in classical nyāya (as we find it in, say, Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.7.,) and modern nyāya (as we find in such standard preliminary texts of navyanyāya as *Bhāṣāpariccheeda* and *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*). This should not strike one as anything unusual. On the contrary it is natural that views on otherwise the same subject would change in course of time. Such changes seem rather inevitable if one considers two sharply distinguished and far distant periods of the history of a single tradition. The classical and the modern periods of nyāya are such two periods. A problem has, however, been created in the present case by the fact that Gaṅgeśa is undisputedly among the greatest of navyanaiyāyika-s, but he agrees as much with some naiyāyika-s of the classical period as he differs from some modern nyāya scholars including his own followers. How to understand or view this situation ? Should we say that the navyanaiyāika-s were divided among themselves in the matter ? But there is no textual evidence that Kṛṣṇadāsa wanted to reject or modify the definition given by Gaṅgeśa and offer another better definition in its place. Our hypothesis is that the definitions of Gaṅgeśa and Kṛṣṇadāsa are of two related but

different things. Gaṅgeśa was defining in his definition of *śabda* what Gautama defined in his aphorism 1.1.7. And tradition and modernity in the school of nyāya till at least the time of Gaṅgeśa was not one of antagonism. Gaṅgeśa added many innovative ideas and effective techniques but he did not deviate much from the tenets of classical nyāya in substantive matters. Anyway, Gautama and Gaṅgeśa aimed at defining in their definitions in question what may be called *pramāṇaśabda*. The familiar definitions which the navyanaiyāyika-s offered in similar contexts are of *śabdapramāṇa*. This otherwise plausible solution of the uncomfortable situation immediately gives rise to a few further questions which are not very easy to answer. Perhaps one may find here some justification for favouring the second line of solution of the discrepancy between the accounts of Gaṅgeśa and his followers. But we would still insist on the need for facing a situation honestly and resolutely. One should aim at a deeper solution, even if it is more difficult to find, rather than an easier one. Such an approach is useful even if we finally fail to solve the problem we wanted to solve, provided some genuine problems which we overlooked so far are brought to notice in the process.

Some questions of this type are, "How do we know that Gaṅgeśa did not define *śabdapramāṇa* or that he defined *pramāṇaśabda* ?" and "Why did he do so ?". In answer it cannot be said that Gaṅgeśa wanted to follow Gautama; for the same two questions may be raised about Gautama. Besides, there must be convincing reason why Gaṅgeśa exercised the preference which he allegedly did. Before evidences are presented in favour of the contention that Gaṅgeśa or Gautama did not mean to define either *śabdapramā*, on *śabdapramāṇa* a few terminological points may be clarified. The expression *śabdapramāṇa* is not as ambiguous as the word *pramāṇa* or *pratykṣapramāṇa*. Grammar permits us to understand the word *pramāṇa* as meaning both knowledge and special means or cause of knowledge. The experssion *pratykṣa* or *pratyakṣapramāṇa* has a sort of ambiguity which the English expression "perception" has. The word perception is used to signify both perceptual belief and accredited source of such belief. *Pratykṣapramāṇa* likewise means both *pratykṣa pramā* (perceptual knowledge) and special means of it. In case of *śabda* however, the resulting knowledge is called *śabdapramā* and not *śabdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa*. What is *pramāṇa śabda* ? Well,

whatever else it may be it is *śabda* or linguistic expression of some sort. Therefore to define *śabda* in the sense of *pramāṇaśabda* is to offer definition of certain type of linguistic expression. To define *śabda* in the sense of *śabdapramāṇa* is to define a type of means of knowledge. To be considered a means of knowledge a thing must be instrumental in causing or bringing about some or respective kind of knowledge. A thing which satisfies the definition of *śabda* given by Gaṅgeśa cannot be a cause of the respective variety of knowledge called *śābdapramā*. It is generally agreed by the naiyāyika-s that *śābdapramā* is the knowledge of fact which a competent hearer has when he hears utterances of some familiar language. (For stylistic and other reasons we have rendered "*śābdajñāna*" differently as linguistic belief, sentential belief, verbal belief and so on. We have rendered *śābdapramā* accordingly as linguistic, sentential or verbal knowledge.) But the utterances of a speaker which satisfy Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabda* are temporally more distant from linguistic knowledge (if there happens to result one) than a cause can be allowed to be from its effect on point of theory such as the nyāya theory of causality. *Pramāṇaśabda* cannot therefore be considered to be the same as *śabdapramāṇa*.

Unlike many others Gaṅgeśa noted with due seriousness the fact that Gautama changed his procedure in the middle while defining the *pramāṇa-s*. When Gautama defined the first three *pramāṇa-s* he took "*pramāṇa*" to mean respective type of knowledge or belief. Once that is done there is known procedure of constructing respective *pramāṇa-s*, in the sense of means of knowing, out of definitions of respective types of *pramā*. But when the turn came for definng the last of the four *pramāṇa-s* admitted in the nyāya school Gautama did not define *pramā* or *pramāṇa*. If he wanted to define *śābdapramā* in the way he defined *pratykṣa pramā* he would have said something like "*āptopadeśajanyaṃ jñānaṃ śābda* (*pramā*). That he did not do this is suggestive of some special difficulty. If Gautama's definition of *śabda* could be treated as independent way defining the respective means or source of knowledge then again one could perhaps construct out of it a definition of respective type of knowledge or *pramā* following some obvious and known procedure. But Gaṅgeśa perceived clearly that Gautama's definition of *śabda* could not be taken as an independent definition of *śabdapramāṇa*. How then are we to take Gautama's definition of *śabda*, if it is neither a

definition of *śābdapramā* nor a definition of *śabdapramāṇa*? Gaṅgeśa showed us a way by indicating strongly in his own definition that the definiendum is *pramāṇaśabadaḥ*. Many times he used this expression explicitly and at different places of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. *Pramāṇasábda* is a kind of *śabda* and it is distinct from both *śabdapramāṇa* and *śābdapramā*. *Prāmāṇaśabda* which satisfies the definition of *śabda* as given by Gautama or Gaṅgeśa cannot be the cause of *śābdapramā*. Gaṅgeśa noted as much in his *Pratyakṣacintāmaṇi*. But if it is not a cause of *śabdapramā* it cannot be *śabdapramāṇa*. All these do not quite solve our problem. It is understandable that we cannot easily define *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa* in terms of *śabda*. But why did Gautama or Gaṅgeśa prefer to define *pramāṇaśābda*? They were defining particular *pramāṇa-s* and *pramā-s* one after another following the order in which they were enumerated earlier. Accordingly they should define at a certain stage, *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa* or both. If they did not do this and instead defined *pramāṇaśabda* which is distinct from each of these then they should be accused of committing errors of both commission and omission. In this respect scholars like Kṛṣṇadāsa did the right thing. They explictly defined *śābdapramā* as knowledge resulting from hearer's perception of words (*padajñāna*). This perception of words which as special means causes *śābdapramā* is *śabdapramāṇa*. When such a way out was there why did not Gautama or Gaṅgeśa do what they were most expected to do? We suggest that Gautama and Gaṅgeśa could clearly see that there was no conceivable way of defining *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa* without making reference to the concept of *pramāṇaśabda*. Since, however, the notions of *pramā* or *pramāṇa* have already been explained they needed to explain the word *pramāṇaśābda*. And they exactly did this. Take for example the definition of *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa* we find in *Bhāṣāpariccheda* or *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*. *Śābdapramā* has been defined there as belief (*Jñāna*) caused by the awareness or perception of words (*pada*). But example of liars and deceivers convince us that the belief which an unsuspecting audience derives from the utterences of such persons satisfy the definition just stated and yet the belief is not *pramā* or knowledge; so it is not *śābdapramā* either. Similarly from the side of *pramā*. Even if we have independent way of defining verbal knowledge or *śābdapramā*, we cannot following usual procedure construct the definition of *śabdapramāṇa*. For

it cannot be defined simply as words or sentence which causes *śābdapramā*. First, we may have a piece of true belief from the utterance of a liar or a deceiver provided the latter is, unknown to himself, mistaken. The utterance of the speaker in this case cannot be regarded as *śabdapramāṇa*. Secondly the words of the speaker or his utterance cannot strictly speaking be a cause of hearer's linguistic belief of fact. Only way to defend the sort of definition standard among the navyanaiyāyika-s is, it seems, to interpret the expression awareness of words (*padajñāna*) as awareness of *pramāṇaśabda*. *Śābdapramā* is then a belief which is caused by the perception of such words as are *pramāṇaśabda*. Or from the other side *śabdapramāṇa* is *pramāṇaśabda* being known at the moment or it is perception of such *śabda* in so far as it causes *śābdapramā*. Any student of nyāya may be trusted to have the ability to construe the definition of *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa* if definition of any one of them is given , say, in terms of *pramāṇaśabda*. But for this the sense of the new term, "*pramāṇaśabda*" is to be made clear to him. Some such thought might have led Gautama to exercise his preference in favour of defining *pramāṇaśabda* when he was clearly expected to define *śabdapramāṇa* or *śābdapramā*. Gaṅgeśa did note all this and recorded his deep appreciation of Gautama's profound insight by exercising his own preference in favour of defining *pramāṇaśabda* when he in his turn, was expected to give us his definition of *śabdapramāṇa*. Now we see that if the respective definitional statements, are taken literally as they stand then Gautama's, Gaṅgeśa's or Kṛṣṇadāsa's definition of *śabda* or *śābdapramā* or *śabdapramāṇa*, as the case may be, can be accepted as correct definition of the corresponding subject. The right way to define *śābdapramā* is to define it as knowledge caused by the cognition of *pramāṇaśabda*. Alternatively, *śabdapramāṇa* should be defined as perception of *pramāṇaśabda* in so far as its perception causes *śābdapramā*.

Recognition of the importance of the concept of *pramāṇaśābda* is of far reaching consequence. If we carefully consider the way the concept has been defined by Gautama and Gaṅgeśa it will be clear that through introducing this concept in their account of language the naiyāyika-s acknowledged the need of making reference to speaker and his role in a theory of language and meaning. By opting to follow Gautama in giving due prominence to the concept of *pramāṇaśābda* Gaṅgeśa endorsed

the importance Gautama arguably placed on the role of speaker. Simultaneously he absorbed one good point of the Vaiśeṣika view in the matter. If we contrast the standard view of the Vaiśeṣka-s with the corresponding view of the navyanaiyāyika-s so far at least as this latter view has found expression in the navyanyāya definition of *śabdapramāṇa* stated in standard text books of the subject, we find that navyanyāya omits reference to speaker or minimises the importance of him. But the vaiśeṣika-s have allowed the speaker a place of prominence in their *IA* theory of hearer's knowledge of fact. We now have here a good reason to make natural transition to some of the general issues involved in Gaṅgeśa's treatment of the third major topic (C) noted above. Before, however, we make the actual transition, two points may be mentioned.

If we did not have any obligation to read Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabda* along with Gautama's definition of the same or if it were either unnatural or wrong to relate relevant points of Gaṅgeśa to those of Gautama, then we would have found another more simple justification why Gaṅgeśa prefered to define *pramāṇaśābda*. Soon Gaṅgeśa will engage himself in a dispute with the vaiśeṣika-s over the issue whether or not *śabda* is a (separate, distinctive or independent) *pramāṇa*. Gaṅgeśa would in a sense prejudge the issue or deprive the vaiseṣika-s of an opportunity to raise their point or objection if he started by accepting *śabdapramāṇa*, even by implication. But *pramāṇaśabda* is something which is commonly accepted by both these schools. To put it otherwise, *pramāṇaśabda* is that part of the concept of *śabdapramāṇa* which is accepted by both the naiyāyika-s and the vaiśeṣika-s. This would be quite a good reason for Gaṅgeśa to begin his discussion with the definition of *śabda* rather than *śabdapramāṇa*. The second point to note is that if one takes seriously the difference between what is usually viewed as Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabdapramanāṇa* and the standard definition of the naiyāyika-s of the post Gaṅgeśa or modern period of the history of nyāya then one realises how the relevant standard definition as it is usually stated in the standard text books of navyanyāya should be read and understood. Besides one will find some reason why Gautama suddenly changed his procedure after defining *pratykṣa anumāna* and *upamāna*, and prefered to define *pramāṇaśabda* rather than *śabdapramāṇa*. Again one will find how by endorsing the importance of the role of speaker one can bring out some common core of the views

about language of the philosophers of the classical period of both nyāya and vaiśeṣika schools. These philosophers believed that reference to speaker is essential in any adequate theory of *śabdapramāṇa* . Recognition of this point is not so apparent in the wiritings of the naiyāyika-s of the post-Gaṅgeśa modern period. One indication that they did not take the right cue from Gaṅgeśa's work to give their own discussion on *śabdapramāṇa* a speaker prominent orientation is that unlike Gaṅgeśa they did not seriously or elaborately discussed such non-standard utterances as those of a deceiver, a mistaken deceiver, a talking bird and the like.

It is important to distinguish in epistemology between knowledge of meaning and the knowledge of fact which a hearer obtains, at least sometimes, on hearing some meaningful linguistic utterance. When meaning is considered as an item of knowledge and a part of the furniture of the universe, its knowledge presents us with no special problem. Explanation of if needs no new principle to be postulatd. We can infer what a word means and afterwards whenever we hear that word we are reminded of what we earlier learned to be its meaning. Inference and memory are among the standard sources of belief or knowledge. But the belief about fact a hearer qua hearer comes to have at times is not, according to the naiyāyika-s, a case of perception, inference, or memory. It requires new explanation in terms of some new means of knowing; it involves some new principles too. It may be thought that the two states of perception and memory— perception of words of the sentence in question and the consequent episode of memory of the things which are the meanings of the words— which necessarily precede it are sufficient to account for the knowledge of fact in question. One gets this impression or gets one's impression confirmed, provided one already has it, if one notes the way the naiyāyika-s of the post Gaṅgeśa period usually define linguistic knowledge of fact and linguistic means of such knowledge. But Gautama and Gaṅgeśa realised that perception of any and every word does not necessarily result in the sort of knowledge of the hearer in question. To have such knowledge a hearer must hear *pramāṇaśabda*. This was a new concept in epistemology which needed to be mentioned explicitly and separately; it was also to be analysed or defined. Gautama's statement "*āptopadeśah śabdaḥ*" or Gaṅgeśa's statement "*prayogahetubhūtārthatattvajñāna janya śadbạ pramāṇam*" are

not strictly speaking definitions of linguistic means or, what is the same thing, the special cause of hearer's knowledge of fact. What they define is however an important constituent of the notion of linguistic means considered as perception of *pramāṇaśabda*. The other constituent, perception, however, is no new concept. Even perception of *pramāṇaśābda* is in no important way different as perception from perception of say colour or *apramāṇaśabda*. On the other hand any perception or perception of mere words (*śabda*) cannot ensure that the hearer would have knowledge of fact. Though not sufficient, perception of *pramāṇaśabda* is a necessary condition of hearer's knowledge. Gaṅgeśa's account of *pramāṇaśabda* differs from the account given by Gautama. Gaṅgeśa replaces "*upadeśa*" by plain "*śabdaḥ*"; he also selects only certain theoretical virtue of an *āpta* leaving out some other practical or moral virtues of the latter, for purposes of defining *pramāṇaśabda*. But both of them clearly recognise that what distinguishes *pramāṇaśābda* from other kind of *śabda* is not any feature which directly belongs to *śabda*. Nor is it anything that has to do with the linguistic competence of the hearer. It is distinguished by certain qualities of the utterer or preformer of speech. Depending on who utters it and where, tokens of the same sentence may or may not count as *pramāṇaśabda*. In this way introduction of the notion of *pramāṇaśabda* gives a speaker-prominent-oriention to *śabdaprāmāṇayavāda* or epistemological discussion of language. Absence of explicit reference to this notion in the writings and discussions by the naiyāyika-s of modern and contemporary period is, unless it is otherwise motivated, likely to impoverish the nyāya theory of language by depriving it of the richness and depth which this important notion brings with it.

The way we have reconstructed and further developed the nyāya theory of language brings out in a clearer way the bearing of the theory of *śabdapramāṇa* or epistemology of language on the theory of *śakti* or meaning; it thereby effects a deeper and natural integration between the two major divisions of the nyāya theory of language or *śabda*. We have been able to discover some new dimension in the centuries old debate between the two sister systems—Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika—of Indian realism. This has enabled us to reformulate the relevant problematic more sharply. No longer the old debate appears as pointless or unintelligible. We now see the problem in a new perspective. How to resolve

the tension which tends to develop between an epistemology of hearer's knowledge of fact which commits itself to giving due importance to speaker's point of view and a realist theory of language which commits itself to preserving linguistic creativity, autonomy of language and autonomy and objectivity of linguistic meaning. We also found ourselves to be in a position to suggest a line of solution which is new but consistent with the established tradition of nyāya. Such effective reconstruction could not be possible if the greatest among the philosophers of the nyāya school did not notice these points or did not leave behind in their writings important and insightful cues. Among the important cues we discovered are the change Gautama and Gaṅgeśa introduced in their procedure of defining *pramāṇa-s* when they came to define *śabdapramāna*; introduction by them of the notion of *pramāṇaśābda* which is indicative, according to us, of their desire to give due importance to the speaker-prominent-orientation; a peceptive and different use of the factor of intention by Gaṅgeśa for the first time in his own formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I and simultaneous recognition by him of linguistic creativity. I shall elaborate a little on some of these more general analytical points in relation to the third major topic covered by Gaṅgeśa in the portion of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* which comes indirectly within the purview of the present work of ours.

(C) There are philosophers who lay great stress on studying language, at least the communicative use of it, from the side of the speaker; some among them hold explicitly that the unit of linguistic communication is linguistic act which the speaker performs in such communication. One representative passage from recent literature may be reporduced below with minor change.

We can understand why it is of interest and importance in philosophy of language to study speech acts or, as they are sometimes called linguistic acts. I think it is essential to any specimen of linguistic communication that it involves a linguistic act. It is not as has generally been supposed the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act which constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. To put the point more precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain specifiable conditions is the ...minimal unit of linguistic

communication.

In every standard case of communicative use of language or performance of appropriate linguistic act, information or knowledge transmission takes place. Similarly from the side of the hearer, whenever in standard situation, there occurs an episodic state of what we have been describing as hearer's knowledge of fact there precedes an event of linguistic performance by the speaker consisting in his producing or uttering one or more sentence token. Most important part of the meaning of the concept of linguistic act is the intention of the speaker. Those who hold this tend to view knowledge of a hearer as latter's normal response elicited by the successful performance of certain appropriate and intentional speech act by the speaker. Alternatively it is viewed as the response of the audience which mainfests latter's recognition of the intention of the speaker. Some philosophers become apprehensive at this stage. It seems to them that the full objectivity of the information transmitted or, if one likes, full objectivity of the linguistic meaning may be jeopardised if things are viewed from the side of the speaker. Those epistemologists like the naiyāyika-s who would insist on the autonomy of linguistic means (*anantarabhāvavādin*-s or *svātantryavādin*-s in respect of *śabdapramāṇa*) and those semanticists who insist on autonomy of linguistic meaning seem to do so in their bid to preserve the objectivity respectively of hearer's knowledge of fact and linguistic meaning. They shy away from making reference to speaker, to his belief and intention. Reference to psychological states of the speaker and to intensional factors seem, however, necessary for preserving the rationality of linguistic act and, in case of the majority of Indian philosophers, truth of many of the beliefs about facts which a man obtains as hearer. This is how one can view the on going Homeric struggle in the contemporary Western philosophy of language between the communication-intention theorists and the formal semanticists and also the age old controversy in Indian philosophy between the naiyāyika-s and the vaiśeṣika-s. Important differences are not to be overlooked. Whereas objectivity or *vastutantratā* (of experience) is common concern of the realists of different cultures, anti-psychologism of the philosophy of language of the formal semanticists of contemporary West is conspicuous by its absence among the Indian realists in general and the naiyāyika-s in particular. Again though the concept of rationality of linguistic act

involves, in both the cultures, reference to speaker, to his intention and belief, yet reference to speaker with a view to explain the truth of hearer's belief about fact is something more widely familiar among the philosophers of India. Anyway, the fact remains that the naiyāyika-s are as much concerned as the vaiśeṣika-s to preserve the rational character of linguistic act and communicative use of language. In other words they view speech production as *prekṣāvat puruṣa praoyjanasādhanvyāpāra viśeṣa*. The *prayojana* is also in most cases specifiable as *bubodhyiṣā*. From the side of the hearer speech reception is in standard cases equaly purposive and the general purpose is attainment of truth or removal of doubt. Again the realists of both these schools will agree that where the hearer's belief is true and is not accidentally so (not *kākatāliya* or *samvāda mātra*), the source is the speaker and the quality of the speaker. But the vaiśeṣika-s go further, and here the naiyāyika-s part company with them. The vaiśeṣika-s not only hold that what a speaker says he says on the basis of his current and background belief and his current intention and purpose, they further hold that a hearer comes to believe a certain fact on hearing a sentence because he knows that the speaker spoke on the basis of a belief about the same fact. To be more pracise a hearer first comes to entertain, on hearing a certain sentence, some belief about the state of mind of the speaker at the time the latter uttered the sentence. And if ever at all the hearer comes to acquire any belief about certain fact it must be due to the reason that that fact formed the content of the belief of the speaker which the hearer comes to know in the first place. No fact is known independently but only as content of some belief of the speaker. Language is our means of knowing, in the first instance, some other mind. The naiyāyika-s do not think that such a view is a necessary consequence of one's giving due importance to speaker's role and making reference to speaker's belief and intention. Whether this is really so or not is the deeper issue which kept the philosophers of these two sister schools ever separated from one another. This important point, howerver, did not quite surface in the discussion one finds recorded in the extant literature of these schools.

It may be suggested that the naiyāyika-s may contribute positively towards the solution of this problem by offering further analysis of the concept of linguistic performance. From the speaker's side linguistic performance consists in his producing

speech on purpose. A speaker primarily intends to communicate certain information or issue certain instruction. This in its turn makes him intend to produce suitable utterance. He takes necessary measure and produces certain sentence token. The causal efficacy of a particular intention is exhausted once a particular sentence token, appropriate for the occasion, is produced. The same efficacy of the same act of intention does not extend farther beyond to determine the form, content or production of the belief of the hearer which is eventually produced. Once a sentence token has been produced all competent hearers placed in similar situation will derive the same information from it irrespective of who the speaker was or what had been his intention. (If however they happen to have any of these information then that will determine if they will have any belief). A sincere speaker and a mistaken deciever may utter two tokens of the same sentence and obviously with different intentions. The beliefs which will be produced are the same. Again the result would be similar if the deceiver was not mistaken but the hearer was ignorant about former's intention to decive. These instances show that , once beliefs are produced, intention of the speaker has no determining role so for as the form and content of the resulting belief are concerned. It may seem that there is one exception. The intention of a speaker can affect the import of a sentence through affecting the sense of some sub-sentence part of it. If he uses some constituent word of a sentence in a secondary and indirect significance rather than in their primary and usual sense then the the sentence will produce different belief. Here there is no scope to discuss the relevant important topic of the theory of meaning or *padaśakti*. It may suffice for our present purpose to say that the recognition of secondary meaning or *lakṣaṇā* should not be allowed to destroy the objective, scientific and rigourous character of the structure of our language or theory of meaning. Secondly, in case of *lakṣaṇā* we ascribe to the speaker a propositional attitude with some specific content only after we have decided on a particular line of making objective sense of the utterance in question . In the third place so long one can make sense of an utterance it matters little for the cognitive content of the utterance whether the speaker uttered the sentence in that sense or not. The speaker will also forfeit his credibility as a competent speaker of the language if he testifies to having used the expression in some sense which is different from every single objective sense

of a reasonably wide range of alternative senses.

To return to our point, I have discussed elsewhere in detail if and how far the suggested separation between linguistic act of speech production on the one hand and acts of speech reception and linguistic belief on the other or, in other words, between speaker's act of utterance and hearer's act of linguistic belief can preserve both the autonomy of language as means of knowing and the rationality of linguistic communication. In many places in the nyāya literature in general and in *Śabdacintāmani* of Gaṅgeśa in particular cues are there following which this further faithful and positive development of Nyāya theory of language and meaning has been possible. This is a development more in respect of details and perspective. Once formulated explicitly this nyāya theory of linguistic performance is found to differ in important respects both from their theory of *śabdapramāna* and theory of *śabdaśakti*. The theory of linguistic performance views language not merely or primarily as an item of knowledge, as what we know, but as something which we use or with which we perform. We produce language or sentence tokens on purpose and we receive them on purpose. Both the hearer and speaker perform linguistically in the context of linguistic communication. This phenomenon of linguistic performance as distinct from what the linguists call linguistic competence appears more interesting and important from philosophical point of view. But the predominant pragmatic and practical (rational) concern of theory of linguistic performance should not be allowed to interfere with the truth and objectivity of experience and autonomy of linguistic meaning. The importance and difficulty of the problem of reconciling the theories of *pramāṇaśabda*, *śabdapramāṇa* and *śabdaśakti* (theories of, roughly speaking, rationality of speech production, linguistic knowledge of fact, and linguistic meaning) seem to have been the abiding concern of both the naiyāyika-s and the vaiśeṣika-s all through.

If by introducing the concept of *pramāṇaśabda* the naiyāyika-s have highlighted the importance of the role of the speaker which they admit then by advancing their inferential apprehension theory or *IA* theory of linguistic knowledge of fact the vaiśeṣika-s have given a speaker-prominent orientation to their own approach to the study of language. There is therefore a deeper agreement between these two schools of Indian realism in respect of their views about language. But though the concept of *pramāṇaśabda*

is quite acceptable to the vaiśeṣika-s the way they have used it to construct their *IA* theory of linguistic knowledge of fact of the hearer is unacceptable to the naiyāyika-s. *IA* theory cannot permit the hearer to have the knowledge which everybody admits he has and argument also says he has. This negative point of the naiyāyika-s against the vaiśeṣika-s is more widely known. But a naiyāyika must come up with a positive statement about how much of linguistic act is affected or determined by the intention of the speaker and how much of it remains unaffected. We have endeavoured to meet this demand in *The Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance* and elsewhere. According to the naiyāyika-s linguistic performance is primarily to be viewed as theoretical use of language the goal of which is knowledge of fact. One unit of a complete use of language for this purpose has two moments in it which are in fact two acts related non-mechanically causally. Relation of mechanical causation may obtain between two mental events if the existence or production of the prior event can cause the succeeding event without requiring to be itself known. Under suitable condition one would make appropriate move to collect a piece of silver if he happend to have entertained shortly before a belief to the effect that there is a piece of silver. He does not need to know his belief. But the fact that he has this belief will not suffice if he is to describe that cognitive state; for that he must not only have the belief to be described he must also know that belief. It is this latter act through which the former act determines the description.

An event e_1 is mechanically causally related to another event e_2 if and only if there does not intervene between the occurrences of e_1 and e_2 a belief which takes e_1 for its object. If however e_1 cannot produce e_2 except through a belief about itself (i.e.,e_1) then the causal relation involed is non-mechanical causal relation. In our instance a sentence token s_1 cannot yield knowledge of fact or R^* unless it is mediated through an act of awereness of s_1. This act of awereness is owned by the audience. Thus in one complete act of use of language or sentence token there are two major moments. The first is the production of the sentence token and the last is the occurrence of hearer's belief of appropriate fact or R^*. These two sub-acts are non-mechanically causally related. Viewed as one single unit of an internally complex act, it is initiated by the speaker when there occured in him the appropriate intention which covers the entire stretch of the act

in question. But his intention determines directly the production of the sentence token in question or his uttering the sentence token. By direct determination we mean the occurrence of appropriate desire or intention causes mechanically the act called production of the sentence token; there does not intervene any other act of consciousness in between. An utterance, however has to be known by the audience, who is normally but not necessarily different from the utterer, if there is to occur in him appropriate belief with the intention to produce which the speaker initiated the linguistic act in question. Thus the production of the sentence token is non-mechanically causally related to the occurrence of the event called the belief about some appropriate fact of the audience. Unless there is a hindrance the utterance of the speaker will directly and mechanically causally determine the production of an awereness of this utterance itself in the hearer. This awereness in its turn mechanically causes memory of the meanings of the words which the hearer heard just now and the meanings of which he must have learned previously. The awereness of the sentence token and memory of the meanings of these words then combine to produce mechanically causally the belief of fact in the hearer. This being the picture, a linguistic act or communicative use of language is purposive and conscious. But the appropriate intention of the speaker and his relevant belief determine the form and cognitive content of only the sentence token besides determining its production. But once a token is produced it can non-mechanically causally determine the production of the act of belief of the hearer. Since it is an instance of non-mechanical causation there does intervene a state of cognition. But there does not occur any state of desire or intention which could otherewise determine the occurrence of the belief of the hearer. In other words what the hearer comes to know is not determined by his desire or intention. He knows no more and no less than what the words or the sentence token says; nor can hearers know different things if they happen to have different intentions. The naiyāyika-s introduce a concept to highlight this feature of objectivity of hearer's knowledge. They say the knowledge one derives from a sentence is *niyantritārtha*. This feature of the knowledge to be derived from an utterance leaves no scope for the hearer to add to or subtract from the objective cognitive content of a sentence token. Given the same fact we can percive it as 'There is a book on the table' or as 'The table is under the book'. To change the

example, we can describe the same brute fact in either of these two ways: "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" or "The Rubicon was crossed by Caesar". But unless the process of linguistic act of assertion as described above is interfered with, rendering the act epistemologically unreliable, no two information can be obtained from a single utterance by two hearers having the same level of adequate linguistic competence. Once the meaning of the sub-sentential part of the sentence token is fixed on any given occasion of the utterance of a sentence token, the absolute objective content and form of the belief a hearer can have gets determined. It is imaginable that there would not occur any belief at all should there appear special hindrance; but if a belief is at all produced then the content and form are absolutely predictable on the nyāya theory of linguistic performance. How we solve the problem of meaning at the sub-sentence level is another matter which forms part of *śaktivāda*. But so far as their theory of *śābdapramāṇa* is concerned to view it as theory of linguistic performance as described above is to solve the deeper issue which really kept the philosophers of the nyāya and the vaiśeṣika schools separated for centuries.

We can have solution in the theory of linguistic performance because this theory effectively combines the rational character of our linguistic behaviour and objectivity of information transmitted through language as well as full objectivity and autonomy of linguistic meaning. Shyness of the formal semanticists particularly of those who are behaviourists towards factors like intention tend to do injustice to the rational character of our linguistic behaviour. On the other hand non-judicious use of this factor may interfere with the autonomy of language. By autonomy we mean that it is its own virtue or capacity (*svamahimā*) which enables a sentence token to produce appropriate belief in the hearer. Autonomy or independence of language as means of knowledge cannot be fully preserved if intention plays any determining role in the matter of what information one would have from hearing a sentence token. Intention cannot be made to determine the form or content of the belief of the hearer. A hearer understands by a sentence what exactly the sentence says. To put it differently, a sentence does not have any meaning which left to itself it will not reveal to all the competent users of the language. This is a bold step against any form of mysticism to resist which a realist is as much committed as he is committed to preserve

objectivity of meaning and information.

We return to Gaṅgeśa's negative contribution in the portion of *Śabdacintāmani* with which the present work is concerned. Gaṅgeśa offered (or explicitly formulated it if it was latent in the nyāya theory of philosophy of language all through its development over centuries) in connection with his final rejection of vaiśeṣika reductionism, so far as it is based on such argument as vaiśeṣika Inference-I, a new test for any successful theory of hearer's knowledge of fact. Every such theory, the test demands, should be able to ensure that a hearer dervies such belief about fact which can guide him in conducting his practical life. In other words the hearer must obtain a belief which can causally determine his subsequent practical behaviour.The idea is that a hearer not only has knowledge or information from the utterances of others, he also makes use of it; he acts on it. It is therefore natural and quite intuitive to hold that the knowledge of fact a hearer has when he hears a sentence is of a sort which one needs in order to make the appropriate practical move. Our life testifies to the fact that there obtains near perfect integration and harmony between our theoretical life and practical life, between our beliefs which theoretically appropriate the world around us and actions which are our means for appropriating the world practically. The vaiśeṣika reductionism and the vaiśeṣika Inference-I permit, according to Gaṅgeśa, a hearer to have belief of a form which cannot issue in action; or if we admit that the hearer does act on the belief he obtains then his belief could be what we all experience it to be. This constitutes more important and more substantial failure of vaiśeṣika reductionism than the failure to construct the inference which a hearer allegedly resorts to regularly, in such a way that the inference is not vitiated by any technical logical flaw. Failure on this last count was earlier demonstrated by Udayanācarya.

Contents

ONE

Preliminaries

I

Language is a multi-dimensional subject. Various disciplines have been developed to study the different aspects of it. These disciplines or the orientations from which they study the same phenomenon of language have not always been kept separate, at least in practice.[1] Philosophy of language as a separate discipline is a contemporary phenomenon in British and American philosophy. Except for its concern with language the boundary of this branch of knowledge is anything but clear or definite. Sometimes descriptive metaphysics and study of language have been identified.[2] But even when the two have not been identified it is believed that philosophy of language is that study of language which is relevant in some special and important way for philosophy. The other disciplines like grammar and linguistics, particularly when taken in a narrower sense, do not, however, conduct equally useful study of language-useful, that is, for the philosophers and philosophy. But when it is understood broadly so as to include descriptive linguistics, psycho-linguistics or socio-linguistics, one finds the study of language conducted by the linguists to be philosophically most relevant. It is often thought that with the development of these specialised branches of linguistics, philosophy of language is facing the problem of losing much of its subject matter.[3] This is something comparable to what happened to philosophy in general as and when the different

special sciences established themselves as independent branches of knowledge. It is not a place to discuss the difficulty of demarcating the boundary of philosophy of language. It can, however, be safely said that semantic concern or concern with meaning is the heart of philosophy of language. But under the cover of this general description there are different concerns with meaning felt by the formal semanticists or truth theorists of meaning on the one hand and the communication-intention theorists on the other; concern is also felt for different languages— scientific or ordinary, constructed or natural. It seems that a philosopher's concern with language can somehow be distinguished from the concern which a philosopher of language feels. A philosopher who does philosophy of language for the relevance and use the latter has for philosophy, tends to view language more as a medium of thought and concentrates more on the theory of reference. But one who is first and foremost a philosopher of language seems to take language as a vehicle of communication and concentrates mainly on the theory of meaning. A philosopher or more particularly an ontologist cannot but emphasise the question of anchorage of language in the facts of experience. This anchorage is through reference. So from this point of view the division of language into referring and non-referring parts or expressions and a theory of reference receive if not exclusive, at least, greater attention. Which expressions are to count as referring expressions is, however, decided in terms of prior commitment to certain ontology or elegance and rigour of the logic or the language to be used. But sentences are almost never counted among referring expressions. While referring involves use of names and name-like expressions, communication is carried on almost entirely through sentences. For concrete linguistic act or performance involved in communication, analysis of a sentence into words or still smaller parts seems unnecessary. It is necessary, however, that there should be a speaker and a hearer, some expressible belief and decidable intention and so on. The concepts of belief, understanding, proposition, meaning etc. are intensional concepts which tend to, to say the least, destroy the elegance of logic. Whatever that may be, it is from the point of view of communication that sentence and sentence sense receive greater attention or emphasis. If still

the reference theorists or philosophers studying language are found to emphasize or study with equal importance sentences and grant primacy to them, then that is perhaps due to their interest in truth. Though nothing short of a sentence or something admitting linguistic representation in a sentence can be true, it is not clear if and how far truth is necessary for communication. We cannot communicate by using sentences that are contradictory, but it does not seem to be necessary that a sentence must be true or must be known to be so if we are to communicate anything through it. One's ontology is fixed not by the isolated names one may list but by the names occurring in true assertions. In fact there is hardly any way of finding names in actual use (as names) except in the context of sentences. Language is anchored to reality or world through the referring expressions occurring in the true sentences of it. Thus while a body of true sentences connected properly constitute a theory, the totality of things which correspond to the referring expressions occurring in these sentences constitute the ontology relative to that theory. So a large number of thinkers who study language for its relevance for ontology turn their attention to the problem or theory of truth.

Though even false sentences can carry information yet every serious and sincere act of communication involves assertion of true sentences as a means of conveying correct information to the minimally competent hearer. Still the theory of truth which is the meeting point of ontology on the one hand and logic and theory of language on the other, receives special attention from the contemporary ontologists and philosophers of language. They, unlike the philosophers merely studying, among other things, language, are primarily interested in the structure and function of language for whatever relevance these might have for ontology. Philosophers of language may and do draw on the results of the grammarian's and the structural linguist's study of language. But they are interested in the phenomenon of communication. What we convey when we communicate is the content of the intensional states of belief, desire, hope etc. Such content is almost always (propositional) meaning. We utter true sentences but express true or correct belief, hope, desire and so on; we not only express intensions but also betray intentions. So information in the context

of communication is more than what can be captured by the notion of truth or truth-condition.

The special motivation of fixing ontology has not been shared by philosophers of all times and all places who studied, among other things, language. Those who share this motivation may be called linguistic philosopher in a strong sense;[4] others are just philosophers studying language. This is all very rough and sketchy. What I want to draw attention to is the difference between the study of language which a philosopher *incidentally* undertakes with or without the said motivation and philosophy of language on the one hand and–any one of these and–grammar or linguistics on the other. The Nyāya treatment of language to be presented here forms a part of Nyāya philosophy of language in so far as we mean by this expression just philosopher's treatment of language as an item of the furniture of the universe but not with the special ontological motivation. Philosophy of language is in this sense just philosophy (*darśana*) in the usual sense of the term. It is to be distinguished from another discipline which may be called grammar as philosophy (*vyākaraṇadarśana*). This last again is to be distinguished both from grammar and linguistics on the one hand and philosophy of grammar on the other. There are in India as many philosophies of language in the sense just described, that is, that part of general philosophy which deals with language, as there are schools of Indian philosophy. Some of these schools are Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha and Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsā school is again divided into two groups respectively of Prabhākara and his followers and Kumārila and his followers.

Indian philosophies of language, at least, the Nyāya philosophy of language presupposes but does not itself undertake the structural grammatical analysis of language. It is more concerned with the functional and communicative aspect of language where meaning plays a central role. Though a sort of distinction between reference and sense at the level of words can be attributed to the Naiyāyika-s yet division of expressions, mentioned above, into referring and non-referring ones is not very familiar to them. They do not share the motivation of the empiricist ontologists or the empiricist logicists. They, however, distinguish meaningful expressions, in the sense of bearing meaning relation (*vṛtti* i.e. *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*) to

extra-linguistic things (or, what is almost the same thing, having extra-linguistic things as meaning) from those expressions that are not meaningful in this sense of the term. This distinction corresponds not very roughly to the distinction between word (*pada*) and sentence (*vākya*). We utter or write sentences to communicate our thought (linguistically). But we could not do this unless we had, and knew that we had, the belief etc. to be expressed and also knew the language through which to express the same. Each of these cognitions of the speaker should be capable of being derived from sources other than language. We need not be the hearer of the same sentence we utter. But for communication to be possible there must be a hearer who does or can derive the information the speaker intends to impart, from the utterance of the latter. For this the hearer must not only hear what the speaker says but must also have known earlier the meaning of the *words* the speaker uses. Thus on the hearer's side communication consists in hearing what the speaker says and understanding the utterance of the speaker. Understanding of the sentence uttered by the speaker is to be distinguished from knowing the meaning of the words on which the understanding in question depends. Among the things discussed by any Indian philosophy of language are words, knowledge of words, word meaning, knowledge of word meaning, sentence, sentence 'meaning', knowledge of sentence and knowledge of sentence meaning. Knowledge of the meaning of a word or sentence we have when we hear them is to be distinguished from the knowledge of what a word or sentence is. The knowledge of this latter kind belongs more properly to grammar or linguistics (except perhaps where a philosopher cannot accept their verdict).[5]

The study of language which forms a part of philosophy in general is so far a study of language as means of communication or source of information. Where the information derived is true the source can be counted among the accredited sources of knowledge or *pramāṇa*-s. Language as an accredited source or special means of knowledge yields correct information for the hearer; and the hearer's knowledge in this case consists in his understanding the sentence or sentences uttered by a speaker. Philosophy in general or, as we understand it here in India, that is, *darśana* is the study of those special kinds of object the knowledge of which is needed

if one is to know the true nature of one's own self. This latter knowledge, and for that matter the knowledge of the special objects in question, also called *prameya,* secures final release from the necessity of suffering rebirths which is believed to be rooted, in case of every individual, in the false belief about his or her own self. Anyway, philosophy discusses both *prameya*-s and *pramāṇa*-s; the latter are the means or methods through which the *prameya*-s can be rightly known. In short, philosophy or *darśana* is the study of ontological or axiological categories of things and the accredited sources of knowledge.[6] Now in so far as *śabda* or language is an accredited source of knowledge according to them, the Naiyāyikā-s in their capacity as philosopher in general (and not particularly philosopher of language in the narrower sense) study language. But so far they study the nature, definition (*svarupa* and *lakṣaṇa*) and conditions (*kāraṇa* and *prayojaka*) of hearer's linguistic understanding. They also study the question about the nature and condition of the truth (*prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge which a hearer derives from the utterances of a speaker. Similarly they study the nature, definition and evidentiary character (also called *prāmāṇya*) of the (linguistic) means or the utterance of the speaker itself from which the hearer derives his belief in question. Since among the conditions of hearer's understanding of a sentence, his cognitions of word (*pada*), word meaning (*padārtha*) and the meaning relation (*vṛitti*) are involved, these topics are also discussed. But language comes within the scope of general philosophy in another way also. Philosophy aims at a categorial analysis of the world. It offers a scheme of categories (in the wider ontological and not only in the narrower axiological sense) and allocates to them in a general way all the important types of things that are there. In the comprehensive scheme of categories language must find a place as an item of the world. In fact the Naiyāyikā-s maintain that language is, categorially speaking, a type of quality (*guṇa*). They further inquire about the substance of which language or, more precisely, verbal sound called *varṇa* (alphabetical sound), the ultimate constituent of *pada* (word) and *vākya* (sentence), is a quality. Series of other questions are also discussed: What sort of a quality is verbal sound? Is it mutable or destructible? Is it immutable or eternal? Is it a sensible quality? Is it apprehended

in external perception? How is it produced and perceived?

Language is therefore studied in philosophy under either of its two aspects of being a means of knowledge (*pramāṇatvena*) or being a kind of knowable thing or ontological category (*prameyatvena*). Grammar and linguistics as also grammar as philosophy and philosophy of grammar study language primarily in its aspect of being language (*śabdatvena*).[7] Grammar roughly is a system of rules of constructing linguistic expressions such that we can define in terms of these rules grammaticality or otherwise of them.[8] But grammar concentrates more on the question of grammaticality of word (*pada-sādhutva*) rather than the syntactic or semantic well-formedness of sentences. Gaṅgeśa has noted an apparent circularity in this grammatical account of grammaticality or *padasādhutva.*[9] The study of grammar including phonology (*śikṣā*) and etymology (*nirukta*) has a very long history in India. It was developed as a pre-requisite for the study of the veda-s. The Paninian system of grammar is placed in the seventh century B.C. Maxmüller placed Pāṇini much later on the dubious assumption that he was a contemporary of Kātyayana. Anyway, the system of Sanskrita grammar did not begin even with Pānini. For he himself has named at least nine to eleven of his predecessors in the field who must have contributed substantially to the literature on grammar.[10] A very vast literature in India goes by the name of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*). Sometimes this literature includes studies like etymology (*nirukta*) and phonology (*śikṣā*). Some of the works falling within the corpus of grammatical literature deal more with the techniques of constructing grammatical expressions and can be regarded as formal or technical grammar (*prakṛiyāvyākaraṇa*)[11] to distinguish them from philosophical grammar or philosophy of grammar (*darśana* of *vyākaraṇa*).[12] If grammar is a system of rules often couched in technical language the latter type of works include speculations on and explanation of many of the notions of technical grammar. To give just one example, it suffices for a technical language to define a *pada* (word) as an expression having declensional or conjugational suffix as the case may be.[13] But the kind of speculation on the nature of *śabda* with which the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali begins is a fine example of philosophical grammar. Again the corpus of grammatical literature, taking

grammar in the broad sense, include works that can more properly be called philosophy of language with its emphasis on the semantics and pragmatics of linguistic expressions on the one hand and on the other linguistic performance consisting in the use of language in speaking and understanding linguistic utterances.[14] *Śaktivāda* or theory of word-meaning and *vākyārtha-vada* or theory of sentential understanding are cases in point. Both philosophical grammar and philosophy of language should be distinguished from ontology of language or of sound in the sense of verbal sound (*śabda*).[15] The type of work we call here grammar as philosophy is philosophy of the grammarians. Just as the Naiyāyika-s or the Mīmāṃsaka-s are philosophers who form a group so also the grammarians are a group of philosophers having their own philosophy. They claim that the study of their philosophy will independently or in a more or less direct way enable men to achieve liberation. In such work the phenomenon of language or, what it basically is, verbal sound, is not studied simply as a certain item of ontology (or as *śabda*) or simply as bearer of meaning but as the fundamental principle of reality which is at the same time the stuff from where the world as a whole has emerged.On this view the proper understanding of the nature of *śabda*, being the realisation of the ultimate reality, ensures metaphysical freedom.[16] *Śabda-Brahma vāda* or something like it explained or examined by Bhartṛhari and others can be properly regarded as grammar taken as philosophy. We may call it *vyākaraṇadarśanam* in the sense *darśana* (philosophy) of the vaiyākaraṇā-s (or gramnmarians).

All this is again rough and sketchy but we have no scope here for anything better. These preliminaries will however, it is hoped, tell the readers what is to expect from the present work devoted to the discussion of some aspect of Nyāya philosophy of language to be found in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* We shall discuss Gaṅgeśa's *vākyāratha-vāda* or his discussion on *śabdapramāṇa* i.e., language as an accredited source of knowledge causing hearer's understanding of linguistic utterances.

II

Śabda, according to the Naiyāyikā-s, is the last of the four

pramāṇā-s or accredited sources of knowledge that are there. The other three sources in the order in which they have been enumerated by Gautama—the founder of the Nyāya school of Indian Philosophy—and for good reasons, are *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *upamāna* (analogy).[17] There is no other school of Indian philosophy which admits just four or exactly these four as accredited sources of knowledge. There are indeed schools where some or all of these sources are admitted. But the philosophers of even these schools do not always accept the account of these sources—of their nature, definition and so on—given by the Naiyāyikā-s. After Vātsyāyana (and Udayana) Gaṅgeśa undertook in his book *Tattvacintāmaṇi* the task of defending and developing the Nyāya theory of the four accrediated sources of knowledge in question. He devoted the four parts or chapters of his book to the discussion of these four sources taken in the order of enumeration; these parts are accordingly known as *Pratyakṣacintāmaṇi, Anumānacintāmaṇi, Upamānacintāmaṇi* and *Śabdacintāmaṇi.* We are concerned with some of the themes discussed by the philosophers of India about the fourth accredited source. Or, more particularly, we shall discuss how the Naiyāyikā-s defended or developed some of the various aspects of their theory of language and reacted to the relevant rival views of the philosophers of many of the other schools of Indian philosophy including the Bauddha, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā. In the fourth part of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* the Nyāya philosophy of language has been stated in its most developed and well-argued form. But though the originality of his treatment is unquestionable yet Gaṅgeśa must have derived much of the substance and many of the arguments and insights from the very comprehensive treatment of the subject by the earlier Naiyāyikā-s. Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, independently, it seems, gave the Nyāya views in the matter the shape of a full fledged theory of language. The exact time of Jayanta or how he is chronologically related to Vācaspati has not been established conclusively. But both of them preceded Udayana to whom Gaṅgeśa's debt is perhaps the greatest and immediate.

The Naiyāyika-s not only admit *śabda* as one of the four accredited sources of knowledge but also as the fourth of these

sources. A clear and explicit assertion to this effect (such as *śabda* is the fourth) is not easily found in the works of the great Naiyāyika-s. As a matter of practice they discuss *śabda* after *upamāna*. Though any one can see for oneself such arrangement by looking at the appropriate books yet sometimes the authors of these books begin their work or introduce the treatment of *śabda* by (uttering) writing a sentence like "now *śabda* is being discussed". The first sentence, of the (single sentence) first passage,[18] of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* marked here as $\acute{S}_1$, for example, is just one such sentence. It reads:

[$\acute{S}_1$]

Atha śabdo nirūpyate

[p.1]

The word "*atha*" or some equivalent expression serves in a spoken or written discourse the purpose of attracting attention of the reader or it signifies the order of succession followed in the discussion. So the word "*atha*" occurring in a sentence like "*atha śabdaḥ*" written by Vātsyāyana[19] or in the passage $\acute{S}_1$ of Gaṅgeśa, is understood to mean 'after....' where the gap is to be filled in differently in different contexts. Thus in the text "*Athopamānam*" (Vātsyāyana) or "*Athopāmanaṃ nirūpyate* " (Gaṅgeśa),[20] the word "*atha* " means after *anumāna* or inference. Here in "*Atha śabdo nirūpyate*" the word means, after *upamāna*.

The fact that they introduce the topic of language for discussion after the discussion of other three accredited sources of knowledge cannot conclusively show that the Naiyāyika-s take language to be the fourth of the accrediated sources. The same is true of the remarks in question with which the discussion of this source is often introduced in the text. In those remarks the word "after" means, as can be verified by observation, after the discussion of other three sources, particularly *upamāna*. Of course uniformity of practice is likely to bear the suggestion that the Naiyāyika-s believe that language should be taken up last, that language must really be the fourth of the accredited sources. But what could be the ground for such belief ? The explicit reason available for an author to take up *śabda* for detailed discussion last or after *upamāna* is

that when all the accredited sources were enumerated *śabda* was mentioned last. For example, Gaṅgeśa's decision, expressed in the first passage of *Śabdācintāmaṇi,* to investigate *śabda* after *upamāna,* could be justified by pointing out that it is in this order that he enumerated these accredited sources in the first part of *Pratyakṣacintāmaṇi.*[21] But this does not really solve the problem. It actually raises a different and earlier question why did Gaṅgeśa follow that order of enumeration ? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also could not satisfy the critics by saying, as he did, that Gautama was justified in defining *śabda* after *upmāna* because he (Gautama) enumerated the sources in that order.[22] It therefore seems that the word "*atha*" has not been used in the context in question by Vātsyāyana or Gaṅgeśa just to state the obvious fact about the arrangement of discussion but to indicate that this order of discussion has been followed consciously and for good reasons.

It is clear that the authors like Gaṅgeśa who preface their discussion on *śabda* with the sort of remark in question believe not only that *śabda* comes after *upamāna* in the order of succession but also that it is necessary to express this belief in so many words or by way of some hint. In the respective passages of their works the word "*atha*" bears such a hint. The need for expressing the belief is that otherwise a discerning reader may not feel induced to read the work in question. To be induced to read a text (or listen to a discourse) such a reader (hearer) needs to be assured, preferably by the author (speaker) himself and at the very beginning, that the author is aware of the need to maintain rational order in discussing multitude of topics introduced successively. The absence of such awareness or order reduces, in the extreme case, a discourse into the rambling of a deranged man. So if an author does not want to leave it to chances but wants to ensure attention of the reader he must assure the prospective readers that he is aware of the need to rationally order his discussions on different topics. This he does by asserting or indicating at the time of introducing any new topic that the same is suitably related to the (or some) previously discussed topic and that the fact that there obtains such connection justifies the introduction of a topic just where or when it is introduced in course of the discussion or discourse taken as a whole. Accordingly Gaṅgeśa's remark in $\acute{S}_1$

is intended to carry the hint that there obtains the sort of relation between *śabda* and *upamāna* which justifies his, as also Gautama's, taking up *śabda* only after *upamāna*. The justification is presumably the same in case of authors of other Nayāya texts also.

But what exactly is the relation which, following Gautama, the Naiyāyika-s think justifies the enumeration or discussion of *śabda* after *upamāna*? Now *śabda*[23] here means any properly constructed sentence which yields (under specifiable conditions) for any hearer who is a competent member of the appropriate speech community, some definite information or knowledge. When a hearer understands a sentence his understanding consists in this knowledge which the sentence yields for him. But a necessay condition of understanding a sentence is that the hearer must have already learnt the meaning of the individual words which constitute the sentence in question. In other words, no hearer can understand a sentence unless he remembers at the time the meaning of the relevant words. But he could not remember them unless he had learnt them earlier; and he could not have learnt them if there did not exist means or ways of learning the same. Thus a comprehensive philosophy of language should also contain an account of learning the meaning of words. According to the Naiyāyika-s there are many ways and methods of learning the meaning of words and *upamāna* is one of them.[24]

If one is told that 'an aeroplane is like a bird (of enormous size)' then what one is expected to understand by the sentence is that the word "aeroplane" means an object which resembles a bird (but is much bigger in size than any ordinary or actual bird). Such a method of learning or teaching the meaning of words is called *upamāna* or analogy, the third item included in their scheme of accredited sources of knowledge proper by the Naiyāyika-s. The form of the type of knowledge this source yields is 'x is called (by the name) "x" or 'an aeroplane [i.e., the object which resembles a bird etc.] is denoted by the word "aeroplane" '. *Śabda* or sentence considered as the fourth accredited source of knowledge proper does not or need not teach us the meaning of words. What we learn from a sentence is some fact consisting in some relation R^* binding together, so to say, the relevant things or meanings corresponding to the words which constitute the sentence. It is to

be noted that the sentence contains no word which *names* this relation. So R^* is not among the meanings of *words* of the sentence; only the *sentence* means it in some sense of "mean".

It is now clear that *śabda* as a means of knowledge of R^* depends on *upamāna* as a means of knowledge of things or word-meanings between which R^* obtains. Knowledge of R^* means knowledge of things (or meanings of the words of the sentence) as related by way of R^*. This dependence determines the priority which *upamāna* enjoys over *śabda* in the Nyāya scheme of the four accredited sources of knowledge. There may, however, be persons according to whom this traditional way of explaining or defending the order in which *śabda* is introduced for discussion is uncalled for. An author or a speaker arranges the topics of discussion in the way he wants.[25] In this matter he has full freedom; he cannot be criticised for whichever way he chooses to arrange his discussion. The standard view, however, is that the order to be chosen must be rational: the author should be able to produce some justification for his choice on demand. We accordingly understand the word "*atha*" as occurring in the passages of *Nayāybhāṣya* and *Śabdacintāmaṇi* noted above to bear the hint that the relevant authors are aware of the sort of demand in question and are ready to meet the demand along the line just sketched.

III

It has been said that language has not been given any place in the scheme of accredited sources of knowledge by every school of Indian philosophy. It is not denied that any competent member of the speech community to which a speaker belongs understands the utterances made by the speaker under normal conditions. What is denied is that the information which the hearer derives qualifies for the title *knowledge* or, in case it is conceded that some knowledge does result, that this knowledge is of a *distinct* kind which warrants our postulating language as a distinct means or *pramāṇāntara.*[26] Those who deny the second alternative believe that a hearer's understanding of a sentence (or, as we shall sometime call it, sentential knowledge) consists in his having a knowledge or belief of some already familiar type, say, inference. The gensis

of this type of knowledge is and should be explained in terms of one or the other accredited source of knowledge admitted already. One should not accord to language the status of a distinct source. But whether one denies knowledge-character or the property of being a distinct type of knowledge to sentential understanding, one will find that the Nyāya scheme of accerdited sources contains one such source too many. If this is true, that is, if language is not a distinct scurce of knowledge, then the question of according *upamāna* (relative) priority over *śabda* considered as a *pramāṇa* does not arise. By the same logic inference also cannot be said to be prior. How are we to interpret the relevant occurrence of the expression *"atha"* then in the texts like *Nayāyabhaṣya* and *Śabadcintāmaṇi*?

Two answers seem to be possible. One may say that Gaṅgeṣa had in mind the explanation we have sketched above. He meant to assert relative priority of *upamāna* over *śadba* or dependence of *śabda* on *upamāna*. This commits him to the view that language yields knowledge of a distinct kind— a view which could be and is disputed. But Gaṅgeśa could begin by accepting this view in anticipation of the success of his arguments against those who deny the knowledge character or *distinct* (type of) knowledge character to the sentential understanding of a hearer. In fact the entire portion of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* or *Śabdacintāmaṇi* relevant for our present work is actually devoted to establishing sentential understanding to be a distinct type of knowledge proper. But if some interpreter does not like to interpret a given text by depending on anticipated success of the author (or the work) or if he does not like to think that Gaṅgeśa did depend on it, then he may explain the word "*atha*" differently. It is a frequently observed custom of the Hindu writers that they begin their work (of writing a book, say) by performing certain auspicious act. The belief operative behind such custom is that performance of such act can and will ward off unforeseen obstacles that may be there in the way of the completion of the job being undertaken. The auspicious act called *maṅgala* consists in offering obeisance to one's dear deity or god or in uttering (or writing) certain (auspicious) words like "*Om*" and "*atha*".[27] It may therefore be held that the word "*atha*" with which Gaṅgeśa begins his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* signifies *mangala.* Gaṅgeśa has begun

by writing the word *"atha"* or by performing the act of *maṇgala* in observance of the established custom in question. It may be noted that in the first section of the first chaper of *Tattvacintamaṇi* he had already defended this custom in detail by revealing the sound theoretical basis of it i.e., the soundness of the belief operative in the minds of the authors who perform *maṇgala.*[28] It may not be said that if Gaṅgeśa performed *maṇgala* in the beginning of the book he should not have done it again in this last chapter. For the relevant custom permits and encourages performance of *maṇgala* not only in the beginning of a work but also in the middle and in the end.[29] Gaṅgeśa began his third chapter on *upamāna* also with the word *"atha"*. Some interpreters found it desirable to take the word there as signifying *maṇgala.*[30]

The word has still another use. Its occurrence in the sentence under reference may be taken as an instance of this use also. The use in question is made to signify that the discussion or discourse, or the portion of it, which begins with this word *"atha"* has for its subject matter the theme which is signified by the word (here *śabda*) to which the word "atha' is prefixed. So if a book, discussion or discourse—or any part thereof--begins with the declaration *"Atha śabdaḥ"* or *"Atha śabdo nirūpyate"*, we can be sure that the book etc. takes up *śabda* for its theme.[31] If the word *"atha"*, in this sense, is prefixed to a series of names of themes then no order among the themes is asserted or implied; only the fact that these are the themes being discussed is expressed. I am, however, inclined to believe that when Gautama enumerated the four accredited sources in his aphorism 1.1.3 he had in view certain philosophically significant order of succession among them and this constituted his justification for the order of enumeration he followed. This thesis, or some slightly weakened version of it, deserves to be stated in detail and argued thoroughly. But that is beyond the scope of this book.

IV

Since the time of Gautama the Naiyāyika-s have always accorded to *śabda* or language the status and role of a source of knowledge and discussed various aspects of it. There is a norm, more or less

accepted by the Indian philosophers in general and the Naiyāyika-s in particular, to which philosophical treatment of any topic should or should preferably conform. This norm, as has been set forth by Vatsyāyana,[32] is the following. The topic to be treated or theoretically investigated should first be verbally introduced (*uddeśa*). Then, wherever possible or necessary, the subject of discussion should be classified or divided (*vibhāga*) according to some rational principle. After this there should follow the definition of the subject in general and, where necessary or possible, the specific definition of each division of that subject. For example, an ideal philosophical treatment of the topic of *pramāṇa* or special means of knowledge to be found in the classical Nyāya literature consists first in some statement which verbally introduces the subject of *pramāṇa.*[33] Then *pramāṇa* is classified into *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda.*[34] Again defintion of each of these four kinds of *pramāṇa* is given[35] after the definition of *pramāṇa* in general.[36] Anyway, in addition to definition the philosophical treatment of a subject should contain a thorough examination of the definition given and also of all the available accounts of the subject leading to the defence of one or rejection of the rest of such accounts. In the fourth chapter of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa, in any case, follows this arrangement closely. He, like the other Naiyāyika authors, consciously takes up the accredited source of language after *upamāna* for *nirūpaṇa,* because language is dependent on *upamāna.* Whether this is really so we shall not discuss here. But what exactly do they mean by the word *nirūpaṇa* or some variant of it which may be used to translate what is somewhat vaguely called theoretical treatment of a subject ? One of the dictionary meanings of the term is investigation. Theoretical investigation in philosophy means both the process of investigation and the product of this process i.e., the resulting knowledge or truth regarding the relevant subject. The process of investigation consists in an oral or written discussion or discourse. Such discussion is needed to instruct the inquiring student or to settle account with the adversaries who hold rival views in the matter. In the second case the discussion takes a critical, even, at times, polemical form. A theoretical discussion which is not or need not be critical or polemical should still be very much systematic and

methodical. In other words, the discussion should conform to the norm like the one set forth by Vātsyāyana. The philosophers usually take interest in those things only which have something problematic about them. There may be found disagreement about the nature or definition of these things ; or about if and what evidence is there for admitting such things or accepting certain statements about them. Accordingly, a philosophical investigation takes more often than not the form of refuting the rival views and proving one's own view about all the relevant matters regarding certain philosophically important and disputed subject matter. Gaṅgeśa undertakes, in the fourth chapter of his book *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* to investigate *śabda.* He discusses in this connection various issues themes and views. They are all necessary parts of the comprehensive theory of language which Gaṅgeśa builds up gradually. A glance at the major topics discussed in *Śabdacintāmaṇi* may give some idea of Gaṅgeśa's conception of philosophy or theory of language.[37] Gaṅgeśa, in any case, can be taken to declare in $\acute{S}_1$ that he will be propounding Nyāya theory of language (considered as a means of knowledge). The statement of this theory consists in, among other things, the statement of the definition, description of the nature and the demonstration of the evidentiary character of *śabda,* according to Nyāya philosophy. It should be noted, however, that *nirūpaṇa* does not mean simply the statement of the Nyāya position in these matters. It also means construction and consideration of the supporting arguments both positive and negative. We shall discuss in the next chapter the Nyāya definition of *śabda pramāṇa* as formulated by Gaṅgeśa. It is to be noted however that Gaṅgeśa is not the originator of the Nyāya theory of language. One can fully acknowledge the importance of his contribution and can yet say with enough justification that Gaṅgeśa's debt to his predecessors is perhaps the greatest in his theory of language. His immediate and greatest debt is undoubtedly to Udayanācārya and, through him, to Vācaspati Miśra. Though Gautama and, following him, Vātsāyana and Uddyotakara wrote many things about *śabda* or language yet it is Vācaspati Miśra who really gave a complete shape to what was to be later regarded as Nyāya philosophy of language, in the modern sense of the term. Even the central and technical notion of *vākyārtha* or sentence

meaning does not seem to have received the special attention or extensive treatment due to it before Vācaspati Miśra. The only other Naiyāyika who before Udayanācarya discussed the Nyāya philosophy of language very comprehensively is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. But while Jayanta's views in the matter can all be found in his *Nyāyamanjari,* the major sources from where Vācaspati's views can be known are *Tātparyatīkā, Tattvabindu* and *Nyāyakaṇika.* Only the second of these three is an independent monograph devoted to philosophy of language the other two being commentaries respectively on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyabhāṣya-vārttika* and Mandana Miśra's *Vidhiviveka.* None of these is a text exclusively of philosophy language.

Philosophy, as we understand it in India, that is, *Darśana,* comprises both a theory of being or ontological types and a theory of knowing including that of means of knowledge. All other familiar branches of philosophy somehow come under these two major theories. Each system of philosophy contains some discussions on relevant forms of cognition and types of object. Now language is an item of reality i.e., certain type of thing as well as a source of information. Theory of language accordingly is either an ontology of language or logic and epistemology of it. Indian philosophers are found to be discussing whether language is a thing belonging to the category of quality. They also discuss what understanding a sentence means or what should be the analysis of the sentences in the imperative mood. So far as ontology of language is concerned Gautama and his commentators before Vācaspati Miśra concerned themselves primarily with the question whether words in general or the *Veda* in particular are eternal or destructible. The related logico-epistemological questions which received their attention include "Do we perceive or remember a sentence?" "Is linguistic sound perceived by one single sense organ?" "Can we know anything without knowing at the same time and in the same act the word for it?" None of these questions belongs, it seems, to the core of philosophy of language which is primarily concerned with the problem of speech comprehension—with the learning or understanding of language. Comprehending language in which linguistic communication consists is not knowledge *of* language as an object—a theme of

general epistemology—but knowledge derived *from* language considered as a special means or accredited source of it, that is, as a *pramāṇa*. Theoretical investigation of *śabda* or language which constitutes philosophy of language consists in the study of sentence as the linguistic means of knowledge (*śabda-pramāṇa*) and the problems which are centred round it. Some aspects of the problem of speech production as distinguished from epistemological problem of speech reception falls within the purview of philosophy of language. But philosophy of language does not aim at providing primarily or exclusively a physical or causal account of the production of speech. Nor does it seek to provide the sort of account of language or of language learning which is provided by the linguists or the grammarians. True, these physical, linguistic, epistemological and logical or philosophical orientations or discussions overlap. In practice they have not been always kept clearly distinguished in the respective literature. But conceptually they were kept clearly distinct.

The major problem of philosophy of language is the study of linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*), that is to say, the study of language as a means of knowledge. It aims at giving a theoretical account of hearer's understanding of language or of meaningful discourse. It is in this account that the notion of meaning or, more particularly, sentence meaning plays a central role. Theoretical investigation into the nature, condition, value and logical properties of hearer's understanding or speech comprehension is the task of philosophy of language or the study of language as means of knowledge. Language in this context consists of units of meaningful discourse or sentences. The study of linguistic means of knowledge and speech understanding involves the study of sentence meaning. The study of word meaning on the other hand leads to the study of such means of knowledge as analogy or *upamāna*. The Nyāya scheme of accredited sources of knowledge includes both these means (*pramāṇa*) viz., language (*śabda*) and analogy (*upamāna*). This clearly shows that the Naiyāyika-s were aware of the distinction between a theory of words and a theory of sentences. These two studies jointly constitute the major portion of their very comprehensive philosophy of language which include semantic, logical and epistemological discussions of language. But the

ontology or grammar of language are not equally central in philosophy of language. In so far as grammatical topics are included in philosophical works almost invariably clarification is sought in terms of semantic basis of certain grammatical notions or rules.

Thus though the Naiyāyika-s were aware even at the time of Gautama of the importance of distinguishing the study of sentence and sentence meaning from the study of words and word meanings yet until much later these two branches did not receive equal emphasis or were not separately developed. In Gaṅgeśa the gradually dawning awareness of the importance of these two different studies for philosophy in general and philosophy of language in particular, developed into complete realisation. He begins his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* with the study of *śabdapramāṇa* or linguistic means of knowledge. One major theme is linguistic communication. How does a speaker communicate his thought or intended information to the hearer? In which does the understanding of the hearer consist? What according to the Naiyāyika-s a hearer needs to understand if linguistic communication is to be successful is not primarily the meaning of words but the 'meaning' of sentences. Thus the study of *śabdapramāṇa* is mainly the study of hearer's understanding of a sentence. I prefer to formulate it as understanding a sentence rather than knowing the *meaning* of a sentence because the word "meaning" does not have the same sense in case of a sentence and a word. There is a sense in which the study of meaning is basically a study of words and word-meaning. Gaṅgeśa undertook this study in a later part of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* referred to as *Śaktivāda*. Anyway, in the present work some aspects of the Nyāya theory of sentence and sentence 'meaning' will be studied. Sentence is here understood as the linguistic means of information or *Śabdapramāṇa*.

In the very first sentence of his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa announces that he resolves to investigate into (the nature etc. of) *śabda*. By *śabda* here he means (he also says as much) *śabdapramāṇa*. In view of the fact that the relative priority of *upamāna* (analogy) over *śabda* is disputed, we may take the word *"atha"* occurring in S_1 to signify the theme or topic of the discussion being what is signified by the word to which "atha" is prefixed

namely *śabda*. It is *śabdapramāṇa* or sentence as the linguistic means of verbal knowledge which is the immediate theme. In the first section Gaṅgeśa therefore resolves to study sentential understanding (*śābdapramā*) and the linguistic means for it (*śabdapramāṇa*). But what is problematic about sentential knowledge and its source? It has already been noted that every school of Indian philosophy does not count language or sentence among the accredited sources of knowledge. The philosophers of these schools do not deny that every competent member of the speech community to which a speaker belongs understands the utterances made by the speaker under suitable conditions. But they maintain that the information the hearer derives does not qualify for the title knowledge; or, if they concede to such information the status of knowledge, they believe that knowledge derived from language does not constitute a *distinct* kind from the point of view of logic and epistemology. They therefore maintain that it is wholly unwarranted to postulate a distinct type of means or source for knowledge derived from language. Thus while admitting that a speaker can communicate successfully, these philosophers deny to language or sentence the status of a distinct means or accredited source of knowledge. The issues before us are therefore: Does a hearer's understanding of a sentence constitute knowledge? And does sentential knowledge constitute a distinct variety of knowledge called verbal knowledge or is it a variety of such familiar kind of knowledge as inference? If answer to any one of the first two questions is in the negative then *śabda* or *language*, that is, sentence cannot be regarded as a distinct means of knowledge. The result will be the same if the last question is answered in the affirmative.

Discussions of these questions also come within the purview of *nirūpaṇa* or theoretical investigation of *śabda* which one should start, according to the accepted norm of philosophical investigation, by verbally introducing the topic in the manner of the announcement made by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_1$. But just such introduction of the topic does not reveal which side, in the issues involved, the introducer takes. Thus *nirūpaṇa* or investigation may be conducted either by or from the point of view of the critic who takes the negative stand or it may be conducted from just the opposite standpoint. Though

a critic is not called upon to define linguistic means (*śabda-pramāṇa*), a thing he does not admit, yet he must know in which sense of the term he denies *śabdapramāṇa*. Again who accepts language as a source of knowledge is unlikely to maintain that every form of linguistic expression yields knowledge, let alone a distinct kind of knowledge. In other words he does not take the property of being language (or being a linguistic expression) to determine something necessarily and sufficiently to be a linguistic source or *śabdapramāṇa.* Not only the contending parties in the issues in question must define (or refer to the definition of) *śabdapramāṇa*, a neutral historian or reviewer of the controversy between the disputants starts his account by stating some definition of *śabdapramāṇa.* Thus the requirement of philosophical investigation according to the standard norm, that the topic introduced for discussion must be defined, is not without justification. And Gaṅgeśa in this respect follows Gautama closely. Both of them offer their definition of linguistic means or *Śabdapramāṇa* in the very beginning of their discussion on *śabda.*

It may not be impossible, it may even be desirable, for an author of a work like the present book to start by assuming that we all have some intuitive understanding of what *śabda* or language is, and then to pass on immediately to the controversies in question and the consequences of them. Such an author can begin by considering the thesis and the argument of the critic—why does he maintain, say, that no knowledge or no distinct type of verbal knowledge results from language. If he finds that the critic is wrong then he can himself offer some other definition of his own or may take note of some such definition already prevalent. The following procedure of Gaṅgeśa will, however, be adopted here. Anticipating the probable soundness of the position of the Naiyāyika-s Gaṅgeśa first offers some definition of *śabdapramāṇa* acceptable to the Naiyāyika-s. Then he examines and rejects critic's objection that language does not yield any knowledge or that it yields no distinct type of belief called verbal.

V

We have noted that there are different types of language study including philosophy of language. It has also been said that of the

two major areas of philosophy of language, we shall be concerned here with only one and that too in so far as it has been developed by the Naiyāyika-s in general and Gaṅgeśa in particular. This portion of philosophy of language deals with sentential understanding; the four major topics are: definition (*lakṣaṇa*), nature (*svarūpa*), truth or evidentiary charcter (*prāmāṇya*) and cause (*kāraṇa*) other than what constitutes the source or means. Gaṅgeśa's treatment of these topics is contained in the first 374 pages of the first volume of his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1897. The Society published this book with the commentaries of Mathurānātha and, where this was not available, Jayadeva Miśra in two volumes. The first volume runs into 525 pages and the second volume into another 859 pages excluding the 226 pages containing two independent but related tracts by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Even a translation in English of what has been written and explained in 374 pages of terse and technical *Saṃskṛta* would require a book containing pages about ten times more. Attempt has been made here to explain independently only a portion of Gaṅgeśa's own text in volume one. We have at times deviated from Mathurānātha without giving any reasons or even without announcement.

Anyway, in the first 374 pages of the first volume of the Asiatic Society edition of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa has begun by introducing and defining *śabda* in the sense of an accredited source of certain type of knowledge. Accordingg to the standard view this accredited source is the (most) special or instrumental among the causes of the resulting knowledge. In the pages 185 to 374 Gaṅgeśa discusses four other conditions of verbal knowledge which are called auxiliary (*sahakārī*) causal conditions.[38] The *pramāṇa* or the special means or the instrumental cause of the knowledge which a hearer derives from the utterances he hears and understands, consists of perception of words and recollection of meanings of them, in this order.[39] Thus a hearer's understanding of a sentence is preceded and caused by his hearing the relevant words and recollecting their meaning. The hearer might not have heard this particular sentence before but he must have learnt earlier and should remember now, the meaning of the words forming the sentence in question. These are the most proximate or immediate among the conditions determining his understanding of the sentence. But

the hearer needs must recognise also that the sentence is well constructed and the fact it purports to describe is a genuine fact. Therefore he should know that certain particular syntactic relations obtain between the words uttered, without which the words could not form a sentence, and that certain relation obtains between the relevant things— the word meanings—recalled and without which the things could not constitute a fact. These relations (or factors or features) or the knowledge of them also determine causally if any or what information a hearer derives from a sentence in a concrete situation.[40] It is to be noted that though Gaṅgeśa begins by defining *śabdapramāṇa* as language satisfying certain description yet it is the knowledge of this language which actually constitutes the *pramāṇa* or the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge. But Gaṅgeśa does not inquire in this part of his book into the nature and condition of this causing knowledge. He is interested here in the causing knowledge itself. For that is the condition of the resulting knowledge of the hearer.[41] Other conditions include the knowledge of (word) meanings, and four other factors (or the factors themselves) which function as auxiliary causal conditions.

Gaṅgeśa has also discussed questions about the nature of *śabdapramā* and of *śabdapramāṇa*. It is inquired if *śabdapramāṇa* as defined is really of the nature of a *pramāṇa*. Does it yield any knowledge or more accurately *pramā*? Similarly it is inquired if the knowledge that is derived from language has a distinct nature of its own, if it forms a separate kind called verbal knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika-s are of the opinion that every knowledge derived from sentence as means is inferential in nature. The Mīmāṃsaka-s, however, believe that it is inferential if the sentence is ordinary, or secular, that is, if it is a sentence of ordinary language or is uttered by some human being. But if the sentence belongs to the (language of the) scriptures then the resulting knowledge is of the distinct type called verbal. Gaṅgeśa discusses and rejects all these views and defends the Nyāya position that knowledge derived from any well formed sentence is of the distinct kind called verbal. The single topic of whether knowledge derived from a sentence is of the distinct type called verbal occupies pages 22 to 184 of the first volume of *Śabdacintāmaṇi*. It is in this topic that we are mainly

interested in the present book. Gaṅgeśa does not separately discuss the question of truth of verbal knowledge or evidentiary character of language in this portion of his *Tattavacintāmaṇi.* He discussed the question of truth and evidence generally[42] in the beginning of the first volume of *Tattavacintāmaṇi.* Given the result of that part of the book Gaṅgeśa's views regarding *śabdapramāṇa* or verbal knowledge and *śabdaprāmāṇya* or evidentiary character of language can be construed once we know from this part of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* that he considers language as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the means of a distinct variety of knowledge called *śābda* (or verbal).

Two

Definition of Linguistic Means

I

The foremost positive task of a theoretical investigation or philosophical treatment of a subject is to properly delineate the subject or specify the range or scope of the concept in question. This is done by offering suitable definition. But adequacy of a definition cannot be tested unless we have, prior to defining it, a reasonably clear conception of the thing being defined. Such a situation does not create as serious a problem in case of a real definition as it does in case of a nominal or verbal definition. The definition which forms a necessary part of the philosophical treatment of a subject is, according to the Naiyāyika-s, a real definition. Such definitions can be and are often used as the criterion for the correct application of the word for, or the name of, the definiendum. But still it is not the word but the thing which it is the task of a philosopher to define. In case of a real definition there are at least some instances of the definiendum which are accepted as such. The task of the definition is to identify or formulate some essential feature of the definiendum which must not only characterise the agreed instances of it with which one begins but also every other (including hitherto unknown) instance. Further the feature must not characterise anything which is not an instance of the definiendum. So far as there are identified or agreed cases of the definiendum even prior to our offering the definition, we

can test the adequacy of the definition and need not have to move in a circle. Nor need we turn every definition into an analytic one. This in its turn keeps room for genuine controversy or disagreement regarding the definition of a thing.[1] It is possible to offer and consider seriously alternative definitions which are not just equivalent but are genuinely different or incompatible.[2]

What is sought to be defined here is something complex. It is not just *śabda* or *pramāṇa.* The definiendum here is *śabda-pramāṇa* i.e., such words as yield knowledge proper.[3] It is both necessary and difficult to define *śabdapramāṇa.* For philosophers are not unanimous as to whether there are such words or which words are they. Where there is disagreement about the range of the definiendum there cannot be agreement about the definition. Initially, at least, different philosophers will offer different definitions in so far as they have different or different range of definiendum in view. Gaṅgeśa therefore states his own definition of *śabda* in the very second passage of *Śabdacintāmaṇi.*— His definition is determined by his acceptance of the Nyāya view about the scope or range of the definiendum which include both human and divine utterances or, in other words, ordinary and *vaidika* sentences.[4]

The definition of language or linguistic means being given and discussed here does not aim at answering the question 'What is language ?'. Nor does it seek to tell us what one knows when one knows a language. It rather tells us what conditions words should fulfil—what features the words must have—if they are to yield knowledge for a competent hearer. It is already assumed that sometimes at least a hearer understands a sentence or, what is the same thing, derives knowledge from certain words in question. The said features constitute the defining characteristics of language considered as a source of knowledge or *śabdapramāṇa.* The definition of language formulated by Gaṅgeśa in the following passage describes these characteristics.

[$\acute{S}_2$]

Prayogahetubhūtārthatattvajñānajanyaḥ śabdaḥ pramānam.

[p. 1]

It is difficult to explain this definition. The difficulties in

question will keep us engaged through many pages. But if one so desires one may turn to the last section of this chapter where this definition has been explained in the familiar way in which definitions are explained in the standard Nyāya texts.

What I want to do in this section is to clarify, especially for the students of Western (Anglo-American) epistemology and Philosophy of language, two points of considerable importance. In the first place language is not always included among the accerdited sources of knowledge enumerated in Western epistemology, though it is never doubted that language is a means of communication. It is indeed the most important means for the purpose. It is also distinctly human and characteristically social. What perhaps makes a language a proper language is its having a grammar. This grammar is really the link between sound and meaning so far as man is concerned. Man is not only *homo loquens* he is *homo grammaticus.* We can see this point more clearly if we look briefly at the idea of communication.[5] There are indeed various communication systems. Persons who want to communicate know that they have something to communicate and that there are specific ways of communicating. Under normal circumstances successful linguistic communication consists in the hearer's deriving certain knowledge from the utterances of the speaker. But still language is not always treated in epistemology as a source of knowledge. One reason may be that there is a tendency to take any indirect or mediate knowledge of things or facts as essentially inferential. In India also there are philosophers who take every direct knowledge as perceptual and every indirect knowledge as inferential. But there are many who maintain that the knowledge a hearer derives from the utterances of a speaker is not inferential even though it is not direct either. One may even define language as the means of a special variety of indirect knowledge which differs from inference in that in the process of its genesis there is involved the relation called meaning relation which obtains between words and their meanings. Udayanācārya has noted a possible definition of linguistic means which highlights this aspect.[6]

The second point to note is that though at least for three thousand years we have been viewing language as closely

associated with grammar yet we do not mean by *bhāṣā* or *śabda* (rough equivalent of language) essentially or primarily written language. The same is not perhaps the case with the thinkers of the West. Though we in India take language as vehicle of communication and hold that things would remain unrevealed had it not been for language yet we do not view language as means of objectifying or making public the private experience one has. The root is perhaps there in the notions of grammar and, what is taken to be its synonym, *vyākaraṇa.* The notion of grammar involves the notion of writing. The etymology of the word 'grammar' shows that it comes from the Greek word which means 'to write'. The word *vyākaraṇa* does not have any such etymology. Anyway, the Indian philosophers of language do not share the widespread view that only a written language has grammar worth the name or that a written language alone is language in the true sense of the term.

II

In the sentence $\acute{S}_2$ constituting the second passage of *Śabdacintāmaṇi,* Gaṅgeśa defines *śabdapramāṇa* or, as the Naiyāyika-s admit, the fourth accredited source of knowledge proper. The analysis or interpretation of the sentence is, as has already been said, difficult. So the following literal translation produced before resolving the problem of interpretation is bound to be broad and vague. ($\acute{S}_2$) *Śabdapramāṇa* is what is produced by that correct knowledge of things which has the nature of being the cause of the use of language.[7]

Most, if not all, definitional statements, have two broad divisions. One part consists of the expression which denotes or signifies the thing to be defined and the other part is constituted by the (expression or) expressions naming or signifying the defining (property or) properties. But so far as $\acute{S}_2$ is concerned it is not clear how much of it constitutes the definiendum part. There seems to be three alternative possibilities. Either *pramāṇa* or *śabda* or *śabdapramāṇa* or, (as it was arguably in some editions) *pramāṇaśabda* is the definiendum. Now if we assume, which is natural[8] that no word of a definitional statement belongs to both

the definiendum and the definiens part, then if further the definiendum part of $\acute{S}_2$ contains all three or any two or any one of the words in question, it follows that the definiens part includes none or remaining one or two words. It is hard to believe that Gaṅgeśa intended the word *pramāṇam* alone to constitute the whole of the definiendum here. From the context it is clear that Gaṅgeśa admits *śabda* or some *śabda*, which perhaps he seeks to define here, to be *pramāṇa*. But it is only one of the four types of *pramāṇa* admitted by the Niyāyika-s. So just *pramāṇa* or *pramāṇa* in general cannot be the definiendum where *śabdapramāṇa* is intended to be defined. Not only such a general definition is not needed at this stage, that is, after three of the four *pramāṇa-s* have already been defined individually but also as definition of *pramāṇa* in general what is left of $\acute{S}_2$ including the word *śabdaḥ*, is too narrow. It does not apply to say, *pratyakṣa* or perception, the first of the four accredited sources of knowledge proper. If we consider the context of its occurrence or the portion of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* where $\acute{S}_2$ occurs then it is as much likely that Gaṅgeśa offered $\acute{S}_2$ as the definition of *Śabda pramāṇa* or linguistic means in particular as it is unlikely that he offered it as the definition of *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge in general. Now if we further consider the usual way in which Gaṅgeśa frames a definitional statement it can hardly be doubted that the word "*śabdaḥ*" is or is included in the definiendum part of $\acute{S}_2$. If however, "*sabdaḥ*" alone constitutes the definiendum and if no word in a definitional statement can fail to belong to both the definiendum and the definiens part, then the definiens part of $\acute{S}_2$ must be taken to include "*pramāṇam*". It would not be wrong or unusual if Gaṅgeśa used "*śabdaḥ*" alone as the definiendum of the definition of *śabdapramāṇa*.[9] But inclusion of "*pramāṇa*" in the definiens part of $\acute{S}_2$ or, what comes to the same thing, to define (partly though) *śabdaḥ* in terms of *pramāṇa* seems to be unusual for Gaṅgeśa besides being useless. To show that it is not useless one may argue in this way. If from the definition part of $\acute{S}_2$ the word *pramāṇam* is omitted then it must be included in the definiendum part. But since it alone cannot constitute the definiendum part and since it would be usual to include *śabda* in the definiendum part this part will contain both these words. But what would be the justification for choosing "*śabdaḥ pramāṇam*"

(or *pramāṇam śabdaḥ*) as definiendum when "*śabdaḥ*" alone can suffice? Secondly, if both the words "*sabdaḥ*" and "*pramāṇam*" are dropped from the definition part of $\acute{S}_2$ then the definition becomes too wide. For now anything will be *śabdapramāṇa* if it has the property of being produced by such knowledge of things as is the cause of the utterance of words. Consider first that every belief and for that matter knowledge or truth is the (potential or actual) cause of utterance of words. Therefore any belief or, at any rate, any true belief, satisfies the condition of being such knowledge of truth as is the cause of utterance of vocal sound or of speech. Again almost every belief or knowledge can induce volition. Thus volition which is not intended to be defined satisfies the definition since it has the defining property of being produced by such knowledge of truth as is a cause of words. Inclusion of the word *pramāṇam* in the definition part prevents the definition from becoming over inclusive or too wide. For volition cannot satisfy this new defining condition of being a *pramāṇa* i.e., special means of knowledge proper. In other words *śabda pramāṇa* alone satisfies both the conditions of being an instrument of the production of knowledge proper and an effect of knowledge of truth which can cause (linguistic) utterance.

This defence, however, does not work. For even *anumāna pramāṇa* or inferential means—where it consists in the memory of the inferential relation in which the ground of inference stands to the object to be inferred—satisfies the definition of *śabda pramāṇa* in question including the condition of being a pramāṇa, i.e. instrument of production of knowledge proper. But we may frame the definition in such a way that *śabda pramāṇa* alone satisfies it. *Śabda pramāṇa* is the meaningful sound (*śabda*) which is produced by such knowledge of truth as causes utterance. To derive such a definition from $\acute{S}_2$ we need to add to the definition part, the word *śabda* and omit the word *pramāṇa* from this part. The word *pramāṇa* would then form the definiendum. But if *pramāṇa* were the sole definiendum then the present definition would be too narrow. In other words, as definition of *pramāṇa* in general, the property of being *śabda* which is produced by such knowledge of truth which causes utterance, turns out to be too

narrow for it fails to cover some genuine variety of *pramāṇa*. This definition can be made adequate if we narrow down the scope of the definiendum by adding to "*pramāṇam*" the word " *śabdaḥ*" or, in other words, by taking " *śabdaḥ pramāṇam*" as a whole to be the definiendum. The whole definitional statement now reads: ($\acute{S}_{2a}$) *pramāṇa śabdaḥ* is such *śabda* (words) as is produced by the knowledge of truth that causes (linguistic) utterance.

It is to be noted that the word *śabda* figures in both the definiendum and the definiens part of the definitional statement ($\acute{S}_{2a}$). Or, in other words, ($\acute{S}_{2a}$) requires at least two occurrences of the word *śabda*. But in the original i.e., in $\acute{S}_2$ we have only one occurrence of the word. And no single word or single occurrence of a word can be normally taken to belong to both the definiendum and the definiens part. As a solution we may suggest, following the usual practice, that the word *śabdaḥ* used in $\acute{S}_1$ is intended by Gaṅgeśa to be repeated in $\acute{S}_2$ also. But it may be objected that since in the case of other *pramāṇa*-s Gaṅgeśa has not included the word *pramāṇa* in the definiendum part of the definitional statement it is unlikely that he should make any departure here. The answer may be that if in this case we include the word *śabda* in the definition part of $\acute{S}_{2a}$, as has just been done, but omit the word *pramāṇa* from the definiendum, *śabda pramāṇa*, then, the definition will be too narrow.[10] For the simple definiendum, *śabda*, includes such *śabda* also which is not *pramāṇa*. To such *śabda* the definition does not apply. So the definition will be too narrow. If, however, we narrow down the scope of the definiendum from *śabda* to *pramāṇa śabda* then the definition can no longer be said to be over restrictive. Thus before we explain $\acute{S}_2$ in translation, we would like to expand it into $\acute{S}_{2a}$ by adding one more occurrence of the word *śabdaḥ* which Gaṅgeśa has used in $\acute{S}_1$, and which we take him to have intended to be repeated in $\acute{S}_2$, after the word *pramāṇam*. Gaṅgeśa's $\acute{S}_2$ made explicit by adding to the original another occurrence of the word *śabdaḥ* gives us his definition of *śabda pramāṇa*. So we understand the definition $\acute{S}_2$ thus: *Pramāṇa* called *śabda* is (the sequence of vocal) sound(s) (*śabda*) produced by (*janya*) such true belief (*tattava jñāna*) of thing(s) (*artha*) which is of the nature of cause (*hetubhūta*) of use of language (*prayoga*).

III

$\acute{S}_2$ defines *śabdaprāmaṇa* or linguistic means as the (vocal) sound produced by the true belief of things which causes the use of words. We need to explain this definition and also to justify the different insertions made or conditions included therein. But first we would like to say a few words about our translation of the passage $\acute{S}_2$ given at the end of the last paragraph. When a definitional statement of a language is translated in another language it is the demand of the logic of translation of such sentences that the definiendum part of the original statement should not be translated. The definiendum part of the original sentence should occur as it is or within quotation marks in the translation. So I have retained in my translation both the words "*śabda*" and "*pramāṇa*" so far as they form parts of the definiendum of the definition in the orginal. The word "*pramāṇa*" has however been used in the sense of accredited source of knowledge proper.[11] The adjective 'proper' has been used in the technical sense of non-recollective. According to the Naiyāyika-s to be considered as *pramā*, in terms of which the notion of accredited source of knowledge proper or *pramāṇa* is defined, it is not enough that a belief should be true, it should further be non-recollective in nature. Even when true, a memory cognition is not considered as knowledge proper or *pramā*; no separate accredited source is admitted for it. A memory cognition cannot occur now unless there had already occurred the coresponding non-recollective awarencess; and unless this latter were true the memory cognition could not be true either. Therefore, in addition to sources for every variety of true non-recollective belief one does not need to admit any seperate or independent source for the truth of memory cognition. An accredited source therefore cannot be defined as cause of memory cognition or of just cognition which includes memory as well. Such a source is defined only in terms of non-recollective true belief i.e., in *Saṃskrita, pramā. Pramāṇa* therefore means in the literature of many schools of Indian philosophy accredited source of true non-recollective belief or knowledge proper.

The word "*śabda*" occurring in the definiendum, literally means sound. But as *pramāṇa* it means sentence or *vākya* which in its turn is, on ultimate analysis, a sequence of vocal sounds.

I have translated the word *śabda* occurrring in the definition part accordingly. The original expression "*arthatattva jñāna*" has been translated here as true belief or correct knowledge of thing(s). As is obvious the word "*artha*" has been translated as thing(s).[12] The singular number has been changed into plural to make it conform to the number of the other noun, sound(s). In fact neither the knowledge of a single vocal sound (or any single sequence of certain vocal sounds i.e., a word) nor sound (or word) *being known* counts in the theory as *śabda pramāṇa* which yields, as accredited source of knowledge proper, *śābda jñāna* or linguistic knowledge. To such knowledge there always corresponds a whole sentence.[13] Thus *śabda pramāṇa* is a sentence or finite sequence of words (in the plural); and such words are uttered on the basis of knowledge of corresponding things (again in the plural) or word-meanings.[14] The word *tattva* as adjective of the word *jñāna* has been rendered as true; and the word *jñāna* which is otherwise translated as knowledge, has been translated here as belief because the property of truth has been mentioned separately. Again, instead of translating *jñāna* as knowledge or true belief proper, we have translated it simply as (true) belief because a sentence may be uttered even on the basis of memory cognition of the corresponding fact. Thus though the cognition resulting from *śabda* as *pramāṇa* or language as means, must be knowledge proper i.e., true non-recollective belief yet *śabda* as *pramāṇa* may itself be caused by or uttered on the basis of any true belief, recollective or non-recollective, of the things corresponding to the words constituting the sentence. The original word "*janya*" has been translated as produced, "*hetu*" as cause, "*hetubhūta*" as 'being of the nature of a cause' and "*prayoga*" as use or utterance of words in the sense *śabda vyavahāra*.

Most, if not all, definitions serve the double purpose of distinguishing the definiendum and providing criterion for the correct application of the word naming the thing (class of things) being defined. Any property or relation can so far serve as a definition if the definiendum in question alone possesses that property or stands in that relation. A class of things therefore can be and is sometimes defined in terms of their peculiar cause. For the things have as one of their unique and therefore distinguishing

features the *property* of being produced by certain cause or being causally related to that. Just as things that are effects can be defined in terms of their unique cause in the way suggested so also the things that are causes can be and are defined correspondingly in terms of their effects. Restriction which is observed to avoid circularity is, it is needless to say, that a cause and its effect are never defined in terms of each other.

The word *pramāṇa*, translated as special means or accredited source of knowledge proper, is the short hand form of '(what is) instrumental in the production of *pramā*' where *pramā* may be translated as knowledge proper. Thus by definition a *pramāṇa* is a cause, in fact the special one among the causes, of a *pramā*, where speciality is a technical notion to be explained later. It was noted that the names of the four accredited sources admitted in the Nyāya school of philosophy are *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (knowledge of similarity) and *śabda* (language). The first three names are given to certain already existing things (like particular relation of sense organs with their objects) only in consideration of the *role* they play in the production of certain type of knowledge proper. This is not so with the last word. The word *śabda* does not only signify certain particular role a sort of thing plays in some context but it is the name of a certain kind of thing itself. The first three names or labels are role-names, they are contextual in a sense in which the last word is not. We disregard for the present the ambiguity of these words which mean both certain source of cognition or process of cognising i.e., *pramāṇa* and certain (the resulting) form of cognition or *pramā*, for if we restrict their use suitably then we can say that the words mean the respective *pramāṇa*-s. *Pratyakṣa* is necessarily *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* and the same is the case with *anumāna* and *upamāna*. This is so because these role-names or words have been introduced as technical and conventional expressions (*śāstriya paribhāṣā*) to designate just the role of *pramāṇa* certain things play and not those things themselves. We have in our language other expressions like "the relation between sense organ and object" for the things to designate the *paramā* generating role of which the word *pratyakṣa* is introduced as a technical word. Thus we can denote or designate the relevant things by the words other than those used to signify

their *pramāṇa* role, that is, without using the words *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* or *upamāna.* But in case of *śabda pramāṇa* we hardly can or do designate certain thing without using the word *śabda*, while we use this word to signify the *pramāṇa* role of it. There is nothing which is *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* or *upamāna* in its own right i.e., as distinguished from or independent of the role it plays in the generation of *pramā* of the respective type. Outside the context of knowledge proper and its cause we hardly have any use for these words. But we require the word *śabda* even if we want just to describe a kind of thing or item of the universe. *Śabda* is an item of the furniture of the world, a thing in its own right. It is not just the name of certain function or role the things of a kind have. *Śabda* therefore does not necessarily mean, as a technical vocabulary, *śabda pramāṇa*. So when we mean to define the role of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* it is better to use as definiendum the complex expression *śabdapramāṇa* and not just the word *śabda*. It is not, however, equally necessary to use *pratyakṣapramāṇa, anumāna-pramāṇa* or *upamānapramāṇa* in similar contexts.

IV

What Gaṅgeśa intends to define in $Ś_2$ is *śabda pramāṇa* (linguistic means) or the *pramāṇa* role of *śabda. Śabda* or a sequence of vocal sounds can be said to play the role of a *pramāṇa* when it generates knowledge proper. Thus to take *śabda* or language as *pramāṇa* is to take it as an accredited source of knowledge proper, where 'being an accredited source of' means being instrumental in the production of. But what the thing *śabda* is as distinct from its role as an accredited source of knowledge proper? What, in other words, the expression "*śabda*" means in ontology? The word does not mean in ontology what it means in the discipline called *vyākaraṇa* (grammar). In *vyākaraṇa* the word *śabda* means, at least sometimes, *śabda* itself.[15] To put it otherwise, some occurrences of the word *śabda* in grammar should be taken as mentioning of the word *śabda* and not just the use of it. But what is this *śabda*? Or what is the description of the thing which the word *śabda* in its (ontolocigal) use signifies? In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scheme of ontology there are seven categories of things of which the first two are substance and quality. There

are in this scheme twenty four varieties of quality which the substances of nine different kinds share among themselves. The fifth in the list of nine substances is *ākāśa* which has for its unique quality *śabda*; and it is the last of the twenty four qualities enlisted by the Vaiśeṣika-s.[16]

There is, even numerically speaking, just one *ākāśa* and it is a substance. While having quality distinguishes this substance from the things of other six categories, *śabda* as its exclusive and specific quality distinguishes *ākāśa* from the other eight substances. Thus *śabda* is a quality of *ākāśa* and though *ākāśa* is imperceptible *śabda* is a sensible quality. Just as it is the unique (sensible) quality of the substance *ākāśa* so also it is perceived only by the auditory sense organ. Any sound including a noise is an object of auditory sense organ provided of course it has adequate intensity. A sound when it is not a mere noise has meaning.[17] Broadly speaking the auditory sense-quality sound is of two types, mere sound or (basically) meaningless noise and vocal or meaningful sound. The word *śabda* is a near synonym in *Sanskrita* of the English word sound. As such *śabda* is also of two types—*dhvani* and *varṇa*. *Dhvani* is that variety of *śabda* which does not (necessarily) have vocal origin or any meaning in itself. There are cases of *dhvani* in this sense which cannot he said to be noise, e.g., musical tune (not a music which may consist of meaningful words) sung or played on some instrument. A *varṇa* (or *varṇa-s*) on the other hand is a unit of meaningful sound; any single letter of the alphabet in the spoken or written form of it is a *varṇa* or *akṣara*. Sometimes the word "*varṇa*" is used in the wider sense of any sound other than *dhvani*. Thus a word of a language is as much a *varṇa* as any single letter of the alphabet. A word or *pada* is normally a group of alphabetical letters or sounds corresponding to it. A *dhvani* may or may not be a sound produced vocally. There may be sound which our vocal organ cannot produce. But there is not or cannot be a *varṇa* which cannot in principle be produced vocally. Thus *varṇa* is a *vocal* sound in a sense in which *dhvani* is not. This is how we want to distinguish a *varṇa* from a *dhvani*. We cannot identify *varṇa* with meaningful sound; for, in the standard technical sense of having meaning, only a word has meaning, while even a single letter of the alphabet is a *varṇa*. The distinguishing feature

of a word is that it bears meaning relation to something extra-linguistic. An alphabetical letter or sound is a vocal sound both because it is produced vocally and is a constituent of some actual or possible word which is a vocal sound in the straightforward sense of having meaning.[18]

When we say that a *dhvani* does not have meaning we do not deny that certain *dhvani* or non-vocal sound unit or units can function as sign or signal of, say, danger or happiness and the like. The sound or *dhvani* of a siren is taken to 'mean' impending air raid or hooting of an owl in the day time may be taken to mean, by some person, future danger. Though the owl does not hoot with the conscious intention to make the listeners aware of any future danger yet when the person in charge of playing the siren plays it he does so with the conscious desire to make the listeners aware of imminent danger so that they may adopt safety measures. Still we do not have a normal morphological (as distinct from mere graphic) representation of the sound of a siren; a siren, in other words, does not emit words and we do not expect such a sound to figure as an entry or item in the dictionary of any language. No grammar takes any note of the sound of a siren. The sound of a siren is not the name of (an) air raid. Nor does it enter into syntactic relation with any word. In short a *dhvani* does not have meaning, at least, in the way in which a *varṇa* has it. Even when a *varṇa* (i.e., vocal sound unit as distinct from non-vocal sound unit or *dhvani*) does not itself have meaning, it can form constituent of a sound that has it (e.g., a word). While a *varṇa* is an element of some meaningful discourse or human speech, a *dhvani* is not so. The former and not the latter is regarded as a component of (human) language produced under normal circumstances by men when they speak something.

Uttering a vocal sound (*varṇa*), unlike the production of a *dhvani*, is a process which is (normally) initiated consciously. So far therefore no vocal sound is produced except through some conscious process or consciously initiated process of utterance. One uttters a (token of a type of) vocal sound if one had heard it earlier, can remember it now and desires to produce (another new token like) it (again). In addition an utterer normally (i.e., for the purpose of communication) utters a finite sequence of certain

vocal sounds (representable as sequence of groups of certain letters) which we call words or a sentence. In other words he utters (single) vocal sounds (or *varṇa*) not in isolation but only as a part of a word (or somehow of a sentence). Thus the utterance of a vocal sound is (at least in standard cases) also determined by the desire to communicate and by some relevant knowledge. What follows from all these is that unlike *dhvani,* a vocal sound is produced directly or indirectly by some relevant belief including the belief about the things the information about which is being sought to be cammunicated by the speaker through his utterances. The words corresponding to these things constitute the sentence which is uttered with a view to communicate the information. These things are also called word-meanings.

V

Let us return to the definition of linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*) or the accredited source of knowledge proper which is called *śabda.* There are two views both of which can somehow be traced to Gautama. According to one view knowledge or awareness of (*śabda*) vocal sound being uttered is *śabda pramāṇa,* while according to the other the the vocal sound being known at the moment, is itself the accredited source of knowledge called *śabda*. I shall have occasion to explain these views. For our present purpose it is enough to note that Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabda pramāṇa* is in line with the second view.[19] Thus vocal sound itself (as being known), rather than its knowledge is the accredited source called linguistic means *śabda pramāṇa.* In other words, *śabda* is instrumental in the production of certain kn[illegible]e proper. This knowledge consists in the understanding of a properly formed sentence whether written or spoken. Anyway, Gāngeśa defines *śabda pramāṇa* in the first place as *śabda* or sound. So in the definiens part of $\acute{S}_2$ Gaṅgeśa includes the word *śabdaḥ.* The definition of the accredited source of knowledge called *śabda pramāṇa* is, so far, *śabdaḥ* (vocal sound). But considered as the complete definition of *śabda pramāṇa,* this is too wide. For this definition covers cases which are not or are not regarded as *śabda pramāṇa.* A *dhvani* is as much a *śabda* as a *varṇa,* but a *dhvani*

(or set of *dhvani-s*) is not a *śabda pramāṇa* even when it is being known; for it does not yield the sort of knowledge which *śabda pramāṇa* is supposed to yield. When we hear a *dhvani* we certainly have perceptual experience of it and so far the *dhvani* can be said to yield knowledge of itself. But even when *śabda pramāṇa* is *śabda* itself it is not admitted to yield knowledge of *śabda* but of something *extra-linguistic.* So the definition should be expanded by adding at least such other condition which can exclude *dhvani* or non-vocal sound (unit).

We have seen that a vocal sound (*varṇa*) as distinct from a non-vocal one (*dhvani*) is produced consciously or is so uttered (written); such sounds (or a certain sequence of them) can yield knowledge of extra-linguistic things which a *pramāṇa* is supposed to yield in case of knowledge by verbal testimony. Thus vocal sounds are the effect of knowledge of things whereas a *dhvani* is not. Normally we do not utter *varṇa*-s in isolation. We utter finite number of properly concatenated *varṇa*-s which we call words (and sentences). We utter these words (or sentences) to convey knowledge or information about certain things. If we do not mean to say something or convey some information then we do not, ordinarily, use language; we do not utter or write sentences. Anyway, we cannot define the accerdited source of knowledge called *śabda pramāṇa* as mere *śabda* (sound) for fear of making the definition wide enough to cover *dhvani* or noise as well. So Gaṅgeśa defines it as (*artha jñāna janya śabdaḥ i.e.*) such sound which is produced by awareness of things (or meanings of the words which constitute the sentence uttered.) [We shall discuss later whether the word *artha* in "*artha tattvajñāna*" singnifies word meanings (*padārtha*) or sentence meaning (*vākyārtha*)].

It should be noted, however, that neither every sound (including noise) is produced by the (speaker's) knowledge of things, nor does every knowledge of things produce *varṇa* (or 'meaningful' sound). The production of the variety of sound (*śabda*) called noise (*dhvani*) does not depend on speaker's knowledge of things. On the other hand there is a variety of perceptual cognition of things which do not or cannot produce sound or at least vocal sound or *varṇa.* This variety of perception is known as *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa,* that is, indeterminate, prejudgemental or mere sensory apprehension.

Such cognition apprehends almost all that the corresponding determinate and judgemental perception called *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* apprehends. The latter cannot even come into being unless the corresponding prejudgemental sensory apprehension apprehends what it does. But nothing corresponding to the relation between the thing and its property apprehended in a determinate perception is apprehended in the corresponding simple apprehension which is essentially a non-relational form of awareness. This constitutes the basic difference between these two varieties of sensory apprehension or perceptual experience in the broader sense. A further and consequential difference is that while judgemental form of perceptual experience can be and is expressed in language, the simple sensory apprehension defies any lingusitic representation or expression in language. Just as such perceptions cannot be expressed in language, so also no utterance or assertion can be made on their basis. Therefore any awareness of things (including prejudgemental perceptual experience) cannot be said to cause linguistic utterance or produce *śabda* in the sense of vocal sounds or their concatenation. So far we cannot, without qualification, say that vocal sound (of every variety) is produced by awareness of things. Gaṅgeśa accordingly further qualifies the term '*jñāna*', which means awareness, occurring in the definition of *śabda pramāṇa.* The definition in question has so far been 'the *śabda* produced by the awareness of things'. This awareness of things is qualified further as *prayogahetubhūta* i.e., one which is of the nature of cause of *prayoga,* meaning use of language.[20] Indeterminate perceptual experience or simple sensory apprehension does not, as we have seen, satisfy this condition. On the other hand the knowledge of things so qualified is or is capable of producing vocal sound. Alternatively, every *śabda* or vocal sound in the sense defined is produced by the awareness of the relevant things. Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabda pramāṇa* till now has been sound '(*śabda*) produced by such awareness of things as can cause utterance (of vocal sound) or use of language'. This means the same thing as vocal sound produced by determinate awareness is that accredited source of knowledge proper which is called *śabda.* We shall see later that nothing short of a sentence can actually be regarded as *śabda* so qualified and hence as *śabdapramāṇa*.[21]

Even this expanded definition is inadequate. We have specified in the definiens first the sound (*śabda*) and then the awareness of the things (*arthajñāna*) by adding suitable conditions or qualifications. But as it stands at present the definition is too wide; it can apply to such (vocal) sound which is not admitted to be an accredited source of knowledge proper. To be considered as such a source a *śabda* or any other thing must be a cause of knowledge proper, that is to say, it must be the cause of some non-recollective true belief. But any use of language cannot succeed in producing such belief. Even a liar or a deceiver uses language. The very fact that he uses language consciously to cause (false) belief in his hearer shows that he has relational or judgemental awareness of things. But *ex hypothesi* what he says is not the case. The belief he produces in an unsuspecting listener is a false belief. There may again be persons who speak on the basis of false awareness of things though they themselves do not know that their awareness is false. What they say or the belief their words produce in a hearer may not be true.[22] In such cases *śabda* uttered cannot be *pramāṇa*, even though it satisfies the conditions laid down so far i.e., being the sound produced by such awareness of things as is the cause of use of language. So to be *śabda pramāṇa* it is not enough for the *śabda* (words or sentence) to be produced or uttered on the basis of (some) determinate awareness of things. The awareness of things must have to be true also. On the other hand the condition of being a (finite sequence of) sound which is produced by knowledge of (relevant) things is satisfied by such sound which serves the purpose of an accredited source of knowledge. The complete definition of *śabda pramāṇa,* that is, of *śabda* which is the accredited source of knowledge proper is therefore this: *Śabda pramāṇa* (or linguistic means) is such (*śabda* or finite series of) sound as is produced by true awareness of things which (awareness) causes use of language. The sentence $\acute{S}_2$ embodies or expresses this definition.

VI

It may be objected that this definitional statement contains at least one word in excess. We do not need to qualify awareness of things by both the proprties of being true and being cause of the use of

language. For though every awareness that determines use of language is not true yet every true awareness is determinate awareness and hence has the nature of being a cause of (actual or possible) use of language. So, compared with the possible shorter definition that *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* or accredited source of knowledge is a finite series of vocal sound produced by true awareness of things, Gaṅgeśa's definition which further specifies this awareness as the cause of the use of language, is unnecessarily longer. Against such an objection we do not have any good defence to offer in favour of Gaṅgeśa's definition. We cannot defend it without taking an amount of liberty in the interpretation of the expression "*artha*", which may appear to be excessive, and without turning the definition imcompatible with the fact of or belief about linguistic automomy or creativity. I would like to note in passing some other interpretation of the sentence $\acute{S}_2$. But I would like to remark first that if the insertions in $\acute{S}_2$ are made in the order in which they have been explained in the preceding paragraphs then each of the insertions turns out necessary. I, in any case, prefer to interpret $\acute{S}_2$ in the way I did and I am inclined to take the above definition or the definition as explained above to have been intended by Gaṅgeśa.

Before I pass on to the other interpretation of $\acute{S}_2$, I would like to return to the problem of interpreting the word *artha* occurring in the definiens part of $\acute{S}_2$. This will further confirm the redundancy of the insertion *prayoga hetubhūta* or having the nature of being the cause of the use of language or linguistic expressions like word. Some definite and finite sequence of words i.e., a sentence, regarded as the accredited source of knowledge called *śābda,* is produced consciously. The consciousness which precedes and causally determines the utterance of words in a sequence (identified as a sentence) consists in the knowledge or awareness of *artha.* But what are we to understand by "*artha*"? We may take the word to signify either the meaning of the words i.e., *padārtha* or the meaning of the sentence i.e., *vākyārtha.* (In whichever sense we take it the purpose of distinguishing *varṇa* from *dhvani* is equally served.) A hearer's understanding of a sentence is causally determined by his recollective awareness of the *meanings of the words* of the sentence. When a sentence is uttered the hearer has

in the first place auditory perception of the words of the sentence being uttered in a definite sequence.[23] Then he remembers the respective meanings of these words. Finally he arrives at the knowledge of the fact constituted by these word-meanings as related. The hearer's understanding of a sentence consists in the linguistic knowledge of this fact. This knowledge is called *śābda jñāna* or verbal (i.e., sentential) belief. When this belief is true, it is called (since it is non-recollective also) a *śābda pramā*. The auditory perception of words uttered in a sequence or such words themselves as being perceived are therefore instrumental in the production of *śābda pramā*.[24] Thus though *śabda pramā* or the hearer's correct understanding of a sentence is determined by the (memory) awareness of the meanings of words, this memory does not causally determine the speaker's utterance of the words which (as asserted i.e., uttered or written) constitute the *śābda pramāṇa*. For the words uttered by the speaker is instrumental in the production of the hearer's *śābda bodha* in so far as they are being known by the hearer. Therefore, even if the source of verbal knowledge called *śabda* is produced (*janya*) by *artha-jñāna* or awareness of the meaning (i.e., *artha*), the word "meaning" here cannot be interpreted as the things meant or recalled by the words. It should mean rather the significance of the sentence being uttered. We find when a speaker consciously utters a sentence to describe a fact he already knows the fact he is going to describe by uttering a suitable sentence. The speaker could have obtained this knowledge of fact from any accredited source such as perception or inference.[25] In other words, the speaker might have perceived or inferred certain fact which he now wants to describe. His wanting to describe the fact to a certain hearer is the same thing as his desire to produce in that hearer a linguistic knowledge of the same fact. Now having had perception or inference of the fact and desire to describe it to a hearer, the speaker recalls the words corresponding to the things which constituted the fact. Then he utters these words in a definite sequence so that the hearer may know how the things are related in the fact being described. Thus the production of a sentence is causally determined both by the awareness of sentence meaning (or *vākyārtha*) and by the (memory) cognition of the relevant words. If therefore *śabda pramāṇa* is

defined as (the sequence of) words produced by the knowledge of the meaning (*artha*), we are to understand by "meaning" *vākyārtha* or fact being described or signified by the sentence (or the sequence of words), in question. But when *artha* is so understood, the condition 'has the nature of being cause of use of language' becomes redundant. For knowledge of *vākyārtha* is necessarily determinate or *savikalpaka*. This condition was earlier found to be rendered unnecessary by the inclusion of the condition that the knowledge in the definiens should mean correct knowlege or true belief.

VII

We now try a second way of reconstructing or interpreting Gaṅgeśa's definition of '*śabda pramāṇa*'. This time we take $\acute{S}_2$ as it is in the original (without expanding it by including a second occurrence of the word *śabda*, as if Gaṅgeśa intended this to be repeated from $\acute{S}_1$ at the end of $\acute{S}_2$ i.e., after the word *pramāṇam, to give us as definiendum 'pramāṇam śabdaḥ'* leaving the first occurrence of "*śabda*" to form a part of the definiens). $\acute{S}_2$ reads in the original "*prayogahetubhūtārthatattvajñānajanyaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam*". We take this sentence to have both a definiens and a definiendum part. The last word alone cannot, for reasons stated earlier, constitute the definiendum. The definiendum part is constituted by the last two words. The word '*pramāṇam*' in the definiendum "*śabdah pramāṇam*" is taken to mean accredited source or means of knowledge proper, by which is meant true and non-recollective belief. In other words, the expression *pramāṇam* refers to anything that is instrumental in the production of some knowledge proper. According as the "knowledge" (or "*pramā*") occurring in the explication of the word "*pramāṇam*" differs in kind the kind of means (*pramāṇa*) also differs; and different words are used for these different *pramāṇa*-s. When this knowledge is perceptual or is an inference, the *pramāṇa* or the special means is called (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) perceptual means or (*anumāna pramāṇa*) inferential means respectively. When the knowledge proper produced by a *pramāṇa* is the knowledge one has when one understands a sentence, i.e., when this knowledge is linguistic or sentential or *śābda* (so called because it is derived from a

sentence or *śabda* or language) the *pramāṇa* is called *śabda pramāṇa.* Anyway, the definiendum here is the instrument of production of true and non-recollective belief or linguistic knowledge. This instrument is called *śabda.* In other words, the accredited source of knowledge called *śabda* (because it is instrumental in the production of some proper variety of knowledge derived from hearing language or linguistic utterance) is being defined in $\acute{S}_2$. Thus "*prayogahetubhūtārthatattvajñānajanyaḥ*" is the definition of "*śabdaḥ pramāṇam*" or the accredited source of knowledge proper which is known as *śabda.*

To proceed in the reverse order, Gaṅgeśa includes as the first defining condition the property of being *janya.* If a thing is to be a *śabda pramāṇa* it must be caused (*janya*).[26] But this is not a sufficient condition. For many things are there which are caused, say, a table or a noise which is not a linguistic means of knowledge or *śabda-pramāṇa.* To expand the definition by adding the word *jñāna* (or belief) will not do either. For though the condition '*Jñānajanyaḥ*' or 'caused by (some) belief' excludes things like non-vocal sound (*dhvani*) yet it covers say determinate cognition or *savikalpaka jñāna.* This type of cognition is entirely different from words or linguistic means. The Naiyāyika-s admit a pre-judgemental awareness which cannot be articulated in language. But this is an act of awareness or *jñāna* none the less. And though such indeterminate awareness cannot causally determine one's use of language, it is a condition for the production of the corresponding judgemental awareness which in its turn can cause vocal sound. This latter cognition is therefore something what is caused by *jñāna* or belief, and yet it is not a *śabda pramāṇa.* Thus as definition of *śabda pramāṇa,* the condition '*jñāna janya*' or 'caused by (some) belief' is too wide. This defect is rectified by the inclusion of the condition *prayogahetubhūta.* To be regarded as linguistic means (*śabda pramāṇa*) it is not enough for a thing to be caused by (some) belief (*jñana janya*); it must further be caused by such belief as is by nature the cause of use of language(i.e., *prayogahetubhūta*). In other words, the belief, to be caused by which has been offered as a necessary condition included in the definition in question, must [not only be a cause of determinate (*savikalpaka*) awareness called linguistic knowledge

but] be itself a determinate awareness. Now the definition reads, *śabda pramāṇa* is what is caused by a belief of the kind which causally determines the use of language. Though any determinate cognition is of this kind yet a determinate awareness of the meaning of a sentence alone can cause what can pass for a *śabda pramāṇa.* Thus instead of defining *śabda pramāṇa* as what is caused by belief of a kind which can causally determine our use of language Gaṇgeśa defined it as what is caused by a determinate awareness of *artha* or, as we may even interpret it, *padārtha* i.e., things constituting the fact to be expressed by the sentence in question. These things are word-meanings. Whoever utters a sentence consciously already knows not only the fact being described by the sentence but also the things constituting the fact and meant by the words composing the sentence in question. Even if the utterance of a sentence is directly caused by the knowledge of the sentence meaning, it is also determined by the knowledge of the relevant word-meanings. It is a definite sentence which is produced by the determinate awareness of the meaning of the (relevant) words. And its being caused by the determinate awareness of the *artha* i.e., meanings (of the words) is what makes a thing (a sentence) a *śabda pramāṇa.* If this were so then *prayogahetubhūtārthajñānajanyaḥ* could alone have been given as definition. But Gaṅgeśa has inserted a further condition, 'true', in the definition to be satisfied by a *śabda pramāṇa.* The idea is this. A person who is, unknown to himself, mistaken about a fact may produce in good faith a sentence which actually misdescribes the fact. Such a sentence satisfies all the conditions stated so far and yet it gives the hearer a wrong idea or produces in him a false belief. Such a sentence cannot therefore be regarded as a *pramāṇa,* (the general definition of *pramāṇa* being what it is). To exclude such false sentences the definition of *śabda pramāṇa* should further specify the determinate awareness of meaning as true awareness. The complete definition of a *śabdapramāṇa* or linguistic means is therefore what is produced (*janya*) by such true awareness of meanings (*arthatattvajñāna*) which induces the use of language (*prayogahetubhūta).*

We can make sense of all the insertions in yet another way. To be caused (*janyah*) is not enough for being considered as a *śabda pramāṇa.* Our desire is jñāna janya or is caused by some

belief. Therefore *śabda pramāṇa* cannot even be defined simply as what is caused by some awareness or *jñāna.* If, however, it is defined as what is produced by the knowledge of meaning of words, then the definition will not cover such things as desire.[27] Though in a sense everything is a *padārtha* yet knowledge of things as word-meanings causes utterance of relevant words and sentences in a sense in which it does not cause any other thing. But this the knowledge of word-meanings can do provided the knowledge in question is not indeterminate. For while an indeterminate awareness is awareness of things, and though everything is an *artha* if the expression means *padārtha* or word-meaning yet indeterminate awareness of things cannot cause the use of language or be *prayogahetu.* Therefore to be a *śabda pramāṇa* a thing should be caused by or be the effect of determinate awareness (*prayogahetubhūtajñāna*) of meanings of words *artha*). But even a fase sentence can be so caused. Such a sentence cannot be regarded as linguistic means or *śabda pramāṇa.* From a false sentence a hearer can *derive* only false belief while nothing is a *pramāṇa* unless it causes only true belief. The possibility of his definition covering a false sentence is removed by Gaṅgeśa's insertion of *tattva* or true as the adjective of the determinate awareness of word meanings. Thus the complete definition of *śabda pramāṇa* as has been given by Gaṇgeśa is, that which is caused by such awareness of meanings of words which is both true and is of a kind which has the nature of being a cause of use of language.

VIII

So far I have given three different interpretations of Gaṅgeśa's statement $\acute{S}_2$ i.e. the second sentence or passage of the fourth or *Śabda* part of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*[28] But I have left the definition of Gaṅgeśa vague in so far as it contains the word *artha.* We should say clearly if the expression is to be understood to mean word-meaning (*padārtha*) or sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). In view of what Gaṅgeśa has said elsewhere we can justifiably take him to have intended that we understand sentence-meaning by the word "*artha*" occurring in the definition $\acute{S}_2$. But there is evidence to show that the Naiyāyika-s were fully aware of and accepted what is called (linguistic autonomy and) creativity.[29] And it seems

that no one can consistently hold both that a competent speaker of a language can produce and understand a sentence never met before and that the speaker's utterance of a sentence is caused by his previous understanding of that sentence—perhaps another token of the same sentence type. This is the deeper source of resistance against taking the word "*artha*" as occurring in $\acute{S}_2$ to mean sentence meaning. This is not perhaps the only possible objection against such interpretation. But we should also try to find out what could possibly be Gaṅgeśa's reason for defining linguistic means in terms of sentence-meaning or, if that is still not settled, by using the vague word "*artha*".

The *Saṃskrita* word for special means or accredited source of knowledge proper is *pramāṇa.* This word is derived from the word *pramā* (or better *pra* and *mā*) which is used in philosophical parlance or, particularly, in Nyāya literature in the sense of proper knowledge or true and non-recollective belief. There are two different ways in which *Saṃskrita grammar permits the derivation of the word pramāṇa* from the word *pramā.* Derived in one of these ways the word *pramāṇa* differs from the word *pramā* only in form but not in meaning. Both the terms signify the same thing, true and non-recollective belief. Derived in the second way the word *pramāṇa* signifies, not what the word *pramā* signifies but, the special means (*karaṇa*) of *that* i.e., the condition which is instrumental in the production of the *pramā.* For facility of understanding we shall here use the word *pramāṇa* only in the sense of *karaṇa* or special means or accredited source of *pramā* while by *pramā* we shall understand knowledge proper. But when Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.3 enumerated the four *pramāṇa*-s it is not clear whether he intended to enumerate the four distinct kinds of knowledge (*pramā*) or four distinct means or *source* (*pramāṇa* in our sense) of them.[30] While defining the first three *pramāṇa*-s, at least, Gautama had only different *pramā*-s in mind explicity. And since he defined them in terms of their distinct sources we know from his definitions what these three distinct sources are. But we do not know the definition of these sources. Thus Gautama defines perceptual knowledge, the first of the four distinct kinds of knowledge proper (*pramā*) admitted in his school, in terms of its special means, the sense object contact

(*indriyārthasannikaraṣa*). This sort of contact is instrumental in causing perceptual knowledge. We therefore, come to know that perceptual means is (or consists in) the contact of the sense organs with their respective objects. In the same way we know from Gautama's definition of inferential type of knowledge that certain particular perceptual knowledge, that is, perception of certain particular things, especially causes inference and constitutes inferential means. So far Gautama has pursued a consistent plan of defining the recongnised types of knowledge (*pramā*) and thereby informing us of what the respective *pramāṇa*-s or sources of knowledge are though this falls far short of *defining* the *paramāṇa*-s themselves. Gautama, however, did not offer any explicit definition of linguistic or verbal knowledge (*śābda pramā*) consisting in the hearer's understanding of some sentence. Instead he explicitly defines what is the means of linguistic knowledge viz. language or *śabda* itself. Now *śabda* is not a kind of knowledge whereas any *pramā* is. Nor does Gautama clearly say what if anything is caused by language, while he said in case of each of the first three kinds of knowledge defined what causes it. Anyway, Gautama defined *śabda* and it is clear from the context that *śabda* being defined is a *pramāṇa* in one of the two senses. Now since it is not *pramāṇa* in the sense of *pramā* or some kind of knowledge proper, it is *pramāṇa* in the sense of means of *pramā*.

Gaṅgeśa is explicit in his definition of *śabda* that what is being defined is not just *śabda* but *pramāṇa śabda*[31] or (some form of) language which is a means of certain variety of knowledge proper. Now when in the standard case certain linguistic experssion produces knowledge it produces knowledge in the hearer.[32] So the definition of *śabda* aims at defining the linguistic means or special (linguistic) cause of hearer's knowledge or the knowledge which a man derives from words heard. If the definiendum is, what '*śabda*' means— the cause of hearer's knowledge then we can understand what this *śābda pramāṇa* is if we know the causal account of hearer's knowledge. And the definition of *śabda pramāṇa* should not conflict with what we thus come to know the *śabda pramāṇa* to be. In other words, though *śabdapramāṇa* has not been defined by Gautama or Gaṅgeśa as the cause (*janaka*) of *śabda pramā,* though we are not even told incidentally what the cause of the

linguistic knowledge is yet the definition must not be incompatible with the acceptable causal account of hearer's knowledge.[33] From the standard causal account we know that perception of words or sentence causes hearer's knowledge jointly with some other knowledge. If Gautama defined *śabda pramāṇa* in the sense of a variety of knowledge, in some such way as the knowledge, which is caused by perception of words, then his definition of *śabda pramāṇa* would follow the same pattern as his definitions of the first two *pramāṇa*-s. For excepting the perceptual (kind of) knowledge, the types of knowledge defined so far has been defined as the effect of some knowledge or other. Inference is caused by certain knowledge including the perception of the ground of inference. *Upamiti* or the knowledge based on analogy is caused by some knowledge including perception of resemblance. And now the linguistic knowledge is, and as it is defined generally by the later day Naiyāyika-s, caused by the hearer's perception of the words being uttered.[34]

We do not have very good explanation to offer why in case of the last *pramāṇa* Gautama changed his style of defining the respective types of knowledge in terms of their special causes (and thereby informing us of what the corresponding causes or *pramāṇa*-s are). If he gave the definition of *śabda pramā* first then, given the general definition of *pramāṇa* or source, as the special or instrumental condition of the (type of) *pramā* (in question), nothing substantial would have been left unsaid about the definition of *pramāṇa*. Could it be the case that this anomaly in Gautama escaped the notice of Gaṅgeśa. Otherwise why did the father of the new tradition in Nyāya followed Gautama so closely ? He too suddenly changed the procedure of defining *pramāṇa*-s when he came to define *śabda pramāṇa*. While defining the other three *pramāṇa*-s he took *pramāṇa* to mean in the first instance *pramā*. Thus after he has defined perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge and knowledge based on analogy, and when he is expected to define linguistic *knowledge,* Gaṅgeśa proceeds to define linguistic *means.* And here too he did not define linguistic means in a general way as the special cause of linguistic knowledge after offering some non-causal definition of this type of knowledge (to avoid circularity).[35] Even if he difined linguistic means as special

cause of linguistic knowledge and offered a causal account of any single instance of such knowledge we would have (most likely) gathered that the linguistic means consisted in the perception of words associated with the recollection of word-meanings. The definition of linguistic knowledge in terms of these causes is the standard definition of the later day Naiyāyika-s to be found in the standard text books of *navyanyāya.* [36] We have reason to believe that Gaṅgeśa or Gautama would accept the definition of linguistic knowledge as the knowledge which is caused by the perception of words together with the recollection of word-meanings. Nor would they dispute the causal account of linguistic knowledge lying behind this definition. Their preference for separate definition shall have to be accounted for otherwise. But if the standard definition of the later day Naiyāyika-s is accepted then one can derive a definition of linguistic means which is different (though not materially) from Gautama's or Gaṅgeśa's definition of this means. The definition that could be derived is that linguistic means (*śabda pramāṇa*) is the perceptual awareness of words together with the memory of their meaning.[37]

Gaṅgeśa never defines linguistic *knowledge* nor does he define linguistic means as knowledge of words etc. He rather defines linguistic *means* and defines it as certain kind of words. In this he follows Gautama closely without noticing the anomaly in the latter's procedure.[38] If the linguistic means were defined in the standard way of the later day Naiyāyika-s even then *arthajñāna* would form a 'part' of the definiens.But the expression "*artha*" would then mean word-meaning, (*padārtha*) and not sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). It is, however, not equally certain that in the actual definition offered by Gaṅgeśa the word "*artha*" cannot mean word-meaning, though it seems more natural to take it to mean sentence-meaning.[39] For given that hearer's knowledge is produced by words forming a sentence, it is almost a common sense that such sentence is caused by the prior knowledge of the fact which the sentence is used to describe. This fact is the meaning of the sentence in question. A linguistic act consists in conscious use or utterance by some speaker of a sentence with a view to impart to some hearer the knowledge of the fact the sentence is being used to describe. It follows that one cannot consciously use a

sentence to describe some fact unless one knows the fact and also knows the words or the sentence that might be used to describe it successfully.[40] Thus the (utterance of) the words which produce hearer's knowledge and as such constitute linguistic means (*śābdapramāṇa*) are themselves caused by the knowledge of the appropriate fact which the sentence means. A linguistic means is therefore words[41] caused by the knowledge of what the sentence means, for this knowledge causally determines the use or utterance (*prayoga*) of the words or sentence (which produces linguistic knowledge in the hearer). Thus the knowledge of what a sentence-means (*arthatattvajñāna*) and the cause of the use of word (*prayogahetu*) are one and the same thing. But these two descriptions are only extensionally the same; they are otherwise different. They are different descriptions of the same thing, namely, certain knowledge. Certain knowledge is there which is the knowledge of relevant fact a sentence 'means'; and the knowledge which causes utterance of relevant words. This knowledge of what a sentence means causes the use of the words which in their turn cause the linguistic knowledge of the hearer. The words so caused, *arthatattva jñānajanya śabda,* rather than the knowldege of them, constitute the linguistic means of knowledge or accredited source of linguistic knowledge.

To subscribe to the view stated above is, however, to over interpret the common sense that the performance of a particular linguistic act or utterance of a particular sentence causally depends on the prior knowledge of the fact which the sentence is being used to describe. The commonsense belief in question does not imply that the knowledge of the fact in question is *linguistic* or derived from some other *sentence.* Therefore the prior knowledge of fact cannot be interpreted *strongly* to mean the knowledge of sentence-meaning. In the strict sense of the term a linguistic knowledge is a knowledge which consists in the understanding of a sentence. In a weaker sense the non-linguistic knowledge of fact required as cause of production of speech may also be said to be the knowledge of sentence-meaning.[42] For the object or content of this non-linguistic knowledge of the speaker is (almost) the same as the content of the hearer's knowledge derived differently. The fact is objectively the same for the speaker and the hearer. But

the hearer knows the fact as the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha*), in the case of the speaker it is not so or, at least, not so necessarily.[43] Thus the words which constitute linguistic means are caused (*janya*) by the prior knowledge of relevant fact or the fact to be described by the words being produced. It does not however follow that they are produced by the knowledge of relevant sentence-meaning. It has further been urged that the knowledge of fact—whether or not this fact is the sentence meaning—is not the cause of production of speech. The utterance of a sentence is immediately preceded by the relevant desire to communicate certain information to the hearer. So what causally determines the production of speech is, strictly speaking, some relevant act of desire but not any cognitive act, let alone the knowledge of the sentence meaning.[44] If, again, the knowledge of the sentence meaning, in the strict sense of the term, were to causally determine the speaker's utterance of words for the purpose of communication then the speaker could communicate linguistically only those information which he himself derived from language as source. He could use only such sentence to communicate his thought to the hearer which was earlier adderssed to him by some other speaker. But to accept this is to deny the fact of a linguistic creativity.[45]

What in fact causally determines the (speaker's) production of speech or words is, it seems, the prior knowledge not of sentence-meaning but of word-meanings. Once certain fact is known perceptually, inferentially or by some other means, that is to say, once one has some knowledge, including non-linguistic knowledge, of some fact, one may intend to communicate and communicate linguistically. Now the constituents of the fact one had known while knowing the fact are all meaning of respective words. That is to say, they are associated with the respective words in so for as the words stand to them in the meaning relation. When one knows the constituents of a fact one may be reminded of the words associated with these constituents. Generally speaking, certain non-linguistic knowledge of fact (giving rise to), the memory of words standing for the constituents of the fact and desire to communicate belong to the set of causal conditions responsible for the production of speech or of the words or sentence the speaker utters. The *fact* known non-linguistically by the speaker is not

however, associated by meaning relation with the sentence.[46] So the knowledge of the fact cannot lead to the recollection of the relevant sentence in the way in which knowledge of the things or the constituents of a fact can remind us of the associated words. No fact, not even the fact which is the 'meaning' of a sentence i.e., *vākyārtha* is the meaning, in the strict and primary sense, of any linguistic expression.[47] What causes the words, that is the utterance of them, is not the previous knowledge of the sentence-meaning, for there is no such knowledge; the words (i.e., the sentence) are caused by the knowledge of the *things* which are the meaning of the *words* used. Related as they are with the words by meaning relation the things remind the speaker of these words when they are being known by the speaker. The words which constitute linguistic means and which the speaker utters while performing the relevant linguistic act are caused by the speaker's knowledge of the meaning of them. Therefore, by "knowledge of meaning" or *arthajñāna* we can and should understand, in the context of Gaṅgeśa's definition of linguistic means, word-meaning rather than sentence-meaning. It is the knowledge of word-meaning (or *padārthajñāna*) which is the cause of (*prayoga* or) use or utterance (*uccāraṇa*) of words constituting the sentence. Which really functions as linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*) is (*vākya* or) sentence (as source of knowledge). This is consistent with what is undisputably the Nyāya position that the knowledge of sentence-meaning can be had only from linguistic means. If this linguistic means were also held by the Naiyāyika-s to consist in or include the knowledge of sentence meaning or *vākyārthatattvajñāna* then their theory would be vitiated by circularity or infinite regress. Again they could not justify the necessity of admitting language as an additional means of knowledge in a theoretical discipline if the knowledge this means is supposed to yield could be derived from some other source as well. If any knowledge of sentence-meaning plays any role in the production of speech which is to function as linguistic means, it must not necessarily be the linguistic knowledge of the fact which constitutes the sentence meaning. So far as the speaker is concerned he has knowledge of word-meaning on the basis of which he utters words leading to the linguistic knowledge of the hearer.[48]

Much of these difficulties of interpretation could be avoided if Gaṅgeśa (and for that matter Gautama) defined linguistic means from the side of the knower or the owner of the knowledge that results from this means. This knower in the case of linguistic knowledge is the hearer. For what immediately precedes the linguistic knowledge of the hearer is not words but knowledge (auditory perception) of the words[49] along with the intervening recollection of the word-meanings. There is obviously no knowledge of sentence-meaning, so far as the hearer is concerned, prior to the sentential knowledge he acquires at the end. So the causally prior knowledge that functions as means of hearer's linguistic knowledge cannot be the knowledge of sentence-meaning. This means is none the less the linguistic means or *śabdapramāṇa.* So if one proceeds from the side of the hearer one can easily realise that *śabdapramāṇa* consists in such knowledge of the hearer as can cause in him another knowledge, the linguistic knowledge.[50] But the knowledge of the hearer which causes his linguistic knowledge cannot be a knowledge about sentence-meaning in the strict sense of the term. For in that case the causing knowledge would itself be the linguistic knowledge, which is, admittedly, the knowledge of the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). Linguistic means is the special cause of the linguistc knowledge of the hearer. The cause of an effect cannot be anything except what necessarily precedes the effect in a sense in which it is not separated from the effect by any intervening condition except the *vyāpāra.* Neither the words uttered by the speaker (or their utterance) nor the speaker's knowledge of the relevant fact can be said to precede in this sense the hearer's linguistic knowledge. In the required sense the hearer's perception of the words and his recollection of the meanings of these words precede (his own) linguistic knowledge. Thus if one approaches from the side of the hearer there is no possibility of mistaking sentence-meaning as the meaning the knowledge of which especially causes linguistic knowledge and hence, constitutes linguistic means (or *śabdapramāṇa*). *Śabdapramāṇa* if it consists in any knowledge of meaning it is the knowledge of the meaning of words and not of the sentence. The approach and the view of *śabdapramāṇa* just sketched are familiar as the standard position of the later day

Naiyāyika-s.

This standard *navyanyāya* position which accords the status of means not to the words or their utterance but to the (hearer's) knowledge of words (*padajñāna*) has this further argument to support it. We can communicate not only by uttering words but also through our writings and bodily gestures. Since the same content is or can be communicated in each case, the knowledge of the person to whom the information is communicated, is regarded as linguistic knowledge. The theory is that the person, to whom the writing is addressed or the gesture is directed, infers or remembers the associated words. And since (or if) the person knows the meaning of these words, he derives the (linguistic) knowledge he would have derived directly had the communicator actually uttered the words in questtion. In any case, where communication is made through bodily gestures no words are uttered, and so far no words are being known at the moment (*jñāyamāna*). But nonetheless the knowledge of words is there. Thus the knowledge of words, such as the hearer of a sentence has, is there in every case where linguistic knowledge is produced. So if the source or means of knowledge is understood to signify speical cause of the knowledge in question then linguistic means is the knowledge of words (*padajñāna* or *śabdajñāna*) but not words (*pada* or *śabda*) themselves.

Why did not the father of *navyanyāya* (or the tradition of modern *nyāya*) offer this less confusing and more justified definition of linguistic means which became widely familiar among the later day Naiyāyika-s ? Why did he say that words (of certain description) themselves constitute linguistic means ? Well, it is inadequate if not wrong to take as linguistic means the (hearer's) perception of words and his memory of the meaning of these words. For linguistic means is supposed to produce not just belief about the relevant fact or sentence meaning but *true* (and non-recollective) belief about the same. But a hearer can have the (right) perception of words and memory of word-meanings and yet may fail to derive any *true* belief about fact. Such is the case when the hearer hears a sentence which is false though he does not know it to be so. Suppose one is told that 'George Elliot is the author of the work *Murder in the Cathedral*' or 'An argument

is valid only if the implicative behind it is a tuatology'. The hearer hears the words and remembers the meaning of them. consequently he has the belief that George Elliot is the arthor of the work *Murder in the Cathedral* or that an argument is valid etc. But this resulting belief is false and the hearer's knowledge of words fails to qualify for the title *pramāṇa* even though it duly causes the linguistic belief of the hearer. So either we quilify the resulting linguistic belief as linguistic knowledge or we independently qualify the words the knowledge of which is the linguistic means. Either we define linguistic means as knowledge of words causing true (and) non-recollective linguistic belief (of the hearer) or we define it, say, as knowledge of such words as have been uttered by some properly qualified person or *āpta.*[51] The difficulty with the first way of defining linguistic means is that it is already implicit in it that knowledge of words do not always lead to true linguistic belief. Now to say that such knowledge is a linguistic means if and when it causes true and non-recollective linguistic belief (*śāpdapramā*) is to invite and leave unanswered the quiery 'when does the knowledge of words cause *śābdapramā* ?' One answer is that when the words being known are the words of some trustworthy or authoritative person i.e., *āpta.* Thus the words of some authoritative person (being known at the moment by the hearer) is the special condition which causes the occurrence in the hearer of certain belief which is true. Since the belief is caused by the words it is not recollective also. So we derive the definition of linguistic knowledge proper (or *śābdapramā*) as (certain) true and non-recollective belief caused by the words of *āpta.*[52] Now we see that the approach from the side of the hearer ultimately leads us to the approach from the side of the speaker. Perhaps for reasons such as this that Gautama and Gaṅgeśa preferred to define linguistic means as words of a certain kind, the words the utterance of which by the speaker is determined by latter's knowledge of the relevant fact.

As definition of linguistic means, from the side of the hearer, (hearer's) belief of words (*padajñāna*)[53] is inadequate. To make it adequate we are to further qualify the words as having been produced by (some) authoritative person. Under the circumstances economy can he achieved if linguistic means is defined as words produced (i.e., uttered) by some authoritative person. This way

of defining also conforms to such ordinary usage as 'the matter is known from what he said'.[54] Gautama did not actually define linguistic means in the way the later day Naiyāyika-s define it usually, that is, as consisting in some knowledge of the hearer. He defined it as consisting in the words of some authoritative person. Gaṅgeśa also followed Gautama here. He did not define linguistic knowledge (*śābdapramā*), nor did he define linguistic means as the special cause (*karaṇa*) of some true and non-recollective linguistic knowledge (*śābdapramā*) which the hearer of some linguistic utterance has under suitable condition. He did not define or identify such means as some knowledge of the hearer. Though he did not define it as *āptopadeśa* either, yet what he states is essentially the same definition. For Gautama defined linguistic means as words of authoritative person meaning thereby the words produced or uttered by some authoritative person. Though, as has been explained by Vātsyāyana,[55] the authoritative character includes both cognitive and moral virtues yet the grammatical analysis of the word for authoritative person (*āpta*) in terms of *āpti* or *prāpti* primarily points at the cognitive feature or knowledge. Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti* clearly shows that Gaṅgeśa's definition of linguistic means as words produced by true belief of or about *artha* i.e., meaning and Gautama's definition of the same as words produced by some authouitative person come to the same thing in that an authoritative person is one who has (at least) true belief about *artha* or meaning.[56] Yet Gaṅgeśa is perhaps unwilling to make any reference to the notion of *āpta* because it is one of the characteristic tenets of the Naiyāyika-s that 'the hearer does not require to know that the speaker of the words in question is an authoritative person in order to derive linguistic knowledge or information from these words.[57] Another reason why Gautama preferred to define linguistic means rather than linguistic knowledge (*śābda pramā*) may be that he wanted to postpone for the present the debate with the Vaiśesika-s over the issue "Is there any such thing as *śābdapramā* or linguistic knowledge?". The Vaiśesika-s maintain that what some philosophers identify as a distinct kind of knowledge called linguistic knowledge or *śābdapramā* is really a knowledge of the familiar inferential kind. But even these Vaiśeṣika-s do not dispute that the hearer of an

utterance derives under suitable conditions true belief or *pramā*. So one is likely to face resistance from smaller quarter if one seeks to identify certain words the utterance of which results from some true belief. This mere historical fact or such mere practical consideration of convenience of exposition might have also been the reason why Gaṅgeśa, following Gautama, preferred to define linguistic means first; (and that too not as special means of linguistic knowledge. There is evidence to show that such considerations carry weight with Gaṅgeśa and perhaps, according to Gaṅgeśa, with Gautama as well.[58]

But this way of postponing for the time being the controversy with the Vaiśeṣika-s has the disadvantage of immediately inviting objection from the Mīmāṃsaka-s. For the attempt to define or identify as linguisttic means certain words by specifying the conditions which produce them is to put forward the claim that the words (or sentence) which function as source of knowledge are non-eternal or created words, the words which are produced. This is just the opposite of what the Mīmāṃsaka-s believe to be true. They hold not only that words (*śabda* in some sense) are eternal but also that only the scriptures, consisting of words which have not been produced by any author, can be considered as means of knowledge or correct information. Only in a loose sense, the Mīmāṃsaka-s say, they admit that secular pronouncements are also means of knowledge. The philosophers of both Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika schools agree that ordinary utterances of human being are followed by true belief provided of course these utterances are themselves backed by the true belief about what is being described. To say merely this is not to be committed to the view either that the resulting knowledge is a *pramā* or that it is (*śābdapramā*) *linguistic* knowledge, in the strict sense of the term.

We have found some possible resons why Gaṅgeśa did not begin his account of language by defining linguistic knowledge (*śābdapramā*) and why did he not define linguistic means (*śābdapramāṇa*) as special cause of linguistic knowledge. We also considered if he lost the advantage he gained by opting to define linguistic means rather than linguistic knowledge when he preferred to define it as words that are caused (*janya*). A reason was suggested why Gaṅgeśa made no reference to *āpta* or authoritative speaker

even though he defined linguistic means as words spoken or caused. We need to explain further why did he not define linguistic means as hearer's knowledge of some sort instead of defining it as a knowledge of a kind which a speaker can have. The argument given earlier is inconclusive. For just as hearer's knowledge of words may fail to yield the *pramā* in question if it fails to yield true non-recollective belief so also the utterance of the speaker, based on his true belief about what is being described or *artha*, may fail to yield the knowledge of fact in question if it fails to produce in the hearer the perception of the words uttered. It seems that the definition of linguistic means in terms of speaker's knowledge of meaning (*artha*) provides scope for the Vaiśeṣika to urge that a hearer of some sentence comes to know the fact in question through his knowledge that the speaker uttered the words under reference on the basis of his knowledge of the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). Thus a hearer comes to know the fact described by inferring that the speaker knew the fact, by ascribing belief to the speaker. The knowledge of the fact a hearer has when he hears certain utterance is a case of inferential knowledge. Perhaps to provide *the Vaiśeṣika-s* a natural occasion for stating their rival view in the matter that Gaṅgeśa defined (speaker's) knowledge of *artha* where the ambiguous experssion *artha* can be taken to mean *vākyārtha* or sentence-meaning. The inferential apperhension theory of hearer's knowledge advocated by the Vaiśeṣika-s would be ruled out before it was stated if no room was there for the view that hearer's knowledge depends on the speaker's knowledge of the sentence meaning. The final view of the Naiyāyika-s is that the hearer's knowledge is not or cannot be said to be caused by the speaker's knowledge of the meaning of the words or the sentence in question. In addition to the considerations which have already been offered there is this further consideration. In case of infants or talking birds, at least, there is no knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, though they produce sound or *śabda* which simulate a sentence.

IX

In the third passage, to be reproduced presently, Gaṅgeśa examines a view, allegedly held by some Bauddha philosophers, that there

is no such *pramāṇa* or accredited source of knowledge proper, as *śabda*.[59] This is obviously a view contrary to the Nyāya view in the matter. According to the Naiyāyika-s there *is* such a thing as linguistic means. It is generally believed by the Indian philosophers of different schools that existence or non-existence of a thing is to be settled in terms of our non-contradicted experience (*abādhita anubhava*). On the evidence of experience or knowledge of it that we admit the existence of a thing. The knowledge or *siddhi* to be appealed to can be had through *definition* (*lakṣaṇa*) and *pramāṇa*.[60] *Pramāṇa* in this context should be understood broadly to mean supporting cognitive evidence or argument both positive and negative. Such arguments constitute a necessary part of any philosophical theory. Engaged as he is in expounding the Nyāya theory of linguistic means (*śabda pramāṇa*) it is incumbent on Gaṅgeśa to state both the relevant definition of the thing and the arguments or evidences in favour of it. The idea is this. The first (or the second) step in the construction of a philosophical theory of a thing is the definition of it. The need for starting with a definition is particularly felt in philosophical theories because the nature of the thing such theories seek to reveal is most likely to be controversial. One of the tasks of a philosophical theory is to find evidence for the defensible view about the thing or reject all the views contrary to it. Sometimes, a philosophical theory may offer such interpretation of them that these views turn out to be compatible and coherent. But one cannot discuss—support, reject—or even state or interpret certain controversial views about a thing, without using some term or expression as referring to that thing. In controversial matters a person will simply add further confusion if he does not start by specifying the sense of the term he uses to refer to the thing in question. Take the case of *śabda pramāṇa*. Before he attempted to expound and establish the Nyāya view about *śabda pramāṇa* Gaṅgeśa knew that there were conflicting views about the nature and existence of such a thing. Even a Naiyāyika may refuse to accept *śabdapramāṇa* if certain sense is given to the term, while those who normally deny it will not do so if the word means something other than what they took it to mean when they denied it. In short one's views about or attitude towards a thing called *k* is determined, at least, partially, by the

sense one gives to the expression "*k*". Different theorists will be talking at cross purposes if they do not begin by specifying the sense of the expression they use to refer to the thing being discussed.[61] So it is a common practice with the Indian philosophers, especially of the Nyāya school, where the relevant norm of theorising has been explicitly enunciated, to begin their philosophical theory of a thing by stating the relevant definition. Generally they offer what is called a real definition, but even such a definition, while it distinguishes the things being defined from all other kinds of things, provides adequate criterion for the correct use of the corresponding term. In the last part of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* devoted to expounding the Nyāya theory of *śabda pramāṇa,* Gaṅgeśa has defined *śabda pramāṇa* in the second passage i.e., in $\acute{S}_2$ which marks the actual beginning of the discussion on *śabda.*

The definition offered in $\acute{S}_2$ is intended as a real definition. In other words, the thing called *śabda pramāṇa* i.e., the sentence or sequence of words being known (by the hearer), is believed to actually possess the defining properties. But that *śabda pramāṇa* has such nature or properties is yet to be established or proved; just to define certain things is not to prove that those things have the defining properties in question. If one intends to give not just a stipulative definition then one must be ready to adduce evidence to show that the things in question are in fact characterised by the defining properties. The definition which states a thing to have certain properties neither does nor can prove that the thing really has them. If it could then we would not have needed, in addition to *lakṣaṇa* (definition), some *pramāṇa* or accredited source of knowledge to inform us of what are the truths about the thing so defined. It is only by means of such accredited sources as perception or inference (or language) that we come to know what the thing is, what is its nature and what properties it has or even whether it really has the properties in terms of which it has been defined. Thus even a definition needs to be justified; some accredited source or *pramāṇa* alone can show (i.e., yield knowlege to the effect) that the thing actually is as it has been said to be in the definition. We need a means to know that the thing actually has the properties in terms of which it has been defined. So a real definition is not

an analytic truth; and if for no other purpose, at least for the purpose of justifying the definition—to be correctly informed of the fact that the thing is what it has been defined to be we— need some *pramāṇā.* A philosophical theory which begins by offering a definition of what the theory is about seeks to assert, on the evidence of some *pramāṇa,* certain truths about the nature of the thing being defined including the truth that it has the properties it is assumed in the definition to have. If no means is available which can yield any knowledge or knowledge of these truths then the theory so far fails to determine (*nirūpaṇa*) the nature of the thing. In philosophical theories we resort to the *pramāṇa* not only to establish what we believe to be true about the thing in question or what properties we believe to constitute its definition but also to examine and reject the rival views in the matter. All these constitute philosophical activity or are ingredients of a philosophical theory which aims at establishing truth (*tattva nirṇaya*) about a thing (*artha*) through examination (*parīkṣā*). Not only a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) is given of the thing but also the rival positions (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa*) in the matter are examined. The mere existence of these views leaves us in doubt (*vimarśa*) as to the true nature of the thing (till of course the doubt is resolved).

It may be thought that the distinction between a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and justifying evidence or source of truth (*pramāṇa*) such as perception or inference, is tenuous. It is so at least in case of the definitions which not only provide criteria of the use of the respective terms but also differentiate their respective definiendum from things of every relevant kind. For to say that the definition *D* provides criterion for the use of the word *w* is to say that the definition yields the information that the word *w* correctly applies to a thing (one being defined) if the thing has the property or group of properties mentioned or included in *D*. This is a truth and the defintion yields it. The relevant truth can even have the form of an inference. "The thing *t,* is (correctly) called *w* because it has *D*." So far as a definition yields truth, it qualifies for the title *pramāṇa* or special means of knowledge proper. In response to this suggestion we should ask first, supposing, that the definitions are also *pramāṇa*, what sort of *pramāṇa* a defination could be? Is it perception or inference or verbal testimony? Perception cannot

yield the general truth "Everything which has *D* is called *w*" even if it can know all the things that are called *w*. To reduce the general truth to an infinity of particular truths of the form 'This is called *w* because it has *D*' is of little help. For we can not ascertain such truth by mere sensory perception. We can *hear* people calling the thing *t*, *w*; we can *see* the thing *t* and can even *see* that the *t* has the property *D*. But unless we compare and combine the information yielded by the different sense organs we cannot ascertain the truth in question. Comparing and combining involve on the other hand more than perceiving. They involve complicated judgement of the form "The *t* I saw to have *D* is the same *t* which I hear people call *w*". Even such judgements fall far short of the truth "*t* is called *w* because it has *D*" or that "whatever has *D* is called (or should be called) *w*". If on the other hand it is maintained that the criterion for the use of a word yielded by a definition is really a case of *śabda pramāṇa* then the definition or definitional statement is regarded as yielding the knowledge in question. To take a concrete case, *dravya* or substance is defined as what has quality.[62] From this sentence we can have, according to a Naiyāyika, the knowledge that a *dravya* (substance) is non-distinct from what has *guṇa* (quality). The definition does not so far yield the required knowledge: "A thing should be or is called *dravya* because it has quality". It may, however, be urged that when a definition is said to yield the knowledge about the criterion of the use of the respective word, what is meant is this. The defining property, and not the definitional statement, yields, as ground of the relevant inference, the knowledge that the *t* is called *w*. The inference in question takes the form

This is called a substance
Because this has quality.

The general truth, also suggested by the definition, is that wherever there is absence of the property of being called a substance there is absence of quality also.

So far a definition yields some truth and it is a *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge. As a source it is not distinct from inference; for the knowledge or truth it yields, it yields through an inferential process. In an inference of this kind the defining property functions

as the ground of inference and what is inferred is the truth that '(things in question) are to which the relavant word applies'. In general, to give a definition of a thing referred to in the definitional statement by a certain name or to hold that the definition determines or provides criterion for the correct use of the name in question is to make or allow the inference of the form described above. To take an example: This is the object used (i.e., referred to in the language) as substance, because it has the property which determines the applicability (*vyavahartavyatāvacchedaka dharma*) of the word "substance".[63]

Thus a Naiyāyika who maintains both that a definition determines the correct use of the relevant expression and that the definition is not a source of knowledge, seems to be talking inconsistently. For on this view every definition is an implicit inference yielding a truth of the form that such and such is the object of such and such (correct) use or usage.[64] And so far as the definition (that is, the defining property) functions as the ground for such an inference it (or its knowledge) can be said to yield inferential knowledge. To say this is to say that it is a source of inferential knowledge. Thus definition of a thing is to be counted among the accredited sources of knowledge; it is a case of inference.

In reply we would like to point out in the first place that the Nyāya theory of definition is not inconsistent. For in the theory definition has indeed been said to be a *pramāṇa.* When a definition is admitted as *vyavahāraupayika* (i.e., the source of use of word) what is meant is that the definition yields the knowledge to the effect that the definiendum is to be called (referred to) thus; and when it is or is called *vyāvartaka* (differentiator) a definition yields the conclusion that the definiendum is different from whatever is other than it (or belongs to a different class). Both these cognitions are again admitted as inferential. As source of (such) inferential knowledge a definition cannot but be regarded as the inferential means. What is more, sometimes the Naiyāyika-s even say as much. They say that in most cases a definition is a *bhedānumāpaka hetu.* This exactly means that (such) a definition is the logical ground of the inference of difference i.e., of the inference to the effect that the definiendum is different from whatever is other than it

in the sense explained.

Consistently with this position of the Naiyāyika-s we are to interpret the general belief of the Indian philosophers, including those who belong to the Nyāya school, that (*laksaṇapramāṇābhyām vastu siddhi* i.e.) the truths about a thing is known or established by means of both *laksaṇa* (definition) and *pramāṇa* (accredited source of non-recollective knowledge). So interpreted the belief cannot be taken to entail, what the opponent thought it did, that *laksaṇa* and *pramāṇa* are necessarily different things and for that matter, *laksaṇa* cannot be a *pramāṇa*. It should not be held that definition and means of knowledge are different things or that defining and knowing are acts of different kinds. The general belief in question should be taken to entail that (the truths about) a thing (are) is known or established by means of *laksaṇa* and such *pramāṇa* which is other than *laksaṇa* (not necessarily in kind but, at least individually). The point is that to know a thing completely or really adequately, to arrive at a philosophical theory about it, we need to employ or resort to both the definition and some means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) other than the definition. This is perfectly a valid point and that this is so can easily be ascertained from the following considerations.

In the first place the definition of a thing can tell us very little, if anything at all, about it. It can tell us how we are to talk about the thing in our language i.e., by which word of the language we are to refer to it. It tells us, to put it otherwise, which word we are to use to refer to it when we talk about it in the language in question. At times it can even tell us what experssion some people use for the thing in question and why. This therefore is one truth about the thing, that it is or should be referred to by such and such expression, which a definition yields. If, however, the definition in question is of a type that can differentiate the definiendum from all other things, then the definition yields yet another truth, a second truth, about the thing viz., that the thing is other than whatever is different from it. If what is being defined is a substance and if the definition offered is in terms of differentium, then the second truth yielded by the definition will be that a substance is other than what is not a substance. Beyond these a definition cannot tell us much about the definiendum. This amount of information falls far

short of a complete understanding of the thing. We need to supplement these information by other truths for which we require (other) *pramāṇa*-s. One's knowledge of a thing derived from the definition of it, cannot be cansidered even adequate, let alone complete. So *vastu siddhi,* if it means understanding a thing, requires in adition to definition some other means. This may be perception or the sayings of some reliable persons; it may even be inference provided the latter does not use as logical ground the definition or the defining property of the thing.

We have seen why in a philosophical theory we need to do more than define the thing or things dealt with there; why we should resort to other *pramāṇa*-s. We can go still further. We need to resort to other *pramāṇa*-s not only for further truths but also for the two truths which are said to be yielded by the definition. What we mean to say is that unless a definition receives the support of other *pramāṇa*-s, in a sense to be specified presently, it cannot really yield even the meagre information it has just been said to yield about the thing defined. Let us explain. A definition of a thing has been said to state or entail the truth that the thing is (should be) called such and such. What sort of truth is it ? If defining consisted in adopting certain linguistic convention or if definition were just a convention regarding the use of the relevant term then the truth in question would have been analytic. In that case it would not require any justification. But a Naiyāyika does not view definitions as mere conventions. Even if the use of a word is ultimately determined by the desire of some person, some speaker of the language, yet the desire is to use the word for certain thing which is characterised by the presence of certain properties including the defining properties. Anyway, the truth corresponding to a definition is held by the Naiyāyika-s to be contingent[65]. So it needs to be established or justified. We justify or establish a truth by actually deriving it or by khowing how it can be derived, from some accredited source of knowledge. In other words, we trust some belief or information to be true just in case it has been yielded by some recognised source of knowledge proper.[66] So far therefore to prove, establish or justify a belief purported to be true is, among other things, to identify certain accredited source of knowledge as the source of the truth in question.

The truth corresponding to a definition, or the criterion of the use of the name of the thing defined, usually takes this form. "(The thing) *x* is the referent of the name "x" because it has (the defining property) *F*." Here there are actually two truths related logically. The truth '*x* is the referent of the name "x" or, what is the same thing, *x* has the property of being called by the name "x", is in need of justification. And it is sought to be justified or explained on the ground that '*x* has the property *F*'. The presence of the property *F* in *x* justifies or explains our calling it an *x* . This is really the inferential way of justifying the truth. When a definition is construed as an inference the defining property functions as the ground of the inference (*hetu*). On the basis of the known presence of this property in the definiendum we infer with respect to this definiendum (which is therefore called *pakṣa*) that it is to be called by such and such word (name) (or that it is distinct in kind from whatever belongs to another class whether co-ordinate or not).

We have seen that a definition can be construed as an inference having for its conclusion either of the following two truths about the thing being defined. If *x* is the thing being defined and *D* the definition, the two truths are : (i) *x* is the referent (*vācya*) of the word (or name) "x", and (ii) *x* is other than (what is) other than it. When a definition is construed as yielding these truths, we see how these truths are justified. They are justified in so far as they are yielded by recognised source of knowledge called inference, in particular by the inference of which they are the conclusion. But an inference proves the conclusion it does on the basis of the premise or the logical ground it has. In the present case the definition *D* itself is the ground and, what is the same thing, the truth (iii) that *x* has *D* is the required premiss. In other words when we say that a definition yields the truths of the form (i) or (ii) about the thing being defined, what we mean is that the definition shows that (i) or (ii) may be established or inferred on the basis of the truth (iii). There is also the truth, which generally holds, (iv) that whatever fails to have *D* fails to be called *x*. What a definition proves inferentially, if it proves anything at all, is the truth of the form (i) or (ii). But it does so only on the basis of the truth (iii). But how is this (iii) established ? How do we ascertain that the thing defined i.e., *x* has the defining property *D* ? A definition

which seeks to prove (i) or (ii) on the strength of (iii) cannot itself prove (iii). But unless we can establish (iii) proof of (i) and (ii) remains hypothetical, that is to say, dependent on the assumed truth of (iii). So we need some other *pramāṇa,* to justify (iii) in order that a definition can yield even the only two truths it is believed to yield. We therefore need to admit some other *pramāṇa* in order that a definition can act as a *pramāṇa* in the restricted contexts of knowledge of the criterion of use of relevent words and the knowledge of the difference of the definiendum from other things. In short, if we already know by some *pramāṇa,* other than the definition, in question, that the definition does apply to the definiendum or that the definiendum has the defining property then we can use this fact or truth (or the definition) to yield inferential knowledge (i) or (ii). A definition cannot itself prove that it applies to the things defined or that the latter possesses it (as property). One of the important tasks of a philosopher, after he defines a thing (that is, assumes the thing to have the defining properties), is to examine or establish that the thing defined really is what it has been defined to be (that it has actually the defining properties in question). Thus both for additional truths about the things dealt with in a theory, and to lend support to the definitions so that they can yield limited number of truths about the things concerned we need *pramāṇa*-s other than definition.[67]

X

We would like to return once more to $\acute{S}_2$ and explain it in a slightly different way before we conclude this chapter. We shall not indulge in any thorough discussion or long digression. We shall briefly explain just the definition of *śabda* offered in $\acute{S}_2$ in the familiar style and in as straightforward a way as possible. We take it that here Gaṅgeśa has defined linguistic or verbal means; the word *pramāṇa* occurring in $\acute{S}_2$ signifies means or source of knowledge. Language in the sense of vocal sound or sequence of such sounds is believed to be one such source, at least by the Naiyāyika-s. This linguistic means ("*śabdaḥ pramāṇam*") is the definiendum of the definition given in $\acute{S}_2$. What we need to explain now is the definiens part or the rest of $\acute{S}_2$. This we shall try to do in the familiar way by explaining the need and significance of each constituent part

of the definiens.

The definiens part of the definition has two broad divisions or constitutents: (a) *prayogahetubhūta* meaning, [caused by] the conditions which produce the vocal sounds and (b) *artha-tattvajñānajanya* or 'caused by the true belief about the meaning of the words; these are the words which compose the sentence which a speaker utters when he uses linguistic means. The descriptions or specifications provided in these two divisions relate to the same thing. So the definiens part is really a conjunctive statement: 'What is caused by the conditions which produce the vocal sounds and what is caused by the true belief about the meaning of the words'. This 'what' is identical with the definiendum. Thus the whole sentence $\acute{S}_2$ is a statement of definitional identity; it reads thus: a linguistic means is what is caused by the conditions which produce vocal sounds and what is caused by true belief about the meaning of the words. What are specified in the two divisions of the definiens are themselves identical each being identical (extensionally) with the definiendum. The two divisions of the definiens are two ways of specifying the same thing— the linguistic means. But these are not just two alternative ways any one of which could suffice. Instead each one of these ways supplement the other and they together constitute the adequate specification or definition of linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*).

The word "*proyoga*" is taken to refer to that of which the *prayoga* is the *prayoga*. The word *prayoga* means utterance. And by utterance we mean the sound uttered. Thus what is uttered is a sentence or a word. The sentences or even words are sequence of vocal sound units or *varṇa-s* or alphabetical letter sounds. It should be remembered that the Nyāya philosophy of language is basically philosophy of spoken language. What is uttered is therefore ultimately *varṇa*; and by utterance or "*prayoga*", as the word occurs in the first division of the definiens in $\acute{S}_2$, we understand this *varṇa*. Now *prayoga hetu* means cause (*hetu*) of vocal sound (*prayoga*). What (physically) causes the vocal sounds is, superficially, the vocal organ. Actually, however, the Naiyāyika-s maintain that when air inside the body is made to move upward and it eventually hits certain particular parts of the throat or the mouth, vocal sound is produced as a result of that impact.

Therefore, such impact (*kaṇṭha-tālyādi-abhighāta*) is the cause of the vocal sound and is meant by the expression '*prayoga hetu*'. By the other expression *bhūta* we are to understand, literally, of the nature of (what is thereby produced). So the whole expression *prayogahetubhūta* means what is produced by the internal air hitting the particular parts of the physical vocal organ. Obviously it is vocal sound. If this division constituted the whole of the definiens then the definition would be that linguistic means is what is produced by the internal air etc. This would have served the purpose if nothing but vocal sound were the effect of the impact in question. But while Gaṅgeśa seeks to assert the definitional identity between linguistic means and vocal sound, the vocal sounds are not the only effect of the impact in question (or what is otherwise the cause of vocal sound). So for establishing definitional identity with linguistic means Gaṅgeśa needs to include further conditions or specification. To be regarded as linguistic means it is not enough for a thing to be caused by the *prayogahetu*. It must satisfy the further condition stated in the second division of the definiens part of $\acute{S}_2$.

But what other effects come within the purview of the definition of linguistic means in so far as it consists of the first division of the definiens in $\acute{S}_2$ and what can be successfully excluded by inserting the conditions stated in the second division of the definiens? The event called destruction of the cause of vocal sounds (*varṇasāmagri dhvaṃsa*) is itself an effect of the cause of the vocal sound. The idea is that if a thing did not exist at least at the moment before its destruction the destruction itself could not occur. But certainly the destruction of vocal organ or of the event of the impact in question with it, is not itself a vocal sound and as such it should be excluded from the purview of the definition of linguistic means. One way to excluded it is to insert in the definiens that to be considered as linguistic means a thing (i.e., the vocal sound) must be the effect of the knowledge of the word-meanings (*arthatattvajñānajanya*). The destruction of vocal sound is not so caused. It is necessary so far that the definiens part of the definition of linguistic means should include the second division. Is it not sufficient also? Do we need to retain the first division? Well, things other than vocal sounds (considered in the theory as linguistic means) are there which are also caused by the knowledge of

meaning of words. Memory of the meaning of the words (known) or memory disposition leading to such memory are cases in point. If the definition of the linguistic means is not to be too wide then these things are to be excluded from the purview of the definition in question. And Gaṅgeśa does this by including the first division in question in the definiens part. Indeed the memory of word-meanings (*padārtha smṛti*) or the disposition leading to it is not caused by the vocal organ or impact with certain parts of it which we understood to be the *prayoga hetu*.

THREE

An Objection Considered

I

The Nyāya theory of *śabda pramāṇa* or linguistic means contains in addition to the truth $\acute{S}_2$, at least the following two truths. (A) Language or linguistic means is a source of knowledge and (B) it is a distinct source. All these three are to be established. They are often subjected to critical examination. To establish $\acute{S}_2$ we need to show that, at least, every agreed case of linguistic means has the defining properties in question.[1] To put it differently, in order to establish $\acute{S}_2$ as a definition of linguistic means we need to prove that no known case of linguistic means *lacks* the properties stated therein and further, that no case which is known to be not a case of linguistic means *has* these properties. Gaṅgeśa will take up in $\acute{S}_4$ and some passages following it[2] the issue if language is a *distinct* means or source. In the passage $\acute{S}_3$, which is our concern at present, Gaṅgeśa seeks to establish that language is after all a source; and for this he rejects the rival view in the matter after critical examination. It may turn out to be false that language is an accredited source of knowledge proper. It may become false in at least either of these two ways: (i) if the belief it produces is not a *pramā* or (ii) if it fails to produce or be instrumental in producing the belief it is said to produce (even though the belief is produced and is a *pramā*). If, however, one can prove inferentially that the belief produced by what is alleged to be a case of linguistic

means, is knowledge proper on the ground, say, that the actions based on this belief are successful, then one can infer that the alleged means—the linguistic act or utterance—is really an accredited source of knowledge proper for it has the property of being instrumental in the production of the true and non-recollective belief in question. Instead of resorting to any of these inferences and leaving all these easy tasks to his readers, Gaṅgeśa rejects in $\acute{S}_3$ the rival view, attributed usually to the Bauddha-s, in the matter. There he states the rival view and expounds and rejects the argument which could be offered in support of it.

The formulation of the Nyāya position in question here as (A) may turn out to be misleading. For (A) can be taken as an explicitly analytic statement. And any position directly rival to it will be a self-contradiction. So far therefore no effort is needed to prove it or to refute its opposite. But (A) is not really analytic. For the expression "linguistic means" (*śabda pramāṇa*) in (A) means what the definition $\acute{S}_2$ above has left it determined to mean namely that it is words which are produced etc. Accordingly (A) may be rewritten thus: 'Words produced by such knowledge of things (word-meanings) which is of a kind that causes use of language, is a source of knowledge proper and this source is called language (*śabda*). No longer (A) appears to be analytic. Anyway, the Naiyāyika-s believe (A) to be true. And to justify such belief Gaṅgeśa takes up the opposite view in the matter for examination.

A definition cannot prove either the existence of the definiendum or that the definiendum has the defining property. Assuming these it can prove that the definiendum (or each instance of it) is distinct from things of its own (relevant) kind or of different kinds. So on the basis of the same two (or at least the first) assumptions it can serve as the criterion for the right application of the relevant word. Thus proving a thing is beyond the scope of the definition of it. The definition can only enable us to distinguish it. When a definition is viewed as an inference, the inference is vitiated by the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi* if the existence of the definiendum is not assumed. For an inference suffers from this fallacy if nothing corresponds in the world of things to the subject of the inference. Now a Bauddha philosopher does not admit any such thing as linguistic means (*śabda pramāṇa*) even if he does

not deny means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or vocal sound (*śabda*) in general.[3] From this point of view Gaṅgeśa's attempt at discovering an acceptable definition of linguistic means is an exercise in futility. For the definition, if it were otherwise cogent, could reveal at the most the *possibility* of there being things of this description; there could be a thing which satisfies this description. But definition even when it is otherwise acceptable, even when it is such that a thing satisfying it would not have a contradictory nature, cannot prove the existence of the thing being defined. We however, need to say (i) that the thing is, (ii) that it is such and such, is different from certain things of its own relevant kind and from all the things of different kinds. The Bauddha-s object that vocal sounds do not satisfy the condition which a thing must satisfy if it is to be regarded as a means of knowledge.

[$\acute{S}_3$]

Nanu śabdo na pramāṇam; tathāhi karaṇaviśeṣaḥ pramāṇam, karaṇañca tat yasmin sati kriyā bhavatyeva. Na ca śabde sati pramā bhavatyeveti nāyam śabdaḥ pramāṇam. Na ca śabdo na pramāṇamiti vākyasya prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyorvyāghātaḥ asyāprāmāṇyepi etaduthạpyamānāvisaṃvādatiti cet, na, ākāṅkṣādimatḥ, padārtha smaraṇādivyāparavataḥ pramāṇatvena tathābhūtāt pramotpatterāvaśyakatvāt atathābhūtatve ca phalājanakatvasya karaṇāntarasāmyāt.

[pp.14-22]

[1] Well, *śabda* (being known at the moment) is no accredited source of knowledge proper; [2] reason being that an accredited source of knowledge proper is one which is a specific *karaṇa* [i.e. instrumental in the production of certain specific effect, here, some knowledge proper]; [3] and a *karaṇa* [on the other hand] is such that if it is there its effect does occur. [4] But it is not the case that if there is *śabda* [or certain utterance], then (its effect) any knowledge proper does occur; [5] so *śabda* in question is not an accredited source of

knowledge proper. [6] It is not, however, the case that the truth and falsity of the sentence "*śabda* is no accredited source of knowledge proper" will be impeded; [7] for even if (the sentence is) false the belief it gives rise to may be true. [8] [Gaṅgeśa replies] no, [9] since [we admit] accredited source of knowledge proper are (words) which are charcterised by *syncategorematicity*[4] etc. [on the one hand and] possession of *vyāparaḥ* such as recollection of word meanings etc. [on the other]; [10] it is necessary that knowledge proper should result from such [words]; [11] not generating the effect [i.e., knowledge proper] on the part of [words] which are not such, is just as it [should be and as it] is in case of other instruments (including those of knowledge).

The Naiyāika-s admit not only that language is a source of knowledge but also that the knowledge it yields is of a distinct kind. Since it is the source of a distinct kind of knowledge language is naturally held to be a distinct source. The supporters of one of the rival views in question hold that language or *śabda* is not a source of knowledge at all; so no question of its being a distinct source arises. The view under reference is usually attributed to the Bauddha philosophers but apparently it could be attributed to the Cārvaka philosophers as well. One thing is certain that this view is not held by the Vaiśesika-s who admit that (under suitable conditions) language or *śabda* does give rise to knowledge, and so far it is a *pramāṇa.* They only deny that knowledge yielded by language is different in kind from knowledge yielded by the source called inference. It is immaterial for us whether the rival view in question is held by the Cārvaka-s or the Bauddha-s; but the traditional philosophical literature represents Diṅnāga as denying that language is a *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge proper. Though Vācaspati Miśra attributes to Diṅnāga the view that *śabda* is not a *distinct pramāṇa*[5] yet the latter could and probably did hold the stronger thesis that language is not a source of knowledge at all. In fact according to the Bauddha-philosophers if an alleged *pramāṇa* is neither *pratyakṣa* (perception) nor *anumāna* (inference) then it is not a *pramāṇa* at all. For then what is alleged to be a *pramāṇa*

could not have either direct or indirect relation with the object of the knowledge (supposed to be yielded by this source). A Bauddha argues in this way. If there obtained 'direct' relation then the alleged source would be no other than perception (*pratyakṣa*); if, on the other hand, there obtained an 'indirect' or 'mediated' relation, then '*śabda*' would be a case of inferential means (*anumāna pramāṇa*).[6] Only a Bauddha philosopher who admits just two accredited sources of knowledge, perception and inference, can argue in this way. In other words the Bauddha-s argue from a two-fold division of knowledge; but that there are only two distinct kinds of knowledge perception and inference is a controversial thesis.

In $\acute{S}_3$ Gaṅgeśa attributes to the opponents i.e., the upholders of the rival view a different argument. Though different, this argument also can be traced to Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya. Gaṅgeśa reproduces this argument explicitly in $\acute{S}_3$. This passage, $\acute{S}_3$, consists of a few sentences.[7] $\acute{S}_{3(1)}$ is the initial statement of the position that *śabda* is not an accredited source of knowledge proper. In $\acute{S}_{3(5)}$ the position is stated as the conclusion of the argument i.e., as following from the premises $\acute{S}_{3(2\text{-}4)}$. $\acute{S}_{3(5)}$ reads, so (this *śabda* or the) *śabda* in question (i.e., the *śabda* spoken of in $\acute{S}_{3(4)}$ as well as in $\acute{S}_{3(1)}$) is not an accredited source of knowledge proper. The first of the three premises or $\acute{S}_{3(2)}$ specifies the meaning of the word "*pramāṇa*" or the nature of the thing called *pramāṇa*. It says that a *pramāṇa* is a praticular type of *karaṇa*. The particularity of the *karaṇa* which is *pramāṇa* i.e., accredited source of knowledge proper, is that it is a *karaṇa* not with respect to any effect but with respect to such effect which is a case of knowledge proper. Thus though a thing need not be a *karaṇa* with respect to an effect which is a case of knowledge yet *pramāṇa* is only such *karaṇa* as has for its effect some knowledge proper. The sense of the word "*karaṇa*" (or the nature of the thing *karaṇa*), which is a part of the meaning of "*pramāṇa*", is stated in $S_{3(3)}$; an instrument or special means (*karaṇa*) is such that if it is there its effect does occur. The point is that an effect owes its origin to many causal conditions some of which may occur simultaneously and some other in temporal succession. Conceived of as a successively occurring series of events, a causal process terminates

with the occurrence of the event called the effect. All the other events of the series preceding the effect are somehow causally related to it. But the last of these events has the speciality of being necessarily and immediately followed by the effect. If a causal process is represented as a series of temporally successive events 'c_1, c_2, c_3 .... c_n, e', then the last i.e. the e is the effect; it immediately and necessarily succeeds c_n. This is not true about any event in the series preceding c_n. For example, occurrence of c_2 cannot guarantee that e will occur. If somehow the series is interrupted after the occurrence of c_2 i.e., if c_3 does not occur (or occurs after c_2 has ceased to exist) then e will not be produced. Since such contingencies cannot in principle be ruled out, e cannot be said to succeed c_2 necessarily. Thus in the series of events constituting a causal process, the last but one event enjoys a speciality, if not superiority, compared to the events preceding it—the speciality of being necessarily followed by the occurrence of the last event in the series, the effect. Wherever and whenever this special condition, the last but one in the causal process of events, occurs the result does occur; it does not fail to occur. $\acute{S}_{3(3)}$ sums up all this in the statement that a *karaṇa* is such a condition that if it is there its effect does occur. Thus a *karaṇa* and its effect almost always agree in presence. Sometimes by a *karaṇa* we mean that one among the causal conditions or causally connected preceding events which is instrumental in the production of the respective effect. One way of unpacking the somewhat figurative notion of 'being instrumental' is to interpret it to mean 'being followed immediately and necessarily by the effect' i.e., being such that wherever and whenever it occurs there the effect too does occur immediately afterwards. What follows from $\acute{S}_{3(2)}$ and $\acute{S}_{3(3)}$ taken jointly is $\acute{S}_{3(3a)}$, that if something is a *pramāṇa* or special means of knowledge then immediately after its occurrence knowledge of the appropriate type necessarily occurs. A special case of $\acute{S}_{3(3a)}$ will be $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$ viz., if *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* then if *śabda* occurs knowledge of the type called *śābda* does occur immediately after it. Neither $\acute{S}_{3(3a)}$ nor $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$ has been explicity included in Gaṅgeśa's exposition of the argument of the opponents who hold that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa*. But these are clearly implied by $\acute{S}_{3(2)}$ and $\acute{S}_{3(3)}$. $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$ asserts the implication that if language (*śabda*)

is an accredited source of knowledge proper (*pramāṇa*) then if there is language (i.e., if some sentence of the language is uttered audibly) then there does occur knowledge of the appropriate kind. $\acute{S}_{3(4)}$ is the denial of the final consequent of $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$. It states that it is not the case that if there is (utterence of) *śabda*(or language) there does occur knowledge proper. For it is imaginable, even experientially evident, that a speaker utters some sentence but fails to communicate any thing thereby to the hearer. Such things happen if the speaker and the hearer do not belong to the same speech community.[8] The denial of the consequent of $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$ yields the denial of the (first) antecedent of $\acute{S}_{3(3b)}$; language is not an accredited source of knowledge proper or, more accurately, *śabda* which is such (i.e., the occurrence of which is not immediately and necessarily followed by the coccurrence of knowledge) is not an accredited source. And this is $\acute{S}_{3(5)}$. This is how Gaṅgeśa expounds both the conclusion and the argument of the Bauddha philosophers who held, in opposition to the Naiyāyika-s, that language is not an accredited source of knowledge.

There is nothing wrong in the way the opponent argued in favour of his contention that language is not an accredited source of knowledge proper. But the truth of the premiss of the argument viz., $\acute{S}_3$ which specifies the sense (nature) of *karaṇa* may be challenged. In fact Gaṅgeśa will presently refute the opponent's argument by resorting to another sense of *karaṇa* and showing thereby that if *śabda pramāṇa,* understood in this sense, is there, knowledge of the appropriate kind does take place. Even apart from this, that is, the truth of the premises or correctness of the process of arguing apart, the conclusion itself seems to be defective. The opponent is represented as anticipating and then rejecting this objection stated in the second part of the passage $\acute{S}_3$ comprising the sentences $\acute{S}_{3(6\text{-}11)}$. In $\acute{S}_{3(6)}$ the opponent anticipates this objection: (o) the truth or falsity of the statement (p), "*śabda* is no accredited source of knowledge proper", will be impeded. The point of the critic is that the opponent's statement in question, (p), is paradoxical. We cannot attribute to the statement either truth or falsity. For if the statement is true then it is false and if it is false then it is true. For what is said about *śabda* in the sentence (p) applies to the sentènce (p) itself because (p) is also a case of

śabda. Now (p) says "*śabda* is not a *pramāṇa*" or accredited source of knowledge proper. If this (p) is true or is a *pramāṇa* then what it says must be the case and *śabda* including (p) cannot be *pramāṇa.* But then what (p) says need not be true. In other words it need not be true that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa.* If now we attribute to (p) the property falsity then since it is false that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa,* it is true that it is a *pramāṇa.* But then as a particular case of *śabda* (p) would also be a *pramāṇa.* And if it is a *pramāṇa* then what it tells us must be the case (for if it were not so then (p) could not be a *pramāṇa* since it follows from its very definition that a *pramāṇa* yields knowledge). In other words, it is true that *śabda* and for that matter (p) is not a *pramāṇa.*

While he anticipates this objection of the critic, the opponent denies it also. In $\acute{S}_{3(7)}$ he is represented as contending that no harm will be done to his position if falsity is attributed to (p). In other words even if (p) is strictly speaking false yet what it says may conform to our experience and practice. That is to say, it is another case of *samvādi bhrama* or (factually) corroborated error. A very common example of such error is when one searches and finds a thing, after waking from sleep, exactly where he saw it to be there in the dream he had during sleep. Dream experience is an agreed case of false belief and yet in this case it is in agreement with the relevant waking experience and behaviour. In the sphere of ordinary perception also we meet with cases of corroborated error. Suppose there are two things x and y adjacent to each other. Suppose one sees x from a distance and mistakes it for y. His belief viz. "That is y" or "there is y" is strictly speaking false. But when he acts on this belief he really gets y. He is successful not because the belief on which he acted was true but because y happened to be there. In the same way the statement (p), like any standard false statement, is false. i.e., fails to yield any knowledge proper. Even so what one learns on hearing (p) may come out true, not because (p) is true, but because what it asserts happens to hold as a matter of fact. Suppose a parrot emits a few sounds ; mistaking it to be the utterance of a man the hearer derives from the utterance (taken to be some one's utterance of a sentence) the belief that Mr. X has arrived. The hearer on the basis of this belief goes to meet Mr. X and finds him there. In this case the

parrot did not utter a sentence which could be said to yield a true belief. The 'truth' of the belief is due to the fact that Mr. X happened to have arrived. At the same time the belief was occasioned by the sound made by the parrot. The effect of the sound made by the parrot or the 'sentence' uttered by it is as it would have been had the utterance been made by a man on the basis of his actually seeing Mr. X to have arrived. In the same way (p) cannot be proved to be true. But even if it is in fact false, it may give rise to certain belief the effect of which would be exactly what it should be if (p) were strictly speaking true. In other words (p) or the belief resulting from it conforms to our actual experience and practice as smoothly as any piece of correct knowledge.

It seems that other editions have in place of $\acute{S}_{3(7)}$ a somewhat different sentence $\acute{S}_{3(7a)}$ which reads "*asyāprāmāṇye'pi etaduthāpyānumānāvisaṃvādaditi*" or, in translation, even if (it were) false, the inference it gives rise to is correct. Again $\acute{S}_{3(7)}$, or the sentence in question taken as it is in the edition being used by us here, has been interpreted differently by other interpreters. While we have taken the word "*māna*" occurring in $\acute{S}_{3(7)}$ in the original to mean *pramāṇa* in the sense *pramiti* or knowledge, others interpreted the word *māna* to signfy what the word "*pramākaraṇa*" signfies namely, (a particular) instrumental cause of some *pramā*. They take this instrumental condition to be *manas*. *Manas* (which may roughly be translated as mind)[9] as the internal sense organ, is instrumental in the production of preceptual experience of some of the internal phenomena including cognitive states. It is therefore taken as belonging to the kind of accredited source or means called *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* or perceptual means.[10] The word *māna* can therefore signify *manas*. In another context Gaṅgeśa used the word *māna* to mean (and Mathurānatha took him to mean) *pramiti* or knowledge; however, some interpreter took the word to signify there the instrument of knowledge called *manas*.[11] Anyway, Mathurānātha thinks what Gaṅgeśa means to say in $\acute{S}_{3(7)}$ is that even if the sentence (p) is false, it, or words constituting it, produces memory cognition of the respective things or word-meanings. And though (p) which is false fails to produce linguistic knowledge (*śābda jñāna)* of these things as related yet there is no explicit awareness that they are not related. These two viz. memory of the word

meanings and absence of awareness of absence of relation (between the word-meanings) function as the auxiliary conditions, while *manas,* having these as auxiliary, functions as the principal cause to produce the knowledge which (p) would have produced if it were true. In other words, *manas,* aided by memory of word meanings and lack of awareness of absence of relation among these meanings, produces the knowledge or true belief that *śabda* is other than what is immediately and regularly followed by knowledge proper. So interpreted $Ś_{3(7)}$ is an answer to the objection that the conclusion $Ś_{3(5)}$ gets contradicted no matter whether we attribute truth or falsity to the sentence stating it, viz., "*śabda* is not a *pramāṇa*". For the conclusion $Ś_{3(5)}$ is yielded by *manas* jointly with the two auxiliary conditions stated above.

To sum up, in $Ś_{3(1)}$ through $Ś_{(7)}$ the opponent has stated[12] and argued for his (rival) view about *śabda* that it is not what yields, as means, knowledge proper as has been said in $Ś_{2(1)}$. An argument has been given in $Ś_{3(2\text{-}4)}$ and the view has been reiterated in $Ś_{3(5)}$ as the conclusion of this argument. Next the opponent anticipates in $Ś_{3(6)}$ the objection that his conclusion cannot be said to be either true or false and in $Ś_{3(7)}$ he gives the answer that this objection does not affect his position, for even if the conclusion were false the belief it gives rise to would be true. So far therefore Gaṅgeśa has stated and defended the position of the opponent, believed to be some Bauddha philosopher, against the Naiyāyika-s who take *śabda* or language to yield, as an accredited *means,* knowledge of a distinct kind. Gaṅgeśa now addresses himself to the task of refuting the argument of the opponent and therefore, the connclusion based on it. $Ś_{3(8)}$, which consists of the single word "no", is his statement of denial. This denial relates particularly to what the opponent has (been represented to say) said in $Ś_{3(1)\text{-}(5)}$. $Ś_{3(8)}$ therefore may be taken to mean what the opponent said in $Ś_{3(5)}$ on the grouund $Ś_{3(1\text{-}4)}$ is not correct. This therefore is the conclusion of Gaṅgeśa. He states his arguments for this conclusion in $Ś_{3(9)}$ and $Ś_{3(10)}$. He further strengthens his position by offering the argument contained in $Ś_{3(11)}$.

What Gaṅgeśa says in $Ś_{3(9)}$ and $Ś_{3(10)}$ challenges in effect the premises $Ś_{3(3)}$ and $Ś_{3(4)}$. $Ś_{3(3)}$ reveals the sense in which the opponent uses the term *karaṇa* viz., *karaṇa* is such (condition)

that if it is there the effect cannot fail to follow. And since by $\acute{S}_{3(2)}$ *pramāṇa* is a *karaṇa* in this sense, though *karaṇa* of the particular kind of effect called knowledge, it follows that if *śabda* were really a *pramāṇa* then if *śabda* were there, knowledge could not fail to follow. Gaṅgeśa does not challenge in $\acute{S}_{3(8)\text{-}(10)}$ the truth that it is necessary that knowledge proper should result from *pramāṇa*. He admits in $\acute{S}_{3\,(10)}$ that it is necesary that different kinds of knowledge proper should result from *pramāṇa* and appropriate *pramāṇa*-s at that. He does not also deny what the opponent has said in $\acute{S}_{3(2)}$ that *pramāṇa* is the *karaṇa* with respect to some knowledge proper. But he denies that *karaṇa* is what the opponents hold it to be in $\acute{S}_{3(3)}$. While the opponent there holds *karaṇa* to be what is necessarily followed by the coccurrence of the effect, Gaṅgeśa (in $\acute{S}_{3(9)}$) has a diffferent conception of *karaṇa*. He thinks *karaṇa* is indeed a special cause and that this speciality entitles it to be taken as instrumental in the production of its effect. But the notion of being special or being instrumental is to be unpacked or explicated. Gaṅgeśa, however, explicates it, not in the way the opponent did. The opponent explained the notion of being instrumental as being immediately followed by the effect (or, in *Saṃaskṛta, phalopadhāyaka kāraṇam*). Gaṅgeśopādhyāya indicates his view of *karaṇa* in general when he says in $\acute{S}_{3(9)}$ what he takes to be a *śabda pramāṇa. Karaṇa* according to him is that causal factor, in the production of an effect, which produces the effect through another such factor known as *vyāpāra*. A *vyāpāra* is the causal factor that intervenes between the factor known as *karaṇa* on the one hand and the effect on the other; further, it is itself an effect in relation to the *karaṇa* and a cause in relation to the effect. In a series of events constituting a causal process the events are so related that while all of them excepting the last are jointly responsible for bringing the last event or the effect into existence, between themselves the preceding events too, at least some of them, are related as cause and effect. So some of the events in a causal series have, unlike the first and the last, a double character. Any one of them is an effect of the preceding event and a cause of the succeeding one. If we begin with the effect and constitute a series with the causal factor immediately preceding the effect and the causal factor in relation to which this immediately

preceding causal factor is itself an effect, then this intermediary or the penultimate event in the causal series is the *vyāpāra*. What in the series precedes this *vyāpāra* and causes it is *karaṇa* in so far as it actually produces the *vyāpāra*. Thus a causal factor which has *vyāpāra* in the sense of having actually produced it already, is, according to Gaṅgeśa, a *karaṇa*. This sense of the word *karaṇa* is at least as widely known and accepted by the philosophers as the other sense of it in which the opponent has used the word in $\acute{S}_{3(3)}$ viz. that causal factor immediately after which the effect is produced. If by *karaṇa* we just mean the event preceding, in a causal series, the last but one event which immediately precedes the effect, then the effect does not occur immediately after *karaṇa*. It, however, immediately follows the *vyāpāra* which is the effect of *karaṇa*. Those who take *karaṇa* as the cause immediately after which the effect occurs, identify *karaṇa* with *vyāpāra*. For them *karaṇa* is *vyāpāra*. And on this view a *pramāṇa*, a *karaṇa* or special means of respective type of knowledge proper, should mean that causal factor immediately after which the knowledge of the appropriate kind occurs.[13] If now words being heard (*jñāyamāna śabda*) is regarded as *śabda pramāṇa* or the special means of the type of knowledge which is believed to be derived from language (i.e., *śābda jñāna*) then the opponent is justified in saying that words cannot be said to be *pramāṇa* since immediately after he hears the words, the hearer does not have the appropriate knowledge believed to be derivable from a *sentence*. The hearer has instead recollection of what the words of the sentence mean.

The words being heard produce in the hearer first, *padārtha smaraṇa* or memory cognition of word meanings and then, through such memory of word meanings, they produce what is called *śābda jñāna* or knowledge (derivable from a sentence) of the relation between the word meanings. If now one takes *karaṇa* to mean not just the causal factor (*karaṇa*) which precedes the event that immediately precedes the effect[14], but such causal factor as has already produced the *vyāpāra* (the event immediately preceeding the effect), if, in other words, one takes *karaṇa* and *vyāpāra* together, then immediately after such *karaṇa* (i.e., *vyāpāravataḥ karaṇa*) the effect does occur. Gaṅgeśa's contention is that *śabda pramāṇa* or linguistic means is not just the words being heard at

the moment. Taken in themselves such words constitute just one causal condition or only one event in the causal series. But effect need not immediately follow any factor in the causal series however distant in time it may be. Effect must immediately follow the causal factor which has *vyāpāra* as its immediate effect and in so far as it has it. Accordingly, knowledge supposed to be the result of *śabda pramāṇa* does not need to follow immediately the words being heard at the moment. For such words do not constitute *śabda pramāṇa.* However, the knowledge in question needs to follow immediately the words being heard if the words have already produced the *vyāpāra* which in this case is the memory of the relevant word meanings. So Gaṅgeśa says, in Ś$_{3(9)-(10)}$, among other things, that since by *śabda pramāṇa* is meant (*vivakṣita*) that causal factor (or words being heard) which has, or in so far as they have, (as immediate effect or) *vyāpāraḥ* (memory of word meanings) it is necessary that knowledge should result (immediately) from such words. The fact, pointed out by the opponent in Ś$_{3(4)}$, that knowledge of the appropriate kind does not result immediately after the words being heard, does not prove that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa.* Such fact would have proved this conclusion if by *śabda pramāṇa* Gaṅgeśa meant merely words. But since by *śabda pramāṇa* is meant words, being heard, in association with the resulting memory of word meanings, appropriate knowledge need not result immediately from merely the words being heard; it is necessary though that it should result from these words having (already caused) the *vyāpāra* viz. memory of word meanings. Having asserted in Ś$_{3(10)}$ that knowledge of the type *śābda* needs must result from *śabda pramāṇa* which means such words as have *vyāpāra* associated with them, Gaṅgeśa further strengthens his contention by saying in Ś$_{3(11)}$ that if words which are not such do not produce the result i.e., the knowledge in question, then that is exactly what happens in case of other *kāraṇa-s* including other *pramāṇa-s.* He means to say that it is not the instrument of *śabda* which alone fails to produce its effect immediately after it; any other instrument (of any other effect) fails to produce the respective effect if it does not have *vyāpāra* associated with it or has not already produced the *vyāpāra.* Gaṅgeśa's point is that if one is justified in denying that *śabda* has the status of a *pramāṇa,* as

the opponent tends to do in the sentences $Ś_{3(1-5)}$, because its effect i.e., the type of knowledge called linguistic knowledge fails to occur immediately after it, even though the words or *śabda* do not have the benefit of their association with the *vyāpāra* in question, then any one can deny to any other *karaṇa* its status of being *karaṇa* on the ground that it fails to produce its efffect immediately, that is, irrespective of whether there is the factor called *vyāpāra,* after it. Any *karaṇa* does so fail when it fails to have the benefit of the association with the *vyāpāra.* The factor called *karaṇa* turns out to be sufficient condition only in conjuction with the other necessary condition called *vyāpāra.*

Gaṅgeśa's point in $Ś_3$ is therefore that the objection of the Bauddha-s that from (mere) words there does not immediately result linguistic knowledge is, to say the least, misplaced. Their conclusion based on the assumed soundness of this objection is also unsound. Linguistic knowledge or *śābda bodha* does necessarily and immediately occur, according to Gaṅgeśa, from words when they are associated with other appropriate conditions. We shall discuss in the next section the problem about these conditions and also the nature of them. But we should first note that the Nyāya reply to the Bauddha objection is not an *ad hoc* one. Gaṅgeśa has asserted as much in $Ś_{3(11)}$. He says that language as means of verbal knowledge behaves in the same way in which any *karaṇa* or special means behaves. The a *karaṇa* of a certain kind of knowledge or of any kind of effect whatsoever fails to produce its effect if it lacks (association with) other necessary conditions including the *vyāpāra.* In the familiar and perhaps the agreed case of knowledge, say, perception, sense organ is the *karaṇa.* But even when there is the object to be seen our visual sense organ cannot enable us to see, cannot produce visual perception, if there do not obtain such condittions as adequate light, appropriate contact of the visual sense organ with the object in question and so on. Just as it is in this case so also in the case of linguistic means or *śabda pramāṇa,* the *karaṇa* or the words cannot yield the appropriate result, the verbal knowledge, unless the other necessary conditions mentioned in $Ś_{3(9)}$ obtain. This further requirement, association with other necessary conditions, without which words cannot produce linguistic knowledge and in terms of which Gaṅgeśa answers the

Bauddha objection, is not a speciality or peculiarity of linguistic means. It is a requirement which is to be fulfilled if any *karaṇa* is to produce its respective effect. This should dispel any suspicion that the reply Gaṅgeśa has given to the Bauddha objection is *ad hoc.*

II

The conditions which must obtain in order that the words of a speaker can produce linguistic knowledge include on the one hand that which functions as *vyāpāra* and, on the other hand, such features as syncategorematicity etc. Gaṅgeśa in fact says that the words being heard at the moment function as *pramāṇa* or instrument of knowledge, if and in so far as they are *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ* and *padārthasmaraṇavyāpāravataḥ.*[15] Now what do these expressions actually mean and how exacty do these features contribute to the hearer's understanding of a sentence? From the context we already know that Gaṅgeśa is seeking to explain, particularly to the Bauddha critic, what according to the Naiyāyika-s are necessary and sufficient for the linguistic knowledge of a hearer. In fact any causal account must include enough conditions for adequately specifying the effect in question. Some of the causal conditions stand to each other in the relation of immediate precedence or immediate succession. Such conditions form a regular temporal sequence of events identified as a causal process. We individuate causal processes in terms of the effect event which marks the termination of the process. The event in the causal sequence immediately preceding the effect event is *vyāpāra* and the event that immediately precedes the *vyāpāra* in the sequence and also causes the *vyāpāra* is *karaṇa.* But all the causal conditions of an effect do not form with it a sort of causal sequence or process just described. There may be found a causal condition which is contemporaneous with some of the even: forming a moment in the causal process or chain taken as described so far, that is, as a regular temporal sequence of events. Of course such a condition precedes the effect event, as it must do if it is to be a causal condition. But either it is contemporaneous with the *vyāpāra* or with the *karaṇa* or with some other still preceding condition. Such contemporaneity of a causal condition necessiates that it should

be regarded as belonging to a distinct class of causal conditions known as (*sahakāri kāraṇa-s*) auxiliary causal conditions. It may be thought that this description does not have anything to do with the contemporaneity of one causal condition with any other causal condition or with the contemporaneous conditions forming a group of auxiliary conditions. There may be many such groups with respect to any single event. Therefore the motivation behind calling certain causal condition auxiliary might have been just to distinguish it from *vyāpāra* and (or) *karaṇa.* This would have been a more acceptable position had not there been contrary practice. Thus a Naiyāyika does not regard the second time 'perception' of the inferential ground (or *dvitiya-liṅgadarśana*) as an auxiliary condition (*sahakārikāraṇa*) of inferential awareness. Though *sahakāri karaṇa-s* are different from *vyāpāra* and *karaṇa* yet just the difference from the last two types of causal condition is not the sufficient mark of an auxiliary condition. Anyway, Gaṅgeśa has referred to both auxiliary and other condition of linguistic knowledge to answer the Bauddha objection. He rightly thinks that to give an adequate reply to the Bauddha objection in question, one should specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of linguistic knowledge. This he himself hopes to do in terms of two features which the words must have if they are to produce knowledge. It is to be noted in the first place that any sound or *śabda* is not capable of generating such knowledge. Even individual alphabetical sounds, which jointly make up a word or word-sounds, are not enough. The words or word-sounds too do not qualify for the title instrument of production of (linguistic) knowledge or special means of it. Utterance of words or production of word-sounds also fail to produce any knowledge if the addressee is stone deaf or is in a place which is beyond the end point of the optimum distance. It follows therefore that not the words but the *perception of them* (on the part of the hearer) is what, as a condition, leads to the knowledge of what these words describe. One who has such knowledge finds on reflection that he had come to know the objects in question from words and he says "I know the objects from the words taken along with the intervening *vyāpāraḥ* and nothing else". Knowledge referred to in such experience or expression is called *śābda jñāna* or verbal

knowledge.[16] It therefore follows that even when one hears the words uttered i.e., has the perception of the word-sounds one does not have verbal knowledge. So the knowledge (or the perception of word-sounds or recognitive awareness of a finite number of words uttered in sequence so as to form a sentence)[17] of words is not the instrument (of verbal knowledge) in its own right. Even when a few words succeed in forming the required sequence, and a hearer succeeds in apprehending them as such,[18] so that he can be said to have heard a sentence, he may not have, there may not be produced in him, the verbal knowledge of what the sentence singifies. When he does have this knowledge, on the other hand, there intervenes beetween his 'hearing' the sentence and having the verbal knowledge some other causal event. Such interventing causal event is called *vyāpāra.*[19] Thus knowledge of a sentence or a sentence being known at the time does not in itself produce verbal knowledge. It produces verbal knowledge when it has the benefit of (the association with) some intervening conditions. What function as intervening causes here are, according to Gaṅgeśa, *padārthasmaraṇādi* or recollection of the meanings of the words (which constitute the sentence in question) etc. The idea is this. If one has not learnt previously the meaning of the words constituting the sentence in question or has forgotten their meaning, learnt previously, then one will not be able to recollect the meaning of the words when one hears the sentence. In such a case the sentence, even though it is heard, will not cause in the hearer any understanding of the sentence or the knowledge of what the sentence says. So far therefore the words (i.e., a sentence) which produce as instrument verbal knowledge are the words (being heard at the moment and) which have associated with them the recollection (or *smaraṇa* the hearer has at the moment) of the word-meanings (or *padārtha*-s). This recollection is the intervening causal factor (or *vyāpāra*). Gaṅgeśa therefore thinks that *padārthasmaraṇavyāpāravataḥ śabdo pramāṇam.*

We now understand what Gaṅgeśa says in $Ś_{3(9)}$ and why he says this. He would have been perfectly intelligible if he said this much, that is, if he said only that (words or) a sentence is a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only in so far as it has or is associated with the intervening causal event which is the recollection of the

meanings of the words of the sentence in question. In other words, Gaṅgeśa would have been intelligible now if he merely said *padārthasmaraṇavyāpāravataḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam.* He however has said more. He has in the first place said *padārthasmaraṇādi vyāpāravataḥ,* that is, having as intervening causal event recollection of word meanings *et cetera.* The use of the expression *et cetera* clearly indicates that he intends to include something more. But what is that something? Or what other things does he want to include? The familiar Nyāya view takes knowledge of words (or sentence), or the words themselves as being known, to be the instrument (*karaṇa*) which produces its effect, the verbal knowledge, jointly with the intervening causal factor of (hearer's) recollection of the meanings of the words of the sentence in question. Thus the standard view does not include as *vyāpāra* anything more than the recollection of the word meanings. What more does then Gaṅgeśa intend to include as *vyāpāra* when he says *vyāpāra* like recollection of word meanings *et cetera* (*padārthasmaraṇādivyāpāravataḥ*). According to Mathurānātha, Gaṅgeśa wants to include understanding of the constitutent sentences.[20] We have verbal knowledge (*śābda jñāna*) when we can be said to have understood a sentence correctly or have correct understanding of a sentence. But the sentence, in the correct understanding of which verbal knowledge partly consists, may be simple or compound. A compound sentence is one which has other (sentence) sentences as its constitutents. A simple sentence is one which does not have any sentence as its constituent. This is not to say that a simple sentence does not have a complex and analysable structure. But when we analyse a simple sentence we do not get further sentences, we only get words. (We postpone for some future occasion the consideration of the issue whether the distinction between a word and a sentence is absolute). Thus what words are to a simple sentence, constitutent sentences are to a compound sentence. Just as the understanding of a simple sentence is causally determined by the knowledge of the word meanings as intervening causal factor, so also the understanding of a compound sentence is preceded by the intervening cause viz., the knowledge (*bodha*) of the constituent (*avāntara*) sentence-meanings (*vākyārtha*). The idea is simple. One who does not understand one or more

constitutent sentences, cannot understand the constituted compound sentence. It should be remembered, however, that the knowledge of the word-meaning which functions as intervening cause in case of the understanding of a simple (or through it a compound) sentence, is of the variety of memory congnition. But the knowledge of the constitutent-sentence-'meaning' or what functions as *vyāpāra* (intervening cause) in case of the understanding of a compound sentence is not of the nature of memory. It is a case of (another) sentential understanding. Because this difference is there regarding the nature of the intervening causal factor, a Naiyāyika should give the causal account of sentential understanding separately for simple and compound sentences. With such a need in mind Gaṅgeśa leaves the hint, while explicitly giving a causal account of sentential understanding in terms of *vyāpāra* necessary for understanding simple sentences, that the sentential understanding which results from a compound sentence involves some other thing as the intervening causal factor. Therefore, a comprehensive causal account of sentential understanding must refer explicitly or implicitly to both recollection of word-meaning and awareness of the constitutent sentence- 'meaning'. Gaṅgeśa's use of the expression *et cetera* (*adi*) carries this implict reference to the awareness of the meaning of the contained sentences. Important point for a philosophy of language is that the Naiyāyika-s do not think (so far as, at least, the understanding of it is concerned) that a compound sentence is a *mere mechanical* or formal putting together of simple sentences or of a few more words. Understanding a compound sentence involves some additional principle. From this it also follows that the understanding of a word and the understanding of a sentence are entirely different things. These are instances of altogether different types of knowledge so much so that while they admit a distinct means or source for sentential understanding, the Naiyāyika-s do not do so for the understanding of a word.[21] They, however, admit that the knowledge of the meaning-relation (*śakti sambandha*) which causally determines one's understanding of the sentence-'meaning' is sometimes obtained through a distinct source or *pramāṇa* called *upamāna* which is a process of knowing by analogy.

Let us now turn to the first of the two qualifications of the

words which the Naiyāyika-s intend to be taken as verbal means. In $\acute{S}_2$ Gaṅgeśa uses the expression *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ* as the adjective of *śabda.* The word "*śabda*" is to be understood in the context of the text which reads, when explicitly stated, *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ padārthasmaraṇādi vyāpāravataḥ pramāṇatvena vivakṣito.* The words, that are not *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ* are not regarded in Nyāya as *pramāṇa* or source (i.e., special means) of sentential understanding. But what does Gaṅgeśa mean by it and why does he include it? The context in which the expression in question or the sentence containing it occurs should be remembered. It was being debated whether *śabda* was a *pramāṇa* or not. The opponent stated his rival thesis that *śabda* was not a *pramāṇa* taking *pramāṇa* to mean that immediately after which the effect, here, verbal knowledge, occurs necessarily. The opponent had based his conclusion on the evidence of actual cases where *śabda* was not followed by verbal knowledge. The opponent however did not specify what *śabda* he found to have failed to produce (in this sense) verbal knowledge. Failure on the part of any and every *śabda* cannot affect the Nyāya postion that *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* or special cause (of verbal knowledge). His position will be affected, it may even get rejected, if the opponent can cite a case where *śabda* in the sense in which a Naiyāyika takes it to be a *pramāṇa* fails to produce verbal knowledge. This being the context Gaṅgeśa finds it necessary to specify which *śabda,* according to the Naiyāyika-s is a *pramāṇa*. For this purpose he qualifies "*śabda*" in the text by two adjectives viz. *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ* and *padārthasmaraṇādivataḥ.* The meaning of the second adjective and Gaṅgeśa's purpose of qualifying "*śabda*" by means of it have already been explained. Now we should explain the sense of the first expression and show the need for its inclusion.

As I said, the opponent has not specified *śabda* (or the sense of the expression "*śabda*") to which he denies the status of a *pramāṇa*. It may be that he has taken *śabda* to mean just words or *pada*-s. If it were so then the opponent's thesis would amount to no more than that *śabda*(s) or word(s) is not a *pramāṇa* or, what is the same thing, verbal knowledge does not follow the utterance (or perception) of word(s). Now a Naiyāyika will not be interested in contesting such a thesis. For he himself does not mean

to say that words produce verbal knowledge, at least, not in this form. He holds on the other hand that only sentence (*vākya*) causes verbal knowledge. A verbal knowledge is a case of sentential understanding or *vākyārthabodha*. But what is a *vākya* ? The Nyāya notions of *pada* and *vākya* (translated roughly as word and sentence respectively) cannot be explained easily and in a few sentences. The simple account with which we begin is not very accurate. Things will be made more precise and accurate as we proceed. A *vākya* may be specified in the first place as a group of words. But any group or concatenation of words does not constitute a sentence; otherwise "or I and the it" could pass for a sentence. A sequence of words which is both syntactically and semantically well-formed constitutes, according to the Naiyāyika-s, a sentence.[22] A sequence of words is syntactically well formed if the words in it are syncategorematic or have the property of syncategoramaticity.[23] To put it otherwise, the words of a sentence should be mutually dependent[24], they should be such as to need each other to form a complete sentence; and each of them becomes unsaturated (*nirākāṅkṣa*) only when it occurs in a complete or closed sentence or forms such a sentence in association with other word or words. Two sentences, however, may combine, in a different sense though to form a compound sentence. It may be thought that it is too much to demand that each and every word of a sentence should be unsaturated in the sense of being other than a name, say. We may very well have in a sentence a saturated expression provided all other expressions are unsaturated. But even an otherwise saturated expression may be treated as unsaturated in so far as it is viewed as a constituent of a sentence. As constituent of a sentence one word of the sentence does not differ from any other. In any case, to be regarded as a sentence words of a sequence should be (*mithaḥ sākāṅkṣa* or) mutually related by way of the relation of syncategorematicity, a property which characterises every word in a syntactically well-formed sentence. In other words to constitute a sentence or, for that matter, a *śabda-pramāṇa* words must have syncategorematicity; they should be *ākāṅkṣāviśiṣta*.

But Gaṅgeśa's expression in question is not *ākāṅkṣāmat* but *ākāṅkṣādimat*. He characterises the words regarded as *śabda pramāṇa* not with syncategorematicity or *ākāṅkṣā* (alone) but with

syncategorematicity *et cetera* (*ākāṅkṣādi*). What other characters does he intend to refer to implicitly by the expression *et cetera*? There are two or three such characters which may roughly be called in English syntactic proximity or juxtaposition of the mutually syncategorematic words in a sentence (*āsatti*), semantic compatibility (*yogyatā*) and conformity to context including the intention of the speaker (*tātparaya*). The idea is this. Though the words "The doctor prescribed bitter medicine for Mary who is sick" have mutual syncategorematicity yet in the following sequence they cannot carry any sense or constitute a sentence: 'bitter for medicine who Mary prescribed Doctor the sick is'. For the juxtaposition or immediate proximity of the mutually syncategorematic words has been interrupted. It seems that while a sentence is a syntactically well-formed finite sequence, its syntactic well-formedness is constituted by mutual syncategorematicity of the words and juxtaposition or immediate proximity between the words of every pair of mutually syncategorematic words. But even when syntactically well-formed, in the sense described, the sequence "Hungry John ate a number of stones", cannot pass for a sentence. One who knows the meaning of all the words in the sequence excepting the last one will take it as a sentence anticipating that stones are certain items of food like biscuits. But one who knows the meaning of each of the words in question including the last one will refuse to accept this sequence as a sentence. For "stones" do not go well with "ate". Stones are not the sort of things that can be eaten. Thus though a verb expression and a noun expression can complete each other as verb and accussative, and constitute a well-formed sequence from purely syntactic point of view yet if the meanings of the expressions are such that they do not fit with each other then the sequence the words form will be meaningless. The meaninglessness here will result from violation of the consideration of semantic compatability. The words of a sentence should therefore be such that they jointly make perfect sense. This is possible if senses of the relevant words are mutual match; in the sentence "The doctor prescribed hard work for the dying patients" words are not such. To pass for a sentence or *śabda pramāṇa* a sequence of words should then be semantically well-formed, words of it should have

semantic compatibility.

Sometimes even this is not enough. "Bring me a page" is both semantically and syntactically well formed no matter whether we understand by the word "page" a boy servant or a sheet of writing paper. But for all that if we do not pay any attention to the context of utterance of the sequence or the intention of the speaker and bring the latter a boy servant when he is waiting for a sheet of writing paper, the sequence of words may be said to have failed to communicate the thought of the speaker. Any sentence worth the name is, however, supposed to convey to the hearer the intended meaning of the speaker. So the words of the sentence be such that their sense suits the particular context of utterance. This condition which, it is sometimes thought, should also be observed if a sequence of words is to qualify for the title of *śabda pramāṇa* may be called pragmatic requirement of *tātparya* consisting in the hearer's attending to the particular context of utterance in so far as this reveals the intention of the speaker. We may as well say that to constitute a sentence, a sequence of words should be syntactically, semantically and pragmatically well-formed or the words in it should be characterised by immediate proximity (*āsatti* or *sannidhi*), semantic compatibility (*yogyatā*) and contextual or intentional relevance (*tātparaya*) in addition to (mutual) syncategorematicity (*ākāṅkṣā*). Of these four features Gaṅgeśa mentions by name the last one only; he refers to the other two or three preceding characters implicitly by using the word *ādi* or *et cetera* after "*ākāṅkṣā*".

What Gaṅgeśa therefore means to say is that mere words are not *śabda pramāṇa*. To constitute *śabda pramāṇa* words must have the properties of syncategorematicity *et cetera* i.e., syncategorematicity, syntactic proximity, semantic compatibility and also perhaps contextual relevance. Now since no single word can have at least the first two properties, what constitute *śabda pramāṇa* as characterised by these properties are (not a word but) words in the plural. Hence though the number of the relevant expression in the original i.e., *śabda* is singular we have always rendered it as words. Further, the properties with which Gaṅgeśa characterises *śabda* which constitutes, according to him, the relevant *pramāṇa* are properties of words,[25] we have so far rendered *śabda* as words

or sequence of words. Since Gaṅgeśa now specifies the characters which words must have if they are to constitute *śabda pramāṇa* (linguistic means) and since words so characterised constitute a sentence, we may henceforward render *śabda* as sentence unless otherwise intended by Gaṅgeśa. This shows that though we have in *Saṃaskṛita* an expression for sentence viz. *vākya* and though verbal knowledge or knowledge derived from language is actually derived from *vākya* yet the knowledge is usually called *śābdabodha* (or *śābdapramā*) and the instrumental condition is regularly called *śabdapramāṇa*. Therefore *śabda* in such constructions as "*śābdabodha*" or "*śabdapramāṇa*" can safely be rendered as sentence (*vākya*).

III

So far as the passage of Gaṅgeśa in question is concerned we should note a few other points. In the first place he has characterised words which constitute *śabda pramāṇa* by syncategorematicity *et cetera* and[26] recollection of word-meanings *et cetera*. This shows that by the expression "*et cetera*" in its first occurrence Gaṅgeśa did not mean to refer to recollection in question even though he uses it to refer to syntactic proximity, semantic compatibility and also perhaps pragmatic relevance. The reason is that while recollection of word meaning (or, in case of a compound sentence, the understanding of the constitutent sentences) functions as intervening causal factor or *vyāpāraḥ*, the properties of syncategorematicity etc. do not do so. Thus according to a Naiyāyika though syncategorematicity (*ākāṅkaṣā*) etc. or their knowledge play a role in generating sentential understanding yet they are not *intervening* causal factor immediately preceding the effect and directly related by way of causal relation with the instrumental causal factor (*karaṇa*). They function as auxiliary condition and jointly with the instrumental condition bring out the effect. But unlike the intervening condition which is dependent on it as its effect, these auxiliary conditions are not effect of the instrumental factor; they are independent. Thus they are as much independent (*svatantra*) condition (*kāraṇa*) as the instrumental condition.[27] So far therefore they lack the essential property of an intervening condition (*vyāpāra*) viz. the property of being

(causally) dependent on the instrumental condition. In generating verbal knowledge or sentential understanding the instrumental causal condition viz. a known sequence of words must have i.e., be associated with or function jointly with both the auxiliary (*sahakarī*) but causally independent (*svatantra*) condition of syncategorematicity etc. and the causally dependent intervening condition (*vyāpāra*) of recollection of word-meanings etc. Gaṅgeśa's motivation for distinguishing the conditions like memory of word meaning (*padārthasmaraṇa*) from conditions like (awareness of) syncategorematicity might have been twofold. He might have wanted, in the first place, to emphasise that it is the *memory* of the word-meaning rather than just the awareness of word-meaning (*padārthajñāna*) which necessarily precedes linguistic knowledge of sentence meaning. It was necessary for him to emphasise this point for in this respect the Nyāya position differs from that of Kumārila. Even when a philosopher shares the realist non-reductivist stand that *śabdapramāṇa* constitutes a distinct source of knowledge and holds that such knowledge requires as a necessary condition awareness of word-meaning, he may not think it to be further necessary that the awareness in question must be a case of memory (*smaraṇa*) caused by perception of words (*padaśravaṇa*). But if the perception of words did not *cause* the memory congnition about word-meaning which precede both causally and immediately the occurrence of the linguistic knowledge then, according to the Naiyāyika-s, we could say neither that the perception of the words was instrumental condition nor that the awareness of word meaning was the intervening condition in the sense described. Thus according to them if words are to constitute means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in the accepted sense of the term then the awareness of word-meanings must function as intervening condition. But for that the necessary awareness of word meaning must be caused by the perception of words. We can perhaps conceive of this causal relation clearly if we interpret the awareness of word-meaning in question as memory of word-meanings caused by the perception of the words. And words can cause hearer's understanding of a sentence only in the sense that the hearer's perception of the releveant words produces in him memory of corresponding word-meanings and this is followed immediately by

the occurrence of the understanding of the sentence. So the Bauddha opponents had to be told that the Naiyāyikas do not say that any and every word is a source of knowledge. They maintain that words in so far as they are being perceived and have (in the sense of being related causally in the sense described) associated with them the memory of word-meanings as intervening cause (*padarthasmarana vyāpāravatah*), constitue the distinct source of knowledge known as linguistic means or *savda-pramāṇa.*

It is also causally necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence that the hearer must have awareness of the features of syncategorematicity etc. yet it is not necessary that this awareness should be a case of memory cognition. This awareness need not even have to be caused by perception of the words. Therefore these features (or the awareness of them) cannot be regarded as intervening cause (*vyāpāra*) so far as the (perception of the) words are concerned. So these features (or the awareness of them) have been distinguished by Gaṅgeśa from the other condition, namely, memory of word-menings etc. This is how we account for Gaṅgeśa's emphasising memory character and *vyāpāra* character of the condition of awareness of word-meaning. Awareness of syncategorematicity etc. are neither necessarily recollective, nor do they function as intervening causal condition. Further the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s were wrong in believing that mere awareness of word-meanings suffices, that it is not further necessary that the awareness be recollective.

The second point to note is that while Gaṅgeśa includes as *vyāpāra* or intervening condition not word-meanings (*padārtha*) but their (recollective) awareness (*padārthasmaraṇa*), he includes as auxiliary and causally independent factors (*svatantra sahakāri karana* as distinct from *karana*) the properties of syncategorematicity etc. and not their knowledge. Taking advantage of this I have treated these properties (and not their knowledge) to characterise the words and thereby enable the words to constitute a sentence. But truly speaking, a sentence is not defined in the system as words having syncategorematicity *et cetera* (in the sense of *et cetera* explained above). It is rather defined simply as words having mutual syncategorematicity or being mutually syncategorematic.[28] If Gaṅgeśa wanted, in the passage in question,

to define or give an account of sentence (*vākya*) he could make do with only the property of syncategorematicity or *ākāṅkṣā*. But Gaṅgeśa is interested in giving an account of instrumental cause or special linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*) of sentential understanding. To qualify as *śabdapramāṇa* in this sense words must have the properties of syncategorematicity etc. in addition to having recollection of word-meanings etc. To be more accurate, Gaṅgeśa is describing in the passage when words can generate sentential understanding. But what functions as causal condition (whether independently or principally) is neither the words nor the words having the properties of syncategorematicity. The verbal knowledge or sentential understanding presupposes for its occurrence (a) *awareness of words*, (b) *awareness* of syncategorematicity (*ākāṅsājñāna*), (c) awareness of syntactic proximity (*āsattijñāna*), (d) awareness of semantic compatibility (*yogyatā-jñāna*) and also perhaps (e) the awareness of pragmatic relevance i.e., intention behind or context of the uttterance of the speaker (*tātparayajñāna*). But the awareness, say, (b) functions as auxiliary (and independent causal condition), to the principal causal condition viz. (a) awareness of words or words themselves as being known (heard) at the moment. To put it otherwise, though the principal causal factor generates sentential understanding jointly with them yet the principal causal factor does not produce these auxiliary conditions. These are therefore causally independent of the principal factor. The case of the intervening causal factor (a_1) is different. For though the principal factor, (a) here, produces the effect (sentential understanding) jointly with the intervening condition (a_1) yet it also produces the latter. So unlike the independent auxiliary conditions the intervening condition is causally dependent on the principal cause. The principal causal condition, the intervening condition and the effect form a temporal causal sequence, an uninterrupted linear sequence. But the conditions (b)-(e) form a horizontal line, so to say, or series with (a).[29]

Gaṅgeśa therefore means to say *ākāṅkṣādimataḥ padārtha-smaraṇādivyāpāravataḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇatvena vivakṣita*. The words (being known at the moment i.e., *jñāyamāna śabda*) having (the association of) awareness of *ākāṅkṣā* etc. (as auxiliary

independent cause) and awareness of word-meanings etc. (as intervening cause) are intended to be understood as *śabdapramāṇa* or instrumental cause of sentential understanding. One may ask how the words (or even the knowledge of them) can *have* the other awarenesses ? What does the word "have" mean in this context ? For the present we may mean by "have", being in the same locus or, more accurately, being in the same locus in which the awareness of the words inhere. Thus the words have these other features in so far as the awareness as of syncategorematicity etc. and recollection of word meanings occur in the same locus (i.e. in the soul of the hearer) where there already occurred the awareness of the words.[30]

We noted earlier at least four tenets or truths of the Nyāya theory of language. (1) The linguistic means or *śabdapramāṇa* is the last of the four accredited sources admitted in the school; (2) the words which are produced by the true belief about the content of them constitute (according to the definition) the linguistic means ; (A) words do produce belief in the hearer which has been variously described here as linguistic, verbal or sentential knowledge or hearer's understanding of a sentence or sentential understanding; and (B) the linguistic means of belief is of a distinct and irreducible kind. In the previous chapter Gaṅgeśa offered his definition of linguistic means or *śabdapramāṇa*. But while offering a definition one presupposes that there is something which counts as the definiendum. So far as Gaṅgeśa's definition of *śabdapramāṇa* is concerned, the Bauddha opposition under reference tended to disallow the assumption that there was any such thing as *śabdapramāṇa* to be defined. For nothing could be a source of knowledge in the causal sense of the term (i.e., a *pramāṇa*) unless it necessarily produced, immediately after it, some true and non-recollective belief. But, according to the Bauddha-s, words are not immediately or necessarily followed by any such belief.[31] Gaṅgeśa's rejection, discussed so far, of this view of the Bauddha-s justifies the necessary presupposition he made at the time of offering his definition of *śabdapramāṇa* in $\acute{S}_2$. He will begin his discussion on (B) from the next passage or $\acute{S}_4$.

FOUR

Transition to the Vaiśeṣika Opposition

I

Gaṅgeśa, as we said, sought to expound in the fourth or *Śabda* part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* the last of the four *pramāṇa*-s which Gautama and his followers admit. In so doing he has expounded the Nyāya theory or philosophy of language in general along the line of, particularly, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya. The basic truths of this theory (or the basic tenets of this philosophy) include (1) that *śabda* is a distinct *pramāṇa*, that is to say, language or sentences constituting it produce, as instrumental causal factor, a distinct variety of knowledge proper called *śābdapramā* or correct verbal or sentential understanding. This view has two parts, namely, that *śabda* is a special causal factor which is instrumental in the production of knowledge and that the knowledge it produces is of a distinct variety called *śābda* i.e., verbal or linguistic. The Vaiśeṣika-s have opposed the second part of the Nyāya view (1) and maintained that though words function as *pramāṇa* they do not constitute a distinct (*svatantra*) source of knowledge.[1]

Gaṅgeśa's presentation of the position of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers needs some initial clarification as otherwise this position as well as reductionism in general might appear paradoxical. In a properly ordered discourse of a book, and Gaṅgeśa has assured us in the passage $Ś_1$ that we have here one, points *established* in the earlier parts are treated as such in the later parts.

While meeting the charge of the Bauddha opponent Gaṅgeśa had already established that as in the case of other instrumental causal factors so also in the case of *śabda* or words, the appropriate effect does not fail to occur if and when the said cause has, associated with it, the necessary and intervening causal factor or *vyāpāra.* If now a Vaiśeṣika is to be represented as raising some objection against the Naiyāyika-s we may understand him to do so by accepting this point. But if he accepts *śabda,* in the sense given above, that is, as a *pramāṇa* then a Vaiśeṣika must also admit that the knowledge that results from such a *pramāṇa,* or is produced by words, as the instrumental causal factor, is *śābda* or verbal. For this is an analytic proposition and to deny it or to say that knowledge that results from words or vocal sounds, in the sense explained, is not verbal, is to utter a contradiction. It sounds paradoxical to claim that verbal or linguistic knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) is a kind of inference (*anumiti*).

But a Vaiśeṣika may say that all these would have been correct if verbal knowledge were defined as knowledge produced by *śabda* (words), in the sense given in $\acute{S}_{3(9)}$, as the instrumental causal factor. But if the Naiyāyika-s defined it in that way then one might rather bring against them the charge of circularity. For then they would be defining verbal knowledge (*śābda pramā* in terms of *śabda pramāṇa*) as knowledge which is derived from words as instrumental causal factor and such causal factor (*śabda pramāṇa* in terms of verbal knowledge) as the cause which is instrumental in the production of verbal knowledge (*śabdapramitikaraṇaṃ śabdapramāṇam*).[2] The definition of *śabda pramāṇa* given by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_2$ is not, however, in terms of *śābdapramā.* Gaṅgeśa defined it as word(s) itself provided of course it is produced by determinate and true belief of things. But why call it, i.e., what is thus produced, *śabdapramāṇa* rather than anything else? If it is a matter of stipulation then perhaps the question of justification does not arise, but one may suspect that such talk of stipulation or convention is an *ad hoc* device to avoid the charge of circularity noted above. Further the charge of circularity can be equally avoided if (*śābda pramā*) verbal knowledge is defined independently of *śabdapramānam* and then *śabdapramāṇa* is defined as what is instrumental in the production of verbal knowledge. Whichever of

these two ways is adopted by a Naiyāyika to avoid circularity, the Vaiśeṣika contention, that though the words function as instrument in the production of knowledge yet they do not coustitute a *distinct pramāṇa* (instrument), can no longer be said to be vitiated by the alleged contradiction. In fact the usual practice of the Naiyāyika-s is to define independently certain specific variety of knowledge such as perception or inference and then to define respective *pramāṇa* or sources of knowledge as the instrumental casual factor which produces this type of knowledge. The names of the different *pramāṇa-s* (instruments) are framed with the help of the names of the respective variety of knowledge they produce. This is true in case of *śabdapramāṇa* (verbal instrument) as it is true in case of perceptual means (i.e., instrument of perception or *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*), inferential means (*anumāna* or *anumānapramāṇa*) and so on.

Now the question is, if, to avoid circularity, we are not to classify or distinguish different varieties of knowledge with reference to the factors instrumental in their production then how can we distinguish them ?. The standard Nyāya answer to this question which a Vaiśeṣika may also accept is that they are distinguished in terms of their special feature as revealed in the corresponding introspective awareness or *anuvyavasāya.* The Vaiśeṣika contention that *śabdapramāṇa* as defined above is not a distinct (kind of) instrument of knowledge will now mean this, though what has been defined as verbal instrument produces a variety of knowledge yet, contrary to the claim of the Naiyāyika-s, that knowledge does not have the special distinguishing feature, said to be revealed in introspection, of being verbal or *śābdatva.* It rather has another feature, *anumititva* or being inferential, which introspection reveals to be possessed by any agreed case of inferential knowledge. In other words, the Vaiśeṣika-s maintain that though what has been defined as *śabdapramāṇa* (viz., a sequence of words (being known) having, associated with them, (the awareness of) syncategorematicity etc. and (the awareness of), the intervening cause, the recollection of word meanings) yields knowledge yet since that knowledge has only the distinguishing feature of being inferential, its instrumental cause cannot be distinct from inferential instrument. What the Naiyāyika-s call a *śabda-*

pramāṇa does not yield any distinct variety of knowledge. It produces only inferential knowledge. Since there is no distinct kind of knowledge called *śābda, śabdapramāṇa*, the instrumental cause of alleged *śābdajñāna*, cannot be a distinct *pramāṇa*.

Thus apparently the Vaiśesika-s seem to agree with the Naiyāyika-s on the point that a knowledge is of the kind it is revealed to be in the appropriate introspective awareness. If one has a knowledge of a table and the corresponding introspection is of the form "I *perceive a table" then we can be sure that the preceding awareness was of the variety called (sākṣātkāra* or *pratyakṣa* i.e.,) perception. Now the Naiyāyika-s maintain that whenever we have a sentential understanding or an awareness resulting from hearing some utterances of a speaker, the subsequent second order perception has the form 'I know by means of *'śabda'*.[3] This shows that the knowledge which results from conditions including the hearing of the utterances of a speaker is of a distinct kind, that it is of the kind *śābda* or is a case of verbal knowledge. Had the awareness been of the inferential variety, as claimed by the Vaiśesika-s the introspection in question would be of the form ("... *anuminomi*" i.e.,) "I infer ...".

This argument may be interpreted strongly as well as weakly. When strongly interpreted it reads as follows. Since the introspective awareness of the knowledge resulting from (hearing) the utterances of a speaker has the form 'I comprehend verbally', the knowledge *cannot* be inferential in nature. The force of 'cannot' derives from the mutual exclusiveness or incompatibility of being verbal (*śābda*) or *śābdatva* and say, being inferential (*anumiti*) or *anumititva* revealed in respective introspective awaraneness, 'I comprehend verbally' or 'I infer'. But unless their observations are thoroughly determined by theory, in which case we can hardly accept their pronouncement as evidence, it is unlikely, to say the least, that a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika will apprehend a knowledge differently or in introspection of different forms. It is unlikely that under otherwise similar conditions the (subsequent) second-order perception of knowledge will take the form 'I comprehend verbally' in case of a Naiyāyika and 'I infer' in case of a Vaiśeṣika. Though the possibility of mistake in the description of a perception cannot be ruled out, yet it seems that the description of the Naiyāyika,

of the internal perception of a piece of knowledge, (which reveals, it is agreed, the kind of the knowledge being perceived) is more likely to be correct. Suppose a person is told by his friend that Dick has purchased a car and suppose that on another occasion the same person tells some one else that Dick has purchased a car. If now the person is asked how he knew that Dick had purchased a car then he is likely to answer "I was told so by my friend" or "I heard it from ny friend". So the Vaiśeṣika-s are unlikely to maintain such a paradoxical view as that we do not apprehend, in a subsequent perception, a knowledge obtained from hearing certain utterances of a speaker, as a case of verbal knowledge or that we apprehend it to be a case of inferential knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika-s cannot deny a knowledge to be verbal or *śābda* if it has been revealed to be one in introspection. For an accepted evidence of a belief being *śābda* is its being *apprehended* as a case of verbal comprehension or, what is the same thing, apprehended in a subsequent second order perception of the form 'I comprehend verbally'.

We should therefore take the Vaiśeṣika philosophers as maintaining all these: that the knowledge we derive on hearing the utterances of a speaker is inferential in kind; that such knowledge is apprehended (at least some times) in subsequent second order perception as a case of verbal comprehension, and that the knowledge which is apprehended as a case of verbal comprehension is verbal knowledge or *śābdajñāna*. What follows from these three is that a piece of knowledge can be both verbal and inferential. One may take this conclusion as paradoxical or contradictory and reject, on this ground, as false at least one of the three propositions from which it follows. Since the second and the third are agreed to be true by both the contending parties, the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s, the first proposition is to be given up by the Vaiśeṣika-s if they are to avoid the necessity of asserting the paradoxical conclusion noted above. But if the Vaiśeṣika-s give up the first proposition then they will be forced to admit that we derive from hearing a sentence, uttered by a certain speaker, knowledge of a distinct kind called *śābda*. It is distinct from the knowledge of the kind called *anumiti* or inference. Word(s) as characterised above and which as instrument of production, yields this knowledge or

is the *pramāṇa* with respect to this distinct kind of knowledge must also be distinct from the special means which produces inferential knowledge. This distinct *pramāṇa* should in all appropriateness be called *śabdapramāṇa* in view of the type of knowledge it produces.

One may, however, accept this conclusion as non-paradoxical by assuming that being verbal and being inferential are not incompatible properties. So far therefore none of the three propositions in question needs must be rejected as false. This seems to be the real point of the Vaiśeṣika-s. If we allow the Vaiśeṣika-s the right to assume that being verbal and being inferential are not two incompatible properties then they can accept both what Gaṅgeśa has established in $\acute{S}_3$ against the Bauddha-s viz., that there results knowledge (of some kind) when one hears the utterances of a speaker and, what is their special tenet namely, that *śabda* or linguistic utterance is not a distinct *pramāṇa*. They may in that case say that though words yield some knowledge yet that knowldge is not of a distinct kind, i.e., distinct (in kind) from, say, inference. The knowledge that one has when one hears the utterances of a speaker is really inferential in nature. What is instrumental in the production of such knowledge is not the word(s) uttered but what is called inferential means. Thus what is improperly called *śabda pramāṇa* i.e., what is instrumental in the production of knowledge we have when we hear a speaker speaking, is really inference and thus not a new and distinct *pramāṇa*. It is not a *pramāṇantara*.

The Vaiśeṣika position in question may still create some uneasiness. Granted that there is no incompatibility between being verbal and being inferential; but how are we to conceive of the nature of the relation between them. Further, if the knowledge that results from hearing words or sentence can alternatively be described as verbal and inferential why may we not say that the instrument in the production of this knowledge is a *śabdapramāṇa*. So far as the second point is concerned a Vaiśeṣika may say that if the Naiyāyika-s agree with them in all essential matters then it will be a case of mere differrence in word or usage if the Naiyāyika-s call the *pramāṇa* in question *śabdapramāṇa* and the Vaiśeṣika-s call it *anumānapramāṇa*. Actually, however, it will be correct, on ultimate analysis, to call the *pramāṇa* in question inference or *anumāna pramāṇa*, even if we sometimes call it, in a loose sense,

śabdapramāṇa. Strictly speaking *śabda* or word(s) is not instrumental in the production of the knowledge we have when we hear certain utterances of a speaker. An utterance constitutes the *occasion* for the resulting knowledge; it does not function as the *instrument* of production of that knowledge. In the strict sense of instrument of production, *śabda* or words cannot be called the *pramāṇa* behind the hearer's knowledge. True, it is sometimes called a *pramāṇa*; but it is so called by taking the word "*pramāṇa*" in loose sense. Anything that is somehow causally connected with a knowledge may loosely be called *pramāṇa*. An utterance of a speaker is, as we have seen, causally connected with the knowledge in question in so far as it provides the occasion for the knowledge in question to result. What happens when we hear the utterances of a speaker is that we derive some knowledge. The utterance creates the occasion for the knowledge to occur. And in this sense the resulting knowledge can be apprehended or described as a case of verbal comprehension. Similarly, as providing occasion for verbal comprehension in the sense defined, the utterances or the words or sentence may by loosely called *śabda pramāṇa* or verbal instrument that is, linguistic means. This is how we are to understand the deliverances of the subsequent second order perception of the form "*śābdayāmi*" or 'I verbally comprehend..."

To turn to the first of the two points noted at the beginning of the preceding paragraph. The relation between the allegedly incompatible properties of being verbal and being inferential, assuming that both are revealed in (different) subsequent second order perceptions, is really the relation of identity. The same property is taken under two different descriptions— one relatively loose and wider and the other comparatively stricter and narrower. The relation here cannot be one between two properties, one narrower and the other wider.[4] There are indeed properties or characters, revealed in the second order perception or introspection of certain conginitive states, between which the relation of being narrower or wider holds. Introspection that follows the perception of a book (a perception of the form 'This is a book') may sometimes take the form 'I know ...' (... *jānāmi*) and at other times it may take the form 'I perceive...' (... *sākṣātkaromi*). The epistemic predictates in question have corresponding to them the property

of being a knowledge (or belief) and property of being a perception respectively. The first of the two properties is possessed by anything that has the second property but not *vice versa*. The Vaiśeṣika-s might have maintained that the so-called incompatible properties of being verbal and being inferential are related with each other in the relation of one way inclusion or entailment. Whatever is verbal is inferential though not *vice-versa*. They could even cite an example. The Naiyāyika-s admit a type of inference called *svārthānumāna* (literally, inference for one's own self) where words or utterances of a speaker play no role whatsoever. The resulting knowledge in such a case cannot be called verbal even in any loose sense. They admit on the other hand another variety of inference called *parārthānumāna* (literally, inference for others) where language plays an essential role, so much so that such inference is described as language (of a certain form) induced inference or *Nyāyasādhya anumāna*. The inferential knowledge that results here can loosely be described as verbal in the sense that the use of language somehow initiates, however distantly, the process that generates the inferential knowledge in question (*parārthānumiti*). We can generalise: every case of verbal knowledge is a case of inferential knowledge but not *vice versa*. That we have language induced inference, which forms the basis of this generalisation, is admitted not only by the Vaiśeṣika-s but also by other philosophers including the Naiyāyika-s.[5]

Now which of these two accounts should we finally attribute to the Vaiśeṣika-s ? What do they exactly mean when they say that *śabda* (words) is *not* a distinct *pramāṇa* or instrument in the production of knowledge while accepting at the same time as established, what Gaṅgeśa has already proved, in the face of the opposition from the Bauddha-s, namely, that *śabda* (words) as spceified by him is a *pramāṇa*, that certain knowledge necessarily occurs (immediately) after it. In the first place neither a Vaiśeṣika nor perhaps any one else admits that there is any inconsistency if one holds at the same time that *śabda* (words) is a *pramāṇa,* and that it is not a distinct *pramāṇa.* To be a distinct *pramāṇa,* something should not only produce, as instrumental causal factor, some knowledge, it is further necessary that the knowledge it produces should be of a kind which is distinct from the kind of

knowledge which any one of the already recognised *pramāṇa*-s yields. When a Vaiśeṣika says that *śabda* is not a distinct source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), he therefore means that knowledge which certain words (that is to say, the words conforming to the specifications noted in $\acute{S}_3$) yield belongs to the kind of knowledge which is admitted to be produced by some other recognized *pramāṇa* or instrument of knowledge, say inference. We call this *pramāṇa* inference because it is essentially of the same sort as the factor which is instrumental in the production of the kind of knowledge called inference (or inferential) and not the other way about. What determines this knowledge to be of the kind of inference (or inferential) is rather its having the objective property *anumititva* or being inferential in nature. Which one of such objective properties a particular knowledge has is made known to us by some subsequent second order perception—or, more particularly, by the form of such perception. Some of the objective properties of a piece of cognition revealed to us by appropriate second order perceptions are hierarchically related. The properties of being an inference (*anumititva*) and being cognitive state (*jñānatva*) are cases in point. But some other objective properties of cognitive states revealed in the same way are incompatible e.g., the properties of being a perception (*pratyakṣatva*) and being an inference (*anumititva*). How, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the properties of *śābdatva* (or being a case of verbal knowledge) and *anumititva* or being a case of inferential knowledge are related? This is an important question. The Vaiśeṣika-s can hardly say about any of these two properties that it is not revealed in introspection.[6] For that would deprive introspection in general of any evidential value so much so that one could doubt whether even *anumititva* or *pratyakṣatva* is ever revealed in introspection. Neither a Vaiśeṣika nor a Naiyāyika could allow such doubt to prevail. For in that case they would perhaps be required to classify cognitions into different classes such as perception and inference on the ground that these were produced respectively by perceptual instrument and inferential instrument. But an instrument of knowledge would have to be specified as perceptual or inferential depending on whether the knowledge it yields is of the kind perception or inference. To avoid such circularity both the Naiyāyika-s and the

Vaiśeṣika-s would like to accept the evidence-character of subsequent second order perception (*anuvyavasāya*). So a Vaiśeṣika will not deny either that being a verbal cognition (*śābdatva*) is an objective property or that it is revealed in *anuvyavasāya* —subsequent perception of a first order cognition.

If both *śābdatva* and *anumititva* are objective properties of cognitive states, and are incompatible with each other then we must admit a distinct type of instrument for each of these kinds of knowledge, verbal and inferential. If we admit, as we do, such an instrument for one of them, say, inference, then we cannot without inconsistency refuse to do so for the other. A Vaiśeṣika is therefore left with only two alternatives.[7] Either these two properties of *śābdatva* and *anumititva* are the same properties like *pratyakṣatva* (being a perception) and *sākṣātva* (being a case of direct apprehension) or they are related in a way properties like being a perception (*pratyakṣatva*) and being a cognition (*jñānatva*) are related . We cannot strictly speaking attribute to the Vaiśeṣika-s the first of these two alternative positions. If being verbal and being inferential were simply two different descriptions for identically the same property then the descriptions could be interchanged or substituted for each other in every case. This is exactly so about 'being a perception' and 'being direct (and immediate) apprehension'; each and every cognition which has one of these properties has the other property also. The corresponding predicative expressions do not only have the same extension but they have also, so far as, at least, the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika philosophies are concerned, almost the same intension. It does not however, seem to be the intention of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers to say that every inferential cognition is also verbal cognition. They mean to say only that every case of (so-called) verbal cognition is a case of inferential cognition but not *vice versa.* For the inferential knowledge that results from what is called *svārthānumāna,* where language plays no role whatsoever, is neither apprehended as, nor admitted to be, a case of verbal knowledge.[8] Thus being an inference and being verbal knowledge are not co-extensive; the corresponding predicate expressions are not just alternative descriptions of the same property. Again since a Vaiśeṣika should accept the evidence of introspection in the case

of the property of being an inference, he cannot hold the predicate expression '... is a verbal knowledge' to be necessarily a misdescription of what is correctly expressed by the predicate expression '... is an inference'. It seems therefore that the Vaiśeṣika-s hold that both *anumititva* and *śābdatva* are equally genuine objective properties. If *anumititva* (being an inference) is not to be taken, for reasons stated above, as reducible to the property of being produced by the inferential instrument, nor should *śābdatva* be reduced to the property of being occasioned by the use of language. Again these two properties which are not incompatible are not altogether unrelated with each other. For both of them are properties of cognitive acts so much so that both of them are really determined with respect to the determinable property of being a cognition (*jñānatva*). In other words they are *jñānatva vyāpya* — they define narrower classes within or under the wider class of being cognition. Inference, for example, is only one variety of cognition. Just as each of the two classes of verbal knowledge and inferential knowledge is related with the class of knowledge in the relation of hierarchical ordering so also the class of verbal knowledge and the class of inferential knowledge form a hierarchy. Every case of verbal knowldge is, according to the Vaiśeṣika, a case of inferential knowledge, though the converse is not true; the hierarchical order of the three classes in question being this: every case of verbal knowldge (*śābdajñāna*) is a case of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) and every inference is a case of knowledge. The converse does not hold in any of the two cases. It follows that while inference (*anumititva*) is a class of cognition which directly comes under (*sākṣāt vyāpya* of) the class cognition (*jñānatva*), the class of verbal knowledge does not come directly under the class of *jñāna;* it comes directly under the class of inference and only indirectly, through its inclusion into the class of inference, it comes under the class of knowledge. Since the properties of *pratyakṣatva* (being a perception) and *anumititva* (being an inference) define narrower and mutually exclusive classes directly under the class of knowledge, perception and inference are two distinct classes of knowledge. We also need to admit therefore two distinct *pramāṇa-s* or sources, means or instruments, for them. But verbal comprehension cannot be regarded as a distinct

class of knowledge in this sense. For though for obvious reasons verbal comprehension and perception are mutually exclusive in this scheme of classification, the same is not true about verbal comprehension and inference. The acts of verbal comprehension do not constitute a class which comes directly under the class of knowledge as the class of inference does. The class they constitute comes under the class of inference which in its turn is directly included in the class of knowledge. Since in this sense verbal comprehension is not a distinct type of knowledge (*pramā*) we need not admit a distinct *pramāṇa* for it.[9] A *pramāṇa* is admitted only for a distinct (in the sense defined) kind of knowledge. *Pramāṇa* which is admitted in some systems to correspond to verbal knowledge is really the *pramāṇa* which corresponds to the distinct variety of knowledge which includes verbal knowledge also. By a distinct variety of knowledge is meant, as has already been explained, one among those classes of cognition which come directly under the class of true cognitive experience. In this sense verbal knowledge is not a distinct kind of knowledge or *pramāṇāntara.* In other words, *śābdatva* is not a *jñānatva-sākṣātvyāpyajātiviśeṣa*; the property of being a verbal cognition does not define a distinct class which comes directly under the class of knowledge. In a philosophical system, which must satisfy the demand of simplicity, we admit distinct sources or instruments only for distinct varieties of knowledge in the sense defined. Since verbal knowledge is not a distinct type of knowledge in their sense of the term, either the Vaiśeṣika-s do not admit any *pramāṇa* whatsoever for verbal knowledge (for *pramāṇa* is admitted only for a distinct type of knowldge) or they do not admit any distinct *pramāṇa* i.e., *pramāṇa* other than the one already admitted for the distinct type of knowledge of which verbal knowledge is a special case.

When the recognised means of inference is employed by some hearer for comprehending what some speaker says, the resulting knowledge is called verbal. Actually, however, it is derived through an inference. If the Vaiśeṣika-s do not admit any *pramāṇa* for verbal knowledge then they do not admit any distinct *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇantara*) for such knowledge either. It is true that no effect, and so not even verbal knowledge, can fail to have among its causal

conditions at least one condition which can be said to be instrumental in the production of it (the effect in question). But whatever the instrument with respect to a verbal knowledge may be, it cannot fail to be regarded as a *pramāṇa* in so far as it is instrumental in the production (or *karaṇa*) of a knowledge (*pramā*). To argue in this way is to miss the real point of the Vaiśeṣika-s which a Naiyāyika is expected to concede. A *pramāṇa* is not just an instrument of any knowledge or even of any variety of knowledge. The point of the Vaiśeṣika-s is that *pramāṇa* is what is an instrument of production of a distinct variety of knowledge where by 'a distinct variety of knowledge' is understood a class (or one of the classes) of cognition which comes directly under (*sākṣātvyāpya*)—and not what comes directly under what comes directly under (*sākṣātvyāpyavyāpya*)—the class of knowledge. This point seems to be uncontestable. A Naiyāyika will also accept it. If now it is admitted, as the Vaiśeṣika-s do, that the variety of cognition called *śābda* is not a distinct type of knowledge in the sense defined rather it is included in the distinct type called inference, then there cannot be any *pramāṇa* corresponding to verbal knowledge. In other words there cannot be any *śabda pramāṇa.* If what is called, in some schools of philosophy, *śabdapramāṇa* is not a *pramāṇa* at all then the question of its being a distinct *pramāṇa* does not arise. The only distinct *pramāṇa* available in case of a verbal knowledge is the *pramāṇa* which corresponds to the distinct variety of knowledge of which the verbal knowledge in question is only an instance. And this distinct *pramāṇa* is the inferential instrument or *anumānapramāṇa.* This therefore is what the Vaiśeṣika-s mean to say when they say that *śabda* is not *pramāṇāntara* or that words (i.e., sentence or language) is not a separate instrument of knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣika-s can maintain this position even if they concede to the Naiyāyika-s the point the latter have owned against their Bauddha opponents. We may therefore take the Vaiśeṣika-s, as represented by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_4$, to accept as established the point which Gaṅgeśa has proved against the Bauddha opponents in $\acute{S}_3$. So far therefore the claim made by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_1$ that his present book contains an ordered discourse can be sustained. And this was our objective behind such a long analysis of the Vaiśeṣika contention

that words do not constitute a separate instrument of knowledge. In other words our objective had been to find out a non-paradoxical formulation of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism and to show further that such a reductionist can and does accept that we derive knowledge from words.

Gaṅgeśa has proved in the previous passage against his Bauddha opponents that *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* whereby he meant, as was demanded by the context, that knowledge does necessarily occur (in the hearer) after one (the hearer) hears a finite sequence of words provided, of course, one has also the awareness of syncategorematicity etc. on the one hand and recollection of word meanings etc. on the other. A Vaiśeṣika grants that there does occur such knowledge when one hears some vocal sounds (*śabda*) which also explains why the resulting knowldge is called verbal (*śābda*). But while granting that there occurs verbal knowledge in the sort of situation described, the Vaiśeṣika-s hold that such verbal knowledge does not constitute a distinct class directly under the class of knowledge. It constitutes a class directly under another class, the class of inference, which is one of the classes which comes immediately under the class of knowledge. They further contened that there are or there should be admitted in a philosophical system worth the name, only as many distinct *pramāṇa-s* as there are mutually exclusive classes of cognition which come directly under the class knowledge. For by *pramāṇa* is understood the instrument of production of knowledge of one of the kinds directly into which the class of knowledge gets divided.

II

The position of the Vaiśeṣika-s being as it has been explained above, the Naiyāyika-s can, it seems, disagree with them only over the point that verbal knowledge is a special case of inferential knowledge; that the class of knowledge called verbal knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) falls directly under the class of inferential knowledge and not under the class of knowledge as such. In the passages which follow Gaṅgeśa aims at expounding both the thesis of the Vaiśeṣika-s and their argument for it. He will also show why the Naiyāyika-s reject this thesis.

[$\acute{S}_4$]

> *Tathāpi śabdo na pramāṇantaraṃ; padārtha saṃsargasyānumānādeva siddheḥ.*
>
> [p.22-23]

> (1) even so, vocal sound (words) is not a distinct source of knowledge; (2) for the relation between word-meanings is known through inference and nothing else.

In this passage Gaṅgeśa reports, so to say, in direct speech, (though as was customary he used no quotation mark) what the Vaiśeṣika-s finally say in the matter— both their final conclusion and the major positive agrument supporting it.[10] The passages in question are addressed, as if, to the Naiyāyika-s or to the author of *Śabdacintāmaṇi,* in his capacity as the representative of the Nyāya school. The passages may so far be taken as the remark of the Vaiśeṣika-s.

The first sentence of the passage $\acute{S}_4$ has two parts. The second part i.e., the portion '*śabdo na pramāṇāntaraṃ*' states the conclusion or the position of the Vaiśeṣika-s in the matter, that *śabda,* literally, vocal sound, is not a distinct or separate instrument of knowledge. The first part of this first sentence, consisting of two words, "Even so" (*tathā api*), serves the purpose of referring to the discussion of the preceding passage $\acute{S}_3$ which provides occasion for the Vaiśeṣika-s to state their own position in the matter and to state it in a particular way. They formulate in this passage their position as a comment on what the Naiyāyika-s have (being represented by Gaṅgeśa to have) achieved in the previous passage, $\acute{S}_3$. To put it differently, the Vaiśesika-s begin by accepting what has been said there. The remark "Even so" may therefore be made explicit in this way. Granted that vocal sound is, as you (the Naiyāyika or Gaṅgeśa) have just said in $\acute{S}_3$, a source or instrument of knowledge; even so i.e., even then ... . Consistently with this explicitly formulated first part of the sentence the second part of the sentence may be slightly reformulated (without changing the sense) to read: it cannot be said that vocal sound is a separate or distinct source. The first sentence of this passage $\acute{S}_4$ may therefore be made more explicit and read thus: Even if we grant that vocal sound is an instrument of knowledge it cannot be said

to constitute an independent or separate (type of) instrument.

This remark is particularly relevant against the Naiyāyika-s. For they not only admit that vocal sound (*śabda*) produces knowledge—which the Vaiśeṣika-s also admit—but they also hold that *śabda* constitutes a distinct source of knowledge. In the preceding passage Gaṅgeśa had refuted the radically opposed view of the Bauddha philosophers that vocal sound or, for that matter, linguistic utterances made by others cannot give us knowledge or truth. The Vaiśeṣika-s do not go so far. One possible reson is that while the Bauddha philosophers do not accept the scriptural or *vaidika* statements to be true, the Vaiśeṣka-s admit that whatever has been said in the *Veda-s* is infallible. So the Vaiśeṣika-s do not deny that knowledge results from reading or hearing a *vaidika* sentence or, for that matter, any well-formed sentence. If on the other hand vocal sounds in general were incapable, as the Bauddha-s hold, to yield any knowledge, then the scriptural pronouncements also could not produce any true belief. The Vaiśeṣika-s therefore did not find anything wrong with the Nyāya view which Gaṅgeśa defended in $\acute{S}_3$ in the face of Bauddha opposition—the view that knowledge does occur from (hearing) such vocal sounds which (are known at the time to) have syncategorematicity etc. and are associated with the intervening condition of memory of (relevant) word-meanings. If the Naiyāyika-s did not mean anything more than this when they held *śabda* to be a *pramāṇa* then the Vaiśeṣika-s would not have any reason to make the remark in question. But since they do not accept vocal sounds (words or sentence) to constitute a separate *pramāṇa* even though they admit that such sounds produce knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika-s are constrained to tell the Naiyāyika-s "Granted that the vocal sound is, as you have just said, an instrument of knowledge; even so it cannot be said to be a separate *pramāṇa* or a different kind of means of knowledge".

In $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ Gaṅgeśa has stated two rival views which are respectively more and less radically opposed to the Nyāya view in the matter, namely, that *śabda* is a distinct source of knowledge and, what is entailed by it, that *śabda* is a source of knowledge. The more radically opposed view examined in $\acute{S}_3$ has sometimes been described as the Bauddha view;[11] and the less radically opposed view stated in $\acute{S}_4$ is the Vaiśeṣika view in the matter. In

the last paragragh we endeavoured to guess what might have been the reason why Gaṅgeśa distinguished the two rival views. If Gaṅgeśa meant to distinguish the two rival views while taking them respectively, as the later commentators thought he did, to be the views of the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s respectively then the point of distinguishing them which suggests itself immediately is what has been stated in the preceding paragraph. But this is a point of doubtful value. For though the Bauddha-s do not accept the Hindu scripture or the *Veda*-s to yield infallible information yet they accept the pronouncements of their preceptors including those of (the penultimate or *Śākya*) Buddha as true. Nor do they or can they deny, what is a matter of common experience, that many assertions and pronouncements we meet with in our everyday life turn out to be true. It is therefore unlikely that the Bauddha-s held or Gaṅgeśa took them to hold the view that words do not yield any information let alone correct information.[12] They could perhaps did hold at the most that words did not constitute a *separate* source of knowledge, that what others take to be linguistic means is really the already recognized means of inference. But this is the view which Gaṅgeśa has stated in $Ś_4$ and which is widely known as the view the Vaiśeṣika-s advocate in opposition to the Naiyāyika-s and perhaps the Mīmāṃsaka-s. We mean to say that there is no difference, nor is there any evidence to think that Gaṅgeśa thought that there was any, between the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s regarding the stand to be taken against the Naiyāyika-s when the issue is whether or not language constituted a separate source of knowledge. Whether language is a source of knowledge at all, i.e., whether words ever yielded correct information was never an issue among these philosophers. For fear of inviting the charge of contradicting oneself and running counter to the evidence of daily experience one cannot deny that words often yield correct information.[13] So far then the Bauddha-s hold exactly as the Vaiśeṣika-s do, that language is not a separate source of knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra attributed to Diṅnāga the view (not that language is not a source of knowledge, but) that it is not a separate source;[14] and Udayanācārya credited the Vaiśeṣika-s with the view that language as a source of knowledge is no other than inference.[15] It is not true that Gaṅgeśa was not acquainted with the texts of

these predecessors. Nor is there any evidence that he found any good and new ground to attribute to the Bauddha-s a more radical view than the one held by the Vaiśeṣika-s that language is not a separate source, that as a source it is not different from inference.[16] However different their arguments may be the conclusion of the Bauddha-s and that of the Vaiśeṣika-s in the matter are the same. If therefore we have no reason to believe that Gaṅgeśa meant to distinguish their positions the search for the point of distinguishing the position of the Bauddha-s from that of the Vaiśeṣika-s is uncalled for.

It may seem that we have created a new problem for us. How then the discussions contained in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ are related ? The views to be found in these passages cannot be attributed to the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s respectively. Yet the view stated in $\acute{S}_3$ that *śabda* is no source of knowledge at all is logically distinct, though related, from the view put forward in $\acute{S}_4$ that *śabda* is not a separate source of knowledge, that it is just a case of inference. These two views are actually the negation of the two logically distinguishable constitutents of the Nyāya view that language is a distinct source of knowledge. From the point of view of the critics it is always advantageous to analyse the position to be criticised as conjuction of two or more statements. For then the denial of any one of them can suffice for the refutation of the position. In $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ Gaṅgeśa considers the refutability of the two assertions into which the view of the Naiyāyika-s, that *śabda* is a separate *pramāṇa,* or distinct source of knowledge can be analysed. So it seems that Gaṅgeśa's point in distinguishing the views stated in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ is not to attribute them respectively to the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s. His point is to lay bare the logical structure and the strength or weakness, as the case may be, of the Nyāya position. In short Gaṅgeśa's point of distinguishing the two views stated in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ is logical rather than historical.

Another explanation is also possible. The point of inserting the passage $\acute{S}_3$ is to supplement the account given in the preceding passage. In $\acute{S}_2$ language as a source of knowledge has been defined. It has been assumed that there is such a thing as linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*) to be defined. But what justification is there for such an assumption ? It cannot be said that all of us have experience

of obtaining information from what others say or write. For we have also experience of failure of linguistic communication. The objection raised in $\acute{S}_3$ directs our atention to the fact, as formulated by Udayanācārya, that words as such cannot be counted as a source of correct information.[17] To be so counted the words must satisfy certain conditions. In $\acute{S}_3$ Gaṅgeśa states these conditions; and this is why he inserted $\acute{S}_3$.[18]

Now that we have solved the problem[19] of transition from $\acute{S}_3$ to $\acute{S}_4$ we can proceed with the explanation of the latter. But we need to recapitulate first some of the things we said in the preceding section of this chapter. Though any vocal sound or utterance of any words does not produce knowledge in the hearer yet (a finite sequence of) words of a well formed sentence do so, provided the hearer had previously learnt the meanings of these words and can remember them now. So far therefore the Vaiśeṣika-s agree with the Naiyāyika-s in maintaining that the words being heard[20] by the hearer in such a case contribute to the production of the resulting knowledge. The point of the remark "Even so", constituting the first part of $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$ with which the Vaiśeṣika philosopher begins his account in $\acute{S}_4$, must have been to express his acceptance of the position thus clarified, or his agreement with the Naiyāyika-s, so far.

Now the question is what sort of knowledge is the knowledge which the words are agreed to produce under the circumstances just specified? Considering the role language or words play in the production of the knowledge in question it seems to be most natural and reasonable to describe this variety of knowledge as verbal, linguistic or *śābda*. The Naiyāyika-s do characterise it as *śābda*. If a Vaiśeṣika refuses to call it *śābda* then, in spite of what he has just said in the first part of $\acute{S}_4$ i.e., $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$, he cannot be taken to have accepted that *śabda* is a *pramāṇa*. If on the other hand he agrees to call the knowledge in question verbal then he admits a distinct kind of knowledge, that is to say, a type of knowledge which is different from the already admitted varieties of perception and inference. But in that case he will be forced to admit, like the Naiyāyika-s, that words in the sense defined constitute, as instrument in the production of a distinct variety of knowledge, a separate *pramāṇa* or a new accredited source of knowledge. If

what he says in the first part of the sentence $\acute{S}_4$ i.e., in the expression "Even so", means as much as this, that words in the sense defined is a separate source of knowledge, then the Vaiśeṣika-s must have uttered a self contradiction[21] when they said "Even so, word is not a distinct source of knowledge". For they deny, in that case, in the second part of the sentence, what they assert in the first part of it, (assuming that our explication of the part "Even so" has been correct).

We found earlier a way to resolve this contradiction, though it was not ultimately satisfying. The Vaiśeṣika-s are held to be using the word *pramāṇa* in two different senses. There is a comparatively weaker or wider sense in which the expression is mostly used by the philosophers. As used by them even this wider sense is quite precise and technical if it is compared with any expression, including the expression in question, used in ordinary language by common men. But even so it is not as narrow as the other sense to be sepecified presently. In the wider sense, in which the philosophers of India normally use it the word *pramāṇa* means the special means or instrument of production of knowledge—whether only non-recollective, as the Naiyāyika-s hold, or both recollective and non-recollective as some other philosophers including the Vaiśeṣika-s maintain. In this sense words constituting a well-formed and finite sequence should be regarded as *pramāṇa.*[22] For such words do produce, as instrument, knowledge. We also found that it was most reasonable to call this knowledge verbal or *śābda* and the instrument of it, the words, *śabda pramāṇa.* The narrower sense of the word *pramāṇa* is obtained by adding further restriction the type of the knowledge which is to result. A *pramāṇa* must not only be instrumental in the production of some knowledge or even non-recollective knowlege, it should be instrumental in the production of the knowledge of at least one of the classes into which the class knowledge gets divided immediately and directly. Two such classes which both the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s admit (to fall immediately under the class knowledge) are perception and inference. If now a Naiyāyika wants to regard *śabda* or words, in the sense defined, as a *pramāṇa* then he should hold that verbal comprehensions constitute a class which falls directly under the class knowledge just like the class of perception or

inference. Though the Vaiśeṣika-s do not, yet the Naiyāyika-s do maintain this. But in none of the preceding passages has Gaṅgeśa proved it. Therefore, accepting whatever has gone before in the form of saying "Even so" the Vaiśeṣika-s may assert, without contradiction, that verbal comprehensions do not constitute a separate class directly under the class of knowledge along with the classes of perception and inference. The implication is that *śabda* (vocal sound) is not a distinct *pramāṇa* (instrument of ...) on the same footing as, or in the same sense in which, preception or inference is a *pramāṇa*. Thus the apparent contradiction noted above may be resolved by taking the word "*pramāṇa*" to mean two different things in its two occurrences in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$. The Vaiśeṣika-s are not thus reopening the same issue (raised by the Bauddha-s and already settled in the previous passage). They are offering a new challenge by way of stating a characteristic tenet of their philosophy—that words do not constitute a separate source of knowledge.

The line of argument sketched above or the interpretation of $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$ just given to resolve the apparent contradiction may not seem very satisfying. For in the first place we are familiar with the use of the same word in two different senses in the same sentence as a figure of speech in some literary work of humour or as unfair means of polemics used to discredit the rival theorist advocating perhaps the right thesis in a dabate. In a serious philosophical discourse such ambiguities are sometimes mentioned or noted as possible sources of confusion which needs to be removed; but they are not used to create a confusion the effort to remove which may cost the commentators a good deal of time and energy. Secondly, if our above interpretation is correct, if it is the point of the Vaisesika-s to say that while in some wider sense words constitute *pramāṇa* in a narrower sense they do not do so, then the Vaiśeṣika-s should have said that. But in the sentence under consideration they are reported (in direct speech) to say not that words do not constitute a *pramāṇa*, but that they do not constitute a separate *pramāṇa*.

A second and a slightly different way is there. This is a simpler and more satisfying way of resolving the apparent contradiction. The import of the sentence $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$ taken as it is, that is to say, prior to any interpretation, is that even if it be true that words as specified

in $\acute{S}_3$ constitute *pramāṇa,* they do not constitute a separate *pramāṇa.* Now words can be *pramāṇa* without being a separate *pramāṇa* if and only if they are identical with some other *pramāṇa.* This may not be held logically impossible on the ground that no two things can be identical with each other. For *pramāṇa* is not a thing or an ontological item like *śabda. Pramāṇa* is a concept or description which signifies some objective property. Certain thing like vocal sound qualifies for the title or description *pramāṇa* when it functions in some particular way or possesses some particular property. A thing which is otherwise a substance, say, smoke, may be called a case of *anumāna pramāṇa* i.e., inferential instrument or source in the context of (inferential) awareness of fire since it bears some particular relation to fire. Thus smoke is a *pramāṇa* or yields as instrument, knowledge; but it does not constitute a separate *pramāṇa.* It is just a case of inferential instrument. In case of the thing smoke, however, it does not need to be emphasized that it does not constitute a separate *pramāṇa,* for no one envisages that possibility. The case is otherwise with the thing called vocal sound. The Naiyāyika-s maintain that such sounds yield, as instrument, knowledge. In addition to saying that vocal sounds constitute *pramāṇa* or instrument of knowledge, the Naiyāyika-s say that the *pramāṇa* these sounds constitute is different from, and not reducible to, inferential (or other) instrument. They, in other words, constitute a distinct *pramāṇa* or *pramāṇāntara.* In the sentence under reference the Vaiśeṣika-s mean to say that it has been rightly pointed out, in the previous passage, to the Bauddha-s that vocal sounds or *śabda* as specified, i.e., as words of a finite and well-formed sequence or sentence, is instrumental in producing knowledge; they do not fail to yield knowledge. But even as *pramāṇa* they are like smoke in our previous example. In other words, they are used by the hearer as logical ground (*anumāpaka hetu*)[23] to infer that the meanings of the words in question (i.e. the words constituting the sentence uttered) are related. This knowledge of the relation between word meanings is what is agreed to be yielded by the vocal sounds as specified i.e., by a sentence. That vocal sounds constitute a *pramāṇa* means no more than that they yield knowledge of the relation that obtains among the word meanings in question. But what are we to

understand when it is said that the words of a well-formed sentence yield knowledge of the relation between the word-meanings ? The Vaiśeṣika-s think that we should understand only this that the hearer *uses* the words, to *infer* that the meanings of the words are related; in much the same way we use (the presence of) smoke to infer (the presence of) fire. Thus *śabda,* which has been established as a *pramāṇa* in the previous passage, functions[24] just in the way any inferential instrument functions. So far it is nothing other than a special case of inferential instrument or *anumānapramāṇa* or a logical ground of some inference. The words of a sentence being known yield knowledge of the relation in question just in the way in which smoke (or its knowledge) yields knowledge of fire being inferred. The whole or part of the logical ground which the hearer of a sentence uses to infer the meaning of the sentence in question or, what is the same thing, the relation between the meanings of the words constituting the sentence in question, is constituted by *śabda.*[25] The words which thus function as inferential instrument do not constitute a separate *pramāṇa* as the Naiyāyika-s think. *Śabda* is thus not a separate *pramāṇa* or *pramāṇantara.* The sentence $\acute{S}_4$ may now be found to be perfectly consistent and not self-contradictory. It is not entailed by "*Śabda is a pramāṇa*", the Vaiśeṣika's acceptance of which has been indicated in the first part of the sentence i.e., "Even so", that it is a distinct *pramāṇa,* distinct from inferential instrument; and in the second part of $\acute{S}_4$ the Vaiśeṣika-s deny that *śabda* is a distinct source of knowledge.

This last line of interpretation which, though not entirely satisfying, is by far the best. It will be also found to be closest to the intention of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers as it will be further clarified in a number of succeeding passages beginning with even the very next sentence of this passage. While the sentence $\acute{S}_{4(2)}$ states the reason for what has just been said in the second part of $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$, it also shows clearly that the knowledge supposed to be yielded by *śabda* independently is really yielded through an inferential process or instrument. For those who admit *śabda* as specified in $\acute{S}_3$ to be a separate *pramāṇa,* the Naiyāyika-s for example, think that the knowledge derived from words as instrument has, at least sometimes, for its object something not known previously A hearer already knows the meaning of the

words of the sentence he hears. But a sentence or a finite sequence of words as specified in $Ś_3$ yields the knowledge of the relation that obtains among these meanings, it reveals how the word-meanings are related. This object, unknown before (*apūrvārtha*), is the object of the knowledge produced by the words as instrument.[26] Now the Vaiśeṣika-s say in $Ś_{4(2)}$ that the relation between the meanings of the words of a sentence is known through a process which is nothing other than the inferential process. Thus from the first part of $Ś_{4(1)}$ and $Ś_{4(2)}$ taken together the second part of $Ś_{4(1)}$ follows as conclusion. In the first part of $Ś_{4(1)}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s inform us that they take words, as specified in $Ś_3$, yield to knowledge— evidently the knowledge of the relation obtaining between word-meanings. Now in $Ś_{4(2)}$ they say that the relation obtaining between the word-meanings is known only through the inferential process or instrument. It follows that the words are, or constitute, inferential instrument so far as the knowledge of the relation between word-meanings is concerned—they do not constitute a distinct or new instrument of knowledge. Or even if words do not constitute the inferential means or the ground of the inference, the knowledge a hearer has when he hears certain sentence is derived [by him] by using some kind of inference.

FIVE

Vaiśeṣika Inference-I

I

Every one accepts the undeniable fact that we communicate and often communicate successfully by using language. It goes without saying that only the competent speakers of a language can communicate, can converse (successfully), in that language. Competent use of language consists in the production (utterance) as well as understanding of meaningful words, phrases and sentences. A sentence is a finite sequence of certain vocal sounds—or, for the present, what are intuitively and commonly known as words— provided the condition of well-formedness is satisfied. Both the speaker and the hearer of a language— when they converse successfully— share, that is to say, both of them already have, the knowledge of the meaning of the vocal sounds, or words of the sentence, being uttered and heard respectively.[1] What a hearer therefore learns when he hears the utterances of a speaker is not the meaning of the words uttered, for he already has that knowledge.[2] Although the meanings of certain words can be taught by using language, yet a hearer cannot learn the meaning of every word in this way. Since the word-meanings can be known by non-linguistic means as well,[3] and since the hearer must learn the meanings of the words of the sentences before he hears and understands the sentences in question, the sentences yield, while they admittedly yield knowledge for the hearer, knowledge of some

other thing which is not necessarily known previously. This new thing is the relation which binds together, so to say, the word-meanings into a fact as much as certain syntactic relation combines words to form a sentence. Now when a competent hearer hears what another competent user of the same language says, he, accdording to the Vaiśeṣika-s, actually uses the words of the speaker to infer the relation in question, to be symbolised here as R^*, obtaining between the meanings of the individual words of the sentence under reference. Usually knowing an R^* takes the form of knowing the word-meanings as related.[4] Whatever the case may be, prior to the actual performance of a linguistic act consisting in the utterance (understanding) of a concrete sentence S_1, both the hearer and the speaker must have, in a situation of linguistic communication, learnt the meanings of the relevant words i.e., words constituting that sentence. But while the speaker *somehow* also knew the R^*, being stated in the sentence, the hearer did not know it prior to his hearing this sentence. When the hearer hears the sentence S_1 he uses it inferentially and derives (inferential) knowledge of R^*. The question 'How exactly a hearer makes inferential use of a sentence ?' will be discussed in the next passage. But even at this stage one may feel like parting company with the Vaiśeṣika-s, because the view of the latter seems to be utterly counter intuitive. They tend to ignore or largely minimize the role of language as a source of information. It may be said in defence of a Vaiśeṣika that though he maintains that some inference is essentially involved whenever language is found to succeed in imparting the required sort of information yet he takes this inference to be of a special variety. Such inference has at least two specialities. It gives us knowledge of R^* and it involves use of language—to be more accurate, words—inferentially. Every inference does not involve the use of language nor does it inform us of some R^*. Thus the Vaiśeṣika-s do not ignore the role language plays in (linguistic) communication. They simply mean to say that only when it is used inferentially, in a sense to be explained presently, can language yield the desired knowledge i.e., the knowledge of R^*.

It should be remembered that both the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s admit that a hearer who knows the language of a speaker, can understand a sentence S, when this is uttered by the

speaker, even if he (the hearer) has not heard the sentence before. Thus the philosophers of both these schools admit that the hearer of even a new sentence obtains the knowledge of R^*, where R^* is the relation that obtains among the meanings of the words of the sentence being uttered audibly. They disagree, however, as to the exact nature of the process through which this knowledge is generated. The Naiyāyika-s hold that if the hearer knows the language the speaker is speaking, if he had earlier learnt the meanings of the words of the sentence being uttered, then the process in question has three moments in it. In the first place, the hearer hears the words (and also the letters of the sentence) which the speaker utters. This means that the hearer has the auditory *perception* of a finite series of vocal sounds. (The actual process is more complicated.[5]). In the second place, he *recalls,* what he had already learnt in the past, the meanings of the words being spoken by the speaker. Finally, in the third place, the hearer has the *knowledge* of R^* i.e., this knowledge occurs in him. Thus the hearer does depend especially on the words he heard so much so that his knowledge of R^* should be admitted as a distinct variety of knowledge ; it should be called verbal or linguistic in view of the special role the vocal (i.e., spoken) language or sound plays in the production of it. If like the meanings (of the words) i.e. the things corresponding to the words of the sentence, the hearer had earlier heard about R^* then we could possibly say that the knowledge of R^* is a case of memory as much as the knowledge of the meanings of the words in question is. If there were a word for it the hearer could hear about R^* as he hears about word-meanings when he hears the words of the sentence being uttered. But there is no word for it.[6] The Naiyāyika-s therefore find no other way but to admit a distinct source for knowledge of R^* or, which comes to the same thing, admit language to be a distinct source of knowledge. We shall call this theory the verbal apprehension theory or *VA* theory of hearer's knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣika-s agree with the Naiyāyika-s so far as the first two moments of the process, generating knowledge of R^*, are concerned. By knowledge of R^* we do not here mean *verbal* knowledge of R^* or knowledge of R^* generated through the *instrumentality* of vocal sounds. For to say that would be to beg

the question in favour of the Naiyāyika-s, depriving thereby their opponents, the Vaiśeṣika-s, of even the opportunity of stating their position, let alone the scope to defend it. The non-controversial meaning we attach here to the expression "knowledge of R^*", in order to be able to formulate the controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s, is, the knowledge of the relation obtaining between the meanings of the words being heard (*anvayabodha*). The Vaiśeṣika-s disagree with the Naiyāyika-s so far as the third moment in the process of generation of this knowledge of R^* is concerned. The disagreement relates to the description of the nature of the knowledge of R^* which in any case and admittedly results. What is the correct description or statement of the true nature of this knowledge? The Vaiśeṣika-s maintain that in the third step the hearer uses the words heard inferentially[7] to arrive at the knowledge of R^*. So far therefore this knowledge of R^* does not constitute a special variety but is of the familiar type called inference. Further though words play an essential role in the production of the knowledge of R^*, that role is the role of some element in an inference. We shall refer to this theory as *IA* theory or Inferential Apprehension theory of hearer's knowledge.

Instead of analysing an actual inference into premiss and conclusion, (with the inferential relation or the statement of it, which does not form a part of inference like the premiss, dropped from the formulation of an inference), the Indian philosophers analyse it into three elements: the subject of inference (i.e., of the inferential knowledge and, usually, of the statement of this knowledge), the predicate of inference (i.e., of the inferential knowledge and, usually, of the statement of this knowledge) and the ground of inference, where the ground is that the (certain) knowledge of which *causes* the inferential knowledge to occur. The latter knowledge is to the effect that the subject (thing) of the inference has the predicate (property) of the inference.[8] The knowledge of the ground which produces this inferential knowledge usually has the form— 'the subject of inference has *h* in it' where the *h* is the ground.

Now to know a thing inferentially means to have an inference with that thing figuring as the predicate or the property (of the

subject) being inferred (*sādhya dharma*). In the alternative analysis, to infer a proposition means to have an argument with that proposition as the conclusion. What is meant is that in Western Philosophy the dominant view of inference is the argument view or linguistic view. An argument is a body of sentences related by way of the relation of implication. The implying sentence (or sentences) is the premiss and the sentence which is implied is the conclusion. The third elememt viz. the relation of implication is not among the sentences which are premises or conclusion. No statement of this relation is involved in the (linguistic) formulation of an inference. Indian Philosophers do not usually take this sentence-view of inference.[9] The inferential relation does not obtain between sentences (premises and conclusion) but between things which are content either of the inferential knowledge (or judgement) or of the knowledge that causally and immediately precedes the inferential knowledge. Any such knowledge has propositional form and can be expressed or even represented in sentences. So certain linguistic categories apply, with suitable adjustments, to knowledge. What is inferred is the *predicate* content of the resulting inferential knowledge or judgement. The *Saṃskrita* term for this predicate is *vidheya* of *anumiti*; it is what is inferred to be possessed of by the *subject*-thing of the inferential judgement. This subject (*uddeśya*) is called *pakṣa.* The ground of inference (*hetu*), which bears the inferential relation to *sādhya*, is a content of a knowledge which causes the inferential knowledge but (usually) not of the inferential knowledge itself. When the Vaiśeṣika-s say that the hearer of a sentence infers R^*, they mean that the hearer makes an inference when he hears the sentence—i.e., the words or the vocal sounds— and recalls the word-meanings; and that the R^* figures as or in the predicate of the inference. His purpose will be equally served if this R^* forms a part of the predicate or is the sole predicate of the inference he makes. Gaṅgeśa has discussed both these versions or types of inference of R^* envisaged by the Vaiśeṣika-s or, on behalf of them, by others. The vocal sounds heard by a hearer could be said to have constituted inferential means if they played the role of instrument or special cause so far as the inference of R^*, in any of the above two versions, is concerned. Though strictly speaking

they do not function as logical ground if the term is understood in the sense given to it above yet these vocal sounds play an essential role in the inference in question. The hearer uses the vocal sounds or words either as subject of inference or as forming part of the ground of inference. So far as the version one of the Vaiśeṣika inference (or inference-I) of R^* (which we shall discuss presently) is concerned, the subject is 'These words';here the demonstrative refers to the words of some concrete sentence which is actually being uttered by a speaker, such as "Drive (or beat) the cow home with the rod" ; the predicate of the inference, as we shall see, has R^* only as part of it. Now the ground of the inference of R^* in its first version are the properties like syncategorematicity. These are taken here to be the properties of the vocal sounds.[10] So the subject of inference is the sentence or the words constituting it. Now the inference or this version of the inference of R^* may be stated in this way. These words must have been uttered (by the speaker) on the basis of (his) knowledge of R^* since the words have the property of syncategorematicity etc. The actual formulation of the present version of the inference of R^* has been given by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_5$. It is a bit more complicated. So before we attend to these complexities in the next section we shall state briefly the upshot of the argument.

Whenever a competent speaker of a language wants to state or describe a fact or issue a command (verbally) he utters certain particular sentence [and not just any other]. The sentence he utters consists of a finite number of vocal sounds or words properly ordered. If the words were different or differently ordered then it would be at best a different *sentence,* perhaps unable to serve the purpose in hand. On the other hand if the words lacked the minimum ordering, if they lacked the essential syntactic and semantic properties, then also they would have failed to serve the purpose, though for a different reason. They would not fail because they constituted a different sentence but because they would fail to constitute any sentence at all. If his purpose is to be served the speaker must utter certain definite sentence. A definite sentence is produced by uttering a few definite words in a definite order. Thus if we want to describe the state of a piece of iron when it has been heated in an oven for quite some time, we need to use

such words as "this", "piece", "of", "iron", "looks" and "red". Words like "this", "piece", "of", "wood", "gets" and "burnt", cannot serve the purpose. Again if we want to describe the event of John making a gift of a book to Dick, we need to utter the words "John" etc. in certain order or sequence and the sequence should be uninterrupted. If we utter the word "John" today and the next word on some other day then we would fail in our purpose. We would equally fail if we uttered the words in this way: John piece of iron makes looks a gift red of a book etc. The same would be the result if we uttered just the words needed but in a different order e.g. "Dick makes the gift of a book to John". Thus whenever a competent speaker of a language uses language with some definite purpose or with the purpose of communicating a definite piece of imformation he uttters appropriate words in appropriate order and in unbroken or uninterrupted sequence; in short, he utters a definite sentence.[11] But what determines his uttering one sentence S_i rather than any other sentence S_j is his knowledge, derived from whatever source,[12] of the fact he wants to describe or, which is the same thing, his knowledge of the relation R^* or some other relation corresponding to it which constitutes the fact by binding together, so to say, certain things.[13] These things are the meanings of the words composing the sentence S_i which (sentence) describes (certain definite) R^*. This R^* or things ordered into (this) fact by R^* is therefore called the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) or fact.[14]

If the hearer is also a competent speaker of the language in question then he knows all that has been said in the previous paragraph.[15] In any case whenever he finds a speaker uttering a few words ordered properly, he knows that the speaker has been determined to utter such words because he (the speaker) knew an R^* or a fact and wanted to express his knowledge. But whenever such a hearer notes the presence of the appropriate syntactic features in the words uttered by the speaker and infers on that basis that the utterance of these words must have been determined by the speaker's knowledge of R^*, he himself acquires, through the same act of inference a knowledge of R^*.[16] Of course the knowledge of R^* the hearer acquires fails to have the form, say, 'these things are related by R^*,' or 'R^* binds these word-meanings together'. It has rather the form, say, "The speaker has the

knowledge of R^*" or "These words (uttered by the speaker) are due to the (speaker's) knowledge of R^*. But even if one has knowledge in the form noted last, one has the knowledge of R^*, though indirectly. For no one can know that a speaker knows R^* without knowing the R^*, at least in so far as it forms the content of the speaker's knowledge in question. This is in essence the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s. To defend such a thory the advocates must be able to formulate the type or types of inference which according to them, a hearer actually uses in order to derive the information he derives from the utterances of some speaker. In $\acute{S}_5$ Gaṅgeśa offers on behalf of the Vaiśeṣika-s formulation of one of the two types of the inference in question[17]. We shall call it the Vaiśeṣika inference one. Let us now explain Gaṅgeśas's formulation which involves some complexities.

II

[$\acute{S}_5$]

> *Tathāhi gāmabhyāja daṇḍeneti padāni vaidika padāni vā tātparyaviṣayasmāritapadārtha saṃsargajñāna pūrvakāṇi ākāṅkṣādimatpadakadambatvāt ghaṭamānayetivat.*
> [pp. 23-29.]

> To illustrate, the [ordinary] words like "drive near the cow with the rod" or the words of the Veda [(in translation) "Those who aspire after heaven should perform the (necessary) rite" (by sacrificing a horse)] are preceded by the [speaker's] awareness of the intended relation obtaining between the word-meanings recalled; because (these words) have the property of forming a group of words having syncategorematicity *et cetera*; to cite an example, [we can take the sentence] "Bring a jar".

In this passage Gaṅgeśa has construed the predicate of the inference as '(are) preceded by the *speaker's* awareness' etc. and the R^* occurs there as a part of this predicate. But R^* has been specified as the intended R^* i,e., as that relation between the things (word-meanings) recalled which (relation) the speaker intends to

assert.[18] The point of the inference is that a competent speaker utters, under normal circumstances, words to describe some particular fact or convey certain information about an R^* (one among the possible R^*s) in the terminology we are using. Hence the words a speaker utters to convey the information about certain intended relation to be known as obtaining between the things (i,e., meanings of the words) recalled (by the words uttered), are caused by his knowledge of this intended R^*. The conclusion of the inference Gaṅgeśa formulates in $\acute{S}_5$ is therefore the following. The words are preceded by the awareness of the intended relation obtaining between the word-meanings recalled.

This conclusion is the statement or, better, expression or linguistic representation of the inferential knowledge generated. The subject of this statement or inferential knowledge, which is called *pakṣa*, is 'The words'. The rest of the sentence is the predicate or *sādhya*. By the word "awareness" occurring in the predicate we are to understnd, though Gaṅgeśa has not said it explicitly, speaker's awareness. Similarly 'The words' in the (*pakṣa* or the) subject position means the words being uttered by the speaker. The word "intended" is a very rough translation of the *Saṃskrita* expression "*tātparyaviṣaya*" occurring in the original text of Gaṅgeśa. We shall presently clarify, to some extent, the notion of *tātparya*.[19] In Gaṅgeśa's formulation of the inference in question i.e., the inference through which, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the hearer of a sentence obtains the knowledge of R^*, the proeperty of the subject of the inference viz. the property of being groups of words which have syncategorematicity etc., figures as the ground of inference. So far therefore the inference is

> The words, being uttered, are (i.e., have the property of being) preceded by the (speaker's) awareness of the intended relation obtaining between the word-meanings recalled.
> Because, they (the words) have the property of being a group of words which are characterised by syncategorematicity etc., just like the words of the sentence "Bring (me) a jar".

Since in the above formulation the property of 'being a group etc.' characterises the subject of the inference (the words), it fulfils one of the necessary conditions which every logical ground or *hetu*

should satisfy. A ground must also be related to the predicate of the same inference. It is on the basis of this connection, that is, in considereation of its having this connection, that something is regarded as the ground of the inference of that predicate (*sādhya*). This connection in other words, forms the basis of why what figures as the ground of inference is taken to be so. The connection of this sort, or our awarness of it, enables us to infer the predicate of an inference from the ground (and not *vice versa*). So in the present formulation of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I Gaṅgeśa has cited, following the standard practice, an instance where this relation of the ground with the predicate is known to have been realised. The instance in question is the sentence "Bring (me) a jar". The point of incorporating such an instance or example in the formulation of the inference in question is this. In this sentence, cited as an example, we have words which exemplify respectively the property (of being a group etc.) which figures as ground and also the property (of being preceded by etc.) which figures as the predicate of the inference in question. This example thus illustrates and also provides occasion for perceiving that connection between these two properties which should be there if the first is to be able to yield the inference of the second. 'The words' which form the subject of the inference in question must have the second property since they have the first property. But if 'The words' constituting the subject of this inference were exactly the same words (which constituted the sentence) which served as example then there would have been no point in inferring that here there was the second property. For that was already known ; otherwise the sentence could not count as an example. As a rule the inferential subject (i.e., the subject of inferenctial judgement or statement expressing it) and inferential example (i.e., an instance where the inferential relation in question is acknowledged to have been earlier apprehended) are different. The presence of the inferential predicate (or the property being inferred) in the example is already a known or undisputed fact. The presence of the inferential predicate in the inferential subject is not already known or is still desired to be proved logically. So what figure respectively as subject and example in the context of a single inference cannot be the same. Gaṅgeśa therefore needed to specify the subject of the inference

further so that nobody can say that they are the same words which figure in the formulation as example. In Gaṅgeśa's formulation the subject of the inference is accordingly not just "The words" but "The [ordinary] words like 'Drive the cow near with the rod' or words of the *Veda*-s" [(in translation) "Those who desire heaven should perform the (necessary) rite" by sacrificing horse]; these are not words being actually cited to illustrate the inferential relation involved. This is the initial explanation why Gaṅgeśa formulated the inference in question in the way he did in $\acute{S}_5$.

In $\acute{S}_5$. Gaṅgeśa has then given a formulation of one of the two types of inference which, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, are really responsible for the knowledge one obtains when one hears a speaker uttering words of a familiar language. To put it otherwise, the Vaiśeṣika-s maintain that one or the other of these two types of inference, to be referred to henceforward as the Vaiśesika inference-I and Vaiśeṣika inference-II, yields the knowledge of R^*. This is incompatible with the *VA* theory of the Naiyāyika-s which contends that the knowledge of R^*, that is to say the non-perceptual knowledge which one has when one hears the words or a sentence of a familiar language, has for its *special means* (*pramāṇa*) vocal sound itself[20]. Verbal knowledge then is a distinct kind of knowledge and *śabda* or vocal sound, in the sense explained, is a distinct means or source of such knowledge. To establish the Nyāya position Gaṅgeśa states the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I to show, by examination, that this inference cannot replace *śabda* as a distinct means or source of (verbal) knowledge. Of the two types of the Vaiśeṣika Inference Gaṅgeśa has given the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in the pages 31-32 of his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* while the Vaiśeṣika Inference II has been stated in page 57 of the same text.

The formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference one (or Vaiśesika Inference-I) given in $\acute{S}_5$ is significantly different from the foumulations given to it by such Vaiśeṣika philosophers as Vallabhācārya.[21] Gaṅgeśa is in any case aware that the inference in question admits, apparently at least, of different formulations. This put Gaṅgeśa under the obligation to defend his own formulation given in $\acute{S}_5$ after comparing it with some other formulations. He considers and rejects in the next two passages some formulations

of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I which differ from that of his own in respect of the (formulation of the) ground of the inference. In subsequent passages he defends along the same line his own formulation of the *sādhya,* or what is to be inferred i.e., the predicate of the inferential knowledge to be had, and the *pakṣa* or the subject (of this knowledge) which the property inferred is asserted to characterise. So far as the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is concerned Gaṅgeśa's own formulation is, to be found in $\acute{S}_5$; and our aim in this section is to explain this passage. One comment about Gaṅgeśa's defence of his own formulation is, however, in order. Some alternative formulations of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, traceable to Vallabhācārya, have been stated and rejected after examination in $\acute{S}_6$ and $\acute{S}_7$. By rejecting in these passages the alternative formulations of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I Gaṅgeśa not only justifies his own way of formulating it, but also shows that he has improved upon the formulation of others including perhaps those of some Vaiśeṣika-s themselves. But he should not be taken to have really proved that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is free from all defects, even when it has been formulated in the way he formulated it. Therefore Gaṅgeśa's rejection of some alternative formulatations should not be taken to carry any implication other than that his own formulation is so far the best. He should not be taken to have implied further that the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s or the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, at least as it has been formulated by him, can tell us what the nature or process of sentential knowledge really is.

Our discussion of Gaṅgeśa's own formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I or, for the matter of that, our interpretation of the passage $\acute{S}_5$ will remain, we are afraid, somewhat unclear. This will be due mainly to the fact that the ground of the inference in question cannot be fully explained at this stage unless we allow too long a digression. The discussion of the three (four) features, referred to in $\acute{S}_5$ as syncategorematicity etc., which constitute the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, covers one hundered and eighty pages of the present edition of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* (which includes the commentary of Mathurānātha) whereas the discussion of the different versions of *IA* theory takes no more than one hundred and sixty two pages. Gaṅgeśa himself did not allow his discussion

of the *IA* theory to be interrupted by a long discussion of the four features which constitute only the logical ground of argument which allegedly yields hearer's knowledge of R^*. He undertook a thorough examination and explanation of these features only after he had otherwise completed the examination of the various versions of the Inferential Apprehension Theory of sentential understanding proving thereby that *IA* theory is untenable. The only tenable thory is the *VA* theory or the Verbal Apprehension Theory (of the Naiyāyika-s). We cannot anticipate at this stage the whole of Gaṅgeśa's subsequent discussion of the four features. It is not even clear in which of the various senses of the terms he discussed later, did Gaṅgeśa use the expressions like "syncategorematicity" in his formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in $\acute{S}_5$. So our explanation of $\acute{S}_5$ cannot but remain unclear at least in respect of these terms. Since the features which these expressions signify constitute the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference of the type I as it has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa, our intuitive understanding of this inference also will remain somewhat unclear. But our understanding of this inference or the present formulation of it, will become a bit clearer when we explain Gaṅgeśa's rejection of some alternative formulatitons of the ground of the inference in question.

For the present we understand the following to be the import of the passage $\acute{S}_5$ or Gaṅgeś's formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I given there. When a hearer hears a sentence S_i of some familiar language and finds the words themselves or the things which they recall as their meaning have the features noted below, another knowledge is caused in him. This is the knowledge of an $R_1{}^*$ which ($R^*{}_1$) may be called the 'meaning' of the sentence $\acute{S}_i$. The features are or include syncategorematicity (*ākāṅkṣā*), uninterrupted succession or proximity (*āsatti*) and semantic compatiblity (*yogyatā*). The knowledge of $R_1{}^*$ takes, according to the *IA* theory, this form. The words '.....' are (causully) preceded by the knowledge of the intended relation obtaining among the things recalled (by these words). Since the description 'the intended ..... recalled' is satisfied by $R_1{}^*$, the resulting knowledge is (partly) the knowledge of $R_1{}^*$. The idea is that there is no direct (inferential) link between certain words or words of a certain sentence S_i and certain relation $R_1{}^*$. But there is a relaton between certain words

(sentence) S_i a speaker utters and his knowledge of certain relation R_1* so much so that his knowledge of that relation causes the utteranece of the words. This being the case a hearer can infer, from the known fact that a speaker utters certain words S_i, that the speaker has the knowledge of the corresponding R_1*. So what a hearer infers in the first instance is not an R* but the speaker's knowledge of some R*. But since the inference of the speaker's knowledge of R* is at the same time inference of R*, a hearer is said, in the *IA* theory, to know R* by inference. Hence the theory is called the inferential apprehension theory or *IA* theory of hearer's knowledge of sentence-meaning.

The basis of this inference by a hearer is his own knowledge of the features of syncategorematicity and the like. Since it is one of the conditions laid down in the theory of inference that nothing that does not characterise the subject of an inference can be a (logical) ground of that inference, we are under compulsion to take the features of syncategorematicity etc. as properties of words so far as the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is concerned. For this inference is distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika Inference-II primarily on the ground that the subject of it, the inference-I, is word(s) or *pada*(-s) while that of the inference-II is thing(s) corresponding to the words of a sentence(-s) or *padārtha*-s. As features of words mutual syncategorematicity and mutual proximity at least are intuitively clear.[22] Semantic compatibility may also be understood for the present as the relation between meaning-wise compatible categories of words. Thus "Fire cools" or "Water burns" is not a sentence i.e. not a group of semantically compatible word categories. These words do not severally mean things which go together in fact or reality. Utterence of a string of such words does not presuppose and therefore does not have behind it the knowledge of any relational fact or relation. The same cannot therefore be inferred.

The second point to note is that whatever feature or thing functions as the logical ground of an inference does so only through the inferer's knowledge or awareness of it. It is not the thing (say, smoke) or the ground of inference (of fire, say), but the awareness of it which actually yields the inferential knowledge (of fire). So it is not directly or simply the ground of inference but the awareness

of the ground which is the special means (instrumental cause) or accredited source of inferential knowledge. Since (or if and in so far as) the features of syncategorematicity *et cetera* constitute the ground of inference of R^*, the awareness of these features causes the knowledge of R^*. It should not however be thought that whoever accepts that the belief about these features is the cause of our belief about R^* thinks that these features constitute the logical ground of inference of R^* or that the resulting knowledge of R^* is inferential. The Naiyāyika-s, for example, admit that the hearer must have knowledge of these features if he is to have the knowledge of R^*. But they do not think that the knowledge of R^* in which a hearer's understanding of a sentence consists is inferential. We should therefore carefully distinguish the role which the knowledge of these features plays in the production of the hearer's knowledge of R^* according to the *IA* and *VA* theories respectively. The *IA* theory needs it that these features are to be known both as characterising the words which form the subject of the inference in question and as being themselves characterised by the inferential relation in which they stand to what is to be inferred from them in the sense described. So in this theory the knowledge of these features is really the knowledge of their presence in (or characterising) the subject of inference and of their standing in the inferential relation of *vyāpti* to what is being inferred. Neither the knowledge of the words as words nor the knowledge of the features of the words in question as what they are play the determining role according to the *IA* theory. What determines the production of knowledge of R^* is the knowledge of these features as constituting one of the terms of the inferential relation which has as the other term R^*. In other words, in the *IA* theory the role of language as language is not so important. In the *VA* theory, advocated by the Naiyāyika-s, however, the knowledge or the features of syncategorematicity etc. does not play any role which can make the role of language as language secondary or insignificant. Knowledge of these features plays, on the contrary, the role of an auxiliary condition. The principal causal role is played by the words themselves— along or in association with some other condition which presupposes the specific role of language as language. A function whereby a linguistic item is distinguished from

everything else is the function of recalling the corresponding thing to which it bears the relation called meaning (relation). The standard version of the *VA* theory of the Naiyāyika-s contends that hearer's perception of certain *words* and, associated with it, the recollection the words cause of the things which they mean, jointly produce in the hearer the knowledge of the relevant R^*. This is so far as the principal causal conditions of the hearer's (non-perceptual and non-inferential) knowledge of R^* are concerned. It is clear that the role of the principal cause has been assigned to words in their characteristic role as meaningful expressions of language. The knowledge of the features of syncategorematicity etc. is regarded only as auxiliary. Even as auxiliary condition the knowledge in question is the knowledge of these features *qua* these features and not as the seat of inferential relation or as the ground of inference. In short what distinguishes *IA* theory is not the fact that the *IA* theory assigns the role of causal condition to the knowledge of the features of syncategorematicity etc., but the fact that by the knowledge of these features is understood the knowledge of these features as bearer of inferential relation.

Another point to note is that some formulations of the *IA* theory may differ in respect of the number of the features (like syncategorematicity)taken to constitute the ground of inference.The features the knowledge of each of which functions as an auxiliary causal condition of the hearer's knowledge of R^* in the *VA* theory roughly correspond to the features which jointly serve as the ground of the inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I of the *IA* theory. Gaṅgeśa has later enumerated four features of syncategorematicity, semantic compatibility, proximity and interntion[23] as the features the cognitions of which function as ancillary causal conditions. But while formulating the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in S_5 he has not mentioned each of these features explicitly. He has referred to these features as 'syncategorematicity etc.' It is not clear how many of these features Gaṅgeśa intends us to take as constituting the ground of the Vaiśeṣika inference in question. It seems that he does not want the feature of intention to be taken as part of the ground, for it already forms a part of the predicate of the inferential judgement as it has been formulated in $\acute{S}_5$. Semantic compatibility is in any case to be included. For where

semantic incompatibility between the words uttered has been detected there the words fail to yield any information. Where it has not been detected even though it is there, the words can at best yield wrong information or false belief. So the words must be characterised by semantic compatibility in the context where they are viewed as accredited source of knowledge. About the mutual proximity of the words also there can hardly be any doubt. For if betweeen the words (viewed or intended as a sentence) we allow time-lapse to intervene then we will fail to have a sentence which alone can yield the sort of belief which language is supposed to yield. Though there is disagreement as to whether or not awareness of mutual syncategorematicity is needed if words are to yield sentential information yet Gaṅgeśa does not seem to have this controversy in mind or does not seem to take note of it. Otherwise he would not have included it explicitly as the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as he formulates it in $\acute{S}_5$.[24]

I would like to mention only one more point in connection with our explanation of the passage $\acute{S}_5$ and intial clarification and defence of Gaṅgeśa's formulation of the ground of the inference in question. From our explanation above it appears that the words which constitute a sentence have at least the three features of syncategorematicity, proximity or unbroken sequence and semantic compatiblity. So one might think that a simpler way of formulating the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I would be to make the property of being a sentence itself the ground. But no real economy is effected if the expression "sentence" is just a convenient short-hand for "words having mutual syncategorematicity, mutual proximity and semantic compatibility". If however, the word "sentence" means just sentence or group of words then the property of being a sentence cannot suffice as ground of the inference in question. For, as it is clear in the instance of utterances by liars and uninformed children, there are sentences which cannot serve as ground for inferring that the speakers had knowledge of the relevant R^* before they made the utterances. Udayanācārya noted this point explicity. He also ruled out the attempt to formulate the ground as the property of being the utterance of a trustworthy person (*āpta*). For whereas the prior knowledge of the ground (as characterising the subject of inference)

is necessary for generating the inferential knowledge (here the hearer's knowledge of R^*) we cannot ascertain that the speaker of a sentence is an *āpta* prior to ascertaining that his sentence yields *knowledge* of R^*.

III

In this section we shall discuss, following Gaṅgesa, some alternative ways of formulating the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. Gaṅgeśa considers two such formulations in $Ś_6$ and $Ś_7$ respectively and rejects them as defective. It therefore seems that he considers these grounds or these ways of formulating the ground with a view to defend in the sense described earlier his own formulation given in $Ś_5$. The alternative formulations in question are traceable to Vallabhācāry's (twelfth century) *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. But one cannot be sure if Gaṅgeśa had this text in mind when he wrote the two passages of his *Śabdacintāmaṇi* in question. He might have in mind as possible version what Vallabha had actually written.

[$Ś_6$]

> *Yogyatāsattimattve sati. saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatvāt tatpara-sannidhimattvāt vā na hetuḥ. Saṃsṛṣṭohi yo'rthastat-paratvaṃ tatparasannidhimattvaṃ vā assiddhaṃ saṃsargasya prāgapratīteḥ.*
>
> [pp. 31-32]
>
> The logical ground, however, is not [either of the following two]: (i) Because besides being characterised by semantic well-formedness and uninterrupted succession, (the words in question) have been uttered with a desire to signify things as related or (ii) because (these words are) uttered with a desire to signify that besides being characterised by [semantic well-formedness and] uninturrupted succession. For since the relation is not known prior [to the inference in question], there is no knowledge of the property (of the words) of having been uttered to mean these things that are related or of the property of uninterrupted succession along with the property of having been uttered to mean related things.[25]

The statement of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as we find it in Gaṅgeśa's own formulation in $\acute{S}_5$, is : Because (these words) form(s) a group of words [*padakadamba*] which have the character of syncategorematicity *et cetera*. As stated in the passage $\acute{S}_6$ the logical ground is roughly[26] (i) Because (these words are) uttered with a desire to convey R^* besides being characterised by semantic well-formedness and uninterrupted succession (in production) or (ii) because (these words are) characteriesd by uninterrupted succession (and semantic well-formedness) besides being uttered with a desire to convey R^*. It appears that $\acute{S}_6$ gives two alternative formulations of a second possible ground with which to construct the Vaiśeṣika Inference of the type I.

The general import of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I with its logical ground as formulated in (i) of $\acute{S}_6$ is clear. A Vaiśeṣika philosopher will offer such inference to argue that when a hearer hears (a finite number of) words of a familiar language (or a language which he understands) and understands them he actually performs an act of inference. The inference is to the effect that the words in question must have been uttered (by the speaker) on the basis of (his) knowledge of R^* ; because these words have been uttered with a desire to convey mutual relatedness of the word-meanings (i.e., the things corresponding to the words which have recalled them), are semantically well-formed (in the sense that the extra-linguistic things corresponding to them can go together or can enter into suitable relation), and have among them (or have been uttered in) uninterrupted succession. The force of the argument is that, words such as these cannot be uttered by one who does not fully know the R^* obtaining between the things (the word-meanings) in question. Thus if a hearer can identify a sequence of vocal sounds as words which have been uttered with the desire (on the part of the speaker) to inform us of the things as related and if the hearer can further identify the words as satisfying both the semantic criterion of compatibility (that the corresponding extralinguistic things are or are capable of being related in some appropriate way i.e. the way in which they have been asserted or described to be related by the words in question) and the syntactic criterion of unbroken continuity (that the words are uttered in uniterrupted temporal succession) then he can be sure that the speaker had

uttered them on the basis of his knowledge of R^*. This is the Vaiśeṣika account of the process of understanding a sentence. Because they believe this account to be true, they maintain that our understanding the meaning of a sentence (or R^*) is really a case of inferring R^*. So when one hears a sentence S_1 and has in consequence knowledge of $R_1{}^*$, this knowledge is derived from inference and not, as the Naiyāyika-s believe, from words as a special means of verbal knowledge i.e., *śabdapramāṇa.* From what has been said above the import of the second ground as formulated in (ii) of $\acute{S}_6$ should also be clear.

Before we proceed with the translation and elucidation of $\acute{S}_6$ as a whole we may quickly discuss a few questions about the reading and interpretation of the following portion of $\acute{S}_6$:

(i) Because besides being characterised by semantic well-formedness and uninterrupted succession (these words are) uttered with a desire to signify R^* or (ii) because (these words) are uttered with a desire to signify that besides being characterised by [semantic well-formedness and] uninterrupted succession.

This portion of $\acute{S}_6$ has two divisions connected disjunctively. But do these two parts (i) and (ii) state two different logical grounds or just one ? A wholly negative reply to the second alternative will not carry conviction. For what is most apparent is that, but for the difference in the order of occurrence of their constitutents, the expression for the logical ground as stated or formulated in (i) is exactly the same as the expression for the logical ground as stated or formulated in (ii). They have the same content or constituents. But to say simply that (i) and (ii) state the same ground will be to invite the charge of senseless repetition. So either we should be able to discover greater and more significant difference between the two logical grounds (or the two formulations of the logical ground) we find in $\acute{S}_6$ or we should be able to discover some purpose behind repeating in (ii) what has been stated in (i).

One may think that the appearance of repetitiveness in Gaṇgeśa's formulation of the logical grounds in $\acute{S}_6$ is due to faulty translation. In the first place, the constituent 'semantic well-formedness' has been added, though in parenthesis, to (ii) in translation. It is not there in the original text of Gaṅgeśa. In his own formulation the logical ground as stated in (i) contains one

more constituent than the logical ground as stated in (ii). Therefore, if we go strictly by the original text then these two logical grounds (or these two formulations of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I) differ more importanttly than in the mere order of occurrence of their consitutents (or of the expressions of them). But the omission of the constituent 'semantic well-formedness' from the portion of the orginal text which corresponds to (ii) of $\acute{S}_6$ cannot be taken as intended by Gaṅgeśa. Its inclusion rather is arguably intended by him. That is why we have added it to expose Gaṅgeśa to the charge of being repetitive. But if Gaṅgeśa intended to retain 'semantic well-formedness' as a part of the logical ground as stated in (ii) why did he omit it then? The omission seems to be a case of oversight.[27] It may as well be the case that Gaṅgeśa did not envisage the possibility of any confusion.

Now we are back to the old problem of justifying, or at least discovering the purpose behind, Gaṅgeśa's act of repeating the same logical ground with insignificant change in the formulation consisting just in the difference of the order of occurrence of the constituent parts.[28] It may be that Gaṅgeśa repeats, with slight change of order, in the second half of $\acute{S}_6$ what he has stated in the first half of that sentence with a view to dispel possible error or confusion that not only all the constituent parts of the logical ground as stated in the first half of $\acute{S}_6$ are necessary but the order or relation which obtains among these parts as stated there is also necessary. Sometimes it happens that the logical ground of an inference is complex and involves more than one part or constituent. Again though all these parts contribute to the possibility or validity of the inference yet they do so independently and not as related with each other in any particular way. Such a situation creates a problem of description or communication. All the parts of the logical ground cannot be uttered or written at once. But when uttered or written successively, the succession of the parts will realise some one or other of the possible orders. To convey that this order is merely the order of uttering or stating the parts of logical ground and does not signify any objective or logically necessary order among the constituents of the complex logical ground, one needs to add to the statement of the logical ground the further statement to the effect that the order of the parts of the ground has no logical

relevance. One can achieve the same result by simply adding disjunctively to the statement of the logical ground another statement exactly like the first but differing only in the order of the occurrence of the words. This technique of alternating two formulations with same ingredients but different order can show most easily that the order is immaterial where the number of elements is just two. This might have led Gaṅgeśa to drop from the second half of the sentence one of the three words occurring in the first half viz. the word "*yogyatā*". It leaves him with a two part logical ground and he states them in the second part of the sentence in an order exactly opposite to the order in which they have been enumerated in the first half of the same sentence, indicating thereby that the order of the constituents is not logically relevant. Gaṅgeśa does not really mean to exclude *yogyatā*; it should rather be taken as understood in $\acute{S}_6$ (ii).

This is a way to defend the alternative formulations of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in ($\acute{S}_6$) in a disjunctive sentence the disjuncts of which include in reverse order the same constituents. It seems to be better than the argument that the charge of repetitiveness does not hold because at least the order of the constituents is different in the statement of the logical ground in the two halves of $\acute{S}_6$. For while this change of order is only too apparent the charge of repetitiveness is really to the effect that this change of order of the constituents is not so significant from the logical point of view as to convince any one that here there are two logical grounds.

IV

For convenience of discussion we have distinguished in our translation, three parts of the passage $\acute{S}_6$. The second part consists of (i) and (ii) being the two ways of formulating the second possible ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. We have so far discussed something about this second portion of $\acute{S}_6$. The first portion or part of $\acute{S}_6$ consists of the statement of rejection of the (i) and (ii) as the ground of inference. This portion of $\acute{S}_6$ reads "The logical ground, however, is not [either of the following two]" i.e., (i) and (ii). We now turn to explain this remark of Gaṅgeśa. We shall return presently to some other textual problem relating to the second part

of $\acute{S}_6$. In the last portion of $\acute{S}_6$ Gaṅgeśa states his reason why he thinks that neither (i) nor (ii) can be the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I or why the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I cannot be formulated as (i) or (ii). We need to explain this reason also. In other words we shall now explain the following remark and the argument: "The logical ground, however, is not [either of the following two]". "For since the relation is not known prior [to the inference in question], there is no knowledge of the property (of the words) of having been utttered to mean the things that are related or of the property of uninterrupted succession along with the property of having been uttered to mean related things."

A feature, however contingent, of a thing can be used as logical ground to infer (i.e. inferentially assert) some other feature of that very thing, provided these two features had earlier been found in some other instance to be especially related.[29] To be used as the ground of an inference a feature should further be *known* to characterise the thing some other feature of which is being inferred. It follows that the feature to be inferred, or part thereof cannot be used as ground. For unless already known and known as a feature of the thing in question, a feature cannot be used as ground. But if it is already known, there is no point in attempting to infer it. The solution is that, the features to be inferred cannot be known in the context of an inference except through that inference whereas what is to be used as ground should be known even as the feature of the subject of inference, independent of and prior to the particular act of inference in which it is to be used as ground. So in short nothing which is not already known (as a feature of the thing which is the subject of inference) prior to the performance of a certain act of inference, such as what is to be inferred in that act, can be used as the logical ground of that inference. Now the Vaiśeṣika-s contend that what the Naiyāyika-s believe to be known from a sentence considered as special means of knowledge viz., R^* is actually known by what is called here the Vaiśeṣika *inference*-I (or by the Vaiśeṣika *inference* II discussed later.) But if R^* is what is, as contended, inferred by the Vaiśeṣika inference-I then it cannot be, solely or partly, the ground of inference. Each of the two formulations of the ground of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I given in $\acute{S}_6$ is, however, in term of the relation in which the things

(or word-meanings) are related; and it is this very relation or R^*, which is contended by the Vaiśeṣika-s to be known by inference.

To explain, both the alternative formulations of the second ground given in $\acute{S}_6$ have the common part 'uttered with a desire to signify that or the things as related' i.e., *tatparatva* or *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva.* But the feature (of words) of meaning (uttered to mean) things as related, to be used as (part of) ground of inference, must be known prior to the inference (of *sādhya*) to be effected through its knowledge. In other words knowledge of R^* must be had non-inferentially. And the Naiyāyika-s admit a distinct source for non-inferential knowledge of R^*; they call this source *śabda pramāṇa.* To elucidate let us first note that to know that the words of a sentence mean things as related is to know the relation also which turns otherwise isolated things into a fact or into things as related. The book lying on the floor, and the table which has an inkpot on it but no book, are isolated in a way in which the book and the table are not isolated in case the table has the book on it. What turns otherwise isolated book and table into related things or fact, 'The book on the table', is some relation, say the relation of conjunction. So to know things as related in this case is to know the table, the book, and the relation of conjunction that obtains between them. A Naiyāyika would maintain that the relation that binds the book and the table in fact is the conjunction and on appropriate occasion we can know this conjunction through perception. But words do not or cannot mean things as related if to do that the words are to yield the knowledge to the effect that the book is there on the table in (the relation of) conjuction. For which words could yield this knowledge? The words like 'The book is on the table' or 'The table has a book on it' cannot. For these words do not include any word for the particular relation, conjunction. The words 'The table has a book on it in *conjunction*' cannot do either. For though these words include one which introduces conjunction, it introduces it as one of the things that are related and not as the relation that binds the things in question. For what binds together the table, the book and the conjunction—or the table on the one hand and the book-conjunction on the other—is not conjunction but inherence. The words "The table has a book on it in conjunction" do not,

however, include any word which names inherence. To generalise, sentences of the form '... is/has ***' do not contain any word for the relation which actually binds the relevant things into corresponding facts. So while the relation which actually turns otherwise isolated things as related is conjunction, inherence and so on, no sentence that describes the *fact* can yield knowledge of the form '... has ***' in conjunction/inherence etc.' Such sentences always contain something to show or indicate the relation but do not contain an expression which names the actual relation in question. If they did they would not have given us knowledge of the things *as related*. What it means then to say that the words, say, 'The table has a book on it' signify R^* or give knowledge of things as related? This is a larger issue requiring a decision as to whether individual words really mean isolated things. This issue is discussed in a later part of *Śabdacintāmaṇi.*[30]

For our purpose it will be enough to take simple sentence like 'The red rose' or 'The white cloth'. It may be objected that these expressions are not sentences but sequence of words. The adjective has been used here attributively whereas in a sentence, however simple, some expression must be there which is used predicatively. Thus in 'The (piece of) cloth is red' the adjective red has been used predicatively. The difference is not simply the use of the expression 'is' as copula. If it were so we could say that the distinction between the attributive and predicative use of an adjective is a peculiarity of English language which is not to be found in *Saṃskṛita* where use of anything like a copula is a rarity. Further in English verbs like 'speaks' 'runs' 'flies' form sentences in conjunction with suitable nouns without any use of 'is' or any variant of it. In *Saṃskṛita* we do have a distinction between *siddha* and *sādhya viśeṣaṇa* which are close if not exact counterparts of the attributive and predicative constructions. But in *Saṃskṛita 'śukla paṭaḥ'* (literally, white cloth) can be taken as a sentence which is equivalent to the sentence 'The cloth (which) is white'. It can also be used as a term involving attributive use of the adjective as in 'The (piece of) white cloth is on the table'. In any case from hearing a sentence such as 'The cloth is white' we derive the knowledge of the relevant things, i.e., the (piece of) cloth and the (particular) white, as related. Now since here the piece of cloth

and the thing which the particular white characterises are one and the same, the things may be known as related by way of *abheda* i.e., identity or, more accurately, identity in difference. So one who understands this sentence, that is to say, knows the things in question as related, also knows the relation (here, 'identity'). This 'identity' is here the R^* the knowledge of which a competent user of the language has when he hears the relevant utterance of some speaker. If this knowledge of R^* is to be had by means of an inference then R^* cannot form the logical ground of that inference or any part of it. But each of the alternative formulations of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I noted by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_6$ involves as a part of it 'things as related' and for that matter the relation obtaining among the things or the word meanings. Gaṅgeśa therefore says that the logical ground so formulated cannot really be or cannot be accepted to be the logical ground of the inference. Compared to the formulation noted in $\acute{S}_6$ Gaṅgeśa's own formulation of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I given in $\acute{S}_5$ is so far the better.

V

At the beginning of the previous section we promised to return to some textual, though not merely textual, point about $\acute{S}_6$. None of the two ways in which the second possible ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I has been formulated in $\acute{S}_6$ includes the feature *ākāṅkṣā*. The formulation of the logical ground in $\acute{S}_5$ includes this feature. The omission of *ākāṅkṣā* or (mutual) synacategorematicity seems to leave the ground as formulated in $\acute{S}_6$ exposed to the charge of discrepancy. While refuting the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I noted in $\acute{S}_6$ Gaṅgeśa remarked that the supposed logical ground fails to qualify as logical ground for we cannot have knowledge of it before the inference in question. But he has said nothing about whether the logical ground as formulated here is vitiated by the defect of diecrepancy, that is, by the fact that it goes without what is to be inferred by its means. An alleged ground of an inference fails in its job of enabling us to infer on its basis the desired conclusion or what is to be inferred, if it goes or is found to go without the latter even in a single instance. An alleged ground which goes without what is to be inferred is a vicious ground,

it is vitiated by the defect known as discrepancy or *vyabhicāra*. It appears that Gaṅgeśa could have brought such objection with reference to such words as are not mutually syncategorematic. It is natural to think that in his own formulation in $\acute{S}_5$ he included *ākāṅkṣā* as part of the logical ground so that the critics could not allege that the (rest of the) ground as formulated by him goes without what is to be inferred just in case the speaker utters words which are not mutually syncategorematic. Since the alternative formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I being considered in $\acute{S}_6$ omits *ākāṅkṣā* from the logical ground, it would have been natural if Gaṅgeśa brought the charge of discrepancy with reference to *nirākāṅkṣavākya* to avoid which he himself included, when formulating the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in $\acute{S}_5$, *ākāṅkṣā* as part of the logical ground. In fact Vallabhācārya anticipated in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī,* a work with which it is not very likely that Gaṅgeśa was not acquainted, exactly this charge against his formulation of the inference in question in terms of a ground which includes *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva* but omits *ākāṅkṣā*. But Vallabha did not only anticipate the charge he also refuted it. He said there that where the words of the speaker are not mutually syncategorematic, there the property 'uttered with a desire to signify things as related' is absent. Therefore still the ground as formulated by him which is the same as (i) of $\acute{S}_6$ will not show discrepancy since this ground, at least the part *sāṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva* of it, too is absent.[31] But the defect known as discrepancy requires the presence of the ground along with the absence of the thing to be inferred.

It may be that Gaṅgeśa did not bring the charge of discrepancy because he thought that the charge could be answered in the way Vallabhācārya answered it. Or, what is the same thing, the ground formulated as or in terms of *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva,* is not open to the charge of discrepancy. For one thing, in case the words uttered by the speaker are not individually syncategorematic relative to each other, there is no *saṃsṛṣṭa artha*. The words cannot therefore be said to have the propeprty of intending such *artha* i.e., things as related. But even in this case the words may be such as have been uttered with a desire to produce (*para*) in the hearer, the awareness (*pratīti*) of relatedness (*smsṛṣṭatva*) with respect to the things recalled by the words. One may use words which do not

mean things as related to produce awareness to that effect. This happens when one utters intentionally or through ignorance such words as 'The old man is sick'; or utters the words "This house is old" and "The man is sick" in such a way that the hearer hears him as uttering the sentence "This old man is sick". Actually there is an old house and a man who is sick though not old. Further these words may have been addressed to Dick, who knows an old man but is unaware of his sickness, to convey to him the misleading information that the old man is sick. Obviously the mischievous speaker did not utter these words on the basis of his awareness of the relation R^* obtaining between an old man and his sickness.[32] Observing that *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva* cannot be the ground in consideration of what Gaṅgeśa has said to refute its, (or of what includes it) claim to be regarded as the ground, one should not hasten to reformulate the ground as *saṃsṛṣṭatvaprakārakapratītipratva* or *tatprakārakapratītiprasannidhimattva.* However, anticipating such contingency Gaṅgeśa rejects even this way of formulating the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in the passage $\acute{S}_7$ to which we shall now turn.

VI

Gaṅgeśa now considers in $\acute{S}_7$ still another way of formulating the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I. In the first place Gaṅgeśa notes the third different way of formulating the logical ground or the third possible logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. The second sentence is included to express the consequent rejection of this way of formulating the ground or the ground so formulated. One should take the sentence or sentence part 'not the logical ground' (*na hetuḥ*), belonging to the passage $\acute{S}_6$, to have been (meant to be) repeated here also.

[$\acute{S}_7$]

> *Saṃsṛṣṭatvaprakārakapratītiparatvaṃ*
> *tatprakārakapratītiparasannidhimattvaṃ vā*
> (*na hetuḥ*), *anāptokte nirākāṅkṣe ca vyabhicāri.*
>
> [p.33]

The property of having been uttered to produce awareness of relatedness [in respect of the things recalled by the words

> in question] or the property of having been uttered to produce awareness of that along with the property of uninterrupted succession [is not (or cannot be) the ground of the inference in question]; [as it] is discrepant where the words are uttered by an untrustworthy man and where the words lack syncategorematicity.

Let us recall the example given above. There is no such *saṃsṛṣṭārtha* as a sick old man. That is to say things such as old age, man, sickness *et cetera* are not, or do not happen, in this case, at least, to be related.[33] So the words uttered by the speaker to mislead the hearer do not mean, (as in this case) things (such as old age, man and sickness) as related. But none the less the speaker in such cases utters the words to convey the (false and misleading) information, about certain things, that they are related. So far therefore even in case of words cited above as example, the property of having been uttered to produce the awareness of relatedness (of the things in question) is there and can be known to be there (even prior to making the inference of the sort of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I). So far the logical ground as formulated in $\acute{S}_7$ is not open to the charge to which the logical ground as formulated in $\acute{S}_6$ is exposed. But the words in question, particularly 'man' and 'sick' are not really individually syncategorematic relative to each other. (At least they have not been so used here). Further the speaker is not trustworthy or authoritative, either because he does not, as he cannot, have the knowledge of the sickness of the man, or becase he intends to mislead the hearer. So the words taken here as example are both *anāptokta* or uttered by one who is not trustworthy and *nirākāṅkṣa,* that is, are not individually syncategorematic relative to each other. But while these (*anāptokta* and *nirākāṅkṣa*) words exemplify the property which figures as ground of inference as it is in $\acute{S}_7$, they cannot be said to have been causally preceded by the speaker's awareness of the relation in question, that is, the relation between things which the words recall to the mind of the hearer—in the present case, old age, man and sickness. So far as the words cited as example are concerned the alleged ground of the inference in question therefore goes without what is to be inferred viz. (causal) precedence of speaker's awareness of R^*. Therefore the alleged ground[34] formulated in $\acute{S}_7$ is discrepant and

cannot be accepted as ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I.

The refutation of the alternative ways of formulating the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I confirms that the formulation given by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_5$ is at least and so far the better. Further, this can at most confirm Gaṅgeśa's formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I to be better so far as the logical ground of it is concerned. Or 'better' is not perhaps the right word. For the alternative ways of formulating the logical ground have been shown to be not inferior but wrong altogether in so far as the ground so formulated is a spurious ground. So, put more accurately, in $\acute{S}_6$ and $\acute{S}_7$ Gaṅgeśa has sought to explain and defend the logical ground as he has formulated it, by comparing it with some differently formulated logical grounds and showing the latter to be spurious. Now in a few passages beginning with $\acute{S}_8$ he will explain and defend the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as he has formulated it in $\acute{S}_5$; again by comparing the same with some alternative formulations.

SIX

Vaiśeṣika Inference - I Continued

I

In Gangesa's own formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I the expression for the inferential predicate or *sādhya* is *'tātparyaviṣayasmāritapadārthasaṃsargajñānapūrvakāṇi'* or, as it has been translated before, 'are (casually) preceded by the awareness of the intended relation (obtaining) between the (word) meanings recalled.[1] In this formulation the relation or *saṃsarga* has been qualified as *tātparyaviṣaya* or object of intention. Gaṅgeśa's formulation so far differs from some other versions of the inference in question including the version of Vallabhācārya and Udayanācārya. But the reason why Gaṅgeśa qualifies *saṃsarga* or the relation being inferred (i.e., as forming part of the *sādhya*) as intened (or *tātparyaviṣaya*)[2] is that, more than one relation may be found there between the things which happen to be the meaning of words of a given sentence. Just as the words may signify (ambiguously) different things so also different relations may obtain between the same set of things. The purpose of those who like the Naiyāyika-s admit language or sentence as a distinct source of informaiton will be defeated if language cannot account for our having the knowledge of the R_1* on hearing the sentence S_1. The Vaiśeṣika purpose of reducing *śabda*, to the already admitted process of inference will on the other hand fail if the inference, with which the philosophers of this school seek to replace the

process of verbal apprehension, does not yield the knowledge of the particular (sort of) relation for which the Naiyāyika-s admitted *śabda* as a distinct source. The relation among the word-meanings the awareness of which is yielded by the words which the speaker utters, is, according to the Naiyāyika-s, the intended relation or *tātparyaviṣayibhūta sambandha*. So the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I (and also of the Vaiśeṣika inference-II) has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa in terms of *intended* relation. If it were not so formulated then the critics of the Vaiśeṣika-s, including the Naiyāyika-s themselves, could say that the Vaiśeṣika inference-I did not yield as result or prove as *sādhya* that for the knowledge of which the Naiyāyika-s admitted *śabda* as a distinct source of knowledge. This would be another way of showing that the Vaiśeṣika-s in that case could not prove that *śabda* was not a distinct source of knowledge but just a case of inference, at least, arguably so.

[$\acute{S}_8$]

Saṃsargasya bahuprakārakatvepi nānabhimatasaṃsargasiddhistasya tātparyāviṣayatvāt. Anyathāśabdādapyabhimatānvayabodho na syāt.

[p. 34]

Though many relations are there, knowledge of unintended relation does not result [from the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I], for that [relation] is not the object of intention [of the speaker]. Otherwise there would not result knowledge of intended relation even from language [as source].

The point of the Vaiśeṣika-s as represented here by Gaṅgeśa is that (*śabda* or) words of a sentence, or the features of them, do not bear the inferential relation of (*vyāpti*) to any and every possible R^* that may obtain between things signified and recalled by these words. In any given case they stand in inferential relation to only the intended R^*. So if a relation does not happen to be the relation (or R^*) intended by the speaker of a sentence, that is to say, if the speaker has not uttered the sentence with a desire to produce in the hearer a belief about that relation then the hearer cannot

(validly) derive the knowledge of that relation by using the words of the speaker inferentially. So the fear that the Inferential Apprehension theory of hearer's knowledge fails to account for successful communication is unfounded. Let us explain. The issue is whether there is a distinct epistemological-psychological process of verbal apprehension as alleged by the Naiyāyika-s or the process is just the process of inference where certain properties of the words (uttered by the speaker) yield as logical ground the knowledge in question. There is no dispute about the fact that knowledge of some intended relation obtaining between things corresponding to the words of a sentence results in the hearer when the latter hears that sentence.[3] One who holds the inference view or *IA* theory of sentential understanding (of the hearer) should therefore formulate the inference in the way Gaṅgeśa has done here. He should at least formulate the *sādhya* of the inference or represent the object being inferred as, or in terms of, intended relation. The inference so formulated will clearly indicate that according to the inference theorists the inferential relation obtains between certain features of the words of the sentence being uttered and the *intended* relation that obtains between things signified by those words. Now one can no longer bring against the Inferential Apprehension theorists like the Vaiśeṣika-s the objection that on their theory a hearer may be found to derive knowledge of a relation $R_1{}^*$ which the speaker of the sentence in question did not intend to assert or communicate. For the *IA* theorists believe, as much as the verbal apprehension theorists, that words yield the knowledge of that relation with a desire to impart information about which the speaker utters them (or utters sentence containing them). If a theory of language, say the *VA* theory, does not need to disallow the derivation, from the words of the speaker, of the knowledge of a relation to convey information about which the speaker had not uttered the words then the advocates of the verbal apprehension theory would be equally exposed to the charge that even according to them the hearer cannot derive from the words the knowledge of the relation intended or of the things related in the intended way (*abhimatasaṃsarga siddhi*). So the *IA* theorist is represented here as saying 'even on their theory (or *VA* theory) i.e., even from *śabda* as distinct from inference (*śabdāt api*), knowledge of the intended relation

(*abhimata anvayabodha*) could not result (*na syāt*). On the other hand if the words yielded knowledge of the intended relation only, then the inference theory cannot leave open the possibility that a hearer derived knowledge (*siddhi*) of an unintended relation obtaining between things in question. These considerations justify Gaṅgeśa's framing the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in terms of intended relation. If *sādhya* were not formulated in terms of intended relation then it could not be said that the properties of the words constituting logical ground had inferential relation only to the R^* intended by the speaker. And in that case there would be no guarantee that by using the words of the speaker inferentially the hearer would arrive at the knowledge to account for which the Naiyāyika-s admit, as a distinct source, language. In that case the Vaiśeṣika position would not really be a rival position. For then *VA* theory and *IA* theory would be theories about different things. The *VA* theorists maintain that the hearer's knowledge of the R_1^* intended by the speaker is a distinct variety of knowledge requring us to admit language as a separate source for it. The hearer may occasionally use the words of the speaker inferentially as the *IA* theorists say. But such use of words does not yield knowledge of the intended relation R_1^*.

Gaṅgeśa says explicitly that the considerations noted above have determined him to formulate the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in the way he did. Otherwise the *sādhya* could have been formulated in a more general and wider way. For example the description 'the relation between subject and predicate' covers all the possible relations the knowledge of which the words, on this theory, can yield. But Gaṅgeśa did not formulate the *sādhya* in terms of subject-predicate relation or awareness (on the part of the speaker) of this relation. For even an unintended relation could satisfy such description. Gaṅgeśa says all these in the passage $\acute{S}_9$.

II

[$\acute{S}_9$]

Ataeva viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāvavadarthakāni tatbodha-pūrvakāṇi vā iti na sādhyam.[4]

[p. 34]

> Therefore the predicate [of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I] is not either [that the words] have corresponding to them things related as subject and predicate or are preceded by the knowledge of that [subject-predicate relation].

Gaṅgeśa's reason for not formulating the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in either of the following two ways— (a) and (b)— has already been given in $\acute{S}_8$. It is the same as his reason for formulating in $\acute{S}_5$ the predicate of the inference in question in terms of *intended* relation or *tātparyaviṣayasaṃsargaḥ*. The formulations (a) and (b) are as follows.

(a) These words(of an ordinary speaker or of the *Veda*-s) have corresponding to them things related as subject and predicate, because they form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc., e.g., the words 'Drive the cow this way with the rod'.

(b) These words (of an ordinary speaker or of the *Veda*-s) are preceded by the awareness of the (corresponding) things related as subject and predicate, because they [the words] form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. like the words "Drive the cow this way with the rod".

In both these formulations of the *sādhya* or the inferential predicate of the Vaiśeṣika inference, R^*, being the relation of the word meanings, has been specified as subject-predicate relation. But this relation may not be intended by the speaker of a particular sentence. If the hearer on hearing the words uttered by the speaker inferentially uses them to derive knowledge of the subject-predicate relation then words cannot be said to yield knowledge of the intended relation. When a man utters the sentence "A blue lotus" he may be asserting a relation of noun (thing) and adjective (property) between the lotus and the colour blue, but when a man says "Bring me a glass (of water)" he does not mean to inform the hearer of the relation of a thing and its property as obtaining between the glass and the act or event of bringing. If on the inference theory of hearer's knowledge words in this case yield knowledge

of thing-property or subject-predicate relation then the inference fails to yield the knowledge of the intended relation. But it is an agreed point that the speaker can and does produce in a hearer the belief about the relation about which he intends to tell the hearer. Now if inference fails to yield as a source, this knowledge then a separate source must be admitted. To admit this is to concede to the Naiyāyika-s the point that language is a distinct source of knowledge of R^* which R^* a speaker intends to talk about when he speaks.

The knowledge that results from an inference is the knowledge of the object being inferred. Hence, if the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I were construed as 'have corresponding to them things (i.e., word meaning) related as subject and predicate' or as 'preceded by knowledge of the relation of subject and predicate' etc. then a sentence would yield a knowledge of R_1^* where R_1^* is not the relation intended by the speaker. For never or at least not always does the speaker of a sentence mean to assert a thing-property relation as obtaining among things being spoken about. So while a Vaiśeṣika maintains that the process through which a sentence yields the knowledge of R^* is actually a process of inference from certain properties of the words uttered, he must so specify the *sādhya* that the inference can really yield knowledge of R_1^*. For this purpose it will not do to specify the *sādhya* simply as relation between word-meanings or *padārthasaṃsarga*. For the R^* which a hearer comes to know from the utterance of a speaker is not just any relation between word-meanings or mere *padārtha-saṃsarga* but *that one* among the possible or actual relations between things signified by the words heard or uttered *which is intended by the speaker* i.e., *tātparyaviṣayasmārita padārthasaṃsarga*. If the inference theory of hearer's knowledge is to supplant the verbal apprehension theory of the same then the inference from the relevant properties of the words in case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I should be an inference of such relation between word-meanings as is intended by the speaker. So far therefore the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I should be as Gaṅgeśa has formulated it viz. *tātparyaviṣayasmāritapadārthasaṃsarga* etc. It cannot be formulated as broadly and simply as relation between word-meanings (*padārthasaṃsarga*) or thing-property relation, or

as narrowly as conjunction or identity and so on. The Vaiśeṣika Inference-I would in the former case be 'These words (of an ordinary speaker or of the *Veda*-s) correspond to *padārtha-saṃsarga* or preceded by knowledge of it' and in the latter case it would be 'These words... have corresponding to them *saṃyoga* (conjuction), *tādātmya* (identity), *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* (noun-adjective) relation (obtaining between word-meanings or are preceded by the knowledge of them)'. But if this were the model or form of inference from properties of words, then R^* as the intended relation could not be known from hearing a sentence, at least, where some specific relation other than any of these *saṃyoga* etc. is intended.

So far therefore if the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is formulated in the way (a) or (b) above then the *IA* theory of hearer's knowledge advocated by the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot explain how a sentence uttered by a speaker can yield for the hearer a knowledge of the intended relation among the word-meaning. And this amounts to a failure to explain the hearer's knowledge as understood whereas the ability to explain this is the acid test for any theory about understanding sentence or language. The situation hardly improves if the *sādhya* is framed in terms of the (speaker's) awareness of the relation between word-meanings, or of the thing-property relation etc. For the relation the knowledge of which the inference would yield this time is again not the intended relation.

III

There is still another way of constructing the *sādhya*. Mathurānātha attributes this other formulation to Ācārya. Perhaps he has Udayanācārya in mind though the formulation can be traced to Vācaspati Miśra.[5] Again in the relevant formulation of Udayanācārya in *Nyāyaykusumāñjaliḥ* the logical ground is different. Above all the formulation in question has not been favoured by Udayana. But we shall ignore these for the present. We want to examine whether this formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I presented in $Ś_{10}$ is better than the formulation given in $Ś_5$ in respect of *sādhya*. The *sādhya* in this formulation is 'have the relation obtaining among the things recalled (by the words in

question)'. This new formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, which leaves all parts excepting the predicate of the formulation given in $\acute{S}_5$ unchanged, reads thus: These [ordinary) words (like) 'drive the cow this way with the rod' or the scriptural or *Vaidika* words [say, 'perform by sacrificing a horse etc.], have the relation that obtains between things recalled [by these words]; because (these words) have the property of syncategorematicity etc. The objection to such construction relates to the interpretation of the expression "have" which forms a part of the predicate of the inferential knowledge. 'Having' in this case cannot mean possessing in the relation of conjunction or inherence or identity or the thing-property (relation).[6] For these relations and things in these relations reside in the things signified but not in the words signifying them.[7] Thus not words but only things as non-linguistic entities can have R^* if having is understood in the ordinary sense of possessing in the relation of conjunction etc. But in an inference the *sādhya* is known as characterising the *pakṣa* or the subject of inference. And the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is distinguished by the fact that *pakṣa* here is word(s) rather than thing(s) signified by word(s). So either the expression "having" be given a different sense or this formulation be rejected. So the word "having", as it occurs in the formulation in English of the *sādhya*, or the expression "vat", being a secondary suffix called *matup* or *vatup* as it occurs in the suggested formulation in *Saṃskrita,* in $\acute{S}_{10}$ cannot be understood to mean conjunction etc. Gaṅgeśa skips over these possible interpretations of the secondary suffix and formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I accordingly. He considers another interpretation in $\acute{S}_{10}$ which was also noted by Udayanācārya both in his *Pariśuddhi*[8] and *Kusumanjali*.[9]

Those who would prefer to construe the *sādhya* or the predicate of the inferential judgement (i.e., object of inference) in question in the way shown above must answer the question "In what relation can these words have R^* or the relation which obtain between word-meanings?" Or what should we understand by the expression 'have' or *vat* occurring in the formulation of inferential predicate or *sādhya*? It may be said that when the words are said to *have* the R^* in question what is meant is that they (as *jñāpaka*) inform the listener of the R^* in question in the manner in which

a logical ground proves its *sādhya*. When we say that a logical ground proves its *sādhya*, what we mean is that one's knowledge of this logical ground leads to (that) one's having the knowledge of the *sādhya*. According to the Vaiśeṣika-s just as the knowledge of *hetu* or logical ground leads to the knowledge of *sādhya* or object of inference, so also the knowledge of the words (i.e., the relevant properties of them)[10] leads to the knowledge of R^*. The words so far can be said to have i.e., stand to R^* in the same way in which the logical ground of an inference stands to the object of that inference.

One should not confuse the present issue with the other issue viz, whether the *words* constitute the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. The present problem is how words as subject of the inference in question can *have* R^* which they must have, if the inferential predicate is allowed to be construed in the relevant way. The following formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is offered by taking "have" or "*matup*" in the sense explained. 'These words stand to R^* in the manner in which the logical ground of an inference stands to the *sādhya* of that inference because they (the words) form a group or words having syncategorematicity etc.[11] Anyway, Gaṅgeśa hints at this formulation and this sense of *matup* in the passage $\acute{S}_{10}$ where he first anticipates an objection against this formulation which, he shows, can be avoided. He then expresses his own rejection in the words "*tanna*" meaning, that (view, however) is not (acceptable). Gaṅgeśa concludes this passage by stating his *reasons* for rejection. The whole passage is

[$\acute{S}_{10}$]

Yattu smāritārthasaṃsargavantīti sādhyam, matvarthaśca liṅgatayā jñāpakatvam, na cānyonyāśrayaḥ; pūrvapūrvānumitihetutvena anāditvāt. Tanna. Jñāpakatvamātreṇārthāsiddheḥ; pramāpakatve tenaiva vyabhicārāt.

[pp. 34-36]

[The view] which contends that the *sādhya* is 'have the relation obtaining between things recalled', the sense of 'having' being 'informing in the manner of a logical ground',

is not [vitiated by the defect of being] circular since [the *sādhya*-s of successive inferences are] the logical grounds of [only] the preceding inferences and this series is without a beginning. That view [however] is [still] not correct. For [if "have" means] simply 'informs' then the relation [of the word-meanings] is not proved; [but] if [the word means] informs *correctly* then discrepancy [in the noted instance vitiates, the inference].[12]

In this passage the view of a section of the Vaiśeṣika-s (actually existing or not) has been examined by Gaṅgeśa. Since they are Vaiśeṣika-s they believe that understanding the sentence of a speaker is really a case of inferring the (relevant) relation R^* which obtains among the things which the words being uttered recall. These Vaiśeṣika-s however suggest certain formulation of the inference or, for the matter of that, of the object (*sādhya*) of inference which differs from the formulations considered and rejected in $Ś_9$ as well as Gaṅgeśa's own formulation presented in $Ś_5$. Formulations considered in $Ś_9$ differed from the formulation given in $Ś_5$ in respect of *sādhya*. Whereas in the latter formulation the part of the *sādhya* or R^* is specified as *intended* R^*, no reference to such intention is to be found in the formulation in $Ś_9$. This makes the $Ś_9$ formulations liable to be rejected. For if the Vaiśeṣika-s had such inferences in mind, when they advocated the reduction of what others believe to be sentential understanding to inferential knowledge, then they must have failed to effect the desired reduction. For according to the verbal apprehension theory, sentential understanding does not consist always or necessarily in the cognition of the relation of conjunction or inherence or identity or thing-property connection between the things signified and recalled by the words of the sentence.

Though Gaṅgeśa has not said so explicitly yet it seems that the Vaiśeṣika-s who suggest the formulation being considered in $Ś_{10}$ mean by the relation in question, intended relation. So their formulation is not open to the criticism levelled by Gaṅgeśa against the formulations examined in $Ś_9$. But still the formulation to be found in $Ś_{10}$ differs from Gaṅgeśa's own formulation presented in $Ś_5$. Since the defence of $Ś_5$ formulation needs the rejection of $Ś_{10}$ formulation Gaṅgeśa brings new criticisms against the latter.

The passage $\acute{S}_{10}$ has two major divisions. In the first part Gaṅgeśa states and clarifies the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as given by the section of the Vaiśeṣika-s in question. The second part of the passage consists in Gaṅgeśa's statement of rejection and his reasons for rejecting this new formulation. The clarification of the formulation has been offered by way of anticipating, and rejecting, so to say, a provisional criticism.

This formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference is meant to be different, in respect of *sādhya*, from the formulations given in $\acute{S}_5$ and $\acute{S}_9$. The *sādhya* in $\acute{S}_{10}$ formulation is *smāritārthasaṃsargavanti* i.e., have the relation which obtains between the recalled word-meanings. If this relation is meant to be the intended relation in view of the discussions of $\acute{S}_9$ then the *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is, according to these Vaiśeṣika, 'have the intended relation which obtains between the recalled word-meanings'. The points of similarities and dissimilarities with Gaṅgeśa's own formulation to be found in $\acute{S}_5$ may become apparent if we construct the inference fully. This we do by simply changing the *sādhya* of the inference as construed in $\acute{S}_5$. For it is the *sādhya*, the formulation of which is in question in $\acute{S}_{10}$. Anyway, the formulation suggested by some Vaiśeṣika-s is

> *Etāni padāni (tātparyaviṣaya) smāritārtha saṃsargavanti ākāṅkṣādimatpadakadambatvāt; ghaṭāmānayetivat.*
>
> or
>
> These words have the (intended) relation that obtains among the things (i.e., word-meanings) recalled. Because (these words) have the property of forming a group of words which have syncategorematicity etc.

This is the explicit formulation of the inference of some Vaiśeṣika-s referred to by Gaṅgeśa in the passage $\acute{S}_{10}$ which includes: "The view which contends that the *sādhya* is 'have the relation obtaining between things recalled'. Gaṅgeśa clarifies this view first by noting one provisional objection against the above formulation of the inference or the *sādhya* of it. He answers the objection for the Vaiśeṣika-s, thereby provisionally defending this formulation.

IV

The objection is, what could be the *matvartha* or meaning or sense

of "have"? The *sādhya* of the inference, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s in question, is '... *saṃsargavanti* '. The grammatical analysis of the expression is *saṃsarga* + *vat.* The expression *vanti* is only the plural form of the expression *vat.* The word '... *vanti*' is grammatically related with the word '*padāni*'. The neuter gender noun *padaṃ* having been used in this inference in the plural form of '*padāni*' the expression '... *vat*' also takes the plural form '... *vanti*' and we have *padāni* (meaning, the words) '... *vanti*' (meaning, are what have). Anyway, the expression *saṃsargavanti* is the neuter gender plural form of *saṃsargavat* which is analysable into *saṃsarga* and *vat* where *saṃsarga* means relation and *vat* means that which has. Now there are some terminations which when applied to certain expression adds to the meaning of that expression the meaning 'that which has'. These terminations or suffixes (*pratyaya*) are called *matup-pratyaya* or *matvarthiya pratyaya.* Thus here the *matup pratyaya, vat,* has been applied to the expression *saṃsarga* to yield the expression *saṃsargavat*; the meaning of this *matup-pratyaya* or 'that which has' has been added to the meaning of the expression "*saṃsarga*". The meaning of "*saṃsarga*" is *sambandha* or relation and the meaning of the expression "*vat*"—*the sign of matup*—is that which has; therefore the meaning of "*saṃsargavat*" is (is) that which has *saṃsarga* (roughly, relation).

That the meaning of *matup* is 'that which has' is familiar. So when the objector here asks what could be the meaning of the suffix *matup,* what he means to say is this. What could it mean to say that the words *have* or are what have (*saṃsarga*)? No matter whether we understand 'have' to mean possess in the relation of conjunction or inherence or any such relation, how words can *have* in any of these relations, *saṃsarga*? Such relations obtain between or are possessed by, things, like chairs or tables but not by the words "table" or "chair" etc.[13] As the objector uses it, the question 'How words ...' etc. is really a case of the figure of speech known as interrogation. To ask this question is to say in effect that contrary to what is claimed by the Vaiśeṣika-s advocating the formulation of the inference in question, words *cannot have* in the relations like conjunction the R^* or the *saṃsarga* that obtains among the word-meanings. The idea is that to have (ordinarily) means to

possess in the relation of conjunction, inherence etc. Thus a table can have a book on it, in so far as it can possess the book in conjunction or the book can exist on the table in conjunction. Similarly the table can have the relation conjunction in so far as conjunction can inhere in it or it can posses conjunction in the relation of inherence. But the words by virtue of their categorial nature are prevented from having relations like conjunction in the sense in which a table can have a book or certain colour. So the words cannot have in conjunction the *smāritārthasaṃsarga* though the table can have in inherence the book-conjunction. Similarly the words cannot have in inherence the *smāritārthasaṃsarga*. So far therefore the formulation of the *sādhya* in question in terms of 'that which has' or *matvartha* is objectionable. This is the provisional objection; provisional because Gaṅgeśa finds an answer to this objection from the point of view of the Vaiśeṣika-s who advocate or might advocate the present formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I or the *sādhya* of it.

The answer is this: the meaning of the *matup* i.e., *vat* (or "has") as it is used here, is not 'possesses' in the relation of conjunction and the like. It rather means 'informs'. Thus *padāni saṃsargavanti* means the words inform (us) of (whatever be) the relation i.e., R^*. But since according to the Vaiśeṣika-s the words (of the speaker) yield only inferential knowledge of the relation of R^* (that is, they enable the listener to infer R^*) the meaning of *matup* is not just inform but inform in the way a logical ground informs us of whatever it may be. Thus the interpretation of *saṃsargavanti* is 'inform (the listener) of the relation R^* in the way a logical ground gives (us) information (about the *sādhya*)'. This is an unobjectionable sense of *matup* in the present context. In other words, even if the words cannot *possess* R^* in the relation of conjunction etc. they can act as logical ground to produce inferential knowledge of R^*. To put it otherwise, the words can *have* R^* or (intended) relation obtaining between things (meant and) recalled by the words in question, in the sense that they are the object of the knowledge which causes the (inferential) knowledge of R^*. The answer to the objection expounded so far is contained in the portion *matvarthaśca liṅgatayā jñāpakatvam* of the passage $\acute{S}_{10}$. This portion has been translated above as 'the

sense of having' being informing in the manner of a logical ground'.

V

The first provisional objection discussed and answered above has not been explicitly stated by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{10}$; but the objection is implied in the need he felt for clarifying the sense of *matup* or of 'have' in the perticular way stated by him in the portion 'the sense of 'having' being' etc. There is (a second provisional) objection against the noted interpretation of "have" or *matup* and for that matter against the third formulation in question of the *sādhya* of the inference. Both the objection of circularity and the answer in terms of non-vicious infinite regress are extremely difficult to explain and express. Let us consider the objection first. The formulation of the inference in question given a few paragraphs back has since received some clarifications offered by way of specifying the sense of "have" (or having) which occurred in the formulation of the *sādhya.* So the inference may first be restated to facilitate understading of the objection of circularity to be explained.

> The words, inform [us] as (or in the manner of) logical ground [of] the (intended) relation that obtains between the things (meant and) recalled.
>
> Because these words have the property of forming a group of words which have syncategorematicity etc.

For convenience of reference let us reformulate this inference by using these abbreviations: *w* for the 'these words', R^* for 'the (intended) relation... recalled' and *F* for 'have the property ... etc.' The abbreviated statement of the inference then is

> *w* inform [us] as logical ground [of] R^*, because *Fw.*

The objector now points out that the inferential apprehension theory of the sentential understanding would be vindicated if *F* could prove [or inform as logical ground] that *w* inform [us] as logical ground, of R^*. But for that i.e., for the inference as formulated here to succeed, we should be able to ascertain, prior to this inference, that the inferential relation of *vyāpti* between *F* and the property of informing as logical ground R^*, has been

substantiated in at least one instance. Now to ascertain that an instance *i* exemplifies this relation, we need to ascertain normally both that *i* has the property *F* and that *i* has the property of informing us as logical ground R^*. But the *i* about which both these propositions are true can hardly be different from words. For *words* alone can form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. That is to say only words can have the property *F.* It is almost equally true about the other property. Thus if we are to ascertain, prior to the inference under consideration, that *i* has the property of informing us as logical ground R^* then we should be able to ascertain that (some) words [even if not these words] inform as logical ground of R^*. But according to the Vaiśeṣika-s (or at least in so far as they advocate the formulation of *sādhya* in question) that words prove, as logical ground R^*, is itself inferred or is the object of inference. Thus in order to be able to prove by inference that [some] words [or these words] inform us as logical ground of R^* we need to first ascertain inferentially that words inform us as logical ground of R^*. This is how the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I which has been given the formulation in question falls back on itself. So the objection is that the formulation being examined is vitiated by circularity or, as Gaṅgeśa puts it in $\acute{S}_{10}$ *anyonyāśrayaḥ.*

Though we find the (second provisional) objection, just expounded, in the writing of Udayanācārya, the answer which the Vaiśeṣika-s can offer to the objection has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa in the words "*Na ca anyonyāśrayaḥ pūrvpūrvānumitihetutvena anāditvāt*" i.e., "is not vitiated by the defect of being circular since the *sādhya*-s of successive inferences are the logical ground of (only) the preceding inferences, and further this series is without beginning." The idea seems to be that circularity or circular reasoning results when we seek to explain certain phenomenon in terms of a process which is viciously infinite. Such is the case when we arbitrarily stop at any stage instead of pushing the process further back even though logic permits it. For in that case we either fail to account for or justify the arbitrary first step or we explain it in terms of what comes next to it and what we account for in terms of it. The only way to avoid circularity in such cases is to hold that we can continue our regressive movement infinitely. This is another way of saying that the process or the

series has no beginning or is *anādi.* Within such a series any individual member or step admits of an explanation in terms of the previous one ; only the process as a whole cannot be explained. Nor can an explanation of the whole process be legitimately demanded, for there is no such thing as the whole or entire process or series. It is ever receding logically or temporally.

If we consider a beginningless series of inferences the logical ground of any one of which is not the logical ground of any one of the preceding inferences, then every inference or the ground of it has another different inference to justify it. Therefore whatever an inference proves it proves in a non-circular way. No inference presupposes for its being what it aims at proving. When an inference proves something with the help of a logical ground, this ground can be justified or proved, if necessary, by a different inference employing a different logical ground. If we need to justify this second argument or the legitimacy of logical ground of it we can do so without raising the question whether what it sought to prove has already been proved. Justification can be given in terms of a logically prior third inference. Thus no inference need to fall back on itself to prove what it has to prove. In the present case F is the logical ground which proves that w inform us, as logical ground, of R^*, but if we need to justify or infer that F informs us, as logical ground of the fact that w inform us, as logical ground, of R^* then we would require a second inference and a second ground G. Thus, if challenged, a Vaiśeṣika can say that by some prior inference having the logical ground G he has ascertained that F can prove, when a suitable argument with F as logical ground is constructed, with respect to anything which has F that it has (also) the property of informing us, as logical ground, of R^*.

The Vaiśeṣika reply to the (second provisional) objection is not that the logical ground of th Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, as it has been formulated, in $\acute{S}_{10}$ does not require to be itself justified. The Vaiśeṣika-s may even admit that it is to be justified inferentially. But in so far as a different or a prior act of inference establishes the legitimacy of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference in question, in so far as the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference is not the logical ground of the prior inference, the Vaiśeṣika Inference is not vitiated by circularity. The appearence of circularity

was caused by the fact that while the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference had to be legitimised by proving that it had the inferential relation of *vyāpti* with what was being inferred, to prove that the logical ground was so characterised seemed to be the very point of that inference. This comes to mean in plain language that unless the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I could prove what it is designed to prove the logical ground of this inference could not be legitimised. On the other hand till the logical ground could be ascertained to be legitimate the inference using it could not be taken to be successful in establishing what is sought to be established. Thus the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is, to repeat,

> These words inform as logical ground of the (intended) relation obtaining between things (meant and) recalled [by these words]. Because they [these words] form a group of words having the properties of syncategorematicity etc.

The charge of circular reasoning may be explained in this way, The Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, as it has now been formulated,[15] illustrates the inferential process through which words yield the knowledge that the words inform us of R^* in the manner in which the logical ground of an inference yields the inferential knowledge of the *sādhya.* So far as this inferential process is concerned the subject of inference is 'the words' such as "bring this way the cow with the rod". The logical ground is the property (of these words) of being a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. and the truth being inferred is that (the words) inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground. If inference like the present one is sound or is acceptable, then only the Vaiśeṣika point will be vindicated that the words inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground. For it is to illustrate this point or make it fully explicit that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is actually constructed. In other words if a formulation like the present one could not be given then the Vaiśeṣika-s could not illustrate their point that the words yield knowledge of R^* inferentially.[16] But to claim that words yield knowledge of R^* inferentially and to formulate the inference are not sufficient. The inference has to be sound. But the inference can be deemed to be sound or successful only if it yields knowledge of R^*. And it can be accepted as yielding knowledge of R^* if it sound. This is

one way in which the charge of circularity may be interpreted. The charge is, to put it slightly differently, this. If the inference is sound i.e., if the logical ground of it proves the *sādhya,* then only we can say that the words inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground. But on the other hand, if the words inform us of the R^* in the manner of a logical ground, then only the argument, which seeks to illustrate that words yield knowledge of R^* through a process of inference, can be sound.

This seems to be the charge of circularity which results if the *sādhya* (predicate) of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is formulated as 'having R^*, where 'having' means informing us of in the manner of the logical ground of an inference. But the way Gaṅgeśa has refuted this charge, suggests that he had a different charge of circularity (or formulation of it) in mind. The charge is that the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is to be justified by the same inference of which it is the logical ground. This amounts to saying that the logical ground of this inference is to be supported by the logical ground of this inference i.e., by itself. And hence circularity is involved. Once, the charge of circularity is formulated in this way, one can say in reply that the logical grounds that are sought to be justified in successive inferences are grounds of the preceding inferences (*pūrvapūrva anumiti hetu*). That is to say, the logical ground of an inference is or needs to be justified by another inference with a different logical ground. This second inference seeks to justify the logical ground of the preceding inference only. And even if this preceding inference aims at justifying a logical ground then that must be the ground of a still prior inference. In this way if successive inferences are viewed as justifying (on the strength of their own logical grounds) some logical grounds then these logical grounds are grounds of some preceding inferences. If in this way we push back the series of the inferences infinitely, that is, if we take the series to have no beginning in the past then the charge of circularity may be found to have been misplaced when it was brought against the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I.

This formulation of the charge of circularity makes a consistent reading with the reply of Gaṅgeśa in terms of the beginningless series of inference. But it is very difficult to visualise the series.

What exactly are the inferences that precede the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I such that in the series the logical grounds of the preceding inferences (*pūrvapūrva anumiti hetu*) or the preceding inferences themselves depend not on themselves but only on the successive inferences? We may try to formulate them. The first inference is the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as it has been formulated in $\acute{S}_{10}$.

> The words "Drive the cow this way with the rod" [have R^* in the sense that they] inform us of R^* in the manner of the logical ground of an inference. Because, they (these words) constitute a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. example being the words like "Bring me a jar".

It may be thought that one who infers in the way illustrated above must have already convinced himself that the words which form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. must be capable of proving, as logical ground, the *sādhya* viz. 'have R^* or inform us of R^* in the manner of the logical ground of an inference.' But he must have convinced himself by arguing in this way

> The words which form a group of words etc. inform us in the manner of a logical ground the *sādhya* [have R^* i.e.,] inform us of R^* in the manner of the logical ground of an inference. Because, say, they (i.e., the words which form a group etc.) have the relation of *vyāpti* with 'inform us in the manner of a logical ground... an inference'.

If one must have convinced himself already and inferentially that the ground of this last inference proves the *sādhya* then he had undergone the following sort of inference.

> The group of mutually syncategorematic words having the relations of *vyāpti* with 'inform us ... an inference' inform us in the manner of a logical ground of (the *sādhya*) 'inform us in the manner of a logical ground ... an inference'.
>
> Because, say, the group of mutually syncategorematic words having ... an inference, is such that the knowledge of it causally produces the knowledge of the *sādhya* 'inform us in the manner of a logical ground of the *sādhya* inform

us in the manner of a logical ground of the *sādhya*' inform us in the manner of a logical ground etc.

Such a series of inferences consists of members having the following forms.

(1.1) P has S_1
Because H
(2.1) P(H) has S_2
Because H_1
(3.1) $PH(H_1)$ has S_3
Because H_2

and so on, 'Has' in each case means informs us of in the manner of a logical ground. Anyway, none of the inferences in the series falls back on itself so as to invite the charge of circularity. The logical ground of one inference is not the logical ground of the other inference. While these logical grounds are mutually related as supporting and being supported by the other yet they are grounds (hetu) of different inferences. And since the series of infefrence is infinite or beginningless the charge of circularity does not hold.

This interpretation of the charge of circularity and suggested reply to it take the word "*hetu*" to mean logical ground or *anumāpaka hetu.* This determines us to interpret circularity as consisting in the dependence of the logical ground on itself for its own justification. In our earlier way of interpreting the charge we took the circularity to consist in the mutual dependence of the *hetu* and *sādhya* of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I on each other. But before we pass on to Gaṅgeśa's final objection to the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I or of the *sādhya* of it in question we would like to restate slightly differently the first and, to us, the best interpretation of the charge of circularity which Gaṅgeśa rejects in terms of the beginninglessness of the series.

The proposed formulation in question of the Vaiśeṣika Inferecne-I is the following.

(A) The words 'bring this way the cow with the rod' inform us, in the manner of a logical ground, of the relation obtaining between things recalled.

Because these words form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc., like the words "Bring me a jar".

That the words, which satisfy the conditions found in the statement of the logical ground, inform of R^* is not the point at issue. For the Naiyāyika-s also admit it. The Naiyāyika-s however do not belive that the words of a sentence inform us of R^* *in the manner of a logical gorund.* One of the points of presenting a formulation of the inference of the type of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is to illustrate the process (of inference) through which, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the words of a well-formed sentence inform us of R^*. If this illustration of the process in quesition in the form of an inference is accepted, then it may also be accepted that the words inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground[17]. On the other hand unless it is accepted that the words inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot illustrate the process through which the words generate knowledge of R^* as the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I having for its predicate 'inform us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground'.

Anyway, let us return to the proposed formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in question noted against (A) above. Prior to the success of this inference we cannot say that the words of a sentence yield inferential knowledge of R^* so much so that we do not need to admit any separate source for this type of knowledge. But prior to this inference the *sādhya* must somehow be a known fact. It may not be known to be a property of the *pakṣa,* or the subject of the inferential judgment, but it must not be a wholly unknown thing. For if it were so then the inference would be vitiated by the defect of *sādhyāprasiddhi.* Let us explain. An argument does not for the first time make us aware of the proposition which figures as its conclusion. Even prior to the inference we entertain belief about the proposition or somehow entertain it cognitively. The argument only establishes it as proved or valid, legitimate or logically sound. Similarly in case of an *anumāna* (inference) the person who infers must have the idea of the *sādhya* before he can infer or prove inferentially the presence of this *sādhya* in the *pakṣa,* that is, before he can assert with inferential evidence or justification that the subject (thing) of the inferential judgement has the *predicate* (property) of the inferential judgement. Thus if the predicate or the *sādhya* was unknown altogether we could not infer it i.e., assert it inferentially. To put it otherwise, if a certain property

were altogether unknown or unreal then we could not have an inference with this property as *sādhya*. So the *sādhya* must be somehow already known. If it is claimed to have been known by the same act of inference of which this is a *sādhya* then, it will be a case of circularity.

It is to be claimed therefore that the *sādhya* of any inference[18] must have been known prior to and independent of the inference itself. But the question arises: What does knowing the *sādhya* in this case mean? When we come to know a *sādhya* by means of the inference of which it is the *sādhya* we know it as existing in or characterising the *pakṣa* or the subject of the inference. But prior to this inference or prior to knowing it as existing in the *pakṣa* of this inference we need to know it as existing in or characterising certain instance illustrating that both the logical ground and the *sādhya* of the inference are present together. Thus, prior to one's inferring or inferentially knowing that certain x has F because it has G, one must know a y where one finds that G and F are present together in a manner so as to suggest that wherever there is G there is F. Thus in order that we can inferentially ascertain the presence of *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* we need to ascertain the presence of *sādhya* in any one of an indefinite number of instances or *dṛṣṭānta* where the logical ground is also present. But how can we ascertain the presence of *sādhya* in a *dṛṣṭānta* in a non-circular way? Well, we can know it either by a different inference or through some non-inferential source.

In the present case whatever else an instance or *dṛṣṭānta* may be it must be certain *words*. For if *words* illustrate the property of informing us of R^* in the manner of a logical ground then only the relevant purpose of the Vaiśeṣika-s can be subserved. But in that case the words become the instance. We could, if at all, ascertain or establish, non-inferentially the presence of *sādhya* in question in some instance, if we could know it from the utterances of some person. But the Vaiśeṣika-s, who deny language the status of an independent source of knowledge, think that this is impossible. They therefore must maintain that we ascertain the presence of *sādhya* of the inference in question in some instance with the help of some inference. But to avoid circularity it must be held that we ascertain the presence of the *sādhya* (along with

the *hetu*) of an inference in some instance other than *pakṣa* by means of a different inference. Thus so far as the inference (A) above is concerned we ascertain inferentially the presence of its *sādhya* in an instance in the following way:

(B) The words "Bring me a jar" inform us of the (relevant) R^* in the manner of a logical ground.

Because, these words form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. just as the words "Chaitra is going home".

This inference also requires that the *sādhya* should be real or already known. It should be known to be present in some instance through still another inference. The inference may be the following one.

(C) The words "Chaitra is going home" inform us of (the relevant) R^* in the manner of a logical ground.

Because, these words form a group of words having syncategorematicity etc. like the words "The aspirants for heaven should perform the *yāga Aśvamedha* through sacrificing a horse."

The critics may say that if the Vaiśeṣika-s stick to their reductionist thesis and hope to avoid circularity in the manner sketched above, then they would find themselves landed in an infinite regress. But it can be said in favour of the Vaiśeṣika-s that if the process is truly infinite, if it has no beginning, then not only is circularity finally avoided but the system will not also be considered defective on account of such infinite regress. For to admit infinite regress to avoid otherwise inevitable circularity is not a defect but, to say the least, a defensible strategy.

We have so far interpreted the first portion of the passage $Ś_{10}$ where Gaṅgeśa notes a propposed formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, an objection against it and the rejection of this objection.[19] The formulation is different from the formulation given in $Ś_5$ only in respect of the *sādhya* or the predicate of the inferential judgement.[20] In $Ś_5$ the *sādhya* was 'preceeded by the (speaker's) awareness of the intended relation between the word-meanings recalled'. In $Ś_{10}$ the *sādhya* or the object to be

inferred is 'inform us of the (intended) relation between things (word-meanings) recalled in the manner of a logical ground'. The objection first noted is that if the Vaiśeṣika Infernece-I or the *sādhya* of it is formulated in the manner of $\acute{S}_{10}$, then there will be circularity. The reply given to this objection is, according to one favoured interpretation of the text, that in the beginningless series of inferences the logical grounds that prove the existence of the (respective) *sādhya* in the (respective) instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) are the logical ground of the preceding inferences (*pūrvapūrvānumitihetu*) such as (B), (A), and so on. To refer to such a beginningless series of inference to avoid otherwise inevitable circularity is or should be admitted to be unobjectionable not only by the Vaiśeṣika-s but by their critics as well.

VI

Gaṅgeśa now brings his final objection against the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proposed in $\acute{S}_{10}$. Since no acceptable answer to this objection is (yet) available Gaṅgeśa remarks, on the strength of this objection, 'that cannot be said' or '*tanna*'. In other words, the inference or the object (*sādhya*) of it cannot be construed in terms of '*inform us of as logical ground* of the relation R^*'. The objection this time is that this construction of the inference in question fails in its purpose no matter whether the word "inform" (*jñāpaka*) is taken, as it stands, to mean inform merely or *mātra jñāpaka* or, in the narrower and stricter sense, inform correctly *pramāpaka*.[21] If "inform" as it occurs in the *sādhya* or the predicate of the inferential judgement has been used to mean merely inform then the inference in question will prove that words that are characterised by the properties constituting the ground of the inference in question yield correct or incorrect information about R^*. If thus the inference from words, even when the latter are suitably specified, yields incorrect information about R^* then such inference cannot replace, as source of knowledge of R^*, sentences which according to the Naiyāyika-s constitute an independent means for the purpose. True, what are regarded as other sources of knowledge do occasionally at least yield incorrect information. But such sources when suitably qualified or characterised,

invariably yield truth or correct information. In the present case, however, even when the logical ground is there i.e., even when the words have the property which is admitted to constitute the logical ground, the R^* may not hold or be there. For R^* is proved if and only if correct information or knowledge of R^* is produced. But since inference in question merely establishes words as yielding (inferential) information including incorrect information, it follows that inference from *śabda* or words cannot prove R^* or as Gaṅgeśa says *jñāpakatvamātrenārthāsiddheḥ*. There seems to be no other way left for these Vaiśṣika-s than to use the word "inform" occurring in the predicate of inferential judgment (i.e., *sādhya*) to mean inform correctly (*pramāpaka*). But in that case they would have to maintain that words which have the properties constituting the ground yield (as logical ground) correct information about R^*. This belief in its turn implies the belief that there obtains an indiscrepant relation (*avyabhicārisambandha*) of *vyāpti* between the property of forming a group of expressions having syncategorematicity etc. and the property of informing R^* correctly. The fact however is that the first property is found to be discrepant with i.e., go without the second property which constitutes the *sādhya*. So Gaṅgeśa says if the Vaiśṣika-s hold the object of inference to be 'inform correctly (or *pramāpaka*) etc.' then since with such *sādhya* (*tenaiva*) itself the logical ground will be discrepant (*vyabhicāri*) the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as proposed in $\acute{S}_{10}$ [in terms of (*liṅgatayātātparya-viṣayibhūtasmāritārthasaṃsargavanti* i.e.,) 'inform us correctly, as logical ground, of the intended relation which obtains between things (meant and) recalled by the words' as the object being inferred] cannot be accepted.

Gaṅgeśa has not cited or specified any particular kind of utterance where the discrepancy in question could be illustrated. It must be an utterance where the property of forming a group of expression etc. is there but where either there does not occur any cognition of R^* or there occurs only erroneous cognition of R^*. The first happens to be the case when though the utterance in question is syntactically and semantically well formed it is addressed to a listener who does not understand the language to which the utterance belongs. But a semantically and syntactically

well formed sentence may yield a false cognition of R^* in case the speaker is mistaken etc. We can think of a situation where the words the speaker uses to describe a given situation constitute an example of malapropism even though the same words can be used to make a scientific description. Thus suppose there is a man Dick who for different research purposes collects different specimen of both clarinet and hornet respectively. Now suppose a speaker wanting to describe Dick as one who collects clarinet uses the words "Dick collects hornet", for he mistakenly believes that "hornet" is the right word for the thing he wants to say that Dick collects. If an unsuspecting listener takes the words of the speaker literally then he will not derive the correct information about R^* i.e., the R^* as intended to be described by the speaker.[22]

SEVEN

Failure of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I

I

In chapter six we have explained the passages $\acute{S}_9$ and $\acute{S}_{10}$. The final outcome of the discussion has been that the proposed alternative formulation of the *sādhya* of the Vaiśesika Inference-I or, for that matter, of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I itself, cannot be accepted. In none of the relations so far considered in these formulations the subject of the inference viz. the words of a sentence, can be said to *have* the R^* to be inferred. But if the hearer who has knowledge of it did not infer the R^* then he must have derived the knowledge of R^* from some other source. And that would lend support to the Nyāya view that language itself is that source. If all these are correct then language may be admitted as a distinct source for the irreducibly distinct type of knowledge a hearer has, namely, the verbal knowledge of R^*. The soundness of the verbal apprehension theory of sentential understanding or hearer's knowledge will so far be proved. In fact, however, Gaṅgeśa has shown in $\acute{S}_9$ and $\acute{S}_{10}$ the unacceptabilitly of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I (and consequently of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism) under certain proposed alternative formulation. Nothing has been said so far about the failure of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as it has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa himself in $\acute{S}_5$. Gaṅgeśa now turns directly to that. Does the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as formulated in $\acute{S}_5$ yield knowledge of R^*? The success or failure of the Vaiśeṣika

reductionism in theory of language depends respectively on the success or failure of the Vaiśeṣika Inference, of one type or another, to yield the knowledge of the hearer in question.

The critics of the Vaiśeṣika-s might object that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, even as it has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_5$ cannot yield for the hearer of a sentence the knowledge of the appropriate R^*. For if a hearer infers in the way illustrated in the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as formulated in $\acute{S}_5$, then he cannot be said to infer R^* from the words he hears. One who infers, infers the *sādhya* of the inference he makes or uses. Since the *sādhya* or the predicate of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in question is 'the (speaker's) knowledge of R^*, in the relation of causal precedence,' a hearer derives the knowledge of the speaker's knowledge of R^* (rather than the knowledge of R^*) in so far as he makes or uses the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I to derive whatever knowledge he has. The Nyāya claim is that the hearer's knowledge of R^* is yielded by language understood as a distinct source of knowledge. This view is neither contradicted nor supplanted by the truth, if it is a truth, that inference of the type in question yields, for the hearer the knowledge of the speaker's knowledge of R^*. Rather a Naiyāyika will readily admit this. We do know inferentially the internal states, including the states of cognition, of other persons. So it is but natural that the hearer's knowledge of the *speaker's knowledge* of R^* (or, for that matter, of any other thing) is a case of inference. But because the hearer cannot know, except through inference, the speaker's knowledge of R^*, it does not follow that the hearer cannot know the R^* through some non-inferential source.[1] In fact the hearer's understanding of a sentence consists in a distinct type of knowledge of R^* derived from language as a distinct accredited source.

One may think or even argue in this way. It is controversial whether language is another accredited source of knowledge or not. It is also controversial whether sentential understanding of the hearer is a case of inference or a distinct type of knowledge. But it is hardly controversial that we can, under suitable condition, infer the mental or internal states of other persons. A hearer, accordingly can infer that the speaker knows the fact or the R^* to describe which he utters the words he does. If this much is admitted then one should not object to the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the hearer of

a sentence has knowledge of the relevant fact inferentially. The Naiyāyika-s, however, seem to have more than one objection. Even if a hearer can and does infer speaker's knowledge of the relevant R^* it does not follow that whenever he hears and understands a sentence he makes that sort of inference or that the hearer's understanding a sentence consists necessarily in his inferring that speaker has the knowledge or belief about the fact to describe which he uttered the words in question. The Naiyāyika-s agree that occasionally and under suitable conditions a hearer can make the sort of inference in question. But that is not the only way in which he can know R^*. The second and the stronger objection is that that is *not at all* the way in which a hearer knows R^* where knowing R^* means understanding the relevant sentence. Either the (hearer's) knowledge of (the speaker's) knowledge of R^* is not the knowledge of R^* or such knowledge is not inference of R^*. We need to examine thoroughly each of these last two or all the three objections noted so far. Gaṅgeśa does discuss at length the objection that knowing the knowledge of R^* and knowng R^* are not the same. It is true that one (the hearer) cannot know that a person (the speaker) knows R^*, without somehow knowing R^*. But this awareness of R^* as the determinant (*avacchedaka*) or qualifying adjective of some other knowledge cannot be treated as the knowledge of R^* in the same sense of 'of'. If this is not remembered then we may not sometimes be able to distinguish between a true and a false cognition. To know that a person, say the speaker, has mistakenly cognised something as x is not to know that something or that that something is an x; rather this is to know (that the speaker has) the belief of (or about) x. Thus knowledge of knowledge of an x is not the knowledge of x. This creates a deep problem of epistemology. How to reconcile the undeniable fact that one cannot know that one knows that p (or x) without knowing the p (or x) with the equally undeniable fact that there is a distinction between a true and false belief even when the true belief in question has for its content the false belief itself, and hence, the object of this false belief also. We must find a sense of "of" in which knowledge of 'knowledge of x' is not the same as the knowledge of x. Once we discover such a sense, as we must do, we can no longer say that one who has inferred the speaker's knowledge of R^* has

obtained, on that account, the knowledge of R^*. Thus whereas we needed an account of how does the hearer of a sentence come to have knowledge of R^* and whereas the *VA* theory of the Naiyāyika-s is offered as such an account, the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s only show that and how the hearer of a sentence obtains knowledge of knowledge of R^*. This failure of the Vaiśeṣika-s to offer an alternative to the verbal apprehension theory of sentential understanding amounts to the failure of their reductionism.

Gaṅgeśa argues that there is a sense in which the knowledge of a thing causes volition about that thing. To put it otherwise, in every sense of "of", knowledge of an *x* does not cause our volition about *x*. One cannot know that a person knows *x* without knowing the *x* oneself. But one does not act on such knowledge as one does on one's own knowledge of *x*. One's practical or conative life of positive and negative actions regarding an *x*, is based on the knowledge of *x* and not on knowledge of (other's) knowledge of *x*. This also explains why the mistaken person and one who knows the other person to be mistaken do not behave in the same way. The mistaken person P_1 has a belief about *x* or believes that *p* and acts on it. But the person P_2 who knows P_1 to be mistaken or knows P_1's awareness of *x* to be incorrect, has the knowledge of the 'knowledge'[2] of *x*; but since he does not have the 'knowledge' of *x* as P_1 has he does not behave in the way P_1 does.

One may not be persuaded to accept the suggestion that we should give prominence to the sense of "of" that affects our practical life or conduct. Why should we not give prominence to the accusative or content sense of "of"? In this latter sense of "of" whoever knows that one knows that *p*, knows that *p* also. Accordingly, knowledge of knowledge of *x* is at the same time knowledge of *x*. Gaṅgeśa, like other Naiyāyika-s, it seems, wants to bring the Nyāya theory of how conduct is causally deteramined to bear on the issue under reference. Even a Vaiśeṣika is unlikely to bring the objection that the Naiyāyika-s should not make reference to matters of practical concern in a theoretical discussion. For both the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s are *parataḥprāmāṇya-vādin-s* (i.e., roughly, believers in the causal or cognitive indepence

of truth or falsily respectively over the true or the false). So far as our knowledge of truth (*prāmāṇaya*) is concerned they think we cannot *ascertain* that a piece of cognition is true even if it is true in the same act in which we become aware of that cognition. For such *paratahprāmāṇyavādin-s* or independence theorists questions about volition, its success and failure and its conditions of occurrence are closely related and relevant to the questions regarding whether a belief is true (*pramāṇa*) or how we know the truth (*pramā* character) of any alleged true belief (*pramāna*). Gaṇgeśa is clearly engaged in this book with the discussion about *pramāṇa* or knowledge. *Śabda* (words or language) is, according to him, a distinct means or accredited source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika-s do not deny that words or sentence (*śabda*) is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); they only deny that it is a *distinct pramāṇa*. But still their view may be construed as the denial that words can by themselves produce knowledge (*śabda qua śabda* is a *pramāṇa*). So far, in a sense, question about the truth (*pramāṇa*) character of an alleged true belief (*pramāṇa*) is involved. The (*paratahprāmāṇyavādin-s*) independence theorists maintain that the truth of a true cognition can be inferred from the success of the volition which the cognition causes. Thus, so far as knowledge is concerned, its being a cause of volition is closely connected with its being (or being known to be) a case of knowledge. The sense of "of" in which a cognition of an object causes appropriate volition and action regarding the object wil naturally be regarded both by the Niayāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s as important and predominant.

II

The first objection against the Vaiśeṣika-s is that they could not quite establish their reductionism. For even if it is admitted that the inferential knowledge of a hearer about the speaker's knowledge of an x or that p could constitute (the hearer's) understanding of the utterance of the speaker in question, it does not follow that the understanding of a sentence does always or necessarily consist in such inferential knowledge. Gaṇgeśa did not consider this obvious objection and the natural implications of it. If the hearer's understanding of a sentence consisted sometimes in an inferential

knowledge of R^* and at other times in some non-inferential knowledge of R^* then it would not follow either that *IA* theory or the *VA* theory was wrong. Both the theories would rather be proved unnecessary. Philosophical activity would in that case be directed towards solving the following problems. If and how can we offer a uniform account of sentential understanding? Can we not find anything common between the accounts provided by these two theories in terms of which we can construct a more general and simple account? The second problem is this: If sentential understanding cannot consititute decisive or conclusive reason for admitting language as a distinct source of knowledge and if yet it cannot be denied that this source yields, though only occasionally, sentential understanding and is so far a means or *pramāṇa* then, one might think that the Vaiśeṣika position gets vindicated; language though a source is not an exclusive source of knowledge. So the Naiyāyika-s will have to find some other type of cognition the exclusive source of which is language, if they are to convince us that language is a distinct source. Mīmāṃsaka-s argue that there are different types of sentence. There are sentences understanding of which may, nay, does, consist in hearer's inferential knowledge about the speaker's knowledge of R^*. But there are words (*śabda*-s) which are not words of any conscious or intelligent being. The words which constitute the *Veda* are cases in point.[3] The *Veda* is conceived of as a vast collection of sentences (*vākya*-s, in *Saṁskrita*) which are, without exception true in respect of what they really mean. Since however there is no speaker of the *Veda*, the knowledge one derives from the *Veda* or *vaidika* sentences cannot be of the form 'These words have been causally preceded by the (*speaker's*) knowledge of R^*'. One derives knowledge from the *Veda* more directly. The *Veda* therefore constitute a distinct source of knowledge, a source which does not consist in linguistic *utterances* but is still linguistic in nature. One who derives knowledge from the *Veda* is therefore called a hearer. He is also a hearer in the stronger sense that he hears the utterances of his preceptor, usually a human being. But the human preceptor does not so much produce or utter the *Veda* as transmits them. It is not *qua* the utterance of the preceptor that the *Veda* yield knowledge. The utterances of the preceptor produce the occasion

for the eternal *vidika* sentences to yield knowledge for the hearer of those utterances.[4] For such knowledge the Mīmāṃsaka-s find the excuse to admit a distinct source of knowledge called *śabda* (language) or sometimes, more correctly, *śāstra* (scripture). The Naiyāyika-s apparently does not have this excuse because the *Veda* according to them, has a speaker and a divine speaker at that viz., God. But it does not seem possible for any human hearer to infer God's knowledge of intended R^*. It is one thing to be able to infer that God has knowledge or that he is a knowing being; it is altogether a different thing to say that God uttered such and such a (*vaidika*) sentence to convey to the hearer the knowledge of such and such an R^*.[5] The Naiyāyika-s are more in favour of finding out a single account of sentential understanding no matter whether the sentence is a *vaidika* (sacred scriptural) sentence or a mundane (or secular) one. Under the circumstances they would like to insist that sentential understanding is the reason not only for admitting language as a source of knowledge but also as a distinct source of knowledge. Hence they are under obligation to deny that even on a single occasion inferential means can yield sentential understanding.[6] Sentential understanding consists in the knowledge of R^* whereas inferential means can yield at best knowledge of knowledge of R^*. And a knowledge of knowledge of R^*, is not an instance of knowledge of R^* quite in the same or the required sense of the term. To put it otherwise, inferential means does not yield the knowledge of R^*, quite in the same sense of "of" in which linguistic means yields the knowledge of R^*. Incidentally we may note that from the Nyāya point of view the thesis of the Bauddha-s that the alleged linguistic means is no means of knowledge at all and the Vaiśeṣika view that linguistic means is not a distinct means are not so widely different in their implications as might appear at first sight.

The implication of the Vaiśeṣika reductive thesis, that *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* but not a distinct *pramāṇa*, is not that a hearer derives his knowledge of R^* sometimes through inferential and sometimes through non-inferential (such as linguistic) means. The Vaiśeṣika thesis that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa* is to be understood as the denial of the rival thesis that language is a distinct source of knowledge. Accordingly the Vaiśeṣika thesis is that language, the allegedly

distinct means of knowledge is not a distinct means of knowledge. It is the same as the inferential means. Every case of hearer's understanding of a sentence is a case of inference. The hearer infers that the speaker's utterance of the sentence in question is preceded by his knowledge of the (appropriate) R^*. In knowing this fact about the words he hears, the hearer knows all that he knows about the R^* being spoken of or described the speaker. Compared to the Mīmāṃsā reductionism the Vaiśeṣika-s reductionism is more radical. According to the Vaiśeṣika-s every case of sentential understanding is a case of inference. So the *IA* theory is no less a uniform theory of sentential understanding than the *VA* theory of the Naiyāyika-s. There is no problem of finding a uniform theory so far as, at least, the Vaiśeṣika-s or the Naiyāyika-s are concerned. This is the explanation as well as justification of why Gaṅgeśa did not consider what we described in the beginning of the previous pragraph as the obvious objection.

So though the Naiyāyika-s (or Mīmāṃsaka-s or for that matter any one) may admit by changing the sense of "of", that a person can have knowledge of R^* either through inference or through linguistic means,[7] yet the Vaiśeṣika-s are of the opinion that sentential understanding or knowledge of R^* is always inferential. If, however, the controversy as to whether language is a distinctive means of knowledge or not is to be taken seriously then the positions of the Vaiśeṣika-s and the Naiyāyika-s should be construed in this way. The point of the Vaiśeṣika-s is that in the standard sense of the term "of", the sense in which we say the knowledge of x causes volition and action about x, hearer's knowledge of R^*, which the hearer acquires on the occasion of hearing a well-formed sentence of some language he knows, is necessarily a case of inferential knowledge. The Naiyāyika-s on the other hand maintain that in the same standard sense of the term, a hearer's knowledge of R^* is of a distinct type for which one should admit a distinct source; and language or *śábda* is this source. There is no doubt that Gaṅgeśa viewed the problem of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism as the problem of resolving this issue. But he has not considered why the Vaiśeṣika philosophers thought that words could not yield knowledge of R^* except inferentially or through some inference. It may be that he viewed the problem more logically than causally. He did not direct

his effort towards discovering the cause of the knowledge or R^* showing thereby that contrary to what the Vaiśeṣika-s say, language can be the cause. But closer examination suggests that there was perhaps not much disagreement about individual causal conditions like the knowledge of the feature of syncategorematicity. The controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s is about the exact and specific mode of functioning of these causal conditions or the *hetu*-s. The Vaiśeṣika-s hold that the conditions of knowledge of syncategorematicity etc. function causally in such a way that the features of syncategorematicity etc. can be regarded as *anumāpaka hetu* or logical ground. But while admitting like the Vaiśeṣika-s that the knowledge of syncategorematicity etc. function (non-logically) causally (*janaka hetu*), Gaṅgeśa does not believe that the features in question function as logical ground. Since, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the knowledge of syncategorematicity functions as cause, syncategorematicity itself is logically (inferentially) related to R^*. Naiyāyika-s maintain that the knowledge of syncategorematicity etc. causes the knowledge of R^* even though these features are not the logical grounds which do or can enable us to infer R^*. Thus there is a continuity between the classical and modern Nyāya theory of linguistic source of knowledge, even though the difference in form that the relevant discussions have undergone in the meantime may conceal this fact.[8] In the classical literature controversy was mainly centered round the issue, if and what relation do words bear to what they are supposed to inform us of. Again knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts was taken as example of hearer's knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra was found to interpret knowledge derived from single words like *svarga* (heaven) as knowledge about facts.[9] Anyway, the Vaiśeṣika reductionism admits of or, in any case, has been given, different interpretations. It seems that sometimes the Vaiśeṣika-s are believed to hold that individual words or group of such words yield, for the hearer, inferential knowledge respectively of things or facts. Sometimes again they are believed to maintain that individual words recall the things they mean by virtue of what may be called meaning relation (*saṃketa*) they bear to these things, while a group of suitable words or a sentence yields inferential knowledge of appropriate fact or R^*.

Udayanācāryay formulated the Vaiśeṣika position very clearly. According to him the Vaiśeṣika-s hold that when the individual words of a well-formed group or a sentence, recall for the hearer, on the basis of meaning relation, the things corresponding to them, the hearer infers the relevant fact or the relation R^* which obtains among these things.[10] In short, words do not yield (inferential) knowledge of R^*, a sentence only yields such knowledge. But when this inference is formulated we find that the words forming the sentence do not figure as logical ground in either of the two standard formulations of the Vaiśeṣika inference though in one formulation, that is in the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, they figure as the subject of inference. So far as words forming a sequence called a sentence are concerned the Vaiśeṣika-s, as much as the Naiyāyika-s, appear to maintain that these words do not bear inferential relation of *vyāpti* to R^*. But while the Vaiśeṣika-s maintain that the hearer's understanding of a sentence consists in the inferential knowledge having the words as subject and R^* forming a part of the predicate,[11] the Naiyāyika-s think that the words do not form even the subject of the hearer's knowledge of R^*. The Vaiśeṣika-s further maintain that the hearer of a sentence uses certain features of the words forming that sentence as the logical ground to infer, in respect of the words themselves as subject, certain predicate of which R^* is a part. For the predicate in case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is, 'is causally preceded by (the speaker's) awareness of R^*'. In case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-II, however, the R^* itself is the predicate. The Naiyāyika-s on the other hand think the features in question or some one of them reveal non-inferentially and non-perceptually this R^*. So when the Naiyāyika-s say that language is the means of the hearer's knowledge of R^*, they mean that certain features of language or linguistic expression having a certain form (viz., a sentence) reveals non-inferentially and non-perceptually the R^*; the hearer derives his knowledge of R^* from the liguistic means or words having certain feature or features. But neither these words nor the features of them in question bear either the inferential relation of *vyāpti* or the meaning relation of *saṃketa* with R^*.

Gaṅgeśa takes the Vaiśeṣika reductionism to consist in the belief that the individual words bear meaning-relation to their

respective meanings (i.e., the things meant); that on the basis of his prior knowledge of this relation the hearer of the words recalls on a given occasion the things; that these words further have the features of syncategorematicity etc. and that using these features as logical ground the hearer of a well-formed sequence of these words infer, with the words themselves as subject, a predicate of which R^* forms a part. This at least is true so far as the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is concerned. Gaṅgeśa's objection to this theory is, in the first place, that a hearer can infer, in the stated way, the knowledge of knowledge of R^*. One who has knowledge of R^* only as part or content of knowledge of knowledge of R^* does not have knowledge of R^* in the standard or required sense. Secondly, we cannot say with equal propriety that to see a coloured thing is to *see* both the colour and the thing and to infer a qualified thing is to infer the qualification (or that qualifying property) also. We infer the *vyāpaka*[12] (or the thing to which the ground of inference bears the inferential relation) but the property which determines the *vyāpaka*-character (i.e., the character as possessing which something becomes the predicate of an inference) is not what is inferred. Whether we can make an exception of this rule where the qualifying property is a content or object of belief needs careful consideration.

III

The passage $\acute{S}_{11}$ takes us to the very centre of the issue. In this passage Gaṅgeśa offers, from the side of the Vaiśeṣika-s, the reply to an anticipated objection. The objection is that even if we accept the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I presented in $\acute{S}_5$, it can be said that this inference fails to yield the knowledge of R^*. Unless this (or any other) inference succeeds in yielding this knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot hope to replace language, as a means of knowledge, by inferential means. The inference in question (unless otherwise mentioned we mean by this Vaiśeṣika Inference-I as has been formulated in $\acute{S}_5$), does indeed yield for the hearer-inferer the belief about the (speaker's) belief about R^* in so far as this latter belief can be inferred to precede the words being uttered by the speaker provided, however, the words have

the features of syncategorematicity etc. But if it is to support the Vaiśeṣika reductionism, an inference must be able to yield the knowledge which the hearer is claimed by the Naiyāyika-s to derive from the linguistic utterance itself. They do not claim, and they seem to have the support of commonsense, that a hearer derives from the appropriate linguistic utterance any knowledge about the *words* such as the inference in question yields (that they have been uttered on the basis or knowledge of R^*). They rather claim that the hearer derives knowledge about the *things* (*padārtha*-s) themselves; the knowledge that they are related (*saṃsṛṣṭa*). Anticipating this objection Gaṅgeśa supplies in $\acute{S}_{11}$ a reply. The reply is, in short, this. In the same act of inference, namely, the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, in which the hearer admittedly comes to acquire knowledge of (the speaker's) knowledge of R^*, the hearer is also made aware of R^* itself. One cannot know an act of knowledge (here, the speaker's knowledge of R^*) without becoming aware in the same act of the content of this knowledge. So the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I does not only yield knowledge of knowledge of R^* but also knowledge of R^*. For R^*, being the content of the act of knowledge being known, cannot but be itself known.

There is a further and related objection. How does this inference make the hearer aware of the things (word-meanings) between which the relation obtains? We shall presently see the point of this objection. Vaiśeṣika reply to this objection has also been offered by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_1$. Both these objections on the one hand and the answers to them on the other may be found in the writings of Udayanācārya and (to some extent), Vācaspati Miśra. There is still another objection. Language as means of knowledge yields specific information. This is verified by the fact that a hearer acts on the basis of the information he derives from the speaker's utterances or instructions. Every action is directed towards a determinate object. This shows that the knowledge which forms the basis of such action or volition is also about something determinate. If now the Vaiśeṣika-s want to replace linguistic utterance as means by inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, then such inference should yield some specific information; it should inform us of some specific relation rather than of relation

as such or a relation answering to as general a description as 'the relation obtaining between the things recalled and signified by the words of a sentence'. But only such general relation forms part of the predicate of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. In the passage in question Gaṅgeśa represents the Vaiśeṣika-s as answering the objection in the following way. What (though not only what) turns a relation into a determinate, definite and specific relation are the relata of it, just as what turns an item of knowledge into the specific knowledge it is, is its object. The relata, in case of a relation, and the object, in case of a knowledge, are made known to us by the respective acts of inference if the latter happen to inform us of the relation and the knowledge.

It should not however be thought that the relata (or the object) are inferred in the same sense of the term in which the relation (or the knowledge) is inferred. In the standard sense of "infer" the *vyāpaka* alone is inferred and the *vyāpaka* (one of the two relata of the relation of *vyāpti*, the referent) in case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is (speaker's knowledge or the causally preceding) knowledge. But what we know in an inference is something determinate i.e., a certain thing along with the properties characterising the thing in a way suitable for the occasion. If the thing is the *vyāpaka* these properties are qualifications which determine the *vyāpaka* character (*vyāpakatā*) of it i.e., the respect in (or as) which the thing is being inferred. Thus we can as well say that we infer what is determined by the properties which determine, relative to the inference in question, the character of being inferred (pertaining to the thing being inferred). But to infer x as determined by the property F should not be construed as inferring x and F in the sense of inferring x and inferring F. For what counts as logical ground in relation to x having F may not and usually does not count as a logical ground in relation to F. But this does not prevent our knowing F in the same act of inference in which we know the x, provided x is the thing being inferred (*vyāpaka*) and F determines x as such a thing (i.e., the thing being inferred) relative to the inference in question. In case the thing being inferred is a knowledge, the object of the knowledge corresponds to F. But in the present case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I the determining property or the F is the relation R^* . And since in

the inference the knowledge (in question) is inferred as determined by R^*, since the knowledge of the relation is being inferred, the relation R^* is also known, though strictly speaking it is not inferred. But how do we know the things (word-meanings) between which this relation obtains? Unlike the relation, these things are not what determine the thing being inferred in respect of latter's being inferred relative to the inference in question. Nor do we have any principle as yet which explains if and how we can know in an inference what is neither the thing being inferred nor the property which determines the character of being the object of inference, relative to the inference in question; how, in our example can we know the things themselves as distinct from both the knowledge of the speaker being inferred and the *samsarga* or the R^* (relation between word-meanings) which functions as determinant. Thus the two questions are different and they are so treated by Udayanācārya and Gaṅgeśa. Now do we know *saṃsarga* (relation)? How do we know the things between which the *saṃsarga* obtains? Gaṅgeśa's answer from the point of view of the Vaiśeṣika-s is that what specify a relation are the relata of it. And relation can never exist or be known without its relata. So just as we do not know simply knowledge but knowledge of something *x* or *F* so also we do not know a relation but related fact i.e., we know a relation only in knowing the relevant things as related by that relation. Thus R^* is known only when we know word-meanings as related by way of R^*.

[$\acute{S}_{11}$]

Jñānāvacchedakatayā ca saṃsargasiddhiḥ; jñānajñānasya tadviṣayaviṣayakatva niyamāt. Saṃsarge ca sambandhina eva viśeṣakatvāt. Pakṣadharmatābalāt vyāpakatvenāgṛhitasyāpi saṃsargaviśeṣasya siddhiḥ.
[pp. 38.40]

The relation is known as determining or qualifying the knowledge [of the speaker, being inferred]; for the principle is that knowledge of a knowledge takes as its object the object of that [other knowledge being known]. The relation [itself, however] is specified by nothing other than the relata. The specific relation is

> known by virute of the fact that the ground of inference is a property of the subject of inferential judgement.

The Vaiśeṣika Inference-I has for its conclusion the proposition[13] that the words in question have, in the causal relation or as effect, the knowledge (of the speaker) of R^*. But this type of inference is held by the Vaiśeṣika-s to really do the job of the alleged linguistic means. A well-formed sentence of a speaker is alleged to yield, in favour of the right sort of hearer, an awareness of the relation R^*. How can a Vaiśeṣika then hope to replace by or reduce into inferential means the language as the alleged means of knowledge of R^*? The first sentence of the passage $\acute{S}_{11}$ contains an answer to this question from the side of the Vaiśeṣika-s. The relevant difference between the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I and what the Naiyāyika-s call linguistic means is that while the former yields knowledge of (speaker's) knowledge of R^* the latter is alleged to yield knowledge of R^*. Now the Vaiśeṣika answer utilises our answer to the question 'How knowledge of R^* stands to knowledge of knowledge of R^*?' or 'How does R^* stand to the inferential predicate (*śādhya*) of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, namely, knowledge of R^*?'. It determines the knowledge of R^* to be what it is. What determines the knowledge of R^* to be the knowledge of R^* and not the knowledge of, say, x or y is this R^* itself (in the relation of being object of). Thus R^* is the determining feature or, if you like, the limiting feature which determines the knowledge in question to be the knowledge it is (i.e., of R^*). Therefore, the inference that proves or makes us aware of the knowledge of R^* cannot fail to prove R^* in so far as it is the determinant of the knowledge in question. In fact no knowledge is proved or known without its determining feature. So if the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields for the hearer a belief about speaker's knowledge it yields for him at the same time a belief about R^* as the determining feature of the speaker's knowledge. So this inference does not fail to serve the purpose what linguistic means allegedly serves. If and in so far as language yields the knowledge of R^* it is not distinct from inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. Or, at least, to account for a hearer's knowledge of R^* we do not need to admit in theory of knowledge a source of knowledge in addition to inference.

Some further clarification is, however, needed. What the Vaiśeṣika-s are obliged to prove in order to defend their reductionism is that through some inference like the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I *siddhi* of R^* is obtained or acquired by the hearer of a sentence. The word *siddhi* means knowledge or awareness. Now while the Vaiśeṣika must show that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields knowledge of R^*, the expression 'of' signifies the relation of knowledge with its object. It is therefore to be shown that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields a knowledge which has for its object R^*. But it is undisputed that an inference yields the knowledge of the inferential predicate or *sādhya*. It follows that the object of the knowledge yielded by the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is (the speaker's) knowledge of R^* for that has been seen to be the *sādhya* of the inference. How can the Vaiśeṣika-s claim that the object of the inferential knowledge resulting from the inference in question is R^*? If the inference does not yield a knowledge having R^* for its object how can this inference replace the linguistic means alleged by the Naiyāyika-s to be a distinct source of our knowledge of R^*? To answer this question the Vaiśeṣika-s are to show that the knowledge which is yielded by the inference in question, (i.e., the knowledge of the *sādhya* which here happens to be the knowledge of R^*) has for its object R^*, and is so far a knowledge of R^*. But how can knowledge of knowledge of R^* be the knowledge R^*? The Vaiśeṣika-s resort to a principle stated in the second part of the first sentence of this passage S_{11}. The principle is that the knowledge of the knowledge having an object x is (also) a knowledge of x. In other words, an object of knowledge is the object of the knowledge of that knowledge.[14] Now since the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields knowledge of knowledge of R^* it can be said to yield knowledge which has for its object R^*. To account for just this knowledge the Naiyāyika-s unnecessarily postulate a fourth distinct source of knowledge. To postulate language or words as the fourth source is not only unnecessary, it is unjustified also. For *śabda* or words do not have any relation with R^* except the inferential relation or the relation of being the inferential subject of the inference of which R^* is the inferential predicate or a part thereof.[15] Gaṅgeśa will soon return to this principle and examine its alleged weakness. But first he represents the Vaiśeṣika-s as

meeting a further objection against their position.

IV

The objection is that even after all that has been said in defence of it so far, the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I falls short of a linguistic means. The former yields at most the knowledge of R^* in general while the latter yields each time knowledge of some specific R^*. It is a common experience that a hearer, being told by the speaker to do something, or on the basis of the information he derives from the utterance of the speaker, acts in an appropriate manner. This shows that language is a means of specific information, for it is only on this kind of information that one can act. A security man can perform the act of arresting a definite and particular person. There is no act of arresting which is not an act of arresting a particular man. So unless the specific message that he should arrest this or that particular man could be conveyed to a security personnel, the latter could not perform his job. If he is told or if he derived on his own the general information to the effect that he should arrest or arrest a man that would not lead to any (definite) action. The linguistic means yields specific information necessary for leading the hearer to act. But all that has been said so far about the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I shows that a hearer can derive from this inference a knowledge about the speaker's knowledge. It is this knowledge which is directly the inferential predicate. A subsidiary principle was then appealed to, which turns this knowledge about the speaker's knowledge into knowledge about the object of the speaker's knowledge viz., R^*. But what is this R^*? It is a relation between the word-meanings (*padārtha*) in general. But to know that hings or word-meanings are related i.e., to have the knowledge of the form *padārthāḥ saṃsṛstāḥ* is not enough for action. No one can act on such general information just as the security guard cannot fire when he is just told "Fire" or "Fire a man". If it is to replace linguistic means as a distinct source of knowledge the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is to yield in a given case such specific information as can lead one to undertake to perform, say, the act of bringing (itself meaning of a word) to which act a book stands in the relation of being the accusative. In other words it should not yield just a

general information that there is a relation obtaining between (certain) things or certain things that are recalled and signified by words (*smāritārtha*). But the inferential predicate (*sādhya*) of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I amounts to nothing more than this. We have not as yet found any principle whereby we can say that this inference informs us of a *specific* R^* rather than of an R^* which is just a relation that obtains between things that are word-meanings; this inference does not, it seems, tell us in any given case what these things are or the word-meanings are. Even if we know that there is an R^* obtaining between things or word-meanings, we cannot act on it. We can act only if we know that a certain particualr thing (say, a book) stands in some specific way (say, in the relation of being an accusative of) to another particular thing (say the act of bringing) which in its turn stands related to still another particular thing (e.g., an act of volition of mine).

In short, if the Vaiśeṣika claim to replace the allegedly distinct means of language by an inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is to be justified, we must discover some further principle which will show that this inference does not only inform us in a general way (*sāmānyataḥ*) of a relation R^* obtaining between word-meanings *qua* word-meaning, but (or also) of some specific R^* (*saṃsarga viśeṣa*) obtaining among some specific word-meanings in a given case. Gaṅgeśa finds out this principle for the Vaiśeṣika-s and formulates it in the last or the third sentence of the passage $Ś_{11}$. But before that he clarifies in the second sentence of the passage what turns a relation into a specific relation. What turns a mere knowledge into the specific knowledge it is, is the object it reveals. There is hardly anyting specific in a diaphenous act of knowledge except the object it knows.[16] Similarly, there is hardly anything specific about a relation except the relata it relates. These relata specify and distinguish a relation (of a kind) from another relation. Thus one instance of causal relation is distinguished from another instance of the same relation by the fact that the events which constitute the relata in one case are different from the events which constitute the relata in the other case. The same is the case with such generic relation or generalised formulation of a relation as subject-predicate relation (*viśeṣya-viśeṣana sambandha*), thing-word relation (*pada-padārtha sambandha*) or relation

between word-meanings (*padārtha saṃsarga*). Gaṅgeśa needs to find out for the Vaiśeṣika-s a principle whereby the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I can be shown to yield information about specific R^* (*saṃsarga viśeṣa*) in the sense described. Gaṅgeśa found out this principle and formulated it in an earlier part of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to answer a similar objection.

The problem in its generalised form is, how can an inference prove its object i.e. the object to be inferred (*sādhya*) not only in a general way but also in a specific way ? Let us take as example the inference of fire. What does this inference prove ? If it proves fire in the sense of yielding knowledge to the effect that 'there is fire' then it can be said to prove fire in a general way. But acts like collecting or extinguishing are directed to specific fire like the fire to be found in the oven or in that hill or the fire which the younder building has caught. Such acts are not possible on the basis of general information that there is fire. So the question is if and how the inference of fire yields information about the particular fire in question; and in its generalised form the question is if and how an inference can yield not only general information about (*sāmānyataḥ sādhyasiddhi*) *sādhya* but also specific information about it i.e., put otherwise, specific *sādhya* (*sādhya viśeṣa*). Gaṅgeśa's answer is that what in an inference proves the object to be inferred i.e., the inferential predicate or *sādhya* is the logical ground (*liṅga* or *anumāpaka hetu*). Now among the features of a logical ground two are (i) inferential relation (*vyāpti*) and (ii) possession by the inferential subject (*pakṣa dharmatā*). The logical ground proves *sādhya* in general or yields generic information about (its) inferential predicate by virtue of its feature of *vyāpti* (*vyāpti balāt*), whereas by virtue of its other feature of *pakṣadharmatā* i.e., *pakṣadharmatābalāt* the logical ground yields the required specific information about *sādhya*. Let us explain. Nothing can be the logical ground of an inference unless it is the seat of the inferential relation of *vyāpti* which has for its other *relatum* the inferential predicate of that inference. *Vyāpti* so far is a feature of the logical ground. What does a logical ground prove by virute of this particular feature ? Take for example the logical ground of the inference of fire from smoke. The smoke is here the logical ground and as such it has the feature of *vyāpti*— a feature which

consists in the *hetu* standing in the relation of *vyāpti* to fire. But smoke stands in this relation to fire in so far as the fire is taken in its generic aspect of *fireness* or under the generic description 'something having the property of being fire'. Since the relation of *vyāpti* relates smoke (the logical ground) to fire (the *sādhya*) taking the latter in its generic aspect (*sāmānyataḥ*), the smoke is said to prove, by virtue of its feature of *vyāpti* (*vyāpti balāt*), fire in a general way. We can generalise; a logical ground by virtue of its feature of *vyāpti* proves the inferential predicate taken in its generic aspect. This generic aspect again is what determines, though in a general way, the *sādhya* or *vyāpaka* character (*vyāpakatā*) of what figures as the *sādhya* or *vyāpti* i.e., inferential predicate in an inference. So this feature is also called *sādhyatā* or *vyāpakatā avacchedaka* (*dharma*). We can formulate the principle in this way: a logical ground by virtue of its feature of being the seat of the inferential relation of *vyāpti* (*vyāpti balāt*) proves the object of inference (*sādhya*) taken as something which has the property (*dharma*) which figures as *vyāpakatāvacchedaka* in the context of the given case of inference (*vyāptibalāt vyāpakatāvacchedakaprakarena sādhya sidhyati*). To yield generic information about the object to be inferred therefore means to prove this object as something having the property that determines its role as an object of this inference. The expression 'inference of fire' is not sufficiently precise. For one may like to infer fire taken in its aspect of being the seat of its qualities i.e., as substance. Some other person may like to infer fire in its aspect of being the cause of smoke. These persons are to find out different logical grounds to prove their object of inference (which in each case is, only generally speaking, fire). It is the same fire taken in its different aspects. These aspects or properties determine differently the role of fire as *sādhya* of the respective inferences. So in every inference one proves or seeks to prove the object being inferred in some generic aspect of it known as *vyāpakatāvacchedaka* (*dharma*). The logical ground must bear the inferential relation with the object being inferred taken only in the aspect of *vyāpakatāvacchedaka* relative to that inference. According as the same thing is taken as determined by different properties for the purpose of inference we are to find out and offer different appropriate logical grounds.

For normally only different things can bear relation of *vyāpti* to the same thing taken under different aspects. One's being a legal and biological father is a ground for proving him to be a married man, but this cannot be a logical ground if we want to prove that person to be an intelligent man.

A logical ground (say, smoke) must also have the feature of being possessed by or existing in the inferential subject (say, the hill). For if it did not itself exist in the subject or stood related to it then it could not prove the object being inferred (the *sādhya*, say fire) *as existing in the subject* simply on the basis of its relation of *vyāpti* to *sādhya*. For a logical ground, in so far as it has the inferential relation (of *vyāpti*) with the object being inferred, proves this object under the generic aspect of being a (the other) term of the relation of *vyāpti* (i.e., *vyāpakatvena*). The logical ground cannot so far prove the object being inferred under its other aspect of being possesed by or existing in the subject of inference. But we need to prove fire not only generally as something which has the character of fire but also in the specific form appropriate for the occasion i.e., as existing in the subject of inference or as true of the subject of this inferential judgement. So to prove fire specifically means (in the context of inference of fire in this hill from smoke) proving fire as existing in the hill; predicating, on the basis of inference, fire of the hill. It is only on such specific information as "Hill has fire" that we can act. Thus a logical ground proves its *sādhya* specifically i.e., enables us to assert that the subject of the inference has or possesses in certain specific relation the object being inferred, by virtue of the fact that it itself exists in the subject of inference, that it is itself a feature of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharma*). Inference demands that the object of inference should be proved to exist where the logical ground itself exists.

If therefore the logical ground did not exist in the subject of inference (or *pakṣa*) i.e., if it lacked the feature of being there (i.e., *pakṣadharmatā*) or if it did not bear the relation of inference of (*vyāpti*) to the object being inferred i.e., lacked *vyāpti* then it could not prove the object being inferred (*sādhya*) in the relevant sense or form. It could not yield any specific information on which one could act. But still these two features of the logical ground

do not serve exactly the same purpose or one of them would have been redundant. The feature of *vyāpti* proves the object of inference in its generic aspect that determines it as something which is *vyāpaka* or to which the logical ground bears the infernitial relation of *vyāpti*. But when the object being inferred is not taken in its aspect of being *vyāpaka* (*vyāpakatvena*) but in some other aspect viz. the aspect of existing in or being true of the inferential subject, the object cannot be proved by the logical ground simply because it has the feature of being the seat of the inferential relation (of *vyāpti*). The logical ground must have another property, the property of iteself being true of the inferential subject. It is by virtue of this feature that a logical ground proves the object of inference in its specific aspect of being a property of the inferential subject whence this subject is called *sādhyadharmadharmi*.

The problem in its generalised form has been, how does an inference prove what is inferred in the required specific aspect of it. The answer given by Gaṅgeśa is that the special feature of the logical ground viz. its being true of the inferential subject enables the ground to prove the inferntial predicate in its special aspect of being true of the inferential subject. In $\acute{S}_{11}$ Gaṅgeśa represents the Vaiśeṣika-s as resorting to this principle as a means of answering the following objection against the claim that the inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I can do the job of the allegedly distinct source of knowledge i.e., language. The objection is that while language is claimed to yield concrete information about R^* on which the hearer can act, the inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields only a sort of information which is too general to be of any use in guiding the addressee in respect of his actual course of action. In other words the sort of inference in question informs us of R^* as just a relation obtaining between (certain) things signified and recalled by words. But to know that there obtains a certain relation between certain things being spoken of or, what is almost the same thing, to know that certain fact obtains is not enough to adopt any specific course of action. But to know, when we are thirsty, that the liquid in that glass is water or that water quenches thirst is to be led to undertake to act in the appropriate way. Anyway, lánguage as special means of knowledge does not only tell us in a general way that R^* obtains, but also that R^* obtains

between such and such things or word-meanings. And to be told that R^* obtains between such and such things is to be told that a specific R^* or such and such an R^* obtains. For the two are almost the same.

Now if the Vaiśeṣika-s are to defend their view that the knowledge supposed to be yielded by language, postulated by the Naiyāyika-s as a distinct source of knowledge, is really obtained through a process of inference involving an inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, they are to show that this type of inference proves in a given case not only R^* as such or in general but such and such R^* i.e., an $R_1{}^*$. And this they now seek to do by appealing to the principle that the same logical ground which proves a thing in its general aspect proves that thing under some special aspect also. The logical ground can do that by virtue respectively of two of its features of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*. By virtue of its feature of *vyāpti* or in so far as it is the seat of the relevant *vyāpti* the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves only R^*. This inference so far cannot be held to yield information about only an R^*_1 or R^*_2 specific to the sentence $\acute{S}_1$ or $\acute{S}_2$. This type of inference, however, is resorted to, perhaps unknowingly, by the addressee of any sentence whatsoever. The addressees of different sentences $\acute{S}_1$.... $\acute{S}_n$ do derive information about $R_1{}^*$ ....R^*_n, and in each case the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is involved as yielding the releveant information. It follows that this inference yields only what is common in all these cases; it yields knowledge of R^* in general rather than of an $R_1{}^*$ which is specific to a sentence $\acute{S}_1$. So far the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields R^*in general and not specific R^* say $R_2{}^*$. This shows that the logical ground of this inference bears the inferential relation of *vyāpti* to R^* in general i.e., R^* in its generic aspect of being an R^* (*saṃsargatvena*) or being an R^* that obtains between word-meanings (*padārthasaṃsargatvena*). So the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves by virtue of its being the seat of *vyāpti* only R^* i.e., R^* in general. The property of being a sequence of words having syncategorematicity etc. (*ākāṅkṣādimatpadakadambatva*) bears *vyāpti* relation to *knowledge* of R^* (taken in the relation of being *caused* by (*pūrvakatva*). The Vaiś eṣika Inference-I so far is this. The words in question must have been caused by the speaker's knowledge

of R^* because these words form a sequence having syncategorematicity etc.[17] The unstated basis of the inference here is that the property of being a sequence of words having syncategorematicity is the seat of inferential relation of *vyāpti* with (speaker's) knowledge of R^*. This then is what is meant by saying that the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves only R^* in general, whereas the hearer of a well-formed sentence derives information about some specific R^*, say $R_1{}^*$. While conceding to this charge, the Vaiśeṣka-s or we on their behalf added both some justification and clarification. We explained why the Vaiśeṣika-s must say that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves R^* in general. We have also clarified the sense of the statement that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves R^* in general; and the statement is true only in this sense. The logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I proves by virtue of its feature of being the seat of (the relevant) *vyāpti* proves R^* as R^*, that is, in general.

But to concede even this much is to invite the remark that the inference or at least the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I cannot quite do the job of language considered as a means of knowledge. For it does not yield information about any particular R^* such as $R^*{}_1$. So far there is till the possibility of the Nyāya view being true. Let inference prove R^*; the knowledge of any particular R^* which one, to whom a sentence is addressed, has, is derived from that sentence itself as a source of this knowledge. If we admit even this much then also the Nyāya claim that language is a distinct source of knowledge cannot be overruled. The suggested reply of the Vaiśeṣika-s which we find in the passage $\acute{S}_{11}$ is this. To say that the logical ground of the inference in question does not prove, by virtue of the relation of *vyāpti* it has, any specific R^*, is not the same thing as saying that this logical ground or, for the matter of that, this inference does not prove any specific R^*. For the logical ground may prove a specific R^* by virtue of some other aspect or feature of it. The logical ground of an inference proves, by virtue of this other feature, in a specific way or form what it otherwise proves in a general way. It proves the things in a general way in so far as it is the seat of the inferential relation having as the other term what is being proved. But a logical ground which is a seat of inference proves the same thing also in a particularised form

that is as characterizing the particular inferential subject in so far as the ground itself characterizes or exists in that inferential subject. The logical ground and the object being proved are both viewed as features of this subject or *pakṣa*. Whereas in an inference we proceed with the certitude that the inferential subject has the feature which is being used as logical ground, we infer on the basis of this certainty that the feature which figures, in the given case, as the object being inferred also characterizes the inferential subject. So far the inferential process consists in deriving the information that the *sādhya*-feature is true of the inferential subject, that the inferential subject has the *sādhya*, from the knowledge we already have viz. that the *hetu*-feature holds true of the inferential subject. Two predications are thus involved here. Predicating (or asserting (ultimately) non-inferentially the presence of) the logical ground of (in) the inferential subject and predicating inferentially of the same subject the (presence of the) inferential predicate. In the context of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I the subject of inference is, in any particular case of application of this form of argument, a definite group of words like "Bring the cow" or "The rose is red". Now the property of being a sequence of words fulfilling the conditions of mutual syncategorematicity etc. is true of the words which form the subject of the inference. Beginning with this (ultimately) non-inferential certitude we proceed to infer i.e., inferentially assert, that the inferential predicate in question viz., being (causally) preceded by (the speaker's) knowledge of R^*, characterizes the inferential subject. This inferential assertion or conclusion is therefore "The words,....are preceded (causally) by the (speaker's) knowledge of R^*". The R^* here is obviously the specific R^* that obtains among things the words for which fill the blank in the generalised formulation of the conclusion of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I given in the previous sentence. Where the words which fill the blank are 'Drink water' the things involved are drinking and water. The relation between them which the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I will prove is (*karmatva*) accusative [drinking, water] or the relation of (water) being accusative of (drinking). Where the words are 'He writes poems', the predicate (or what the corresponding property functioning as the logical ground) proves, the specific R_1^* viz., the relation of (he) being subject of

the act (of writing) having as accusative poems. Thus since in each particular case of its application the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I will have as inferential subject a group of particular words, a feature of these words, the logical ground, will prove (or the causing predicate[18] will singnify) such R^* as obtains between the particular things signified by these words. This is what is meant by saying that the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I will yield knowledge of specific R^* (*saṃsargaviśeṣa*) by virtue of its being a feature of certain particular words which happen to form the inferential subject of this type of inference in the given case. This then is the answer to the specific problem or objection anticipated by Gaṅgeśa in the passage $\acute{S}_{11}$.

Gangeśa has so far defended his own formulation of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I against a few objections. The defence consisted mainly in showing that inference of this type can yield in any particular case knowledge of some specific R^* being the relation that obtains among the things signified by the words which constitute the particular subject of the given inference. In course of demonstrating this, appeal had to be made to two principles. The first principle P^1 is that a knowledge of a second knowledge has for its own object the object of the second knowledge. To put it otherwise, knowledge of knowledge of an x is itself necessarily a knowledge of x. The second principle P^2 is that the logical ground or the causing predicate of an inference proves what it proves to be a feature of the inferential subject because it itself is such another feature of the same subject. There is a third principle, which does not need to be especially mentioned here, is that the logical ground of an inference proves in a general way the object being inferred (what it proves as a feature of the inferential subject according to P^2) by virtue of its being the seat of the inferential relation (which this ground bears to the object being inferred by the inference in question). So far as the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is concerned it follows that this inference proves according to the third principle the (relevant) knowledge of the speaker. Where the speaker and the hearer are different persons, the latter has no direct access to the knowledge of the former. The inference in question proves R^* (or speaker's knowledge of R^* rather than simply speaker's knowledge) by involving an appeal

to the subsidiary principle P^1. This principle will come up for discussion in the next chapter. Lastly, the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is shown to yield for the hearer the desired information about certain R^* by appealing to the principle. P^2

EIGHT

On Knowing A Belief

I

Gaṅgeśa now takes up for discussion the principle P¹. The issue is not whether knowing a thing implies knowing that one knows the thing. This is also a very important problem which the Indian Philosophers discussed thoroughly. But what Gaṅgeśa takes up here for discussion is a different issue. Does knowing that one knows an *a* imply knowing (that) *a* ? An affirmative answer might appear most reasonable. But let us first see what can be said against this principle. If in apprehending a belief one is said to apprehend the object of that belief such that the apprehension itself turns out, so far, to be that belief then we can hardly distinguish one's apprehending a belief about an object from one's believing that object.

[$\acute{S}_{12}$]

> *Athaivaṃ bhrāntijñānamapi bhramaḥ syāt. Na ceṣṭāpattiḥ, īśvarasyāpi bhrāntatvāpatteḥ. Idam rajatamiti bhramādiva śuktau rajatajñānavānayamiti bhramasya jñānāt bhrāntijñapravṛtyāpatteśca.*
>
> [p.40]

Now, if this were so, then even the knowledge about an error would itself become an error. And this cannot be an welcome objection, for as a consequence [in that case]

even God would become [a] mistaken [being]. There would [further] be this objection; as from the error "This is silver", so also, from [his] knowledge "This man has the awareness 'this is silver' though there is only shell", [appropriate] action of the person who has apprehended the error would follow.

The phrase 'if this were so' bears reference to the subsidiary principle P^1 noted above i.e., the principle that object of a cognition is also the object of the knowledge of that cognition. By invoking this principle the Vaiśeṣika-s could show that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I which apparently proves only the speaker's awareness of R^*, proves R^* also. In the present passage Gaṅgeśa brings two related objections against this principle [or its indiscriminate use ?]. The first objection is that the acceptance of this principle tends to obliterate the distinction between one who is mistaken and one (not necessarily a distinct person) who has detected the mistake. For detecting a mistake consists in knowing the mistake for what it is. But this knowledge of a mistake has for its object the object of the mistaken awareness also. So far therefore both the mistake and the knowledge of it have the same object, and they can both be described in the same way as erroneous act of cognition. The principle in question, therefore, entails that even the knowledge of an error is an error. Gaṅgeśa puts his objection to the Vaiśeṣika-s in this way. If the principle that the object of a cognition is also the object of the knowledge of that cognition is accepted then let knowledge of an erroneous cognition be itself an error.

The force of this objection is that a Vaiśeṣika cannot ignore it or be indifferent to it, on the ground that it does not affect any of the fundamental tenets of his system. The objection does affect one such tenet of his philosophy. So no Vaiśeṣika can welcome this objection as really going in his favour or as doing no harm to his system; he cannot accept it as *iṣṭāpatti*. One fundamental thesis which the Vaiśeṣika-s share with those who, including the Naiyāyika-s, believe in personal God, is that there is an omniscient being who is God. God is admitted in the (Nyāya and) Vaiśeṣika system to have many more qualities but he is certainly believed to be omniscient. Whether or not omniscience entails infallibility, God is also believed to be infallible. These two tenets turn out

to be inconsistent with each other once the principle in question is accepted. To put it otherwise the following three tenets of the Vaiśeṣika-s constitute an inconsistent set. (1) God is omniscient (2) God is infallible and (3) the object of a cognition is (also) the object of the knowledge of that cognition. We have already seen that it follows from (3) that a person who knows an erroneous cognition has himself an erroneous cognition.[1] Now from (1) it follows that God has knowledge of everything including the cognitions we have. And these cognition admittedly include many errors. In other words, it follows among other things that God is aware of all the mistakes committed by us or erroneous beliefs entertained by us. Now (1) and (3) together entail that (4) God has as many erroneous cognitions. This last conclusion conflicts with (2).

A Vaiśeṣika cannot therefore welcome the objection, against the principle in question, that it makes every awareness (including knowledge, in the strict sense) of error itself erroneous. For he cannot accept what follows from it in his system, namely, that God is subject to errors and mistakes. Thus the point of the first objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ is to show that once the principle P^1 in question is incorporated into the Vaiśeṣika system, the system turns out to be inconsistent. This objection should be regarded as decisive. Why does then Gaṅgeśa think it necessary to offer in $\acute{S}_{12}$ a second objection against the acceptance of the principle in question by the Vaiśeṣika-s ? It is not unusual to think that Gaṅgeśa was not fully satisfied with the first objection. But he could be dissatisfied normally if either the objection did not have sufficient force against the Vaiśeṣika-s or if it affected, however slightly, his own or the Nyāya position itself. We have already seen that the objection is quite damaging for the Vaiśeṣika system particularly on the assumption that God knows everything for what it is. But there is reason to believe that Gaṅgeśa was not quite happy with the objection because it seems to go against the Naiyāyika-s also. For not only the Naiyāyika-s admit *anuvyavasāya* or introspective awareness of an act of cognition they also believe that in order such introspection can occur condition of non-ordinary contact between the relevant sense organ and the object of the introspected cognition must be realised. Such a contact with the sense organ,

here, *manas*(generating the introspection of the cognition of it), turns a thing into an object of the resulting introspecting cognition. So far, therefore a Naiyāyika too cannot deny that introspection has for its object the object of the introspected cognition. In other words, he too must admit the last of the three propositions of the allegedly inconsistent set which the Vaiśeṣika-s admit. That the other two propositions of the set in question are also admitted by the Naiyāyika-s is beyond any controversy. So far therefore the first objection holds no less against the Naiyāyika-s than against the Vaiśeṣika-s. Even if Gaṅgeśa can ultimately defend the Nyāya position against this objection, the very fact that there is *prima facie* possibility that his own system can be subjected to the same criticism might have led Gaṅgeśa to offer against the Vaiśeṣika-s the second objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$.

This explanation of why Gaṅgeśa offered two objections in succession is hardly convincing. True, the second objection differs importantly from the first in that it does not tend to accuse the Vaiśeṣika-s for subscribing to a principle which has the approval of the Naiyāyika-s themselves. But none the less this second objection applies to all, and only, those who accept the principle in question. In fact the second objection is hardly a new and independent objection ; it is the necessary consequence of the first. If the distinction between 'x believes that p' and 'x believes that x believes that p' is obliterated,[2] that is to say, if the distinction between one who is mistaken and one who is aware that a mistake has been committed is ignored, then the second person will be led to perform by the second belief whatever the first is led to do by the first belief.[3] The consequence is yet another absurdity, that there is no distinction between the conduct of a person who is under the spell of an ignorance or mistake and that of another who has detected the mistake and transcended that ignorance.

If the second objection is thus viewed merely as an extension of the first objection, that is, if Gaṅgeśa is taken just to extend the scope of the first objection, then no fresh justification for offering the second objection is needed. We in that case cannot accuse Gaṅgeśa even if the first objection is not more unsatisfactory or the second objection is not a better one logically. But this line of defence has no power to repudiate the inferential apprehension

theory of sentential understanding of the Vaiśeṣika-s without at the same time seriously affecting the verbal apprehension theory of the Naiyāyika-s themselves. One basic reason why the Naiyāyika-s find that a verbal apprehension theory is called for is that certain cognitions are revealed in introspection as possessing the distinct character of being verbal (*śābdatva*). This shows, and it is a fact, that the Naiyāyika-s admit that we have introspection of cognitive acts i.e., *anuvyavasāya*; and such introspection is admitted to take as its object the object of the introspected cognitive act. If it is objectionable to admit the object of a belief as the object of the belief about the first belief then the Naiyāyika-s can neither accept such introspection or *anuvyavasāya* nor can insist, on the evidence of *anuvyavasāya*, that understanding of a sentence consists in a distinct kind of cognition called verbal cognition. For that there is (a distinct type of cognition called) verbal cognition is certified by *anuvyavasāya*.

We therefore suggest the following explanation of Gaṅgeśa's act of offering in succession the two objections in question. He seems to think that whether or not we can prove it, on independent ground, to be necessary, the Vaiśeṣika inferential apprehension theory cannot be said to be false or, to be more precise, inadequate if this theory can explain all the relevant phenomena. The phenomenon to be explained here is the hearer's understanding of a syntactically and semantically well formed sentence, presumably, not heard before, of his language. This understanding consists in the knowledge of R^* where R^* stands for the relation that obtains (or asserted to obtain) between things[4] signified and recalled by the words constituting the sentence in question. The Vaiśeṣika-s claim that their inferential apprehension (or *IA*) theory about understanding a sentence can explain this phenomenon by specifying the necessary and sufficient causal conditions of hearer's knowledge in question. Gaṅgeśa's first objection under reference is to the effect that the explanatory power of *IA* theory depends on the principle P^1: The object of a belief is also the object of the belief about this (first) belief. But this principle, once accepted, obliterates the distinction between a mistaken cognition and the cognition of the mistake or, for that matter, the distinction between a person who has mistaken awareness i.e., who is mistaken

(*bhrānta*) and a person who is aware of that mistake (*bhrāntijña*). This is a formidable objection against accepting the principle P¹ and against using this principle to construct an inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding. It seems that Gaṅgeśa anticipated how a Vaiśeṣika would react if the Naiyāyika-s offered such an objection. He would point out that the principle P¹, held objectionable here, is admitted by the Naiyāyika-s themselves. So nothing could be settled at least between the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s on the basis of the argument or objection from the dubious character of P¹. One might think that Gaṅgeśa could still say that the untenability of the Nyāya position or susceptibility of Nyāya to the same charge does not weaken the strength of the objection hurled against the Vaiśeṣika-s. But a Vaiśeṣika would say, that he would answer the objection made against him exactly in the way a Naiyāyika would answer it when he faces the same objection.

Perhaps anticipating such rejoinder that Gaṅgeśa brought the second objection as somewhat an independent argument against the Vaiśeṣika inferential apprehension theory. The objection is this. A theory of hearer's knowledge is not required only to explain how and what kind of knowledge does a hearer derive from a sentence. In other words, further phenomenon to be explained by a theory of sentential understanding is the action of a hearer. A sentence does not only augment the stock of information of the hearer but also leads him to perform some appropriate action. So just as there is what may be called hearer's knowledge so also there is what may be called hearer's action. And a theory of sentential understanding is required to account for such action also. To take an example, on being told that there is a piece of silver (ornament) lying unclaimed in the auditorium just vacated, the hearer—perhaps the owner of that silver—returns to the auditorium and collects the silver. This act of collecting the piece of silver takes place when the hearer is told about the presence of the silver there. This shows that the act in question is a hearer's act. It is a conscious act. The knowledge which determines such act comes within the purview of a theory of sentential understanding. To put it otherwise, an adequate theory of sentential understanding should be able to credit the hearer with the sort of knowledge which is necessary to explain

or account for his action. The point of final objection of Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{12}$ is that while the verbal apprehension theory of the Naiyāyika-s can, the inferential apprehension theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot explain hearer's action; it fails to explain if and how a hearer can have the belief which can be ascribed to him on the evidence of action he performs.

To understand where exactly the theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s fails, we should remember that, other conditions remaining the same, a man who acts on the basis of an information which is, unknown to him, false, acts differently than another man who acts on the basis of the knowledge that the said information is false. This is a truth of general theory of conscious action. No theory of hearer's action can violate or undo this truth. Further, even when the information on which a man acts is true, his action will be different from another person who instead of having that information has knowledge about that information. To put it otherwise, an action which can be produced by certain belief (or knowledge) cannot be produced by the knowledge of that belief. Thus the belief that can produce the action of a hearer *qua* hearer is his belief about R^*. But according to the inferential apprehension theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s what a hearer derives from the utterance of a speaker is the knowledge of the (speaker's) belief about R^*. The point of Gaṅgeśa's objection therefore is that while the Nyāya theory of hearer's knowledge credits the hearer with the (verbal) knowledge of R^* necessary for his action the Vaiśeṣika theory attributes to the hearer (inferential) knowledge of knowledge of R^* which is, to say the least, irrelevant for hearer's action.

The Vaiśeṣika-s may say that under this interpretation the objection is unfair. The inferential apprehension theory which ascribes to the hearer, in the first instance, the knowledge of knowledge of R^* also ascribes to him, in view of the principle P^1, the knowledge of R^*. The upholders of the *IA* theory contends, in other words, that whoever has knowledge about (speaker's) knowledge of R^*, also has the knowledge of R^*. But it does not follow that these two acts of knowledge are the same or that whoever acts on the second of the two cognitions acts on the first one also. So a Vaiśeṣika may say consistently with all that he has said already, that every hearer who unerstands a sentence has also

the knowledge of R^* and that he can and he does act on it. This shows that there is so far nothing in the second objection such that it affects only the Vaiśeṣika position or that the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot or cannot equally satisfactorily refute this objection. Our aim of discovering the rationale behind Gaṅgeśa's act of offering a second objection remains still unrealised.

If thus the second objection does not apply against the Vaiśeṣika position only, nei her does the first objection equally affect the position of the Naiyāyika-s. Indeed, the Naiyāyika-s admit such phenomenon as introspective awareness of a cognition i.e., belief about another belief. They also admit that one's belief about one's belief about a thing has that thing as its own object. But a person's introspective awareness (of a cognitive act) must necessarily be about his own past cognition. So one's knowledge of knowledge, known as *anuvyavasāya*, is necessarily one's knowledge about another knowledge of one's own. In other words the Naiyāyika-s distinguish between two kinds of knowledge of knowledge. A person's knowledge about some past act of knowledge[5] of his own, the first of the two kinds, is regarded as perceptual in nature and is called *anuvyavasāya* (no matter whether the introspected cognition itself is another perception or inference or the like). The Naiyāyika-s also admit that a person may know the knowledge of some other mind . This type of knowledge of knowledge is necessarily inferential.[6] Now inferential knowledge about someone else's knowledge of x is not a knowledge of x quite in the same sense in which the perceptual knowledege of one's own knowledge of x is about x itself. In the second case there is some straightway perceptual contact with x itself. But where we infer some one else's knowledge of x there is no inferential relation between the logical ground and this x. So one who infers some one else's knowledge of x cannot be said to know x except in the sense that x is 'the object of the knowledge of such and such a person—the knowledge which is being inferred'. In case of an introspective awareness about one's own awareness of x one may be said to know x as x also, in so far as contact is established between it and the respective sense organ. The principle P^1 may be accepted if it is meant to hold only in case of one's intorspective awareness of one's own past act of awareness. So

what was said against the Naiyāyika-s from the side of the Vaiśeṣika-s that the Naiyāyika-s are exposed to all the charges to which the Vaiśeṣika-s are exposed on account of subscribing to P^1 is not quite true. The Naiyāyika-s accept P^1 but do not maintain, strictly speaking, that when we infer someone else's knowledge about an *x* we have knowledge of *x*. So far therefore the first objection cannot be brought against the Nyāya position as well, for the knowledge of knowledge of R^* in question is the knowledge of or about some one else's knowledge of R^*. And knowledge about some one else's knowledge of *x* is not, according to the Naiyāyika-s, really a knowledge of *x* in the required sense of the term. But if the Vaiśeṣika-s subscribed to P^1 in the restricted sense i.e., as holding only in case of the introspection of one's own past cognition then they could not show that the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields knowledge of R^*. Till this is shown the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot defend their reductive theory that when one understands a sentence one only infers the appropriate R^*.[7]

If thus the first objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ holds against the Vaiśeṣika-s and not against the Naiyāyika-s also, then we are back to the old problem. Why did Gaṅgeśa feel the need for recording a second objection ? Well, the first objection has some limitations ; it is not particularly relevant or sufficiently weighty. The objection as formulated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ applies to one who believes in omniscient and personal God. All who subscribe to the *IA* theory, however, do not or need not believe in God, let alone in omniscient God. Some Mīmāṃsaka-s are of the opinion that something like *IA* theory is the correct theory about sentential understanding if and where the sentences in question are secular sentences or human utterances. This shows that the first objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ does not hold against whoever subscribes to *IA* theory or whoever admits that a hearer's knowledge of R^* is obtained through his first inferring that the speaker knows the R^* and then appealing to the principle P^1. To put it otherwise, the objection in question is not so much against *IA* theory as against one's admitting both the *IA* theory and a personal and omniscient God. But the two theses viz. that there is an omniscient God and that a hearer comes to know an R^* through an inference of the sort Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, besides apppealing to principle P^1, are quite independent of each other.

Even those *IA* theorists who believe in a personal and omniscient God may not find the objection particularly relevant. They may argue that *IA* theory was offered to explain certain kind of human knowledge. The theory was offered after accepting what Gaṅgeśa said in $\acute{S}_2$. There he admitted words or language as a source of knowledge which means, in standard Indian Philosophical theories, special *cause* of knowledge. Thus every source of knowledge is a source of occurrent and episodic knowledge. But knowledge which God has, according to the Naiyāyika-s and Vaiśeṣika-s, is not occurrent. God is said to have knowledge of a thing not in the sense that he comes to know the thing through some process comparable with some known human process. Human knowledge and divine knowledge being so distinct it is not very relevant to bring in the question of divine knowledge even for the purpose of raising an objection where the context of discussion is some kind of human knowledge. Besides an objection in terms of divine knowledge is likely to prove to have very little weight. For the Vaiśeṣika-s might say that God does not need to depend on the principle P^1 in order to know a certain thing. Because he has direct access to everything. But a (human) hearer does not have any direct access to R^*. So a (human) hearer's knowledge is bound to be in the first instance a knowledge of (the speaker's) knowledge of R^*, a hearer has knowledge of R^* only in the broader sense of 'having' formulated in P^1. The same is not the case with God. A person, let us accept for the present, remains mistaken even after he has 'detected' the mistake in question, if he cannot know the relevant thing except as the object of the mistake being 'detected'. But while God knows a mistake for what it is, he can also know independently the object, as what something else was mistaken.

God cannot therefore be regarded as mistaken even if one subscribes to the principle P^1. So the objection against the *IA* theory, which involves the principle P^1, that it entails that God is also mistaken, is misplaced. All that follows is this. A human being who has detected a mistake is himself mistaken, paradoxically, for the very same reason. For he could not have detected the mistake without knowing for what it is. He could not have known, on the other hand, the mistake without apprehending the object of that

mistaken awareness. If thus he apprehends the object the apperehension of which (as object) he detects to be an error, then he himself cannot but be mistaken. For in this case there is not the saving condition that the man knows independently what the case really is. If thus the alleged objectionable consequence of the principle P[1] is manifest only in case of human beings and their beliefs, why did Gaṅgeśa bring reference to God and his knowledge? The answer is obvious. The argument from alleged objectionable consequence of P[1] would be a welcome objection if the person in question was a human subject. For such subjects can very well be aware of a mistake and mistaken at the same time. Suppose there is a tree with roots hanging against the wall of a deserted building, suppose the tree is hidden from our vision because it has grown on the roof of the first floor and on the other side of the wall. Now a man mistakes the hanging root for a snake when he suddenly sees it in the evening while passing that way. Suppose a second man has the belief that 'That man mistakes a rope for a snake'. This second man who mistakes the root for a rope is both aware of a mistake and is himself mistaken. Thus brought against human subjects the first objection could be held by the Vaiśeṣika-s to be welcome objection. But they could not say the same thing if the objection was brought against the divine subject. A divine subject cannot be held to be mistaken even when he apprehends, as he always does, since he is an omniscient being, another man's mistake. This may be an explanation why Gaṅgeśa reinforced in the second sentence of $\acute{S}_{12}$ the first objection stated in the first sentence of the same passage, with reference to God. But we need a little more clarification of the situation in order to be convinced that the objection, in the reinforced form, is unjustified or without weight no matter whether it is brought against human subjects or against God.

It is a problem how to interpret the expression *bhrāntijña*. Should we interpret it in the stronger and narower sense to mean one who *knows* a mistake for what it is or in the wider and weaker sense to signify one who is merely *aware* that some one (not necessarily a different man) has a certain belief which is in fact mistaken. Though the expression could be interpreted weakly as it occured in the first sentence of the passage of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

in question viz., $\acute{S}_{12}$ yet we interpreted it in the stronger sense. For it constitutes an objection to say that one is mistaken if one is taken to be *bhrāntijña* in the stronger sense of the term. Taken in this stronger sense a *bhrāntijña puruṣa* is not only a man who is aware of what is in fact an error but also who detects it to be an error.

It is a problem how to explain what detecting a mistake means. Can I detect a mistake if I do not have access to the relevant object except through that mistake? I cannot be said to have detected a mistake when I only apprehend another cognition which is, in fact, though unknown to me, an error.[8] In this case I am a *bhrāntijña* and still there is no reason to believe that I have detected the mistake. Thus the expression "*bhrāntijña*" is ambiguous. The term may refer to person who is just aware of another cognition which is, in fact, but unknown to him, an error; or it may also mean a person who is not only aware of an erroneous cognition but also knows that the cognition is an error. What is common between these two types of persons or *bhrāntijña*-s is that both are aware of another cognition which is in *fact* an error e.g., the belief "It is silver" where the thing that is there is really the shell of a nacre (*śukti*) rather than a piece of silver (*rajat*). The form of the relevant experience or belief of the *bhrāntijña* in both the senses of the term or in case of both the types of person is either "I have the belief 'this is a piece of silver' (*rajatajñānavān aham*) or "He has a belief about silver" (*ayam rajatajñānavān*).[9] One who is a *bhrāntijña* in the sense of being a person who has detected the mistake in question, has awareness of the form 'p has the belief 'that it is *a*' in respect of (what is actually) a *b*'. Thus the awareness 'He has the belief that it is a piece of silver in respect of (what is actually) a shell' (*śuktau rajatajñanavān ayam*) is an example of detection of an error.[10]

What makes God a *bhrāntijña* in the sense of having detected a mistake for what it is, is this. God's awareness of a mistake is always[11] of (or comparable with) the form 'He has the belief that it is a piece of silver in respect of what is actually a shell'. Further, as we shall see, God is not only infallible in ascertaining the actual thing to be a shell, he has direct and independent access to this thing (shell). Anyway, to hold one who is a *bhrāntijña* or

error-knowing, in this sense, to be *bhrānta* or mistaken is to contradict oneself or commit a mistake of far reaching consequences. But who is *bhrāntijña* in the other and weaker sense can very well be mistaken. There is nothing paradoxical in saying about such a subject that he is both *bhrānta* (mistaken) and *bhrāntijña* (error-conscious).[12] In a given case one can be *bhrāntijña* in the stricter sense if one (i) has a belief of the form 'p has the belief 'that it is *a*' in respect of *b*', (ii) has independent means of knowing *b* correctly and (iii) knows *b*.[13]

Now so far as the Vaiśeṣika reductive theory is concerned a human subject who hears and understands a sentence S_1 does not have direct access[14] to R^*_1. So he cannot have awareness of the from 'p has the belief 'that it is R^*_2' about R^*_1' if p is a person other than he himself. But suppose it happens within our knowledge that a speaker p_1 utters these two sentences in uninterrupted succession: 'This horse is Tom's' and 'Servants die out of hunger'. Now a hearer h_1 misses some portion of the first one of these two utterances and believes that P_1 has uttered the sentence 'Tom's servents die out of hunger'. The hearer therefore has the belief, and he tells us to that effect, that R^*_2 obtains between persons signified by the expression "Tom's servants" and the thing signified by the expression " die out of hunger". But this belief that R^*_2 obtains in this case between Tom's servants and death out of hunger, is a mistaken belief and we know that h_1 has this mistaken belief. In other words we know that what p_1 has asserted is, according to h_1, that here there obtains R^*_2, though really it is R^*_1. In this case we have independent and direct way of knowing R^*_1. Here the means happens to be the language or the utterance of the speaker p_1 which we ourselves heard. We can learn directly from what the speaker says and need not have to know it *via* the inference of what belief h_1 has or the report of h_1 as to what he had heard and understood. In other cases a hearer may have the belief, obtained wrongly from certain utterance, that is, on *IA* theory, through inferring the belief of the speaker, that Dick is Tom's brother. In other words, the hearer believes that there obtains R^*_2 or the relation of being (no other than) the brother of between Dick and Tom in this order. But suppose on independent evidence we know that a different relation R^*_1, that of being uncle of, is

what really obtains between Dick and Tom, in this order. So far as a Naiyāyika is concerned we can independently and non-inferentially, that is, through linguistic means, know R^*_1 to be obtaining. We can also know through inference that another person, the hearer h_1, the mistaken hearer, has the (inferential) belief that there obtains R^*_2. Now we can be said to have the knowledge of the form 'h_1 has the belief that it is R^*_2 in respect of R^*_1'. But on the Vaiśeṣika theory one has no independent source of knowing nearly at the same time R^*_1 and also R^*_2 the object of the belief which h_1 has. How then can one qualify on the Vaiśeṣika theory for the title *bhrāntijña* where the mistake in question is an erroneous belief of a hearer? If it is said that two persons can derive respectively, by applying Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, the information that the speaker has the belief about R^*_1 and that he has a belief about R^*_2 then the theory would be proved to be inconsistent; though in that case one could both infer that what obtains is R^*_1 and that h_1 believes that what obtains is R^*_2.[15]

Thus a *bhrāntijña* or one who is conscious or aware of a belief which is in fact a mistaken belief either has or does not have independent access to what really is the case. In the former case the *bhrāntijña* cannot be said to be himself mistaken in so far as he apprehends both what is and what is not the case. He apprehends what is the case directly and apprehends what is not the case, only in the sense formulated in P^1, when he apprehends a belief which is mistaken and which he perhaps knows to be so. But if the *bhrāntijña* does not or cannot independently know what really is there when he apprehends a mistaken belief then he can be said to be both *bhrāntijña* and *bhrānta* without paradox. He is conscious of a belief what is in fact a mistake, so he is *bhrāntijña*. But since he does not know what exactly is there over and above being aware of what the mistaken belief in quesiton apprehends, he is himself *bhrānta* or mistaken. So whether the expression *bhrāntijña* means one who knows a mistake for what it is, e.g., God or it means one who simply apprehends another belief which is in fact a mistake, the *IA* theory is free from the objection it was supposed to be exposed to on account of its involving appeal to the principle P^1. Gaṅgeśa could perhaps anticipate that one might argue in the way sketched above to show that the first objection against the

Vaiśeṣika-s stated in the first sentence of $\acute{S}_{12}$ and reinforced in the second sentence of the same passage is really ineffective. This is perhaps the reason why he preferred to record a second objection against the Vaiśeṣika position in the third or the concluding sentence of the passage in question.

The second objection is free from both the defects which rendered the first objection irrelevant and ineffective. This objection does not involve any essential reference to the divine subject who does not, however, have to derive information about R^* through using inference of the sort Vaiśeṣika Inference-I and the principle P^1. Again unlike the first one this second objection has actually the force of an objection when it is brought against human subjects. It can be said of a human subject without paradox that he is both *bhrānta* (mistaken) and *bhrāntijña* (error-conscious). But it cannot be said that one who is mistaken and one who is conscious of the mistake—that is *bhrāntijña* in either of the two senses— act in the same way. To take an example, a man observes from his fifth floor flat overlooking the main road that a pedestrian, with an umbrella in hand, is walking down the road hurriedly indicating also that he believes that it will soon begin to rain. Suppose also that this belief is false. Now it makes little difference whether the observer in our example believes that the pedestrian's belief is false or true. Whether he is a *bhrāntijña* in the stricter or narrower sense will have little effect on his conduct at the moment. In any case, he will not surely act in the way the pedestrian acts. The same is true about a fellow pedestrian who knows the mistake of his fellow. But so far as the pedestrian's conduct is determined by the belief he has, the observer should act in the same way since (other conditions are assumad to have been fulfilled), according to the principle P^1 appealed to by the Vaiśeṣika-s, he too has the same belief or, belief to the same effect: It will soon begin to rain. The observing fellow does not, however, act in the way the mistaken fellow pedestrian does. So far therefore he cannot be said to have the same belief. Even if the principle P^1 were in some sense true, even if a person who had the belief 'that some one (not necessarily distinct from himself) believes a, to be there or p to be the case, did in a sense have a belief about a, the person still could not be said to have a belief about a exactly in the same sense in which

some one else in question has this belief. Otherwise while acting on the same belief or piece of information both would behave in the same way (assuning that all the other neccssary conditions obtain and obtain equally in both the cases).

Gaṅgeśa states this point in the concluding sentence of $\acute{S}_{12}$ thus. If the principle P^1 is adhered to (blindly) then there would be the objection that he who acts on a piece of information which is, unknown to him, false, namely, 'This is a piece of silver' and he who acts on the belief 'that the other man's belief 'that it is a piece of silver' is in respect of what is (actually) a shell', would behave in the same way. The fact that they do not behave in the same way, that their actions are different, shows that they do not have the same belief or belief about the same object. This in its turn proves that P^1 is false.

Could Gaṅgeśa say as much? Could he say without qualification that P^1 is false? Would he not say that introspective awareness of one's own past cognitive state is also an awareness of the object of that cognitive state? How could he, otherwise distinguish one such introspection from another? If on the other hand he admits introspection[16] of cognitive states and admits it to have for its object the object of the cognition being introspected, then a Naiyāyika himself would have to face both the objections which he brings against the Vaiśeṣika-s to refute their reductive *IA* theory of sentential understanding or linguistic knowledge. Apparently this is no defence, worth the name, of the Vaiśeṣika position. For that (the same) certain defects vitiate the Nyāya position does not show that the Vaiśeṣika position is free from those defects. But the point of the defence is to stall the Nyāya criticism by suggesting that a Vaiśeṣika will answer the objections in question in the same way in which the Naiyāyika-s find it convenient to answer them. Gaṅgeśa has studied this problem in another part of his book. A critical exposition of the Nyāya position in this matter is beyond our scope here. But we may simply mention the following three salient points. One who introspects or infers a false belief cannot be said to act in the same way in which the owner of the belief in question acts. As is clear from the example of initial acts of a child (*ādi pravṛtti*), one acts on the belief one has; one does not need a belief of belief to act on. Secondly, an

introspection may be false as well as true.[17] But so long or in so far as the introspective awareness is false, that is till the erroneous belief has been detected to be what it is, there is no *bhrāntijña* in the strict sense, no detection of error. So far the objection of identifying error with the detection of error does not arise. But if and when, after the correcting belief occurs, the error has been detected for what it is, there does no longer remain an error so that it can be objected that an error is identified with the experience that follows the detection of it.[18]

II

The next few passages, $Ś_{13}$ through $Ś_{15}$, present some textual difficulty.[19] In the preceding passage objections against the Vaiśeśika reductionism have been stated and explained. It is natural to expect reply from the side of the Vaiśeṣika-s in the passage $Ś_{13}$. But it will make a better interpretation of the text if we take Gaṅgeśa to have formulated this reply in $Ś_{15}$ after he further clarifies, in $Ś_{13}$ and $Ś_{14}$, the nature of the objections stated in $Ś_{12}$. This clarification is preparatory to the final reply given in $Ś_{15}$; and it takes the form of a tentative reply of the Vaiśeṣika-s (in $Ś_{13}$ to the objection raised in $Ś_{12}$) followed by a new account of falsity (given in $Ś_{14}$). This new account brings out the tentative nature of the Vaiśeṣika reply to the objection as given in $Ś_{13}$. Even if we accept this line of interpretation generally, there remains some uncertainty as to the interpretation of $Ś_{14}$. But let us first reproduce the passages in question.

[$Ś_{13}$]

Yattu bhramaviṣayaviṣayakatvena na bhramatvam; bhramaviṣayāṇām siddhyasiddhiparāhatatvāt iti.

[p.42]

As regards [the view, however,] that a cognition cannot be said to become false on the ground that it takes for its object, the object of some false belief; since [an attempt to say this] will be [equally] defeated if either the object of the false belief (is or is not or) is known or is not known.

[$\acute{S}_{14}$]

Tatra vakṣyāma, maivam. Asat-viṣayakatvena na bhramatvam, bhramaviṣayāṇām sattvāt. Kintu vayadhikaraṇaprakārakatvena.

[pp. 43-44]

As to that, we would say, no [this reply is irrelevant]. For [We, the objectors, maintain] falsity [of a false cognition] does not consist in the non-existent [or fictitious] character of (its object), since objects of false cognitions do exist; but [it consists] in its [the cognition] having as epistemic predicate one that is true of something else [i.e., something other than what figures as subject of it (the cognition)].

[$\acute{S}_{15}$]

Na ca bhramasya jñāne vyadhikaraṇam prakāraḥ, rajatatvaprakārakatvasya bhrame'pi sattvāt. Anyathā bhrāntyucchedaḥ pramāṇābhāvāt.

[pp.44-45]

But it cannot be said that what figures as epistemic predicate in the belief about [what is] a false belief is true of some other subject, for even the false belief [being apprehended] has silverness as its epistemic predicate. Otherwise there would be no such thing as error, for there would be no evidence for it.

In $\acute{S}_{12}$ it was objected that the Vaiśeṣika reductionism in question, the way they expounded it so far turns the awareness of an error (*bhramaviṣayakajñānam*) itself into an erroneous cognition. To give an effective reply to such objection the Vaiśeṣika-s must show that their reductionism does not entail such a position; it does not have any such consequence. But to show this one must first clarify what is that character of a false belief which constitutes the falsity of the latter. It may be, and it is, that the philosophers disagree as to what exactly constitutes the falsity of an erroneous cognition. Till the opponent clarifies in which sense of falsity the Vaiśeṣika

reductionism is believed by him to turn the awareness of an error itself into an error, his objection can not possibly be answered. Nor can it be proved either. For it may just as well he the case that the Vaiśeṣika-s are operating with a different notion of error—different from the notion their opponents, say, the Naiyāyika-s have. Once the sense of error is clarified, the objection in question may be found not to arise. The objection stated in $Ś_{12}$ is that the Vaiśeṣika reductionism tends to turn one who is aware of a mistake into one who is himself mistaken on that very account. The reply from the Vaiśeṣika side, as has been envisaged by Gaṅgeśa in $Ś_{13}$ is that if by error or mistake the objector meant a belief about some utterly non-existent and fictitious thing then the objection does not hold. For that sense of error stands refuted in any case. If the passage $Ś_{13}$ is thus construed as Vaiśeṣika reply to the objection stated in $Ś_{12}$, then the next passage may be taken to belong to the objector where he restates his objection in such a way that the Vaiśeṣika reply just noted loses its relevance. In $Ś_{12}$ the objector did not clearly say why he thought that an awareness of an error is itself an error. He indeed said that an awareness of an error is on that very account an error. But this did not clarify the position much. What can really clarify the situation is, it seems, the clarification of the notion of error crucially involved here. In the passage $Ś_{13}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s, supply a sense of error which the opponent might have had while formulating their objection in $Ś_{12}$. It is not unreasonable to impute this notion of falsity to the objector who thought that the consequence of subscribing to P^1 is obliteration of the distinction (in respect of their cognitive value) between a false belief and the knowledge of it. For who thinks this, holds that a belief about another belief has for its object the object of this other belief such that in case this other belief is false the knowledge that apprehends this false belief itself will have to be declared false. But to think in this way suggests the view that knowledge of a false belief becomes false because it has for its object the object of the false belief— the object which makes the false belief false. In addition to attributing, by implication, this view of error to the objector the Vaiśeṣika-s refute their objection by arguing that this sense of error, on which the objection in question is based, is untenable.

There are different ways in which the next passage, $\acute{S}_{14}$, may be understood. In the first place the objectors may be taken as bringing out clearly in this passage what they mean by error; this they did not clearly state, while stating their objection, in $\acute{S}_{12}$. This sense, however, is different from the sense which the Vaiśeṣika-s attributed to him in $\acute{S}_{13}$. But the Vaiśeṣika refutation (of the objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$) depended on the assumption that the objector brought the objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ because he had the sense of error which was attributed to him in $\acute{S}_{13}$. Now by stating in $\acute{S}_{14}$ a different sense of error as his own the objector has rendered the Vaiśeṣika refutation offered in $\acute{S}_{13}$ irrelevant. So in the next passage $\acute{S}_{15}$, the Vaiśeṣika-s are represented as refuting the objection again by taking it, this time, to be based on the view of error which the objector himself claims to be his own in $\acute{S}_{14}$. We may, however, view the passage $\acute{S}_{14}$ slightly differently without any significant difference in the final outcome of the discussion contained in $\acute{S}_{12}$ through $\acute{S}_{15}$. This time we may take the Vaiśeṣika-s themselves as attributing to the objector a second sense of error. If we construe it in this way then the trend of the argument in this section may be narrated thus. In the previous section we have discussed the passage $\acute{S}_{12}$ where the critic of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism had brought an objection against the principle P^1 without invoking which the Vaiśeṣika-s could not show that an inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is capable of yielding the knowledge of some specific R^*, but it is to account for this knowledge that the Naiyāyika-s admit language as a distinctive and special means. In $\acute{S}_{13}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s attribute to the objector a particular sense or theory of error, (E_1), which might have been the basis of the objection as stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$. The reason we think so is that the Vaiśeṣika-s then answered the objection by showing that that particular sense is untenable anyway. It follows by implication that since the Vaiśeṣika-s do not entertain such view of error and since their reductionism is not based on it, the objection in question does not affect the Vaiśeṣika position. Then in $\acute{S}_{14}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s themselves attribute to the objector a second sense of error, (E_2), which even they themselves do not call untenable. This they perhaps do in a bid to be fair to the objector or the critic, lest the critic say that it is unjust to attribute to him so untenable

a view as (E_1). The ultimate outcome is, however, the same. The Vaiśeṣika-s show in $\acute{S}_{15}$ that even if the objector had (E_2) sense of error in mind when he brought his objection in $\acute{S}_{12}$ the objection does not hold.

The sense of "is false" as it is in $\acute{S}_{13}$ is admittedly different from what it is in $\acute{S}_{14}$. Without prejudice to this, $\acute{S}_{13}$ itself may be interpreted differently. To appreciate this we should recount the trend of thought once again. The objector argued in $\acute{S}_{12}$ that the Inferential Apprehension Theory of sentential knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika-s turns the apprehension of an error (*bhramajñāna*) itself into an error. Now the Vaiśeṣika-s point out that the objector's argument was based on the unstated view (E_1) which contends that the falsity of a cognition has for its source the illusory (in the sense fictitious) character of the object of this cognition. For the objector could not argue that the cognition that apprehended another cognition apprehended the object of that other cognition and hence in case that other cognition was false the cognition of that cognition was false also, unless he believed that falsity of the false cognition was derived from the nature of its object. But what could be that nature of an object which turned a belief about it (the object) false? The objector may tell us in reply that it is the character of being *asat* or fictitious. The Vaiśeṣika-s are so far justified in attributing to the objector the view that the reason why a cognition becomes erroneous is that the object of it is *asat* or has the character or distinction of not being there. The awareness of such erroneous cognition then must be, if we adhere to the principle P^1, a cognition which has the objcet of the erroneous cognition (*bhramaviṣaya*) as its object, that is to say, has something *asat* as its object (*asat-viṣaya*). What is more to the point, the Vaiśeṣika-s attribute, and it seems so far justifiably,to the objector in question the view that awareness of an erroneous cognition is itself erroneous in sofar as it has for its object something *asat*; it is this *asat* which happened to be the object of the (erroneous) cognition (being apprehended now) and also the reason why the cognition which apprehends it is false.

We may interpret the passage $\acute{S}_{13}$ in two different ways. We may interpret this passage as belonging to the critic of the Vaiśeṣika-s or, more particularly, to the Naiyāyika-s. Having stated

his objection in the preceding passage the critic anticipates a particular way in which the Vaiśeṣika-s themselves or some one (else) on their behalf might try to answer that objection. By rejecting this anticipated answer in $\acute{S}_{15}$ the critic reinforces his objection and further consolidates his position against the Vaiśeṣika-s. The critic or the Naiyāyika in that case should be taken as arguing in this passage thus. The Vaiśeṣika-s (or, anybody on behalf of them) should not say in their defence that the objection brought against them (and stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$) is misconceived. A belief does not become erroneous (*na bhramatvam*) because it takes for its object, the object of the false belief being apprehended; for there is no such thing as object of false belief. The reason why a false belief cannot have an object is that it turns out equally untenable to say that a false belief has or it does not have an object. One who offers such defence believes as if the Naiyāyika-s trace the falsity of a cognition to the peculiar (or non-existent) 'character' of its object. As to that, that is , in refutation of this anticipated defence, the Naiyāyika-s say in $\acute{S}_{14}$, that they do not maintain that a belief or the cognition that apprehends it (and has, so far, for its object the object of this belief being apprehended) is false because the object of it is non-existent. For one thing, it may be untenable and self-stultifying, as has been stated in the anticipated defence in $\acute{S}_{13}$, to say that a (false) belief has for its object what is non-existent.

III

What enables us to interpret the passages $\acute{S}_{13}$ alternatively as the Vaiśeṣika reply to the Nyāya objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ and as Nyāya rejection of an anticipated defence that could be offered in favour of the Vaiśeṣika-s, (either by themselves or by some one else on their behalf) is that neither the Naiyāyika-s nor the Vaiśeṣika-s subscribe to a certain theory of error to which reference seems to have been made in $\acute{S}_{13}$ and more explicitly in $\acute{S}_{14}$. The theory in question is known as *asat khyāti vāda* or a theory which contends that the belief one has under conditions of error does not have any object. The same thing is also expressed by saying that what a false belief has for its object is fictitious, it is nonest. The historical

identity of who held such a view of error is somewhat doubtful; but there is no doubt that neither a Naiyāyika nor a Vaiśeṣika has such a view. They have a different account to offer for the falsity of a false belief. Reference has been made to this account in $\acute{S}_{14}$. Though it is somewhat natural to think that the Mādhyamika-s or the *Śunyavādin-s* among the Bauddha-s are believers in no-object theory of error (*asatkhyātivāda*) yet this has not been universally confirmed [20]. But if we contrast in respect of their familiar and fundamental differences the positions of the Mādhyamika-s and the Advaita Vedāntin-s then the Mādhyamika-s can be taken as no-object theorists contending that beliefs are called error in consideration of the fact that the objects of such beliefs are figments of the imagination, they have no real existence. In fact the universe as a whole is like this. If still there be any doubt regarding the correct way of characterising the Mādhyamika theory of error there are others including the philosophers of the Yoga school who support the no-object theory in some of its possible versions[21]. The Naiyāyika-s sometimes speak of belief about *asat*. But on such occasions they use the expression in a different sense[22]. According to the Naiyāyika-s we can even perceive the absence or non-existence of a thing, provided, however, they hasten to add, the thing admits of existence (in some other place or at some other time) and is real. We can perceive non-existence of such things only the existence of which can also be perceived if it were there and also if other conditions of perception obtained. Such *asat* (or contingently, conditionally, non-existing things) is to be distinguished from the *asat* of the no-object theorists which is simply nonest (*tuccha*). The thing which is *asat* in this absolute sense e.g., self contradicting things like square-circle, is not only what we cannot perceive, we cannot even know it by any other means such as inference or linguistic utterances.[23] Gaṅgeśa himself has elsewhere formulated the Nyāya theory of error and its distinctions form the no-object theory.[24] The Nyāya Theory of error or the minimum relevant part of it has been stated in $\acute{S}_{14}$. So far as $\acute{S}_{13}$ is concerned, according to the first line of interpretation, the Naiyāyika-s reinforce their objection against the Vaiśeṣika-s by refusing to accept a supposed defence by the Vaiśeṣika-s of their own position which would have been relevant

if the objector advocted the no-object theory of error. The Naiyāyika-s do not accept this theory as sound nor did they base their charge against the Vaiśeṣika-s, as stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$, on this theory. According to them believing falsely is a positive state. It cannot be reduced to not believing at all. On the other hand, there can be no act of belief which has no object to be about. It therefore follows that while the Naiyāyika-s hold (i) that even a false belief has some object of its own, (ii) that there is such a thing as one believing that one (or some other person) believes something and (iii) that this introspective awareness of (or belief about) a belief about something takes somehow that something as its own object; they also believe (iv) that awareness of a belief which is false is not (necessarily or on that account) itself a state of false or non-veridical awareness. So far therefore, their objection against the Vaiśeṣika-s stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$ remains unanswered. But they now face a new challenge. the Naiyāyika-s can assert (iv) particularly because they do not think that a false belief is false because of the nature of the object it has as a member of the class of false beliefs. Now if they do not accept this view or particularly the no-object view of error then they should offer their own view in the matter. This challenge is met in $\acute{S}_{14}$.

One point in $\acute{S}_{13}$ has not been adequately explained so far. We have contrasted with the no-object theory the positive view of the Naiyāyika-s more than we have explained the particular argument against the no-object theory which we find in $\acute{S}_{13}$. It is not very easy to explain the argument. It however proceeds in this way: a belief, even a false belief either has or does not have an object. If it has an object then to say it does not have one is to contradict oneself. If on the other hand it does not have any then, if this is not a mere dogmatic assumption but is actually the case, the no-object theory renders it impossible for any belief to be false. For the condition of its being false, namely having no object, is the very condition of its not being there. For there can be no belief, nor even a false belief, without an object.

We have so far interpreted the passage $\acute{S}_{13}$ as one where the Naiyāyika-s reinforced their objection, stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$, by rejecting an anticipated defence by the Vaiśeṣika-s. The passage can as well be interpreted as containing a reply given by or on behalf of the

Vaiśeṣika-s to the objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$. There will be no material difference in the final outcome so far as the controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s is concerned. Still interpreted in the first way sketched just above it is a Naiyāyika who in $\acute{S}_{13}$ rejects the no-object theory. If the passage is interpreted along the second line then the Vaiśeṣika-s are taken to reject the no-object theory implying thereby that they imputed such a view to the Naiyāyika-s in so far as the latter attacked the principle P^1 in the way they did in $\acute{S}_{12}$. The two major reasons why the passage in question can be interpreted alternatively as the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika rejection of the no-object theory is that philosophers of neither of these two schools subscribe to the no-object theory. Both the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s advocate the same theory of error known as *anyathākhyātivāda* the essence of which has been stated in $\acute{S}_{14}$, particularly in the last sentence of this passage. Secondly both the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s admit that there is such a state of cognition as introspective awareness of a state of belief (*anuvyavasāya*) no matter whether this belief is true or false. Gaṅgeśa was fully aware, as I said before, of the problem of reconciling admission of such introspective awareness with the necessity of rejecting the implication that if an introspective awareness apprehends a false belief then it is itself false. Gaṅgeśa has discussed elsewhere this problem thoroughly with reference to both ordinary man's awareness (whether or not introspective) of some false belief of his own or of some one else and the awareness of the omniscient being God of some one else's false belief. It would deepen our understanding of the passages $\acute{S}_{12}$-$\acute{S}_{15}$ if we could reproduce Gaṅgeśa's discussions in question and the solution he arrived at from the sections of *TC* on truth (*prāmāṇya-vādaprakaraṇam*), error (*anyathākhyātivādaprakaraṇam*), and definition of knowledge (*pramālakṣaṇa prakaraṇam*). We, however, do not have scope for that. We briefly present below our interpretation of $\acute{S}_{13}$ along the second line though, for reasons stated above, this will appear somewhat repetitious.

Anyway, in $\acute{S}_{13}$ Gaṅgeśa represents the Vaiśeṣika-s as attributing to the objector, whose argument has been stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$, the view that the cognition that apprehends an error becomes itself false because it takes for its object the object of the error. Further,

the Vaiśeṣika-s attribute to the objector the view that a cognition becomes erroenous if and in so far as its object is *asat*. That the Vaiśeṣika-s attribute such views to the objector is clear from the reply they offer to the objection brought earlier by the objector in the passage being explained. The objection in question has two parts: (a) that a cognition becomes false on account of *asat viṣaya* and (b) that knowledge of an error turns out, on the *IA* theory, to be an error because it has for its object, according to the principle P^1 the object of the false belief being known. The first part of the Vaiśeṣika reply formulated in $\acute{S}_{13}$ relates directly to (b). For it is stated in this part of the reply that (the alleged) falsity (of the error apprehending cognition) is not or cannot be (said to be there) due to its (the cognition) being of or about the object of the corresponding error. This can be offered as a reply only to one who used (b) to construct the objection in question. The reason why the Vaiśeṣika-s think that (a) cannot be held is given in the second part of the Vaiśeṣika reply stated in $\acute{S}_{13}$. The reason is that we simply cannot admit either that error has an object or that it has none. To maintain that error has no object will be inconsistent with the general belief, presumably entertained by the objector also, that error is a type of cognition whereas there can be no cognitive act which does not have an object. The view, on the other hand, that error has an object will be inconsistent with the belief that error is a cognitive act the object of which is *asat* i.e., non-existent.[25] There would hardly be any relevance in pointing out this last inconsistency in course of giving reply to an objector unless it was believed, rightly or wrongly , that the objector subscribed to (a) or held that the object of an erroneous belief is *asat*.

While stating his reply as formulated in $\acute{S}_{13}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s assume that the objector brought the objection given in $\acute{S}_{12}$ on the basis of the following two beliefs taken together. He believes that, in view of the way they defended their reductionism in $\acute{S}_{11}$, the Vaiśeṣika-s are committed to the view that error apprehending cognition—including perhaps a cognition that apprehends an erroneous cognition for what it is— has for its object the object of the error being cognised. He further believes that if a cognition is erroneous then the object of it is *asat* in the sense of being

acctually, if not intentionally, non-existent. On the basis of these two beliefs the objector seems to have argued that cognition that cognises an error has for its object the object of that error; it therefore has something *asat* as its object, for that is the object of the error being cognised. Thus cognition that has for its object the object of error, turns out for that very reason (*bhrama-viṣayaviṣayakatvena*) to be an error. In reply the Vaiśeṣika-s say that the error apprehending cognition cannot be said to become itself an error (*na bhramatvam*) for that reason (*bhramaviṣaya-viṣayakatvena*). The objector could say this only if he could say that error apprehending cognition had as object the object of error. But this he could say if he could admit that error had an object of its own. But an error cannot be said to have any object of its own. So far therefore the objector cannot say that error apprehending cognition has for its object the object of error and becomes, for that reason, itself an error.

The objector cannot, however, say that an error dose not have any object; for there can be no cognition without an object. On the other hand if he admits that there is an object of error how can he say that the object is *asat* or non-existent? But if the object is not non-existent then the cognition is not an error. Awareness of this cognition being not an awareness of an error cannot be said to have for its object the object of error being known. Thus the objection falls to the ground. This is the Vaiśeṣika reply as has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{13}$.

We shall not explain $\acute{S}_{14}$ separately under two different interpretations of it as we have done in the case of $\acute{S}_{13}$. Instead it will be indicated at the beginning in which respect the two possible interpretations are likely to vary. We may in the first place, take the Naiyāyika-s to answer in $\acute{S}_{14}$ the challenge to which they exposed themselves when they rejected in $\acute{S}_{13}$ the no-object theory of error—a theory which the anticipated defence in favour of the Vaiśeṣika-s attributes to the Naiyāyika-s. If the challenge is to be met then the Naiyáyika-s should be able to offer a better theory of error. Gaṅgeśa does just this, at least mainly, in $\acute{S}_{14}$. The Vaiśeṣika-s said in their defence in $\acute{S}_{13}$ that the objector cannot base their objection $\acute{S}_{12}$ on the no-object theory of error which is equally inconsistent with the admission or rejection of the thesis

that a false belief also has some object to cognise. Gaṅgeśa represents the objector as saying in reply, in $\acute{S}_{14}$, that the Vaiśeṣika-s should not have said all this. For he (the objector) himself admits that a belief does not become false because it apprehends an error or because it cognises something which is *asat*. On the contrary the objector holds that object of erroneous cognition is *sat*; that is to say objects of even false beliefs are existing things, they are not nonest.[26]. If now the Vaiśeṣika-s challenge the objector or the Naiyāyika and ask him to produce as his own theory of error, a theory which will be better, in the sense acceptable, than the theory which makes error consist in the non-existence of the object of the belief in question (and which will also justify the objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$) then that can be met in the following way. A false belief is one which has for its epistemic predicate what is true of some subject other than the subject of it (this false belief). If we are to interpret the passage in the second way then we should take the Vaiśeṣika-s to have rejected in $\acute{S}_{13}$ the objection which the Naiyāyika-s brought against them in $\acute{S}_{12}$. But in course of doing that the Vaiśeṣika-s imputed to the Naiyāyika-s the belief that a cognition becomes false just in case it has no object or 'has' only non-existing (or *asat*) object. Now in $\acute{S}_{14}$ the Naiyāyika-s say, in reply to the Vaiśeṣika criticism, stated by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{13}$, that the Vaiśeṣika-s should not impute to the Naiyāyika-s a belief in no-object theory. The Naiyāyika-s do not believe that the account of error which this theory provides is correct. The correct account is that a belief becomes false just in case what figures as epistemic predicate in it is true of a subject which is other than the subject of it. With this prefatory remark about the two lines of interpreting $\acute{S}_{14}$ we pass on to explain the passage somewhat generally.[27]

IV

It is to be remembered that the conclusion of the Vaiśeṣika reductive theory in question, that is the inferential apprehension theory of linguistic knowledge or sentential understanding of a hearer was stated in $\acute{S}_4$. In the next passage Gaṅgeśa formulated one of the two types of inference which yield, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s,

for the hearer the knowledge of R^*. This knowledge, is, as is supposed by the Naiyāyika-s, obtained and obtainable from language as a special means or distinct accredited source of knowledge. Then in $\acute{S}_{11}$ it was shown that the Vaiśeṣika-s could not account for the hearer's knowledge of R^* simply in terms of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. They need to invoke two other related principles. One is that whenever a belief is known the object of the belief is known in the same act as what determines the belief being apprehended to be the belief it is. The other principle P^1 is that belief of a belief is also about the object of the belief being apprehended. The critics objected against the Vaiśeṣika appeal to P^1. $\acute{S}_{12}$ shows the dangerous consequence of a principle like P^1. The Vaiśeṣika-s find behind their argument the unstated premiss or assumption that the apprehension of a false belief is itself false because it has as its object the object of the false belief. In the portion "a cognition cannot be......of some false belief" of the passage $\acute{S}_{13}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s show why the critic could not argue in the way they have been represented to do in $\acute{S}_{12}$, that is, from the premiss that a belief itself becomes false if it takes as its object the object of a false belief. They have shown in the portion of $\acute{S}_{13}$ indicated above that one cannot bring against the Vaiśeṣika-s the objection that they admitted a belief to be false if it apprehended the object of a false belief. One cannot bring this objection no matter whether one admits or does not admit that a false belief has some object. So far the Vaiśeṣika-s sought to answer the charge levelled against them in $\acute{S}_{12}$ by saying that the critics should not have brought that charge for they apparently depended on what cannot be said (*na*), namely that an apprehension of a false belief (*bhramaviṣayakajñānam*) takes the character of a false belief (*bhramatva*) because it apprehends the object of the false belief (*bhramaviṣayaviṣayakatvena*) being apprehended.

Now in the remaining portion of $\acute{S}_{13}$—"*Yattu*", transalated to read "As regards the view, however",—and in the first sentence of $\acute{S}_{14}$— "*Tatra vakṣayāma, maivam*"— translated to read "As to that we would say, no"— the critics of the Vaiśeṣika-s or the Naiyāyika-s announce their refusal to accept the reply the Vaiśeṣika-s offered in $\acute{S}_{13}$ to the charge levelled against them earlier in $\acute{S}_{12}$. In the remaining portion of $\acute{S}_{14}$ Gaṅgeśa states the

reason why the Naiyāyika-s refuse to accept the Vaiśeṣika reply in question which imputes to the Naiyāyika-s a questionable assumption as to what makes a belief false. In the last sentence of the passage $\acute{S}_{14}$ Gaṅgeśa states the account of falsity which the Naiyāyika-s claim to be their own. Further this account is also accepted by the Vaiśeṣika-s. For the other view of falsity, if accepted, would compel the Vaiśeṣika-s to accept as a truth of their system the follwing absurdity which constitutes the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Vaiśeṣika argument for reductionism and of reductionism itself. The absurdity is: a knowledge turns out to be an error if it happens to apprehend an error. The argument for reduction has three steps, of which the first two only are explicit. The steps or premisses are (i) a knowledge which apprehends another cognitive act has as its object the object of the act being apprehended, (ii) if a knowledge apprehends another cognitive act which happens to be erroneous, then it will have for its object the object of this error being apprehended, and (iii) a false belief is so because its object has no existence. Now (ii) follows from (i) by substitution or as a special case of the latter. And (iii) is a new premiss. The conclusion or the objection therefore is that a case of knowledge turns out to be a case of error if it happens to know a state or act of error. Since this conclusion is unacceptable this argument is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism in question. This conclusion is unacceptable because if it were true then detection of error would have no corrective value. To know a cognition to be false would not establish the cognition to be false. For that would be established if the knowledge that shows it to be false were really a case of knowledge. But this appears to be impossible if the argument in question is correct. And a Vaiśeṣika is bound to—and this seems to be the implication of the objector—accept this argument. For there is nothing wrong in the process of reasoning. The premiss (i) was found earlier in $\acute{S}_{11}$ to be vital for the argument for the Vaiśeṣika reductionism; (ii) follows from (i). Lastly (iii) is just a definition of error: error is a cognition the object of which has no existence. The only way left is, it seems, to reject this definition or view of error. It has been found, on independent ground, to be untenable. Whether they would offer the same argument for it or not both the Naiyāyika-s and the

Vaiśeṣika-s subscribe to an alternative view of error. This alternative view contends that (iiia) an error is a cognition epistemic predicate of which is not 'satisfied' by (the thing (things) which figures as) its epistemic subject.[28]

Alternatively, an error is a cognition the property corresponding to the epistemic predicate (*prakāra*) of which does not (as a matter of fact) characterise (though it is *thought* to do so) the thing or things which correspond to the epistemic subject in question.

When one falsely believes that there is a snake (that is, when one has a belief of the form 'This is a snake'), though there is really a rope, one *thinks* that the character of being a snake characterises the thing represented in the belief as the 'this'. In fact or in reality however, the property 'snakeness' does not and cannot, chracteriese the 'this' which happens to be a rope. The property of being a snake *does not belong* to the thing being apprehended, it rather belongs to something else, snake, which is not being apprehended by the cognition in question.[29] In both the senses of 'not belonging to the thing under refernce (*tadavṛttitva*)' and 'belonging to a thing other than the thing under reference (*tadanyavṛttitva*)', the word "*vyadhikaraṇa*" is used in the text. Now replacement of (iii) in the above argument by (iiia) will vindicate the Vaiśeṣika position where as the argument with (iii) failed to do so, provided knowledge of an error is *bhramaviṣayaviṣayaka* but not *bhramaprakāraprakārka*. And that it is not will be argued in $\acute{S}_{15}$ whicn formulates the final defence of the Vaiśeṣika position.[30]

According to this second view or theory of error stated in $\acute{S}_{14}$ an awareness becomes false if it has a judgemental or subject—predicate form and if further the property (*viśeṣaṇa*) represented in the awareness as or by the epistemic predicate (*prakāra*) is a *vyadhikaraṇa* one. An epistemic predicate is said to be *vyadhikaraṇa* (*prakāra*) if and only if the property it represents either does not characterise (*avṛttvi*) the thing or things (*dharmi*) which -correspond to the epistemic subject (*viśeṣya*) or (it) characterises only some other thing— that is, some thing other than the thing or things represented as (referred to by) the epistemic (linguistic) subject.

These are subtle matters and require careful formulation. On the basis of the analysis of error given in $\acute{S}_{14}$, final defence has been given in $\acute{S}_{15}$ of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism against the objection that such reductionism tends to make knowledge of false belief itself false. We have translated and explained Gaṅgeśa's words. But our explanation remained in two respects. We have allowed linguistic mode of speech to get mixed up with epistemic and ontological modes of speech. Once the substance or the content of the theory is clearly grasped such looseness or carelessness does not pose any serious problem. Our presentation or explanation so far of the second view of error cannot be said to be sufficiently thorough or clear. For this and other reasons, we need to explain the background realism which determines this second conception of error. We now propose to remove these definiencies. But in consideration of space we shall be very brief.

It is a salient feature of comprehensive realism that according to it there obtains harmony among all the three spheres of being, thinking and speaking or world, thought and speech. The nature of this harmony, or how thorough it is, is a question of detail in respect of which realists may differ among themselves. To cite an example, one brand of realism might contend that there does obtain correspondence only between a sentence uttered by a human being on the one hand and some facts of the world on the other. Some other form of realism may be there according to which even parts of (true) sentences find their counterparts in the world of facts. Again some realists may hold that the correspondence between any two spheres is a matter of necessity while other realists may hold that the harmony obtains contingently. Such questions of detail apart, general belief in the broad harmony among these spheres suggests or ensures some common methodology. All these sphers can and perhaps should be studied from the same pluralistic-analytic approach. Thought, at least, some form of it, is analysable; so is the world and the languages in it. The universe has not been conceived of by our realists as the essentially unanalysable unity of an indivisible being. Most of the individual items of the universe or multiplicity of beings are also not centres of unstructured identity. Even the ultimate stuff of the material creation and items of reality which are not substances enter into

relation with other things and form a structure. In this broad sense the universe as a whole or any item of reality comprised within it can in principle be understood in terms of unity of some structure. Such unity does not rule out plurality or analysability in ontology. Not only in the sphere of ontology but also in the sphere of thought and language our realists proceed with certain basic elements (and always there are many of them) which are not abstractions or mere methodological tools. Though does not ensure yet it makes plausible, if not structural isomorphism, at least less than perfect agreement in respect of structure between any two spheres. That there obtains or would obtain harmony or correspondence or a sort of mirroring relation between these spheres even in some very broad and vague sense, must be a matter of pre-established harmony or accidental coincedence which tends to turn an article of mere faith into an objective, though contingent, truth. Therefore, if realism did not mean anything more than this then it would at most be an empirically descriptive or non-empirical theory having no explanatory value, whereas a philosophical theory must be both descriptive and explanatory. The Indian realists not only take each sphere as a 'formal' structure of interrelated parts but also as a causal structure. Every item in any of these spheres is related with at least one other item of the same or different sphere, either as a cause or as an effect. Each sphere is a huge causal nexus in itself. Synthetic necessity of correspondence between any two spheres does not follow from the mere fact that, or so long as, each sphere is a causal structure in itself or independent of the other spheres. But the ontological principle of causality as our realists conceive it, operates not only within a given sphere but across these spheres. This principle therefore helps to combine into the vast complex unity of a universe all the three spheres of fact, language and experience. In other words, every item of ontology is brought under each of the three concepts of being (sat), the concept of being knowable (*jñeya*) and being speakable (*abhidheya*). Knowability and speakability are two among the *kevalānvayidharma*-s or universal properties or predicates. Though strictly speaking knowability or speakability does not mean being cause or effect of experience or of speech unless we generalise the concept of an effect yet most of the knowable things are causes of some

experience about them including those which causally determine their being object of speech. In short each of the worlds of experience and speech is a unity which includes the other and is included in the other; they are extensionally the same class. This helps us to see further how closely these spheres are related as well as how the Indian realists conceive of the close relation between the spheres of speech and knowledge or of thought and language. Though everything is a member of each of the two classes of knowable things and speakable things, though knowability and speakability are both universal properties or predicates, yet no comparable universal property of being is admitted. This may suggest, contrary to expectation, that the Indian realists do not accept the allegedly unexceptionable ontological truth, the monosyllabic and affirmative answer to the basic ontological question 'What is there ?'. Surely they cannot utter the contradiction that 'something is not'. But this only shows the banality of the corresponding assertion that "Everything is", or "Whatever is, is". Whatever may be the logical or technical difficulty with this form of experience or speech, our realists are committed to grant reality to everything. They are univocalists so far as expressions like "exists" or "being" is concerned. And this creates the difficulty also. They cannot admit something in one sense to deny it, without contradiction, in another sense. Besides, the banality of the assertion of existence can be avoided by admitting existence in the restricted sense in which things are said to *be* in *ontology*. The sense of 'being' which defines the range of ontological study is 'having (in the standard natural relation) the feature of *sattā*'. In this restricted sense everything cannot be said to *be*. And no contradiction arises if existence is denied in this restricted sense to something. Only in a non-technical sense of the term, it appears to every one, including ordinary men, that it cannot be denied that everything is, that to deny it is to utter a contradiction out of mouth. But that sense is not the sense of 'having *sattā*'. The reason why it is a contradiction to say about any given thing that it is not, is that in the very act of 'knowing' or 'saying' that something is not, we know it and speak about it. But this means what has already been admitted namely that knowability and speakability are universal properties or predicates. Our realists do not only admit

the truth that "Everything is" in the only acceptable sense of it, viz. "Everything is knowable" and "Everything can be spoken about", they also find justification for these truths in the essential agreement and unity of the spheres of thought and speech.

Curiosity still lingers. Is not there a truth of the sphere of being or ontology comparable with the two truths respectively of the spheres of thought and language—that everything is knowable (*sarvam prameyam*) and that everything can be spoken about, (*sarvam vācyam*)? The answer is indeed in the affirmative. But to avoid banality our realists do not formulate it in one single very general and trite formula like 'everything is'. Instead they capture the relevant insight in the form of two principles; these belong to the set of beliefs which form the very basis of realism. The principles are the principle of evidence and the principle of independence. While adherence to the principle of evidence marks out realism as a philosophical theory distinct from forms of mysticism, doctrine of faith, and so on; adherence to the second principle of independence distinguishes Indian realism from forms of epistemological idealism, spiritualism based on it, solipsism and so on. The principle of evidence is enshrined in the doctrine "*samvit eva hi bhagavatī vastusādhane naḥ śaraṇam*". This dictum amounts to the assertion: For anything x, x is, entails there is knowledge of x'. So we cannot say that something is, unless we have knowledge of it. Our assertions of existence should be backed by evidence and the only evidence admissible in the system of our realist is knowledge of the appropriate form. What is, is not there by our preference, faith and the like; but solely on the evidence of, and as revealed by, the right sort of knowledge.

Are we not dangerously close to idealism? It is a small step from 'something is or is admitted to be because knowledge reveals it' to '"to be" means 'to be known'; to say that "x is" is to say that "x is an object of knowledge"'. This collapse into epistemological and/or subjective idealism and solipsism is prevented by an adherence to the principle of independence. To serve the cause of realism the principle of independence should work in one direction only. The world must be held to be independent of our knowing it. But it should not be held or held also that our experience is not determined by or is independent

of the world as it is in itself. For if experience were as much independent of the world, as the world of experience, then there might not be any contact between the two spheres and we might not even have evidence for admitting anyting at all. Secondly, if experience enjoyed independence and world were dependent on experience there would be idealism and solipsism. Thus the realist principle of independence is actually a set of two or three principles. These are the following (i) *Vastutantram jñānam*; knowledge is objectively conditioned or determined. (iia) *Sarvam jñānam saviṣayakam*; every cognitive experience must have an object, there cannot be any such experience which lacks an object and (iib) *Jañānam nirākaram*, knowledge is diaphanous; the object of knowledge is external to or outside the knowledge itself.

It follows from the two principles of evidence and independence that nothing can be said to *be* unless we have knowledge of it. But nothing is known unless it is already there. In the order of existence or in the realm of being and causality, existence has precedence over experience but in the realm of experience, in the order of logic and evidence, experience has priority over existence. Thus our realists do not say, because nobody can do so without committing oneself to senseless truism, "everything is," in this form, but they do not deny the truth. Everything about which we can ask whether it is or is not, everything to the question and doubt regarding which we can attach sense, *is.* For since it is being talked about, it is already known at least to some extent. And a thing must exist independently if it is to be known. We can not have experience about utterly fictitious or mythical things. In other words no experience can be generated by fictitious and mythical discourse, where there is no object to be apprehended. To admit otherwise is to violate the second principle. An experience is and is what it is because there is an object and the experience apprehends it.

The broad spheres of it being as they have just been described, both causal and structural-analytical account of the universe is more than possible, it is almost inevitable. Further the causal relationship itself obtains mainly between structured events. Be that as it may, the structural analyses which the realists bring to bear upon thought, language and reality are closely comparable. The basic structure

of fact is that of a determinate structured thing such as a propertied particular. There is a property (*dharma*) and a substratum (*dharmin*) forming a complex analysable and relational unity. The basic structure in the sphere of language is that of a simple sentence analysable into a subject term or nominative term (*viśeṣya pada*), a predicate term, usually a verb or an adjective (*kriyapada or viśeṣaṇapada*) and their relation (*saṃsarga*). The basic structure in the realm of thought or experience is exemplified by a simple act of perceptual judgment. In it there are an epistemic subject (*viśeṣya*), an epistemic predicate (*prakāra*) and the relation (*saṃsarga*) between them. This last item does not make explicit apprearance. Now the broad, description of the relation, common to all the three spheres, is, roughly, 'determining and getting determined by (*paraspara nirūpya-nirūpakabhāva-sambandha*)'. A substratum is only so in relation to some superstratum and *vice versa*. Similarly in the other two spheres. To give just one example, suppose the propertied thing in question is a table; it is a determinate thing and has the structure of a substratum (this) having the property tablehood. In other words the structure is that of a thing-property (or *dharma-dharmi*). The simplest perception of it has the form "This is a table" where the 'This' is the epistemic subject or *viśeṣya* which stands for the thing (*dharmin*). The rest of the perceptual judgment is the epistemic predicate (*prakāra*). It is the epistemic counterpart of the ontologcal property (*dharma*), here, of being a table or tablehood. The character of the thing i.e., its being a superstratum is determined by the substratum character of the that (this) of it. Thus its being (the 'this') and what being it is (the what) are somehow related. The minimum form of the linguistic expression that one must use to talk about this table is the unit of descriptive discourse, a simple indicative sentence like "This is a table". The linguistic subject (*uddeśya or viśeṣya pada*) or the subject-word, "This" is the linguistic counterpart of the epistemic subject (*viśeṣya*). While the corresponding parts of any of these basic structures of fact, experience, and language stand to each other in mutual determination, one simple structure (or its parts) stands (or stand) to (those of) another such structure in the relation of correspondence or representation. Accurate linguistic representation of a piece of cognition, an *abhilāpavākya*,

represents the structure of thė corresponding fact. Such *abhilāpa* demands that the cognition which is to be given linguistic representation must have a definite structure. The demand on structure is indeed very great in the case of linguistic knowledge. We have nothing to go by except the utterance of the speaker and it is thė form of the speech which uniquely dertermines the form of the linguistic knowledge of the hearer, which results. Wherever we have different forms of expression, we have different linguistic knowledge. Thus "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Caesar was killed by Brutus" are sentences of two different forms. Either both are not equally basic or they express and yield different experiences, however little that difference may be. This is one very respectable view which is held not infrequently. Even if it is found that in spite of their difference in superficial structure they have identically the same profound structure, then this the sentences by themselves do not say. In such cases, our realists bank more on how he feels rather than how he speaks; and recognises the need for correcting or interpreting a superficial linguistic expression differently in the light of his experience or intuition. This gives them an occasion or excuse for distinguishing between the linguistic predicate as it is and as it is to be interpreted with reference to the dictates of the subject's experience.

This shows that agreement or harmony between the spheres is not perfect; there are occasional lapses and deviations. There is no question of following the lead of language blindly. Sometimes it may display more structure than is there in the corresponding experience, sometimes it may suppress some structure and make us believe an item of experience to be more simple than it is. But for all that we need not accept our experience in its face value and follow its guidance. If there is need for careful analysis and interpretation in the sphere of language there is need for analysis and examination in the sphere of experience. If there are occasional deviations from truth in our linguistic representation of experience, there are occasional deviations from fact in our psycho-logical-cognitive representation. In other words, some at least of the Indian realists admit the possibility, or even the facthood of error or false belief. The belief in contingent, empirical or synthetic nature of the agreement between the structures of fact, experience

and language distinguishes realism, or the version given to it by the Naiyāyika-s and Vaiśeṣika-s of India, from skepticism on the one hand and *a priorism*, infallibilism, absolutism, rationalism or whatever we call it, on the other.

For reasons already explained, error cannot be an experience without object. The realists do not seriously entertain the possibility of explaining error by admitting an altogether distinct type of object. There is indeed one oddity in operating with double worlds and double senses. No elegant logic or epistemology could be possible unless falsity and truth belonged to otherwise the same type of thing. Anyway, falsity or error does not consist in our experience lacking an object or having object of a different ontological order. Error is to be explained in terms of disagreement of structure or misrepresentation of structure. The thing-property structure of the fact should not only broadly and superficially agree with the (epistemic) subject-predicate form of experience, but also the agreement should be more detailed. The same property which characterises a given thing in the world should get represented in knowledge by the epistemic predicate as belonging to that very same thing which figures as epistemic subject. The thing (*dharmin*) must have its character of being epistemic subject (*viśeṣyatā*) determined (*nirūpita*) by the epistemic predicate character (*prakāratā*) which the property of the thing in question has. With suitable adjustment the determination works in the opposite direction also.

V

Now what clarification does this long digression bring to the objection stated in $\acute{S}_{12}$? In answer we may restate the argument of the objector. The first step in the argument is an important principle which the Vaiśeṣika-s invoke to prove their reductionism. It is that (i) a cognition apprehending another act of cognition takes for its object the object of that other cognition. The relevant example is hearer's aprehension of speaker's belief about R^* —a belief which enables the speaker to utter the particular words he utters, in a given case. As a substitution instance or special case of (i) we get (ii) the cognition which apprehends another cognition

has for its object the object of a false cognition in case the cognition being apprehended is false. (iiia) A cognition is false if the epistemic predicate of it is discrepant or *vyadhikaraṇa* in the sense defined. Now from these three steps one cannot derive the objectionable consequence that a cognition (whether introspective awareness of one's own belief or inferential awareness of some belief of another person) that apprehends another belief having a discrepant or non-fitting predicate is for that reason itself false unless at least the following two steps are also added. (iv) The epistemic predicate of a cognition is or represents an object which also that cognition apprehends and (v) a cognition that apprehends a belief apprehends all the objects which that belief apprehends.[31] From the steps (i)-(v) it follows (vi) that a cognition that apprehends a false belief includers among its objects what figures as the *prakāra* of the belief being apprehended and, or because of that, what is a discrepant epistemic predicate. But even now the objectionable conclusion does not follow since it does not follow from the steps (i) through (vi) that (vii) the cognition which apprehends a false belief has for its epistemic predicate what is a discrepant predicate, that is to say, predicate which is not satisfied by the thing that corresponds to the subject of the cognition in question or is satisfied by some other thing. In the next passage $\acute{S}_{15}$ Gaṅgeśa shows that this last step cannot be asserted. But then the objectionable consequence of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism specified in $\acute{S}_{12}$ cannot be derived from the reductive inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding of hearer sketched in the passages $\acute{S}_5$, $\acute{S}_{11}$ and perhaps $\acute{S}_{12}$.

To understand thoroughly the reply stated, from the side of the Vaiśeṣika-s, in $\acute{S}_{15}$ one should have acquaintance with the views of the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s regarding such matters as primary cognitive act (*vyavasāya*),[32] secondary perception (*anuvyavasāya*),[33] truth, awareness of truth, conditions of volition (and of use of language) and the like. In these matters a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika have hardly any important differences between them. Gaṅgeśa has elsewhere elaborately stated and defended the Nyāya position in the matters in question and defended it thoroughly against the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Since they largely agree in their views the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s find themselves exposed to

some similar objections which they seek to meet in somewhat the same way. If in the passage $\acute{S}_{12}$ Gaṅgeṣa acted in the role of an opponent and brought against the Viaśeṣika-s a certain objection, which may be brought against the Naiyāyika-s themselves in some other context, in $\acute{S}_{14}$ and $\acute{S}_{15}$ Gaṅgeśa represents the Viaśeṣika-s as answering the objection much in the way he himself had argued elsewhere.

There are certain releveant differences also between the Naiyāyika-s and the Viaśeṣika-s which we would like to emphasize. The objection being discussed here was brought against the Viaśeṣika reductionism in question, at least in so far as that reductionism was based on Viaśeṣika Inference-I. This inference yields as conclusion or effect (hearer's) awareness of (speaker's) awareness of R^*. So context-wise the objection relates to inferential awareness of another (and most likely another sort of) awareness of R^*. Both the Viaśeṣika-s and the Naiyāyika-s would admit that there is such a thing as inferential awareness of another awareness whether of R^* or of some other object. Both again would admit secondary perception which also is an awareness about another awareness. So an awareness of or about another awareness may itself be either an inference or a perception. For our treatment we have generalised the problem as problem about awareness of awareness or one's believing that 'one' believes (something). When one cognises in a secondary perception another primary cognitive act, the act being cognised belongs to the cognising subject himself. Where the act being cognised belongs to other minds the cognising secondary act is inferential.[34] There is one type of cognitive act which the Viaśeṣika-s explain as secondary cognitive act of the inferntial variety but which according to the Naiyāyika-s is a distinct type of primary cognitive act. The type of cognition in question is the hearer's cognition or the cognition a hearer has when a speaker addresses to him certain words of a commonly familiar language. According to the Viaśeṣika-s the hearer infers, on hearing the utterance of the speaker, that the speaker has belief to the effect that R^* obtains. This inferential belief about the speaker's belief about R^* is what costitutes according to the Viaśeṣika-s the so-called linguistic knowledge of the hearer in which latter's understanding of the sentence in question consists. The Naiyāyika-s

have no objection against perceptual or inferential belief about another belief. But they do not think that the sentential understanding of a hearer, as the Naiyāyika-s use the term, is a case of (his) believing that the speaker believes that R^*. It is simply a case of (the hearer) believing that R^*. But believing that R^* is according to the Naiyāyika-s neither a case of perception nor is it a case of inference, it is a genuinely new variety of knowledge called linguistic knowledge (*śābdajñāna*).

The Vaiśeṣika-s reduce, according to the Naiyāyika-s, the linguistic knowledge of R^* into inferntial knowledge of knowledge of R^* and *then* into *inferential* knowledge of R^*. It is this reduction or replacing the (linguistic) knowledge of R^* by (inferential) knowledge of knowledge of R^* is what is the point of attack of the Naiyāyika-s. The knowledge of knowledge or even inferential knowledge of another knowledge in general is not the point of attack. But this special case of knowledge of knowledge into which the Vaiśeṣika-s reduce in the first instance the linguistic understanding of a hearer, has been criticised on a rather general ground. On this ground one may refuse to accept such a thing as knowledge of knowledge. The objection brought against the special knowledge of knowledge attributed by the Vaiśeṣika-s to a competent hearer, applies to any knowledge of knowledge including even those which the Naiyāyikas-s themselves admit. It follows that the objection in question against them can be answered by the Vsiśeṣika-s exactly in the way in which the Naiyāyika-s would answer this objection; and a Naiyāyika is exposed to this objection since he admits second order cognitive act whether of the perceptual or of the inferential variety. The objection against the Vaiśeṣika reductionism has been that since the (inferential) cognition of the hearer is about the speaker's cogintion of R^*, the hearer's cognition would be false just in case the speaker's cognition happens to be false.[35] No one who admits such a thing as belief about another belief can rule out the possibility that occasionally this other belief may be false. At the same time intuitively there may be nothing wrong in cognising a belief which happens to be false. For if false belief is there as a matter of fact, then one can know it for what it is; one may correctly cognise it. In fact if no way of apprehending a false belief were there or if the only way of apprehending a false

belief were to have another false belief of whatever form, then there would be no evidence that there was such a thing as false belief. So to hold that there is a thing like false belief is to hold not only that we have awareness of such belief but also that we sometimes have correct awareness or knowledge about such belief. Anyone who admits that there are false beliefs and that the evidence for the existence of anything consists in our having knowledge of it, must also admit that we can correctly know a false belief. He must admit, in other words, that the awareness of a false belief is or can be true. But this he cannot apparently say. In other words he is obliged to deny the intuitively evident distinction (*asaṃkara*) between a false belief and the awareness of it, in respect of their truth status.

As we have said the Naiyāyika-s and for that matter the Vaiśeṣika-s can answer this general objection against the view that the awareness of a false belief is itself false in more than one way. Gaṅgeśa himself has noted some of these ways elsewhere. In the first place it can be said that one's awareness of another man's false belief may at times be false. So far the objection is a welcome one. But since at other times the awareness of a false belief does not turn out to be itself false the falsity of the awareness of a false belief is no longer due to the falsity of the belief being cognised. It is due to some contingent condition which when holds the awareness of a false belief is indeed false. But when this condition does not hold the question of the awareness of the false belief being itself false does not arise. The condition in question is the corrective cognition or its occourrence. Thus so long, and only so long as there does not occur after a false belief the belief corrective of that mistake, the awareness of the false belief is indeed a case of false belief itself. This shows that there is no necessity why the awareness of a false belief be itself false. We shall not here elaborate on this line of answering the objection brought against the Vaiśeṣika reductionism. This line of argument has been noted by Gaṅgeśa in connection with his discussion on *Prāmāṇya* (truth). There he has also noted explicitly that this line of argument can obviate the charge of turning an awareness of a false belief itself false even when the charge is directed against the inferential awareness about another man's false belief.[36]

The Vaiśeṣika reductionism, at least as it is based on Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, may be defended by or on behalf of the Vaiśeṣika-s in the way just sketched, that is, by pleading, so to say, guilty to the charge in question but then showing that it is a welcome objection. The needed defence can equally be provided if it can be shown that the charge does not hold. The best way to show this is to first allow the opponent to state his own account of the alleged falsity of the awareness of a false belief, and then show that the account is unacceptable. The opponent may think (a) that the falsity of the second order cognitive act which cognises a false belief of the first order, is due to the fact that its object is unreal or non-existent. Alternatively he may think (b) that the falsity of the second order act is due to the fact that it takes for its object everything that is an object of the false belief being cognised.[37] He may again concur with the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s in holding (c) that falsity of an awareness consists in the discrepant character of its (epistemic) predicate; he may further maintain that by this standard an awareness of a false belief is itself necessarily false. The charge against the Vaiśeṣika in question in so far as it is based on the account (a) has been answered in $\acute{S}_{13}$. The same charge may be brought by one who accepts (b). A Vaiśeṣika may answer the charge in the way sketched above. But the opponent may even base their objection in question on (c). The Vaiśeṣika answer to the charge so based has been stated in $\acute{S}_{15}$ being the passage we are now concerned with. To appreciate the reply fully we need to understand why the awareness of a belief does not have a discrepant predicate even when the epistemic predicate of the belief being cognised is discrepant. The matter requires serious study.

The second order act of cognition in which, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, the sentential understanding or belief of a hearer consists, in the first place, is an inferential belief. But both the objection of the opponent and the defence of the Vaiśeṣika-s in passages $\acute{S}_{12\text{-}15}$ relate to awareness of a false belief. This covers perceptual awareness of a false belief also. The treatment of the problem in the passages in question too suggests strongly that Gaṅgeśa had primarily the perceptual awareness of false belief before his mind. Many of the things he has said here are reminiscent

of what he had said elsewhere in connection with criticially elaborating the Nyāya theory of introspective awareness of a cognitive act.[38] If the argument offered in $\acute{S}_{15}$ in defence of the Vaiśeṣika position can justify our admitting introspective awareness of a cognitive act in the face of the objection that such admission entails the indistinguishability of an awareness of a false belief from the false belief itself in respect of truth status, then the same argument may justify, in spite of the objection in question, our admitting inferential awareness of a cognitive act. It is to be remembered however that the opponent objected against making the object of a belief (or everything that is an object *yāvatviṣaya*) the object of the awareness which apprehends that belief. The point of the opponent had been that without resorting to such a principle the Vaiśeṣika-s could not show that whenever a hearer infers a speaker's belief about R^*, he has inferential awareness of that R^* also. On the other hand if the Vaiśeṣika-s fail to demonstrate this, they will fail to prove their reductive thesis. But, the opponent argued, no one can adhere to the principle in question for it entails that in respect of their truth value status a false belief and the awareness of it are the same; and this conflicts with our intuition and also the belief that God is omniscient and infallible.

Gaṅgeśa thinks that the Vaiśeṣika-s can say two things to their opponent. They may say that the opponent has misunderstood both the Vaiśeṣika account of the falsity of a false belief and the Vaiśeṣika theory of second-order cognitive act. If these two are properly understood then the charge brought against the Vaiśeṣika-s may be found to have no basis. The Vaiśeṣika-s can appeal to the principle that believing (inferring) that one believes an object (R^*) is at the same time believing (inferring) that object (R^*) but avoid the obligation to maintain that awareness of a false belief is itself false. Let us therefore try to understand in grater detail first the Vaiśeṣika theory of second-order cognitive act and then their account of falsity. We take these accounts to be essentially the same as those provided by the Naiyāyika-s.[39] Taking as our example of second order cognitive act the introspective or perceptual apprehension of some state of belief of one's own, we may enumerate some of the major tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of second order cognitive act. The first such tenet is that

the distinction between the first-order and second-order cognitive act is real. The acts of these two orders differ both in form and content. Gaṅgeśa has noted elsewhere the views of the philosophers who deny this distinction for one reason or other.[40] The second important tenet is that a second order cognitive act informs the knower of the occurrence and form of the corresponding (relatively) primary cognitive act; it does not further inform him of whether the primary act is true or false.[41] The third important tenet is that though every primary cognitive act, at least as we understand it here, is predicative or judgmental in form, yet it does not reveal itself or its form. the corresponding second-order act only reveals the primary judgment and its form. This the corresponding second-order act can do only by revealing the character of the epistemic predicate of the primary perdicative act. In other words though a primary cognitive act has an epistemic predicate it does not itself reveal that it has such a perdicate or what predicate it has. On the other hand though the secondary act reveals the epistemic predicate of the corresponding primary act and so far it knows the relevant property yet it does not have the same epistemic predicate as its own.[42] The last important point to note is that the second order act does not (at least not necessarily) reveal the discrepant character of the epistemic predicate of the corresponding primary act even when that predicate is really discrepant. It only reveals what actually played the role of the epistemic predicate in the primary act. So far we find that a secondary act does not misdescribe, so to say, the primary act it apprehends, even when it fails to reveal the primary act as true or false as the case may be.

The relevant points noted here about second order perceptions will, with suitable adjustments, apply to inferential apprenhension of cognitions of other persons. Anyway, one very fundamental tenet of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy in general is that nothing can be accepted as existent or real except on the evidence of experience. Thoretical appropriation of a thing in a primary predicative act of awareness is necessary and almost sufficient (cognitive) causal condition which determines linguistic as well as otherwise conscious practical use of it. Our linguistic use of a thing (*abhivadan*) consists in naming it, referring to it, describing it and so on. The otherwise

(consciously) practical use of a thing consists in conscious endeavour to acquire (*upādana*) or shun (*hāna*) it, as the case may be. Thus while conscious appropriation in the broad sense[43] of the term (*vyavahāra*) includes theoretical or cognitive appropriation (*abhijñā*), linguistic appropriation (*abhivadana*) and practical appropriation (*hāna or upādana*), the first form of appropriation causally precedes appropriation of any other type. But as causally preceding and determining any other type of appropriation of a thing, the theoretical appropriation needs must be a (relatively) first-order and predicative act of awareness. A second-order act of awareness is useless for this purpose. Thus if a person is found to physically appropriate a piece of silver—if he collects, say, a piece of silver lying there in front of him,— then, if it is a conscious or voluntary act, we can be sure that the man must have had earlier a perception[44] of that silver. But this perception need not and should not be of the form of self-consciousness or introspection; it need not and should not be of the form 'I believe that I believe that there is a piece of silver'. The man only needs to have a primary predicative perceptual experience of the form 'That/this is a piece of silver', or 'Here/there is a piece of silver'. For the successful practical and physical appropriation or for actual collection of silver many other conditions will have to be satisfied; but so far as the required cognitive experience of the thing is concerned, the experience should be of the form of a primary predicative awareness. Once the correctness of this analysis is accepted, we can infer about a man that he had a belief of the form 'This is a piece of silver' from his appropriate overt behaviour. But, unless we could prove on independent ground that the man really had an awareness of that form, how could we be sure of the correctness of our analysis? If we could independently, that is, without inferring it from his behaviour, know that the man had really an awareness of this form, then the problem could have been solved. Now we can have it on the evidence of his own report that he had the awareness of the form in question. But what is the basis of his report? Though we cannot know if and what form of belief a man has except indirectly by inferring ourselves or being told by the man to that effect, the man himself, however, can know directly if and what form of awareness he had when he sought to appropriate

the piece of silver physically. The Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s are of the opinion that every man can directly verify in his own case whether he had the form of belief the analysis shows he must have had before he could (consciously) non-theoretically appropriate a thing. So they say that introspective awareness of one's own belief which had earlier determined the conscious preactical appropriation of a thing, reveals that belief to have the form of a first-order pradicative awareness.

Though acts of cognition are not things which can be physically appropriated, they can be appropriated linguistically; they can be talked about, described, explained, ascribed to oneself or to others. For all such appropriation the cognitive act in question should have to be known first. In the previous paragraph we had to describe or refer to the belief which causally determines the (conscious) physical act of collecting a piece of silver. this we could not do unless we knew from inference, authority or introspection the belief in question. Thus just as we need to have primary or first order predicative awareness of a thing, say, silver, if we are to be able to appropriate the thing linguistically (or volitionally) so also for similar appropriation of the awareness of silver we need to have another act of awareness about the awareness of silver itself. This second awareness is a second-order act of awareness in relation to the thing silver, but it is a primary predicative act in relation to the awareness (of silver). We need this awareness not so much or not at all for linguistic (or physical) appropriation of the silver but for linguistic appropriation of the primary predicative belief which is a condition for the non-theoretical but conscious appropriation of silver. Thus though the awareness we need for the conscious appropriation of certain cognitive act is necessarily an awareness of ours about another awareness and so far it is a second order act yet the general rule remains correct that conscious non-theoretical appropriation of a thing presupposes as a necessary cognitive and causal condition a (relatively) primary predicative act of cognition having for its object the thing being so appropriated. But while absolutely primary predicative conscious act is directed to some object other than an internal state or state of awareness, a secondary cognitive act—whether it is so relatively or absolutely—is somehow directed towards some act of awareness.[45]

A second order act of awarreness does two related things. It informs us of the past occurrence of certain primary predicative cognitive experience including the form and content of it and, thereby, it enables us to use that primary act linguistically. We are for the present interested in the first of the two functions of a second order cognitive act. For that is relevant here.

When a second order act of cognition reveals a primary cognitive act, it cannot but reveal the latter along with its (latter) object. For nothing or no one can reveal or know a cognition except along with the object of that cognition. So far therefore the object of the primary act is also revealed by the second order act. But we do not need to postulate a second cognition to reveal an object which has been already revealed by another cognition.[46] The Naiyāyika-s postulated a second-order act of awareness not as revealing the object of the primary act but as revealing the primary act itself. But since in itself a cognitive act is diaphanous it cannot be, or be known by itself, the object of the primary act is revealed for the second time. However that may be, the critic will insist, the second order act is also about the object, though indirectly, of the primary cognition. Indeed the secondary act apprehends something more but it apprehends all that the primary act apprehends.[47] Now where the primary act is a false belief apprehending, say a shell as silver, the corresponding second-order act apprehends the object of this false belief. The false belief, let us admit, continues the critic, has some object since no cognition can be without some object. We need not even take sides with any one of the quarrelling groups of theorists of error; we leave it open whether the shell-silver is an unreality or a nonest as the no-object theorists say or whether it is of a special ontological type called, illusory (*mithyā*) object as the Advaitavedāntin-s say. Whatever may be our theory as to the nature of this shell-silver, it is this object which the false belief in question apprehends. The falsity of the belief is determined by the fact that it apprehends only a shell-silver, at least in the sense that once it is detected that the thing the belief apprehended was a shell-silver the erroneous character of the belief gets revealed and we overcome the mistake.[48] It now follows that the second order act of awareness which apprehends a primary act of false belief, say 'This is a silver',

is itself a belief about the shell-silver as much as the primary belief. If this peculiar object determines the primary act of belief to be false it should also determine the corresponding second order cognitive act in the same way. The force of the argument remains unchanged whether this second order act is an inference about another person's belief or an introspection about one's own belief.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply to this objection is in terms of closer examination of the two acts of two different orders which have the same object. Such examination reveals that the acts of different orders cannot have exactly the same object. Speaking generally and roughly the second order act reveals the objective structure this-silver (that is 'this' or the object in front as silver, as in the case of veridical experience, where there really is a piece of silver) or shell-silver (that is, as in the case of a false belief, what is actually a shell as silver) as much as the primary act. But this cannot be true. Let us take the case of a true perceptual belief: 'This is a piece of silver'or '*Idam rajatam*'. This primary act of perceptual belief is, let us suppose, a case of visual perception and as such it has been caused by the contact of the visual sense organ with the piece of silver. Such contact is capable of revealing the minimally complex structure of the fact consisting in the thing-property (*dharma-dharmi or viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa*) relation between the items represented in the belief as the 'this' and 'silver(ness)' respectively. Because the sense organ in operation comes in direct contact with the fact or its two elements, we have the belief in the form *'Idam rajatam'* or 'This (is) silver'. We know, though still we do not know that we know, the 'this' and the 'silver'. We accordingly can make reference to them or linguistically appropriate them by using the expressions "this", "silver" or "this is silver". A second-order act of perceptual belief, that is, an introspection is generated by the only sense organ that can establish direct contact with internal states such as cognition or feeling. This sense organ is called internal sense organ or *manas*. No external sense organ can enter into perception generating contact with an internal state or quality of the self. The internal sense organ may be thought likewise to be able to enter into perception generating relation only with internal states. But if it were so then the internal sense organ could not even reveal or perceive the internal state of primary belief having

some external thing as object. In other words we could not have known through introspection such genuine acts of belief as 'This is silver'. For *manas* could not perceive this belief without perceiving the object, silver. But how can *manas* perceive at the same time both the internal state of belief and the object of this belief which is external ? If it can perceive both or enter into (direct) perception generating relation with both of them why should it be called internal sense organ in contrast with the sense of vision and the like which are called external sense organs ? The Naiyāyika-s maintain that *manas* enters into direct relation with internal states and processes only. But since along with primary cognitions it perceives the external things which are objects of those cognitions, *manas* must be admitted to establish contact with the external things as well. Its contact with the external things is however only indirect. *Manas* can never know an external object like silver in the way in which the visual sense organ can and does know it. But once a primary act of belief about an external thing like silver has been produced by an external sense organ through its direct contact with that thing, the *manas* can establish direct contact with this internal state of belief ; and indirectly through this belief[49] itself, the *manas* at the same time can establish contact with the object of the primary act. To put it otherwise while a primary act can perceive an hitherto unknown external thing the *manas* or the second order belief can apprehend an external object only as object of some other belief or object as revealed in some other belief. So if we already have a primary belief 'This is silver' then in a second-order cognition we can apprehend, while apprehending the primary belief, the 'this' and the 'silver'as and in so far as they were revealed by the external sense organ in the primary act, that is,'as this' and '*as* silver'. Thus the objects which are revealed in primary act as 'this' and 'silver' are revealed in the corresponding second-order act '(The thing) *as* this' and '(The thing) *as* silver'. In the primary act we know, without knowing that we know, 'This', 'silver'. In the second-order act we know (that we know/knew) something as 'this' or as 'silver' or as 'this is silver'. The second-order belief therefore has the form 'I know (something) as this and *as* silver'. But this very form indicates that there was a preceding act of primary belief. For we say 'we know/knew an *x* 'as F' only when there had occurred a

belief of the form *x* is F. In other words 'as F' is always expandable into 'as F, that is, as how I knew it earlier'. When a second-order act perceives an external object, its power is strictly and definiterly restricted. It can perceive only that external object which the primary act in question apprehended; and further, it can perceive even that object only as it has been apprehended in the primary act. There are so many objects lying before me but it so happens I entertain a belief only about *y*. This *y* again has so many features but I apprehend it under the aspect F. Such being the case the second-order cognition can apprehend *y* as something which was known as F.

Now the Vaiśeṣika-s (Naiyāyika-s) argue that while a primary act is of the form 'This is silver', the corresponding secondary act has the form 'I know (something) as the this and *as* silver'. The primary act directly apprehends the piece of silver. The secondary act, however, does not know the silver in the same way. It does not so much reveal the silver. It rather reveals how the primary act apprehended something say *as* silver. The secondary act thus not only clarifies the predicative character of the primary belief but also reveals which figured as predicate in the primary act being known. Observing the overt behaviour consisting in the physical manipulation called collecting a silver bar, we can ascribe to the person (the agent) an experience of that object. But we do not as yet know definitely whether the man found the silver bar as a valuable object worth storing or as a hard thing to hit a stray dog with, if he happened to have seen one. In short, a second order act of cognition directly apprehends the corresponding primary act in a sense in which it does not apprehend the object of that primary act [50]; and it reveals the predicative structure of the primary act along with the actual predicate or predicates [51] of it. Strictly speaking therefore the second-order act has for its object what *functions* as predicate in the corresponding primary act. Though the property of being silver is known in the primary act yet it is not known there as functioning as a predicate. This explains why the form of primary belief is '*x* is F' and not '*x* as F', so to say. The second-order act which reveals that the primary act apprehended *x* under the aspect of F or silverhood', apprehends 'is a silver' as having played the role of a predicate. A piece of

silver can be known in a primary act, say, 'This is silver' or '*Idam rajatam*' or in a second-order act, say, 'I knew it *as* silver' or '*Rajatatvena idam aham jānāmi*'.[52] This second act does not really know the silver, it only knows that the corresponding primary act knew a silver. To know a piece of silver or, better, to be about a piece of silver, a primary act must *have* as its predicate 'is a piece of silver'. That a primary act had this predicate or that it (was about or) knew something as silver is revealed in the secondary act. We can convert it also. To have as predicate 'is a piece of silver' about an x is to be a first-order cognition about that x. On the other hand a second-order cognitive act takes necessarily a form of belief ascription. It must have as its predicate awareness (*jñāna*) itself which is ascribed in this second-order act to the knower himself (the "I" or *aham*) or to another mind ("That man" or *ayam*). Accordingly a second order cognitive act has either of these two forms "I know..." (*Aham jānāmi*) or "That man knows...."(.....*jñānavān ayam*).

Once we know in an appropriate second-order cognitive act what had been the predicate of the corresponding primary act, we can inquire or answer whether that predicate was a fitting or a discrepant one. A thing is independent of the cognitive act that apprehends it. But some of the features of a thing are, though objective, relative to knowledge. They are relational properties which a thing acquires only when it suitably stands related to some act of cognition. thus a piece of silver is an independently existing thing; so is silverhood. But when there occurs the belief 'This is silver', the objective property of silverhood stands related to this cognition in the sense that the cognition apprehends something as silver. Whenever an independently existing objective property of silverhood is taken in relation to a cognition which apprehends something as silver, the silverhood itself becomes the seat of the property of being an (epistemic) predicate (*prakāra*) or property corresponding to this predicate. Just as something is a predicate relative to some particular predicative cognitive act, so also such a predicate is predicate relative to what is the subject of that cognitive act. In other words, predicate is an epistemic category which is corelative of another such epistemic category *viz.* subject. As epistemic categories subject and predicate are used to analyse

and display the structure of any relational knowledge (*viśiṣṭa* or *savikalpaka jñāna*). Subject and predicate are also used as special linguistic categories to analyse and display the structure of linguistic assertions (negations) of different mood. We have separate sets of terms for subject-predicate considered as pair of epistemic category and as pair of linguistic category. If I have a belief 'A jar is a substance' then the two independently existing things are the jar and the property substancehood. Relative to this cognition and what is the epistemic predicate of this cognition, the jar is the subject; and the property of being an (epistemic) subject or (*Viśeṣyatā*) is a knowledge- relative property. Again relative to the cognition in question and what is subject in that cognition substancehood is the predicate; and the property of being an (epistemic) predicate (*prakāratā*) is a knowledge-relative property. In addition to the two things— the jar and the substancehood— there is a third thing which is equally objective and independent. This is the objective relation between what has the *viśeṣyatā* and what has the *prakāratā*, that is, between the things which are respectively the subject and the predicate (or more accurately which have the features of being epistemic subject and predicate). This relation in this case is inherence. Now the objective relation which obtains between what is subject and what is predicate relative to a certain act of cognition, is called *saṃsarga* relative to that cognition; it is the thing which has the knowledge relative property of functioning as relation (*saṃsargatā*). The content of any cognition having a minimal predicative structure can be analysed into a subject, a predicate and a relation. The things that are subject and predicate relative to a cognition are represented in that act of cognition [usually as those things] and their names occur in the description of that knowledge.

Take the primary predicative belief about a piece of silver. In this cognition the subject is the 'this' (silver) or the thing lying in front (*idaṃ*) and the predicate is silverhood (*rajatatva*). In the belief the 'this' figures as or is represented as the epistemic subject and the 'silverhood' or 'is (being) silver' as predicate. The linguistic expression of this belief "This is a piece of silver" uses the expression "This" and "silver". What distinguishes the other content of a predicative awareness, the relation, is that it never

figures as such in the cognition or in the linguistic representation. The relation of inherence does not occur by name in the expression of the knowledge in question. Nor is inherence represented in the knowledge in the way in which the 'this' and 'the silver' are represented. If inherence were represented in the same way the belief would be of the form 'This, inherence, silver'. This is hardly one unitary predicative belief. It is rather apprehension of three unrelated items. Thus in a predicative awareness there must be, among the contents known, a relation; but so far as it functions as a relation and not as(just or like) one of the items between which the relation obtains the relation remains unrepresented separately and explicitly. Whatever that may be a predicative cognition is about a subject, and a predicate though not about them as unrelated. On the other hand such cognition is not about the relation . So it is said, it is about subject-predicate as related. A predicative cognition, in other word, cognises something (the subject) as qualified by another thing (the predicate). But it does not cognise primarily and explicitly the relation which obtains between the thing and the property— the relation which must be there in order one of the things being known can be represented as characterised by the other thing . There is a sense of "about" such that to be about a thing, a cognition must represent that thing as subject or as predicate; as the thing or the qualification of it. A relation qua relation, cannot be so represented in a cognition. Even a primary act represents a thing as having certain property and so it takes a subject-predicate form and is represented in a sentence which asserts a predicate of a subject.

Sometimes the thing represented as subject in a predicative awareness does satisfy the predicate of that awareness or what is represented by the predicate of that awareness. In such cases the epistemic predicate (*prakāra*) is called fitting, satisfied or satisfiable (*samanādhikaraṇa*). In case a cognition or belief is false the epistemic predicate is not satisfied or non-satisfiable, is discrepant (*vyadhikaraṇa*). A first order false belief necessarily has a predicate which is discrepant. Nonetheless it *has* that predicate. The corresponding second-order act reveals that the primary act had a predicate and what predicate it had . So far the second-order act which apprehends a false belief does not tell us

or reveal what is not the case. For, as we said, the belief, 'This is silver', really has as the epistemic predicate, silverhood. In fact if no second-order act were there to reveal that in the primary act in question silverness played the role of a predicate then we would have no proof for the existence of false belief.[53] Secondly, the second-order act has the form 'I knew/know (something) as having silver'. What has been represented as subject in this second-order cognition is what has been linguistically represented as "I" that is the self. Now relative to this cognition and its subject, the self, the predicate is the act of believing something as silver.[54] The self in this case does satisfy this predicate; the self really had entertained this belief. Thus this second-order cognition apprehending false belief does not have a discrepant predicate. The Vaiśeṣika-s thus show that, contrary to what the critic has said, the second-order act even when it apprehends a false belief is not itself false. It does not only not have a discrepant predicate, but also what it reveals about the corresponding primary act is the case. And while revealing what was the predicate of the (false) primary act, it apprehends that predicate which was apprehended by the primary act also. Yet while the primary act knew this property (of silverhood) and the property played the role of a predicate there, this property was not known as *prakāra* in that act. The second-order act reveals that 'is silver' or silverhood did function as predicate in the primary act.[55]

Before we pass on to the next chapter we may as well sum up the discussion of this chapter. The Vaiśeṣika reductive thesis is that a hearer's understanding of a sentence is not a new type of knowledge; it is rather of the familiar type of an inference. When a hearer is said to understand a sentence of a familiar language uttered by a speaker he actually infers (somehow) the speaker's awareness of the appropriate R^*, that is, the relation that obtains between the things in so far as they are signified and as such are recalled by the words of the speaker in question. Though the hearer thus has an inference about the speaker's state of belief yet this inference is at the same time infernce of R^*. For there is a principle that an awareness of another act of awareness also cognises the object of the latter awareness; and the speaker's awareness which the hearer infers has for its object R^*. The critics of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism pointed out the dangerous consequences of adhering

to the principle in question. The first of these is that any awareness—whether of God or of any mortal being, whether perceptual or inferential— that cognises a false belief— of one's own or of some one else's— would itself become false, for the cognising awareness has the same object as the false belief being cognised. The Vaiśeṣika answer to this objection is that a cognition— no matter whether it is of the first or second-order—becomes false only when the epistemic predicate or the corresponding property of the respective cognition is not satisfied by the thing represented in the cognitive act in question as (epistemic) subject. And a first order cognition and the corresponding second order cognition never have the same epistemic predicate. So even when a primary act of belief is false and has a discrepant predicate the corresponding secondary act may not be false. The other objection of the critic was that if the principle in question is adhered to then since the false belief and the awareness of it will have the same object, these two cognitive acts would determine their possessors to act in the same way. But this is counter-intuitive. The reply to this objection has not fully been discussed here, though Gaṅgeśa had discussed it elsewhere. We shall find occasion to state and explain the answer to this second objection later in this book. But this much is already clear that this second objection is somewhat dependent on the first; and once the first objection has been answered it is not very difficult to envisage what would be the line along which answer to the second objection may be given. We also explained what it means to be an object of a cognition. An object of a cognition is that 'about' which the cognition is a cognition. In the relevant sense of 'about', a cognition can be only about what is represented in it as subject or predicate. If this predicate is discrepant the cognition is false, not because the cognition does not have this predicate, but because the thing represented as subject does not have, what the primary act of cognition said it had viz, the property represented as predicate. In the second-order knowledge of such belief we assert that we had a primary cognition which had a discrepant property. The primary cognition really had this discrepant predicate and the subject of this secondary cognition does satisfy the predicate of 'having primary act with a discrepant preticate'. So the secondary act is true while the corresponding primary act in false.

NINE

Defence of Reductionism

I

The Vaiśeṣika-s are hard put to explain how, on their reductive theory, (otherwise) well-formed sentences function in certain non-standard cases. In a standard case the speaker speaks or, he is believed to speak, sincerely, that is, for the normal purpose of imparting to the hearer some information (believed to be true) or some instruction (believed to be of the right sort). If, however, a speaker speaks to a hearer with a view to deceiving the latter then the speaker does not make standard use of the sentences he utters. Similarly, a talking bird like parrot can produce sounds which so closely resemble a standard utterance or sentence in acoustic or sound value that some unsuspecting hearer may be deceived to think that some competent speaker has made the statement with the normal purpose of informing or instructing some addressee. But we cannot ascribe such standard purpose to a parrot as we cannot do so where the speaker is a deceiver in the sense that he speaks to deceive. In these cases no knowledge or awareness of intended R^* causally precedes or determines the utterances made. The parrot has no intention; so for it there is no intended relation (or *tātprya viṣayasaṃsarga*). The 'sentence' it produces or the 'words' it 'utters' cannot be said to have been causally preceded and determined by its awareness of such relation as obtains between the word-meanings[1] recalled and to convey which the words in

question could be said to have been uttered. A deceiver on the other hand utters words to convey certain definite information; his utterance is capable of conveying information about some putative definite fact or relation; that is, in his case there is (*tātprayaviṣaya saṃsarga*) an R^* intended to be communicated. But the relation he intends to convey by his utterance does not actually obtain (at least on that occasion) between the things which the words he utters mean and recall. Otherwise his utterance could not deceive. In any case, since here there is no relation which is both intended by the speaker to be conveyed by his utterance and determined by the word-meanings in question the deceiver could not have *known* such a relation to be obtaining there. The words he utters do not, therefore, have the property of being causally preceded by the awareness of a relation R^* which satisfies the description under reference. This very property is, on the other hand,what, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s, a hearer must infer and infer correctly, by using an inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, when he hears a well-formed sentence of some familiar language. In other words, if understanding of a senterce consists in inferring in the first place that the words or the sentence have the property in question, and if the words uttered by a deceiver or a parrot lack this property then, the critics point out, the inferential apprehension theory of the reductivist Vaiśeṣika-s must be wrong. The critic could argue that the *IA*-theory is wrong because though the hearer cannot infer what he is supposed to infer according to the theory, in case the utterance in question has been made by a deceiver or a parrot, yet the hearer derives certain belief from such utterances.This shows that the hearer's understanding of a sentence does not consist in inferring what the Vaiśeṣika-s think a hearer infers. For what is to be inferred is simply not there where, unknown to the hearer, the 'words' have been uttered by a deceiver or an unwise parrot or a child. But even in such cases an unsuspecting hearer comes to entertain definite belief.

The critic actually argues in a slightly different way to show that the *IA* theory is proved to be unsound by the example of non-standard but otherwise effective utterances in question. He takes such cases to prove first the unsoundness of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I on a technical count. If applied even to the words of

non-standard use in question the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I would tend to yield about these words the inferential knowledge that they have the property of being preceded by the awareness of a relation R^* (which is intended to be conveyed by the speaker of the words in question as obtaining between the things signified and recalled by these words); the ground being that these words have properties like syncategorematicity. But while in the non-standard cases the words do have the *hetu* or exemplify the properties which constitute the *hetu* (ground) of the inference—namely, the properties like syncategorematicity—they do not *have* the property to be inferred (*sādhya*). An inference such as this is called unsound and the fallacy involved—that the ground of the inference is discrepant, that it goes without what is to be inferred by means of it or this inference—is called *vyabhicāra* which vitiates a ground of inference if the latter lacks the inferential relation of *vyāpti*. For if the supposed or alleged ground of an inference can be shown to go without what it is believed to prove— as for example, fire as we find it in an electric stove is not associated with smoke—then the ground is defective and the defect consists precisely in the fact that it is not suitably related with what it is believed to prove. But what is offered as a ground of inference can enable us to infer correctly only if it actually bears the relation in question with what it is used to prove. The inference, the ground of which has such defect, is itself unsound. So far the Vaiśeṣika-s have failed to find an inference which can be said to be used by a hearer in deriving the belief he derives from a sentence. When, at least, a hearer derives from the utterance of a deceiver or a parrot or a mere child certain definite information there is no inferential ground to enable him to infer correctly. The upshot of this criticism is that the Vaiśeṣika reductionism is unfounded at least, as so far it is based on the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. An inference of this type is either not possible or is not valid. So a hearer could not derive any information at all or could not derive the correct information from hearing a sentence if deriving information from a sentence consisted in inferring what the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference in question proved. For it did not prove anything. Gaṅgeśa notes this objection against the Vaiśeṣika reductionism in the passage $\acute{S}_{16}$.

[$\acute{S}_{16}$]

Nanu pratārakavākye vyabhicārah viśesadrśanena tatrasamsargajñānābhāvāt.

[p. 45]

If it be objected: well, in [the example of] an utterance by a deceiver the ground of the inference is found to go without what it is [supposed] to prove to be there; for there is absence [in the speaker] of the awareness of the relation [which the hearer is led to believe to be there] since there is the knowledge of what specifically is the case.

So far as the text is concerned three points are to be noted. In the first place by "utterance by a deceiver" we are to understand here certain false statement (*visambādivākya*) made by a deceiver. Gaṅgeśa will soon consider separately the case where a deceiver utters, without knowing, a sentence which is in fact true, that is, a *sambādivākya*. So by the expression "utterance by a deceiver" Gaṅgeśa refers in this text to false statement made delibarately with a view to deceiving some hearer. A corrupt officer may make a false statement about the condition of the people of the district under his charge so as to deceive his superior to thinking that he (the officer) is a good administrator deserving promotion. The corrupt officer knows the actual state of the people and could have made a true statement if he did not want to deceive. But as the case is, he makes a false statement. With reference to such utterances the critic, as he has been represented in this passage, brings the charge that the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, as applied to this case, goes without what it is supposed to prove. The second point to note is that Gaṅgeśa in this passage speaks of utterance by a deceiver; he does not speak also of utterances by a parrot or a child. The reason is this. There is one difference between utterances by a deceiver and utterances by a parrot or a child even though the utterances are equally false in all these cases. The Vaiśeṣika-s can answer the charge of *vyabhicāra* in a certain way when it is brought with reference to some false statement made by a deceiver; in the same way they cannot answer the charge when it is brought with reference to the utterances by a parrot or a child. For even if the Vaiśeṣika-s can credit the deceiver

with some awareness of R^* actually obtaining there, they cannot so credit a parrot or a child. Gaṅgeśa therefore has arranged the passages in this way. In the passage $\acute{S}_{16}$ he brings the charge of *vyabhicāra* with reference to false statement of a deceiver. Then in $\acute{S}_{17}$ he considers and rejects the Vaiśeṣika reply to this charge. In $\acute{S}_{18}$ Gaṅgeśa states his reason for rejecting the Vaiśeṣika reply. He illustrates the point he makes in rejecting the Vaiśeṣika reply with the example of (false) 'statements' or 'utterances' made by a parrot or a child. So the full statement of the objection of *vyabhicāra* or discrepant ground is completed only in $\acute{S}_{18}$. A part of $\acute{S}_{17}$ states the Vaiśeṣika reply to the objection brought in $\acute{S}_{16}$ with reference to the false statements of a deceiver. In $\acute{S}_{18}$ this reply is rejected partly because the reply does not work when the objection is construed with reference to the false utterances 'made' by a parrot or a child.

The third point to note is that in $\acute{S}_{16}$ Gaṅgeśa not only brings the charge of *vyabhicāra* (or that the *hetu* of the inference is discrepant) with reference to deceptively false utterance but also offers reason to show why the charge is justified in case of an utterance by a deceiver. His reason is that 'there is absence...... is the case'. Let us explain. When a deceiver consciously makes a false statement to deceive his hearer, he knows what is really the case or which fact or relation, R^*_1, actually obtains. He did not utter the sentence which could convey the information that R^*_1 obtained. But at the same time he did not (himself) have the (false) belief that there obtained some other R^*, say R^*_2. However the statement S he makes to deceive the hearer carries the false information that there obtains R^*_2. So the sequence of words or the S does not, and cannot, have the property of being causally preceded by the (speaker's) awareness of R^*, here R^*_2, which is what is intended to be conveyed as obtaining between the things signified and recalled by the words. In short, the objection of Gaṅgeśa or the critic is that since a deceiver knew which relation actually obtained i.e. R^*_1, he could not have known that the relation R^*_2, which the false statement he utters would deceive the hearer to believing, obtained there. So the deceiving speaker could not have uttered the sentence on the basis of his *knowledge* of the relation in question ; that is, the relation the knowledge of which

would causally determine the utterance in question if the utterance were true. This shows that even though the words of the deceiver have the properties like syncategorematicity which constitute the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yet the words lack what this ground is supposed to prove viz. the property of being causally preceded by the speaker's awareness of the appropriate[2] R^*. In other words, the utterance of a deceiver is a case which exemplifies that the ground of the inference goes without the *sādhya* or what the ground is supposed to prove. Since the hearer does not have a ground or at least a legitimate ground, he cannot be said to infer, on the occasion of some one uttering a well-formed sentence of some familiar language, that there obtains R^* or that the utterance of the words have been causally determined by the speaker's awareness of the appropriate R^*, say R^*_2. The inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding as is held by the reductivist Vaiśeṣika-s, is thus shown to be wrong.

The Vaiśeṣika Inference-I and the Vaiśeṣika reductionism based on this inference have been shown to be unsound with reference to the non-standard use of sentences by a deceiver. Gaṅgeśa now states a reply to this objection from the Vaiśeṣika side and then rejects it. The first two and the last word of the following passage taken together, i.e., the expression "*Na ca vācyam,*" meaning, it should not, however, be said, constitutes the (Gaṅgeśa's) statement of rejection, that the said reply should not be offered; the rest of the passage states the reply itself.

[$\acute{S}_{17}$]

> *Na ca saṃsargamapratītya vākyaracanā na sambhavatityāhāryyam tasya jñānam sambhavatītivācyam.*
> [pp.45-46]

> It should not, however, be said that since a sentence cannot be produced without [first] apprehending the [relevant] relation, he [the deceiver] must have had suppositional awareness.

The point of the vaiśeṣika reply is this, the critic has argued why a deceiver could not have known the relation R^*_2 the awareness

of which should have causally determind his utterance, S, if the utterance were true. The reason is that he knew that a different relation, R^*_1, actually obtained there. But the critic does not have a good reply to the question "How could the deceiver utter the sentence S without having prior awareness of R^*_2 which that sentence signifies?". Making linguistic utterance is a conscious act; it is preceded and causally determined by some relevant and appropriate act of cognition. The awareness which determines a conscious utterance of sentence is the awareness of what the sentence is uttered to convey. In this case the sentence which the deceiver utters—say, 'The people of this district are prosperous and happy'— signifies the fact or relation R^*_2. How without prior awareness of this relation could the deceiver utter the sentence in question? This therefore is the dilemma. Either the deceiver is aware of R^*_2 (which the sentence he utters conveys) or he is not. If the latter were the case then he could not have made the statement, if the former then perhaps his statement could not have deceived the hearer.

The Vaiśeṣika-s point out that even an objection is to be construed within the framework of general requirement for any utterance whatsoever. The statement of a deceiver is also a conscious utterance and hence it, must have been caused by his awareness of what the sentence signifies viz., R^*_2 here. So the theory about general requirement of conscious linguistic act justifies and necessitates our ascribing to the deceiver an awareness of R^*_2. This much is settled. How can we now accommodate the critic's point? How can we deny that the deceiver knew that there obtained a different relation or fact, R^*_1? How can one entertain a belief that there obtains an R^*_2 when one knows that R^*_1 obtains there? The Vaiśeṣika reply is that one can very well have a suppositional awareness or belief about R^*_2 even when one knows that R^*_1 obtains. The knowledge of a fact is logically incompatible with the knowledge of certain different fact if the facts in question belong to same space and time. Knowledge of one such fact prevents the occurrence of the knowledge of the other. But knowledge of a fact does not and cannot prevent one from *supposing* that the case is just otherwise, that the contrary fact obtained. Supposition or suppositional awareness (*āhārya-jñāna*) is that kind of awareness

which cannot factually or logically oppose any other act of awareness. Similarly no act of awareness can logically or factually oppose a suppositional cognition.[3] If I so *desire* I can even suppose ice to be hot. I can wish twice two were five even when I am fully aware of the contrary truth. The Vaiśeṣika-s therefore suggest that without denying the general requirement that the conscious act of utterance of a sentence must be causally preceded by the awareness of the meaning of the sentence or of the fact the sentence purports to describe, we can accept the remark of the critic that a deceiver cannot *know* that the purported fact or relation corresponding to his utterance obtains since he knows that a different fact actually obtains there. We are only to ascribe to the deceiver a suppositional awareness of the fact which is purported to be described by his (false) statement. Though the deceiver cannot know that R^*_2 obtains, he can suppose that it does and utter a sentence which is appropriate for describing it.

Gaṅgeśa holds that the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot say all these in defence of their position or in reply to the objection brought against them with reference to false statements made by some deceiver. In the next passage Gaṅgeśa will state his reason for rejecting the Vaiśeṣika defence. But it will be found there that Gaṅgeśa does not so much think, it seems, the defence to be *ad hoc* or unsound. He rather thinks it to have a very restricted scope. Lest, however, one thinks the defence to be merely an *ad hoc* device on the part of the Vaiśeṣika-s to silence their critics we may as well point out that the statements of deceivers are not the only type of non-standard utterance, and it is not the obligation of the Vaiśeṣika-s alone to offer a theory of non-standard utterances regarding the explanation of which even the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṁsaka-s found it difficult to agree with one another. The sentences uttered by a poet or a story-teller, particularly when the poem or the story is not of the narrative type, could not have been caused by the speaker's knowledge of the fact or the relation being conveyed. But the utterances could not have been made without awareness of some sort of what is being said. Where the speaker is a poet, a story-teller or a deceiver, the awareness in question cannot be an ordinary false belief not known to be false. It is, to speak generally, an act of belief entertained and sustained by

wilfully suspending disbelief regarding what is actually being said and described.[4] Suppositional awareness is a fact and one has to reckon with this fact at least in philosophical theories of inferential fallacy and relation of epistemic opposition.[5]

> [$\acute{S}_{18}$]
>
> *Tāvat padajñānādeva śukasyeva vākyaracanopapa-tteḥ. Anyatrāpitasyaiva tantratvāt iti cet.*
>
> [pp.46-47]
>
> It should be noted, that [in case of a deceiver] the utterance of the sentence can be accounted for in terms of the [speaker's] awareness of the words [in question] alone as it happens in case of a parrot. Same is the truth in other cases also.

The point of the critic seems to be that even the Vaiśeṣika-s will agree that a parrot does not have the wilful suspension of disbelief attributed to a deceiver. But still a parrot is known to produce sentences.[6] Such sentences cannot be said to be causally determined by the suppositional awareness of the relation which the sentence conveys as obtaining between the word-meanings. All that we can ascribe to the parrot is the awareness of the words it utters or their sequence. In fact it only imitates utterances of words it had already heard.[7] In other words it can be said to know in its own way the words it utters. So if one takes, knowingly or unknowingly, the utterance of a parrot to be a sentence then this sentence is to be regarded as caused only by the awareness of the relevant words and not also of the relation the knowledge of which would cause the utterance of the same (type of) sentence in standard cases. Gaṅgeśa forestalls a possible attempt of the Vaiśeṣika-s to escape the objection. They should not say that only a bird or an animal, that is, a non-human being alone can produce a sentence simply on the basis of some sort of awareness of the relevant words. This does not hold in case of a deceiver who is necessarily a human being. Gaṅgeśa or the critic forestalls this possible escape by asserting that what is true of a parrot is true elsewhere also. Wherever or at least in many cases where utterance of sentences

is not preceded by knowledge of the relevant R^* the same is caused by the awareness of the relevant words only. One can cite as example the case of a human child who has only learnt to imitate and utter whatever it hears but has not become wise enough to discern what all that he says signify. Let us take the example of one uttering "Socrates, Plato, long, table, teaches, sees". Here the utterer know the words and what they individually mean. But he could not have knowledge of any R^* because there was no relation obtaining among the things. Keeping the situation otherwise unchanged let us imagine that the utterer utters "Socrates teaches Plato" without least idea that one of them was the teacher of the other. He could make such utterance because he knew the words he uttered though he did not know that there obtained any relation or relation of teaching between Socrates and Plato in this order. If therefore the critic is right, if a sentence can be produced or produced by some human being without previous awareness even suppositional awreness of the relevant R^*, then the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot defend, in the way they sought to do in the previous passage, their inference in question, against the charge of discrepancy (i.e., the ground of inference being discrepant), brought with reference to the utterance of a deceiver.

The interpretation of the passage just given does not presuppose the background knowledge of the controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s on the one hand and between the Mīmāṃsaka-s of different schools themselves on the other. The history of the controversy regarding non-standard use of sentences or utterance of sentences in the non-standard situation is very old. The debate was conducted largely with reference to such non-standard utterances as sentences of a poet. The rival philosophers contend respectively that the utterance of such sentences *is* preceded by some sort of awareness of the relevant R^* and that the same *is not* preceded by any sort of awareness of the relevant R^*. Among the second group of philosophers Kumārila and his followers accounted for the utterance of a poet in terms of non-verbal awareness of the relevant things while Prabhākara and his followers explained the phenomenon in terms of absence of awareness of absence of relevant R^*. The Naiyāyika-s such as Udayanācāraya[8] however seem to hold that

even the utterances constituting an imaginary poem caused by awareness of relevant R^*.[9] Thus the criticism of the Vaiśeṣika-s or the rejection of their defence with refernce to the example of utterances caused by mere awareness of words, that is, without any sort of awareness of the relevant relation may be due to the Prābhākara-s. Gaṅgeśa may as well be taken to have recorded here the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika defence by a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka.

The point of the Prābhākara-s is that ordinary sentences or standard utterances including perhaps the setences of merely narrative poems are preceded by the speaker's awareness of the relevant R^*, the knowledge of which the utterances yield for a competent hearer. But the sentences of an imaginary poem are different. They yield for the hearer awareness of certain connection between things which is not there to be known by any ordinary means. So the poet himself could not have known the R^* before creating the poem even though the poem yields for the listener the awareness of this relation. The poet only remembers the words he uses in composing the poem but he does not further know the relation or relations, that is the fact, the awareness of which the poem is supposed to yield for the listener. Actually, however, the listener does not derive awareness of the relevant relation or fact, however much his behaviour etc. may incline us to think that he does. The listener behaves (talks) in the way in which one would have behaved if one had derived awareness of some relation or fact. This is explainable, and the explanation will be logically economical, on the hypothesis that the listener somehow missed that here there was no relation. This absence of the awareness of the absence of the relevant relation, rather than the positive act of any awareness of relevant relation, is what determines the behaviour of the listener. Anyway, neither the speaker (poet) nor the hearer has any knowledge of the relation. The production or understanding of sentence in this non-standard case involves no awareness of fact or relation. It is causally determined by the awareness (memory in case of the speaker and perception in case of the listener) of words only and not also of the awareness of the relevant R^*. Gaṅgeśa extends this explanation to the case of utterances by a deceiver and those by a parrot or a child. In fine, the point of the critic is that an utterance of a

deceiver, just as those of a parrot or a child, is not causally preceded by awareness of the relvant R^*. So in such cases the sentences lack the property which the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is supposed to prove. But the ground itself is there. The words have the property of syncategorematicity and the rest in so for as they are objective features. So the ground goes here without what it is supposed to prove. It is therefore discrepant. On the strength of such a ground one cannot ever infer the relation R^* or that the words in question have been preceded by the speaker's awareness, even suppositional awareness, of R^*.

Gaṅgeśa records in the next passage what the Vaiśeṣika-s have to say finally about the non-standard utterances of a deceiver. They insist that it is reasonable to think that a deceiver does have some sort of awareness of the relevant relation and as such what the critic said just now cannot be true. No one can dispute that if the deceiver has awareness of R^* then the critic must be wrong in contending, as he did just now, that a deceiver's utterance is caused by mere awareness of the relevant words. What the Vaiśeṣika-s are to show, however, is that it is reasonable to hold that a deceiver has the awareness of the relevant fact. Gaṅgeśa in the following passage notes the consideration that leads the Vaiśeṣika-s to credit the deceiving speaker with the awareness of the R^* conveyed by his utterance. The consideration is that no one can be called a deceiver unless he *intends* to deceive and behave (here speaks) with that intention. But to speak with the intention to deceive is to speak with the intention that the hearer may (be deceived to) believe on the strength of (my) this utterance that such and such is the case or, what is the same thing, such and such relation obtains between the things, the words corresponding to which are being uttered. This amounts to admitting that the speaker has the idea of the relation before he utters his words with a view to deceiving the hearer.

[$\acute{S}_{19}$]

Na, etadvākyametasya padārthasaṃsargaṃ bodhayiṣyatītyāśayena vākyaprayogāt tasyāpi saṃsargajñānāt yogyatāvirahāt ca.

[p.47]

> No [this (what the objector has said) is not true]; for since the sentence has been uttered with the intention 'may this sentence inform [the hearer] of the relation between word-meanings', even he [the deceiver] has the awareness of the relation; and there is absence of semantic well-formedness.

The conclusion being sought to be proved by the Vaiśeṣika-s in this passage is that the contention of the critic discussed above, that the utterances of a deceiver is determined not by his awareness of the relevant relation but by his awareness of the relevant words only, is false. They have, however, offered altogether three grounds for the conclusion. The connection of each of these grounds with the conclusion on the one hand and with the remaining grounds on the other is not immediately very clear. If we ignore whatever textual difficulty may be there, the problem is not so great in the case of the first two grounds. The ground that the deceiver has awareness of R^* is directly related to the conclusion that it is false that the deceiver's utterance is not causally determined by the awareness of R^*, which awareness the deceiver was alleged to lack. But the Vaiśeṣika-s are obliged to prove, in face of what the critics have alleged, that even a deceiver has (some sort of) awareness of the R^* (which his utterance conveys). The first proof the Vaiśeṣika-s offer is that the deceiver utters his sentence with the intention that the hearer might understand that there obtained such and such a relation. One cannot intend to convey certain relation without knowing what he intends to convey. Thus the very fact that a deceiver speaks with the intention to deceive the hearer into believing that certain relation obtained there, proves that the deceiver already had the awareness of the relation in question. The last two grounds are not equally directly connected with the conclusion. His (deceiver) having the requisite intention proves the second ground, that the deceiver had awareness of R^*; this in its turn prove that the critics were wrong to think that the words uttered by a deceiver were not preceded by his awareness of (respective) R^*.

The question now is: What is the relevance of the third ground viz., absence of semantic well-formedness? It seems that the

Vaiśeṣika-s add this ground in answer to another point which the critics can be anticipated to raise now. The point is this. Let us grant that the Vaiśeṣika-s have proved that even in case of a non-standard utterance of a deceiver the words have the property which is held by the Vaiśeṣika-s to be proved and provable by the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I; so far the ground and the inference are free from the fallacy of discrepancy. But in another way the discrepancy can still be construed. The point of the Vaiśeṣika-s behind their offering the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is quite general. Wherever a hearer is said to derive certain information from a sentence, that information i.e., the hearer's awareness of R^*, is the result of an inference of the type in question. But the point of the reductionist is that a hearer gets to believe R^* through inference even when the belief is true. But in case of a deceiver's utterance the hearer cannot get to know the R^* because the awareness of the speaker about R^* is false, there (at least usually) no R^* is there. In such cases though the words uttered have properties of syncategorematicity *et cetera*, which constitute the ground of the inference, the words do not have the property which the ground is supposed to prove. It is supposed to prove that the words have been preceded and causally determined by the knowledge or true belief of the speaker about the relevant R^*. For if the ground simply proved that the words were preceded by some belief including false belief about R^* then there could be no way of getting to know, through such inference, R^*, however, indirectly. If therefore the property intended to be proved is the property of being preceded by true belief about R^* then the inference in question or the ground of it is found to be discrepant where the relevant utterance is an utterance by a deceiver. For in such a case though the ground of syncategorematicity etc. is there, the property of being preceded by the (speaker's) true belief about R^* is not there. But it is this property which is to be proved. In answer to this anticipated way of reconstruing the charge of discrepancy that the Vaiśeṣika-s offer the last of the three grounds viz.,the absence of semantic well-formedness. The point is that even if the critic is right in pointing out that in case of a deceiver's utterance what is to be proved is not there, yet it is not correct to say that the ground or the inference is discrepant. For in such

cases the ground of inference is not there. In fact the words uttered by a deceiver lack at least partly the set of properties which functions as the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. A fallacy of discrepancy occurs only if there is both the presence of the ground (as a whole) and the absence of what is to be proved. In case of the Vaiśeṣika Inference in question we have already agreed that the second of these two conditions, yiz., the absence of what is to be proved, holds. The sole point of offering the last of the three grounds is to show that the other necessary constituent of the fallacy of discrepancy viz., the presence of the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, is lacking in the case of an utterance by a deceiver. For a deceiver knowingly asserts what is false or what is not the case. Thus though the words he utters are syntactically well-formed yet the things corresponding to these words are not, or cannot be, related in fact in the way in which they are asserted to be related by the deceiver. Such sentences are to be regarded as semantically ill-formed even when they are not explicitly semantically anomalous like the sentence "He is drenched in fire" or "Straight line drinks coffee".

The Vaiśeṣika-s thus show that the charge of discrepancy cannot be brought against the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I with reference to such nonstandard utterances as utterances by a deceiver or a poet or a parrot or a child. So far as a deceiver is concerned he speaks with the intention to deceive his addressee into believing in the existence of an R^*_2 where he knows that only an R^*_1 obtains. Thus the words he speaks are preceded by his awareness of the putative relation which he intends to deceive his addressee into believing to be actually there. So far the words have the property to be proved by the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I if that property is construed as the property of being preceded by the awareness, including false or suppositional belief, about the relevant R^*. And the fact that here there *is* the property to be proved is sufficient to render impossible or unsound the charge of discrepancy. But here is also the other fact which again is by itself sufficient to prove the charge to be unsound. This fact is that the words of a deceiver lack one of those properties which (together with other properties) constitute the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. The words of a deceiver lack the property of semantic well-fromedness and this

being a part of the ground of the inference in question the ground cannot be said to be there in case of an utterance by a deceiver. The absence of the ground is sufficient to show that the charge of discrepancy cannot be construed; even if one formulated the *sādhya* or the property to be proved so strongly or narrowly as to show that such property is actually absent here.

If therefore the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is to enable a hearer in a given case to infer R^* through the inference of the speaker's awareness of R^*, then this awareness must be construed as true belief or knowledge. And if the utterance of the words of a speaker is causally determined by his knowledge of R^* and if it were possible for us to infer this knowledge then we could infer, as the determining content of that knowledge, that R^* itself (as being really there). There is therefore a strong reason to construe what is to be proved by the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I in terms of knowledge, and not merely awareness, of R^*. Once it is so construed the property to be proved by the inference in question becomes unavailable in case the given words are from a deceiver. But by showing merely that in such cases there is absence of what is to be proved one cannot show that he Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is discrepant; for the ground of the inference or a part if it, the semantic well-formedness, is also missing; the words in question lack it. So in the next passage Gaṅgeśa represents the Vaiśeṣika-s as finally concluding that the charge of discrepancy cannot be brought against Vaiśeṣika reductionism at least with reference to the false statement of a deceiver.

[$\acute{S}_{20}$]

> *Ataeva visamvādivākye śukavaduccarite na vyabhicāraḥ. Śabdāt saṃsargapratyayastu yogyatābhramāt.*
> [pp. 47-48]

> Therefore no discrepancy in case of false statements uttered in the manner of a parrot. The [resulting] awareness of the relation [between word-meanings] is due to the false belief in [the existence of] semantic well-formedness.

The first sentence of this passage concludes the discussion from $\acute{S}_{16}$ through $\acute{S}_{19}$ on the charge of discrepancy against the Vaiśeṣika

Inference-I construed with reference to a deceiver's false statements which are allegedly uttered, in the manner of a parrot, merely on the basis of the knowledge of the relevant words and, for the matter of that, without at least any true belief about the relevant relation. The Vaiśeṣika-s say that in view of what has been said above it is clear that in case of such utterances where the words uttered lack the property of being preceded by the (speaker's) knowledge of the relevant R^*, there is no discrepancy. For the ground of the inference, the whole of it, is not there. But the presence of the ground is a necessary condition for there obtaining the defect of discrepancy.

The second sentence answers a relevant question that naturally arises here. The charge of discrepancy in case of the utterance by a deceiver has been answered by the Vaiśeṣika-s by claiming that in such cases the words lack the property of semantic well-formedness or that the things in question lack the feature of semantic compatibility.[10] Roughly speaking this is what is meant by *yogyatā*. But just as *yogyatā* figures as a part of the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I so also it (its knowledge strictly speaking) is (again roughly speaking) one of the causal conditions of sentential understanding at least accordding to those who like the Naiyāyika-s maintain that such understanding constitutes a distinct class of knowledge requiring a separate causal account of its own. But if (detecting) semantic well-formedness of the words is a necessary condition for our ability to understand the sentence[11] composed by them or for the possibility of the sentence yielding any definite information, then how do we derive as we do, definite belief from an utterance by a deceiver? It is, however, generally accepted that the deceivers often succeed in producing in us (false) belief through their deceptive utterances. The Vaiśeṣika-s therefore anticipate the natural question "How did we come to derive any factual belief or better, belief about some states of affair, (*saṃsarga pratyaya*) from the utterance of a deceiver ?". His reply is that we derive such belief, just in case we have it, from another mistaken belief viz., that here there is semantic well-formedness. What is meant is that strictly speaking not the semantic well-formedness but the belief about it is a necessary condition for deriving belief about the relevant R^* from a given sentence.

We can have the belief that this condition has been satisfied or the relevant feature of the words we hear is there, even when the words are in fact semantically ill-formed. In other words we may falsely believe that the words we hear, which, unknown to us, have been actually uttered by a deceiver, are semantically well-formed. Such a belief explains why and how we come to believe what a deceiver says to be the case. Since belief about semantic well-formedness rather than such well-formedness itself is required for deriving from a sentence a belief about some R^* which the sentence is uttered to convey, we can very well derive a belief about R^* from the utterance of a deceiver even though semantic well-formedness is actually lacking there.

II

In the last section we have seen how Vaiśesika reductionism as a theory of sentential understanding fares where the speaker makes one type of non-standard utterance viz., false statements. Such statements are made by a deceiver, or a child or a talking bird like parrot. In this section we shall examine if the reductionism in question does not fail in case of a second type of non-standard utterances. Though non-standard, these utterance are, unknown to the speakers of them, *sambādi*, that is, they happen to be factually correct or corroborated. Sometimes it so happens that what an infant or a bird like a parrot 'says' turns out to be the case. Here we cannot attribute to the 'speaker' awareness of the relevant fact or R^*. A deceiver who consciously utters a sentence with the intention to deceive cannot ordinarily fail to have the awareness of R^*. But where the deceiver himself is, unknown to him though, mistaken there what he utters is true though he does not have the knowledge of the relevant R^*. In such a case how on the Vaiśeṣika theory could we have knowledge about the appropriate fact or R^* (*saṃsargapramā*)? But we do, however, have it. The Vaiśesika Inference-I cannot yield in this case inferential awareness of the speaker's belief about R^*. This then is the new charge of discrepancy.

[$\acute{S}_{21}$]

Atha samsargajñānaṃ vinā śukasyānysya vā samvādi vākye bhrāntapratāraka vākye ca vyabhicāraḥ. Kathaṃ vā tatra' saṃsargapramā vaktṛ jñānānumānāsambhavāt iti cet.

[pp.48-49]

But [still] there occurs the fallacy of discrepancy in case of utterances which tally with fact even though there is no awareness of R^*, (as for instance) utterances by a parrot or some other being; and utterances of a mistaken deceiver. How could there be [derived in the way suggested by the Vaiśeṣika-s] knowledge of R^*? For [even] the speaker's awareness of R^* cannot be inferred. Let this be the objection.

In this passage Gaṅgeśa shows that the critic of the Vaiśeṣika-s can reiterate his charge that the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is vitiated by the fallacy of discrepancy i.e., occurs without what it is supposed to prove (that is, give inferential knowledge of). This time the charge is construed with reference to a second group of non-standard utterances. The earlier group consisted of non-standard utterances which are false and also not corroborated by fact. Reference is being made now to such non-standard utterances which are all corroborated by fact (*samvādi vākya*). But these are the utterances where there is (accordding to the critic and) *ex hypothesi* absence (on the part of the speaker) of the awareness of the R^* which the utterances signify. We cannot therefore correctly argue that the words in question have been preceded by the speaker's awareness of R^*. Since the speaker's awareness of R^* is absent, the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, viz., the features of syncategorematicity and the like which do characterise the words in question, goes here without what it is supposed to prove. Using such an inferential ground or, for that matter, the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, nobody can arrive at the (inferential) knowledge of the speaker's knowledge of R^* or through this, at the knowledge of R^*. In short if the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I were the way of deriving, from sentences, knowledge of R^*, then we could never come to acquire such knowledge. But

we do derive true belief from the sort of sentences which are in question. This conclusively shows that the reductive account of sentential understanding which the Vaiśeṣika-s offer cannot be the right account. So far there is scope for a diffferent account such as the one which the Naiyāyika-s offer. Accordding to this account language is a distinct means and the knowledge which we derive from sentences is a distinct type of knowledge yielded by this means.[12]

Now that the structure of the argument has been explained, we can endeavour to explain the content of it. In $\acute{S}_{20}$ the Vaiśeṣika-s argued that when we are deceived by a false statement made by a deceiver we derive (infer) some definite information from the statement because we mistakenly believe that the statement is semantically well-formed. In $\acute{S}_{21}$ examples of sentences are being cited which are as a matter of fact semantically well-formed. They describe certain things to be related in a way in which they happen to be related. It is in this sense that the sentences happen to be corroborated by facts. Let us take the sounds produced in a random way by a parrot or an infant. Some sequence of these sounds resembles exactly certain standard sentence of ordinary language, say, "Today it will rain" or "Fire". As it happens in case of lucky guess, it turns out to be raining on the day in question or a house in the vicinity is found to have caught fire. The information or the belief which the hearer, who perhaps did not know the exact source of the utterance, derives, is factually correct. As causing correct belief and as asserting certain things to be related in the way they are actually (found to be) related the sentences are fact-conforming (or *samvādi vākya*). They are still not admitted by the Naiyāyika-s (and the Vaiśesika-s) to constitute accredited source or special means of knowledge, they are not regarded as *pramāṇa (vākya)*. For sentences come to acquire the property of being *pramāṇa* only when they are uttered by speakers having necessarry and relevant qualification (*guṇa*). In other words the *pramāṇa* character (*prāmāṇya*) of sentences which qualify for the title accredited linguistic source of knowledge or *Śabdapramāṇa* is itself an effect (*janya*) of the relevant knowledge or qualification of the speaker. Anyway, even from sentences which fall short of *śabdapramāṇa* of the Naiyāyika-s, a hearer can derive factually

correct information in case the sentences happen to be corroborated by fact.

In case of sentences such as these there is no absence of semantic compatibility or semantic well-formedness. Same is the case with the utterance of a mistaken deceiver. Suppose a deceiver has, unknown to him, the mistaken belief that "Today is Monday" whereas actually it is Tuesday. With a view to deceiving his addressee the deceiver says "To day is Tuesday". The sentence is obviously fact conforming and the belief derived by the addressee is true. Here again the things happen to be (related in the manner) as they have been asserted to be in the fact-conforming statement of the mistaken deceiver. Therefore the condition of *yogyatā* or semantic well-formedness has been satisfied here. Thus in case of a factually correct sentence which fall short of accredited linguistic source of knowledge, the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I including *yogyatā* is present. But the speaker of such a sentence does not have (or, at least, does not have at the time of or just before the utterance of the conforming sentence) the awareness of the R^* which the sentence signifies. In other words, in the instances of this second type of non-standard utterances (produced by speakers who do not have knowledge of the relevant fact) the ground of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I is there, even though what the ground is supposed to prove is not there. The critic of the Vaiśeṣika-s has therefore cited these sentences to illustrate or level the charge of discrepancy (*vyabhicāra*). The Vaiśeṣika-s have thus been placed under obligation to defend their reductionism, based as it is, so far, on the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, against this charge of discrepancy. Whatever they may say in defence, they cannot say that in these cases, at least, we can derive knowledge of relevant R^* through an inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. For that knowledge is to be obtained, if Vaiśeṣika reductionism is correct, through inferring the speaker's knowledge or belief about that R^*. But the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* renders impossible the inference of the speaker's belief about R^*.

The Vaiśeṣika-s can say[13] in defence that the critic cannot show the inadequacy of Vaiśeṣika reductionism in case of this second group of non-standard utterances. For the *IA* theory is offered to explain how a hearer obtains the knowledge of R^* from

hearing the utterances of a familiar language *when he does obtain such knowledge*. But in case of this second group of sentences no hearer obtains any knowledge of R^*. For, as the critic says, here there is no competent speaker with the knowledge of R^*. The fact that in these cases there is no legitimate way for the hearer to ascertain—that is, no non-defective ground for him to infer—that the speaker has knowledge of R^* and, through that, R^* itself, is as it should be. Therefore no deficiency of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism is proved.

The critic may not be convinced. He is likely to point out that in case of the non-standard utterance of type two, conditions of syncategorematicity etc. obtain. How then can we deny that such sentences produce in the competent hearer the belief about the relevant R^*? Or how can we explain the failure of such sentences to produce that belief? Further since in these cases (excepting perhaps in the case of a mistaken deceiver [14]) there are no (competent) speakers, according to the Vaiśeṣika-s themselves, there is no chance of the resulting belief being false due to the defects pertaining to the speaker. So in these cases the hearer obtains not only belief about R^*, his belief is even true. Now the Vaiśeṣika reductionism should be able to provide an explanation how the hearer can obtain the true belief he has in these cases. And it is here exactly that it fails. The next passage may be viewed as the Vaiśeṣika reply to such criticism.

[$\acute{S}_{22}$]

Na. Yadi tatra saṃsargapramā, vedatulyatā ityuktam.

[p. 49]

> No. If knowledge of R^* [is admitted] there [then], as has already been said, similarity with the *veda* [should also be admitted].

The reply to the criticism is that no inadequacy or deficiency of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism is proved even if in cases of this second group of non-standard utterances, the hearer is admitted to obtain knowledge of R^*. For the only obligation of the Vaiśeṣika-s would be in that case to show how the hearer infers R^* through inferring the speaker's knowledge of R^*. In other words, the Vaiśeṣika-s

are to show that in such cases the hearer infers that there is here some speaker who has knowledge (awareness) of R^* which precedes the utterance of these words. That can easily be done. In the first place even critics like the Mīmāṃsaka-s, cannot deny that fact-conforming utterances of a parrot or an infant resemble the *vaidika* statements. For the former is as much free from the defects of a speaker as the latter. But since no Vaiśeṣika would admit that either the *vaidika* sentences or the utterances of a parrot are eternal, he would advance a more positive theory. He would say that just as in case of *vaidika* sentences truth of the resulting knowledge is due to the qualities of the speaker so also in case of the sentences of a parrot the same qualities of the speaker is responsible for the hearer's belief and true belief about R^*. To say this is to take the resemblance of the utterances of a parrot with those of the *veda* to consist in the fact that God is the speaker behind both these types of sentences. In other words, it is God's infallible knowledge of the relavant fact which temporally precedes (and determines production of) the fact conforming sentences which we attribute to a parrot or an infant. All these have been said before.[15]

The Vaiśeṣika reply can be understood in this way. If we admit that a hearer derives true belief about some relevant R^* from the utterances of a parrot or an infant then the explanation is this. The hearer does not know that the source of utterance is an unwise infant or a parrot. He finds the words to be syntactically and semantically well-formed. From this he infers that these words have been preceded by the knowledge or awareness of (the relevant) R^*. And such knowledge is indeed there; knowledge of none but God who is the speaker of the Vaidika sentences. This inferential knowledge of (speaker's) knowledge of R^* is at the same time the hearer's knowledge of R^*. Thus we see that a hearer of the utterances of a parrot or an infant, in case the utterances tally with facts, derives inferentially the relevant knowledge of R^*. So far the *IA* theory of the reductivist Vaiśeṣika-s stands vindicated.

Now a critic may find that the Vaiśeṣika account of the knowledge of R^* which a hearer has when he hears certain factually-corroborated utterance of a parrot or an infant is very complicated. A simpler account seems to be possible. Even the

Vaiśeṣika-s in their account sketched above admit that the non-standard utterances in question are syntactically and semantically well-formed. Further if they were not so well-formed then the hearer could not derive any knowledge of R^* either in the way suggested by the Vaiśeṣika-s or in some other way. It would therefore be logically economical if we explained the hearer's knowledge of R^* in terms of there obtaining the syntactic and semantic features like syncategorematicity, semantic compatibility etc.[16] The Vaiśeṣika-s might have anticipated such a criticism. The reply from the Vaiśeṣika side is that a hearer may obtain belief about R^* even if these objective conditions did not obtain on certain occasion. Thus a hearer may mistakenly believe that certain sequence of words display (all) such features where at least one feature is actually missing. For otherwise how does the belief a hearer obtains from hearing an utterance become false at times? So the Vaiśeṣika-s say,

[$\acute{S}_{23}$]

Akāṅkṣā yogyatāsattiśca jñātopayujyate, anyathā śābdabhramānupapatteriti

[p.50]

Syncategorematicity, semantic compatibility and unbroken succession function as being known, otherwise there could not be false belief (resulting) from (hearing) words.

But if thus the properties like syncategorematicity produce, when known, knowledge or belief about R^*, then they can be compared with things like smoke. Our perceptual belief that there is smoke gives us inferential knowledge that there is fire. In the same way our apprehension that here the words being heard by us have the features like syncategorematicity, causes our knowledge of the relevant fact or R^* (which the words are said to convey to us). The *IA* theory explains in the familiar way the exact process through which the apprehension of the features in question leads to the belief about R^*. The theory describes the process as similar to the process through which our perception of smoke leads to (inferential) belief about fire. The process is inference.[17] In the next place a theory of sentential understanding is required to

actually formulate the inference. In doing that the Vaiśeṣika-s find that syncategorematicity etc. cannot prove (directly as ground and through their knowledge), R^*. The inference from such ground can have for the predicate of inferential knowledge or what is to be inferred, the feature of 'being preceded by the (speaker's) awareness of R^*. They accordingly hold that whenever, or even in case of non-standard utterances of the type two, a hearer obtains true belief about some R^* on hearing the relevant utterances, he first infers that the words in question have been preceded (and causally determined) by the (speaker's) awareness of the relevant R^*, for the words are characterised by the feature of syncategorematicity and the like. This speaker is, in the standard case of secular sentences, some human being but, in cases of *vaidika* sentence or the fact-conforming utterances of a parrot and beings like parrot, he is omniscient God. This therefore is (or is one of the versions of) the *IA* theory of sentential understanding which the reductivist Vaiśeṣika-s advocate and which they have defended against so many criticisms.

TEN

The Final Rejection

I

In the last chapter we discussed how the inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding of the Vaiśeṣika-s could be defended. But the Naiyāyika-s betray their strong commitment to realism by still refusing to be convinced. In fact the realists are essentially opposed to reductive tendencies whether in ontology or in epistemology. Gaṅgeśa is convinced by the evidence of introspective awareness that verbal knowledge derived from linguistic means is an irreducible kind of knowledge.[1] And his realism commits him to oppose every attempt to reduce such knowledge to some other type of knowledge. So after considering all the defences from the Vaiśeṣika side, Gaṅgeśa begins his final reply with the word "*ucyate*" occurring in the next passage $\acute{S}_{24}$.

The connection between what is being said here and what has gone before should be brought out carefully. In $\acute{S}_5$ the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I was stated. In $\acute{S}_{11}$ it was shown how that inference with the help of a subsidiary parinciple could yield for the hearer an inferential awareness of R^*. So far the Vaiśeṣika contention had been that the knowledge or belief in which a hearer's understanding of a well-formed sentence of some familiar language consists did not require for its explanation our admitting language as a separate accredited source of knowledge. The awareness of the hearer is inferential in nature. From the features

like syncategorematicity of the words heard by him, the hearer infers that the speaker must have uttered the words on the basis of his (speaker's) belief about the relevant fact or, as the Naiyāyika-s put it, the relation obtaining among the things corresponding to the words in question. So far the inferential belief of the hearer is to the effect that the speaker must have had the belief about the relevant R^*. But those who admit language as a separate means of knowledge contend that this means yields for the hearer a belief about R^* which is to the effect that the things in question are related. In other words, what language as a separate means is admitted to yield knowledge of is only a part of what the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields as conclusion. The fact or the R^*, the knowledge of which language as a separate means is admitted to yield, is the content of the speaker's awareness whereas this awareness along with the content of it is which the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I allows us to infer in the first place. Unless therefore the Vaiśeṣika-s appeal to the principle that belief about an earlier belief is also the belief about the content of the earlier belief, the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I cannot be said to yield a belief about R^* even if it is admitted to yield a belief about (the speaker's) belief about R^*. The Vaiśeṣika-s therefore contend that the inference formulated in $\acute{S}_5$ yields for the hearer a belief about (the speaker's) belief about R^*, that is, a belief to the effect that the words in question were uttered on the basis of (utterer's) awareness of R^*. Now the same inference yields for the hearer, at the same time, belief about R^* according to the principle that the belief about another belief has for its object the object of this other belief.

Against one's appealing to the said principle it was pointed out in $\acute{S}_{12}$ that adherence to such a principle tends to obliterate the distinction between a false belief and an awareness having this false belief as its object. This charge admits of two interpretations. Under the first interpretation the distinction between the two beliefs— one, the primary belief which is mistaken and the other the belief about this belief— is obliterated in the sense that like the mistaken belief the other belief also becomes false; the two beliefs become indistinguishable (*saṃkīrṇa*) in that both become equally false. The defence of the Vaiśeṣika position against the charge of turning the two beliefs indistinguishable has been

recorded in $\acute{S}_{13}$ through $\acute{S}_{15}$. It is to be noted that the Vaiśeṣika inference in question has for the subject of inferential knowledge (or *pakṣa*) the words being uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer; for the predicate or the feature being inferred (the *sādhya*) it has the property of (the words, that they are) being causally preceded by (the speaker's) awareness of the relevant fact, R^*; and lastly for the inferential ground (or *hetu*) it has the features (of the words) of syncategorematicity, semantic compatibility and uninterrupted sequence. In the passages $\acute{S}_{16}$ through $\acute{S}_{23}$ this Vaiśeṣika Inference-I was defended against various charges of discrepancy.

The final rejection of Gaṅgeśa of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I and, for the matter of that, of the reductionism based on this inference turns on the second interpretation of the charge of rendering indistinguishable a mistaken belief and the belief about that belief. Under this second interpretation the two beliefs are indistinguishable if they lead to the same behaviour.[2]

If Gaṅgeśa accepts, as it seems he does, the Vaiśeṣika defence offered in the passages $\acute{S}_{12}$ — $\acute{S}_{15}$ then it is settled that a belief about another belief which is false, is not itself false if falsity of a belief consists in its epistemic predicate being misplaced. Thus to believe that it is a snake where the thing in question is really a piece of rope is to have a belief with 'snake-ness' or 'the property of being a snake' as its epistemic predicate. Now the case being what it is the predicate is misplaced. This predicate *rightly* belongs to a snake or to a belief of it having the appropriate form; but here it has been asserted about what is really a piece of rope. None the less (the thing i.e.,) the belief in question does *actually* have the property of 'having as epistemic predicate the property of being a snake'. In other words, even though the thing (which really is a) *rope* does not have the property of being a snake, the other thing, i.e. the false belief, 'that it is a snake', is characterised by the property of having for its epistemic predicate 'is a snake'. Similarly the false belief "It is a piece of silver" (*Idam rajatam*) is truly a belief with 'is a piece of silver' or the property of being a piece of silver, as the epistemic predicate. (It is actually a *rajatatva prakāraka jñāna.*) So if this belief is cognised as a belief having for its epistemic predicate the property of being a piece of silver,

then that belief about this belief will be true. The thing (belief about the belief) does satisfy the characterisation of 'being about "a belief which has silverness as its epistemic predicate"'. The contained belief however is false. For it cognises the *it* (an oyster-shell, say,) as a piece of silver. The shell does not really have the property of being silver. Thus even when a thing being cognised (which is actually a shell) fails to have the property of being a silver—as is the case when the belief, that it is silver, is false—this false belief itself, (that) it is a silver, does have the property of being a belief in which the character of being a piece of silver figures as epistemic predicate. Hence the belief is one in which silverness figures as epistemic predicate. The epistemic predicate in a false belief is misplaced. But this does not imply that the epistemic predicate in the belief about this false belief is also misplaced. The thing (shell) does not have the property of being silver. So what figures as the epistemic predicate in the false belief—(in this case), 'This is a piece of silver'—is a misplaced epistemic predicate (*vyadhikaraṇa prakāra*). The belief therefore satisfies the description of being false, that is, being a belief with a misplaced property figuring as epistemic predicate. And the awareness behind such a description as 'the belief that it is silver (in case of a shell) is one which has a misplaced property as epistemic predicate, the belief about the false belief, is not itself false. In it no misplaced property figures as epistemic predicate. Gaṅgeśa seems to have accepted this much. Belief about a false belief is not false on that account. He has accepted the Vaiśeṣika defence against the charge that the Vaiśeṣika-s render indistinguishable a false belief and a belief about this belief because this second belief is equally and necessarily false. In his final rejection Gaṅgeśa brings a new charge against the Vaiśeṣika reductionism.

Gaṅgeśa turns the agreed truth which forms the basis of the Vaiśeṣika defence into an objection against them. He accepts the truth on which the Vaiśeṣika-s built their defence in $\acute{S}_{13}$-$\acute{S}_{15}$, adds a few other truths or premises to it and then derives certain unacceptable consequence. The truth on which the earlier defence is based is that though a belief about another belief, say, an introspective awareness of an earlier belief, has for its object the object of the other belief also, yet the two beliefs do not have

the same epistemic predicate. If the two beliefs were admitted to have the same epistemic predicate then the defence would not work. For the defence has two parts. It contends first that the falsity of a (false) belief consists in the misplaced character of its epistemic predicate and, in the second place, the epistemic predicate of a belief about a false belief is not misplaced. In view of this defence, (granting of course that it is correct), one would contradict oneself if one asserted that a belief and a belief about this belief have the same epistemic predicate. It should however be noted that the epistemic predicate of the contained belief or the belief being known, forms content of the apprehending belief. The content of a belief is either the epistemic subject or the epistemic predicate or the epistemic relation.[3] Now the epistemic predicate of the belief being apprehended does not figure as the epistemic subject or the epistemic relation[4] of the apprehending belief. One may therefore be puzzled to reconcile the two assertions that the the second belief about a belief does apprehend all (or almost all) the contents of the latter and that the two beliefs have different epistemic predicates (even though the epistemic predicate of the contained belief is neither the subject nor the relation of the apprehending belief while the only content of a belief other than the subject and the relation is the predicate). What the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintain is that the epistemic predicate of the contained belief falls on the predicate side of the apprehending belief without itself figuring as predicate of the apprehending belief. The epistemic predicate of the contained belief functions as further qualification of the epistemic predicate of the apprehending belief. It is of the sort of *prakāratāvacchedaka* rather than the *prakāra* of the apprehending belief. Thus if I have the belief 'This is a piece of silver' the silverness is the epistemic predicate of this (relatively) primary act of belief. My possible introspective belief about this belief has the form, I believe (have belief) that 'this is silver. The earlier belief itself figures as the epistemic predicate of apprehending belief. A belief gets determined to be the belief it is by virtue of its having the content it has. Thus the epistemic predicate of the contained belief determines that (contained belief itself) which determines the apprehending belief to be what it is. It is in this sense that the

epistemic predicate of the primary belief is a sort of determining feature (*avacchedaka dharma*) of the epistemic predicate of the knowing belief.

Anyway, it has been settled that, as it follows from the Vaiśeṣika-s defence in question, a belief and a belief about this belief have different epistemic predicates. Add to this the truth that often one acts as told or instructed by others. In such cases one acts on the belief one derives from the utterances of the speaker who informs or instructs. In accordance with the *IA* theory of sentential understanding of the reductivist Vaiśeṣika-s, the belief a hearer derives from an utterance—assertion or command—is necessarily a belief about a belief (of the speaker). On the Vaiśeṣika theory therefore we shall have to say that belief about a belief leads us to act or determine our conduct. Such a position tends to render indistinguishable the ways in which one who has a false belief and another who is conscious of this false belief act respectively. This is a new objection or new interpretation of the charge of obliterating the distinction between a false belief and a belief about this belief. The earlier objection was that both the beliefs were rendered false. The present charge is that both the beliefs [are made to] lead to the same kind of behaviour or act. This charge is to be further clarified; the form and the force of it are to be more thoroughly understood. But let us first present the objection as it has been formulated by Gaṅgeśa.

[$\acute{S}_{24}$]

> *Ucyate. Arthajñānaṃ pravartakaṃ na tu tajjñāna-jñānaṃ gauravāt vyabhicārāt ca. Ato rajatajñānavān ayamiti jñānaṃ na pravartakaṃ kintu idaṃ rajataṃ iti jñānam. Idamapi jñānaṃ rajataviṣayakamiti cet; satyam. na tu rajatatvaprakārakaṃ; pravartakaṃ ca tathā. Anyathā bhrāntasyeva bhrāntijñasyāpi pravṛttiprasaṅgaḥ, tadubhayasaṅkarāpattiśca.*
>
> [pp. 50-53]

[The following is] being said [in reply]. In consideration of violation (otherwise) of logical economy and (causal) necessity belief about a thing rather than the belief about

> the belief about that thing [should be admitted to] lead (us) to act. Thus the belief of the form 'This one [man] has belief about silver' does not induce action, but the belief of the form 'This is (a piece of) silver' does. If it be said that this (the former) belief too has silver for its (epistemic) content, (then) that is true; but (this belief) does not have for its epistemic predicate the property of being (a piece of) silver. What induces action is, however, (a belief) having that (predicate), as otherwise the consequence would be that one who knows a false belief would behave in the same way as one who is mistaken; the objection would be that the two [(sorts of) agents] would become indistinguishable.

It is agreed that a hearer acts when he hears and understands the speaker's words (instruction). But on the Vaiśeṣika-s theory it would mean that what induces a hearer to act is his belief about the (speaker's) belief about an object. One, however, does not act necessarily on the belief he derives from some speaker's assertion or instruction. One may and does at times act on primary perceptual belief about certain things like silver. Under the circumstances it would be wrong and logically uneconomical to insist that not the belief about a thing but the belief about the belief about that thing is required to induce us to act. Now if in consideration of simplicity or logical economy we prefer or accept the thesis that it is the belief about a thing (and not the belief about the belief about that thing) which causally determines us to act then either no action can result from the assertion or instruction of a speaker or the Vaiśeṣika-s must be wrong in maintaining that the belief a hearer derives from the assertion (instruction) of a speaker is not about the thing towards which, the action is directed, but (primarily) about another (speaker's) belief.

The truth to be accepted then is that the belief of a thing rather than the belief about the belief of that thing is what causes action. From this general truth it follows that one is not led to act when one knows about some person that the latter has a belief about silver. What induces one to act is one's own belief of the form 'this is silver'. In short one acts on the belief 'This is silver' rather than on the belief 'This or that man has belief about silver'. Both this general truth and the special case of it need some clarification;

as they stand they are somehow misleading. But before we turn to clarification we shall consider the second consideration Gaṅgeśa has adduced in support of the thesis that Bxa (or x believes that a ; belief of a thing) rather than BxBya (or x believes that y believes that a; belief about the belief of a thing) causes us to act. The consideration of logical economy has already been adduced in favour of Bxa thesis as distinct from the BxBya thesis. Gaṅgeśa not only says that BxBya thesis is logically uneconimical but also that it is unnecessary (*vyabhicāri*). What he means is that the BxBya thesis is vitiated by the disagreement in presence. A cause is required to agree with the effect in respect of presence. If the cause is there the effect should also be there. A thing cannot be the cause of an effect if it is not followed by the effect. One may have belief about another (man's) belief about a thing, he may believe that one (y) believes that here there is silver (a), without being led thereby to act. It is not obvious that we do not behave, when we know that we believe a piece of silver to be there (BxBxa), in the way in which we behave when we believe a piece of silver to be there (Bxa). It, however, seems obvious that we do not act when we know that some one else believes a piece of silver to be there (BxBya), in the same way in which we act when we ourselves entertain the belief that here there is a piece of silver (Bxa). But for the fact that the owners of the contained beliefs are different the two beliefs about the belief about silver (a) are the same in the two cases. If therefore the belief about belief causes us to act on one occasion, when we are the owner of both the contained and the containing beliefs, and does not do so on another occasion, as when we are the owner of the containing belief only, the belief about belief of a thing cannot be said to be the cause of our action. For a cause must always be followed by its effect; cause and effect must be necessarily related. If however something, say, a belief about belief of a thing, is found to have disagreement (*vyabhicāra*) in respect of presence (*anvaya*) with the alleged effect, here, the action of the knower, then the two cannot really be said to be related as cause and effect. Further BxBya does not agree, does not always go together with, the action of x directed towards a. So BxBya is not the type or form of belief which causes us to act.

Now we may turn to the misleading formulation of the truth

that the belief about the belief of a thing does not determine our conduct. We have earlier had occasion to assert that any determinate or judgemental belief can and does lead to appropriate action. Under the circumstances without further specifying the action we have in mind, we cannot say that BxBya does not while Bxa does determine us to act. The linguistic act of referring to or describing certain cognitive event, say Bx..., presupposes as a necessary cause BBx.... This is not only a fact of experience but also a truth at least of the Nyāya theory of knowledge.[5] So when in $\acute{S}_{24}$ Gaṅgeśa says that the belief about the belief about *a* does not lead to action he means it does not lead to actions like collecting it (an action directed towards the piece of silver in question).[6] Similarly the more general statement at the beginning of the passage is to be understood to mean that the belief about a thing rather than the belief about this belief is what causes action or volition as directed to *that thing*. Once we identify or individuate an action in terms of the thing to which it is directed then the (judgemental) belief rather than doubt about that thing should be assigned the role of the cause (or cognitive causal factor) of the action. Now if this much is settled and also it is settled that a man may be led to make a move to collect a piece of silver on being so instructed, or on being simply told that there is a piece of silver there, how can this be accounted for on the Vaiśeṣika theory? The hearer or the instructed person can only (strictly speaking, to begin with) have on the Vaiśeṣika theory an (inferential) belief about (the speaker's) belief about silver. In other words he will have a belief of the form BxBya. But this is the belief which we found cannot cause volition. So the Vaiśeṣika theory about the sort of belief a hearer derives from hearing an utterance must be wrong.

One may still insist that the belief about the belief about silver can cause the same action as the belief about silver for, as has been earlier established, the belief about the belief about *a* also has *a* for its object. So, as belief about *a* (or silver) there is no difference between BxBya and Bxa. (Strictly speaking the primary belief is of the form Bx or 'This is x' rather than Bxa). If the second could cause action the first could also cause it. This defence is unexceptionable if only the assumed premiss— that a belief causes the action it does because it takes as its *object* the thing towards

which the action is directed—were true. Gaṅgeśa says by implication that this premiss is not true when he admits ("*satyam*") that both these beliefs have *a* as object and then hastens to add, that BxBya does not have, however, for its epistemic predicate the property of being a silver. It is this property on the other hand which figures as the epistemic predicate in Bxa. But what Gaṅgeśa does not so explicitly say in this passage is that what epistemic predicate a belief has, and not what object it has, decides if and what action the belief will cause. The general principle is that volition or action with regard to a thing having certain property is caused by a belief in which that property figures as the epistemic predicate. The property of a thing figures as the epistemic predicate in the belief about that thing and not in the belief about the belief about that thing. In this second order belief that property figures somehow as the determining feature or further adjective (adverb) of the epistemic predicate. This is some what over-simplified way of formulating the Nyāya position or interpreting the relevant sentence of Gaṅgeśa's text. But for our purpose this may be deemed adequate.

The controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s[7] over the nature of the process of origin of the belief in which a hearer's understanding consists, can now be settled if we can choose between the two rival theories of volition or action. The Vaiśeṣika theory is that a belief having certain thing for its *object* (*viṣaya*) is the cause of the action directed towards that thing. The Naiyāyika-s maintain that the cause of action directed towards a thing having certain property is the belief in which that property figures as the *epistemic* predicate. Can we choose between these two theories? Gaṅgeśa's argument against the Vaiśeṣika theory is that it leads to unacceptable consequences. To this we may add that the Vaiśeṣika position is ambiguous. Let us begin with this second objection which will lead us to the first one. the Vaiśeṣika-s assign the role of a cause, in respect of an action towards *a*, to the belief which has *a* for its *object*. But the expression "having *a* as object" is ambiguous. An object of a cognition may mean what is apprehended in or what is there to be apprehended by the cognition in question. Or it may mean that (feature) as what the thing is apprehended in the cognition. Now if the Vaiśeṣika-s mean

to assign the role of a cause of action to a belief which apprehends the thing, it apprehends, *as a* then that is precisely the Nyāya position. In order to be led to undertake suitable action with regard to a piece of silver the agent must have a belief of the form 'This is silver'—a belief which apprehends the thing lying before the subject or agent, *as* a piece of silver. In short the subject or the agent must have a belief the epistemic predicate of which is the property of being a piece of silver (*rajatatva*). If thus the Vaiśeṣika-s too accept as part of their theory of action the truth that the cause of the action directed towards a thing having a certain property (say, silverness) is the belief in which that property figures as epistemic predicate then they will have to give up their inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding. For it must be admitted that a hearer is led (at least sometimes) to act by what he hears or what he comes to believe on hearing certain utterances; and that, according to the theory of action just sketched, the hearer must have a belief of the form 'This is *a*'. The inferential apprehension theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s, however, allows the hearer to have a belief only of the form 'The speaker believes that this is *a*. It now seems that the Vaiśeṣika-s would opt for the other theory of action to save their inferential apprehension theory. According to this other theory, to cause an action regarding *a* the action causing belief needs to have *a* as its object; it need not further have to be a belief in which the property of being an *a* figures as the epistemic predicate. What belief a hearer derives, on the Inferential Apprehension theory, from the utterance he hears, has a thing (having certain property) as its object even though the property of the thing does not figure as the epistemic predicate. From the context it is now clear that when the Vaiśeṣika-s assign the role of a cause of action regarding an *a* to the belief having *a*as its object, they do not mean also that the action causing belief must have the appropriate property as the epistemic predicate. Now the Vaiśeṣika position is adequately unambiguous. But stated unambiguously in this way the Vaiśeṣika theory of action is exposed to the charge brought by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{24}$ that the theory leads to unacceptable consequences. We now turn to this.

It is admitted that a hearer acts on the belief he derives from the utterance he hears. So one's theory of action and theory of

(hearer's) sentential understanding must be consistent with each other. In deference to the requirement of consistency with their inferential theory the Vaiśeṣika-s must formulate their theory of action adequately unambiguously. Accordingly they should hold that an action causing belief must have as its *object* the thing towards which the action is directed, it need not further have for its epistemic predicate the relevant feature of the thing. Now Gaṅgeśa points out that since both belief about an *a* and the belief about this belief about *a* are equally beliefs, having *a* as their object, both these beliefs would cause the same (type of) action. One who believes a fact R^* and one who believes that some one believes the fact R^* would, on this theory, behave in the same way. This is really unacceptable. Suppose one mistakenly believes that the thing lying before there is a snake, i.e., he entertains a belief of the form 'This is a snake'. We can well imagine how he would behave. But suppose a nearby man is there who comes to entertain (perhaps by observing the overt behaviour of the first man) the belief that the other man believes (thinks) this to be a snake. Would this second man also behave in the way the first man behaved or would behave ? The answer is obvious. If made explicit Gaṅgeśa's charge is that either we cannot explain on *IA* theory how hearers could act on the belief they derive from the utterances of speakers or we shall fail to distingush between the ways of a mistaken person and those of one (including God) who is aware of this mistake. If we adhere strictly to the theory that an action about a thing is caused by the belief having as epistemic predicate the relevant property of that thing then since a hearer cannot, on the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s, have such a belief we cannot explain how he is led to act on hearing the utterances of a speaker. But since the hearers act on what they understand when they hear the utterances of some speaker, the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s must be unsound.

II

It is a familiar fact that natural languages contain expressions that are ambiguous. The Vaiśeṣika-s may use this fact to construct an argument in favour of their *IA* theory, and so also against the verbal apprehension theory of sentential understanding of the Naiyāyika-s.

The essence of the argument is this. In order to understand a sentence containing one or more ambiguous expressions the hearer needs to *infer* first the intention of the speaker. But in the process the hearer is found to have inferred the relevant fact or R^*. So contrary to what the Naiyāyika-s maintain, we do not require a special means of knowledge to account for the belief of a hearer. There is no such thing as linguistic means or source of hearer's belief. The force of the argument is considerable. For if in one case even—in the case of say, sentences containing ambiguous expression—a hearer can derive his belief about R^* through inference then, at least, there will be no theoretical necessity for admitting language as a separate (*pramāṇa* or) accredited source of knowledge. Under the circumstance even if on some occasion—say, where a sentence does not contain any ambiguous expression—language does yield, as an independent source, for the hearer, a belief about the relevant R^*, still language cannot be regarded as a *pramāṇa* (in respect of hearer's belief). For a *pramāṇa* is a special type of cause of knowledge or true belief. And a cause must be the cause of all the effects of a certain class. So if language were a *pramāṇa* in respect of hearer's belief then no such belief could ever occur without involving language as a means. But a hearer does derive his belief about R^* from *inferential* means rather than from linguistic means in case, at least, the given sentence contains ambiguous expression. If now we are to choose between inference and language as the source of hearer's belief then it is better, in the interest of a uniform account, to accept inference as the source. For inference has already been included in the common scheme of *pramāṇa-s*. The Vaiśeṣika *IA* theory only extends its scope. It is logically more economical to extend the scope of an already admitted *pramāṇa* than to postulate or hypostatize an additional source of knowledge. Gaṅgeśa thinks that what has been said about the danger of *IA* theory in the previous passage can answer this Vaiśeṣika argument from ambiguous expression.

[$\acute{S}_{25}$]

Etena lakṣaṇādi anurodhāt tātparya graho vākyārtha-dhī hetuḥ, tātparyañca padārthasaṃsargaviśeṣa

> *pratītyuddeśyakatvam. Tathā ca tat grāhakānumānādeva tātparyajñānāvacchedakatayā saṃsargasiddhirityapāstam.*
>
> [p. 53]

> For reason such as this [the following argument of the Vaiśeṣika-s] is discarded. To account for sentential understanding in cases such as where words are used [ambiguously or] in their indirect signification, awareness of the intention [of the speaker] is [to be admitted as] cause of the [hearer's] belief about what the sentence signifies; intention again is the property of having been uttered with the desire to produce belief about some specific relation or R^* as obtaining between the meanings of the words uttered. Accordingly, R^* is known, in so far as it determines the belief about the [speaker's] intention to be what belief it is, by nothing else than the inference which apprehends the [intention].

Some times we use words in their indirect signification. Thus when the appropriate ministry takes a decision of the form "Mr. Zubin Mehta be invited to stage a performance in this country", what is meant is not just Zubin Mehta but Zubin Mehta and his party. While the individual man Zubin Mehta is the primary significate of the name, the expression indirectly signifies other men in his troup also. Similarly we use in Sanskrit utterance like "Let in the stick" (*Yaṣṭi praveśaya*). What the speaker means is that the man who has a stick in his hand (and others in his group) should be led into the room. Here also the expression "the stick" primarily signifies the thing stick which is the referent of this referring expression; but indirectly the expression signifies the man who has that stick in his hand. The expressions like "Zubin Mehta" or "the sitck" are not examples of ambiguous word. The individual or the individuals whom these words indirectly signify have their own definite names or definite descriptions. So the expressions in question are used to signify indirectly some individuals; but the expressions are not ambiguous; only, they have not been used in their standard direct, literal or primary sense. The sentence in question in which these expressions occur cannot be taken to have

been understood if the expressions are not understood in their indirect signification. The case is different with ambiguous words. The sentences "Bring me a repeater" could be understood even if the expression repeater was not understood to mean a revolver but a watch and *vice versa*. In whichever of its senses an ambiguous word occurring in a sentence is understood, the sentence would make perfect sense.[8] It will not be found to violate any syntactic or sementic requirement. But the particular context of utterance demands that the ambiguous expression contained in the utterance be understood in only one of its various primary senses and not in any other sense. If the hearer knows the context of the utterance of the word "Bring me a repeater" (or "Bring me *saindhava*") he can make out whether the speaker needs a watch or a revolver (or certain kind of salt or a certain species of horse).[9] If the hearer knows that the speaker is in a hurry, that he is to catch a train, then he can guess that the sepaker must be wanting to ascertain the exact time. His knowledge of this context will enable the hearer to infer that (the speaker must be wanting to ascertain what time it is and) it must have been the intention of the speaker to ask one to get him a watch. While thus inferring the intention of the speaker, the hearer already infers the fact or the R^*. For if the hearer infers that the speaker intends, by the utterence he makes, that the listener should understand that he wants the listerner to get him [the speaker] a watch, then the hearer not only infers that the speaker intends but also *what* the speaker intends him to understand by his utterance. This *what* which the speaker intends the hearer to understand is the meaning of the sentence i.e., the relevant fact or R^*. What the sentence means, asserts or describes, the particular fact R^*, is thus inferred by the hearer. The sentential understanding a hearer has, at least in the case of utterances containing ambiguous words, is a case of inference. So far, at least, the *IA* theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s should be accepted as correct.

Suppose being asked by a man, who is in a hurry, to get him a repeater our hearer brings him a revolver, he will be considered to have grossly misunderstood the intention of the speaker. But he can hardly be said to have failed to understand the sentence if we discount that intention. A sentence is understood in its literal sense in it is understood in the sense if it which is determined by

the syntax and semantics of the relevant words of the language. But one may understand a sentence literally even when one fails to grasp the intention of the speaker. To understand a sentence so as not to misunderstand the intention of the speaker is to understand the meaning of the sentence as shaped, widened or narrowed down, (also) by the context of utterance or the intention of the speaker. The context-relevant sense or intended sense of a sentence, in case of sentences containing ambiguous words, is one of the different senses each of which is determined by the syntax and semantics of the words involved. The context of utterance only serves to determine the intention of the speaker, it functions as a criterion to choose between different literal senses. Where a sentence does not contain any ambiguous word, there the literal sense of each word of the sentence and of the sentence itself is the same and there is no question of choosing between such different senses. If in such cases we use or understand a word of the given sentence not in its only primary signification but as meaning something related with what is the primary meaning of the term, do we do so because otherwise we could not make out any consistent semantic sense of the sentence (*anvayānupapatti*) or because we could not bring out the intended sense (*tātparayānupapatti*) of it ? Philosophers differ amomg themselves as they choose the first or the second alternative. But all would agree that the understanding of the context of utterance convinces us that some or all of the primary senses of certain expression of the given sentence could not have been intended by the speaker. Thus where a certain word is ambiguous or has been used ambiguously and not in its primary signification, the hearer must infer, before he can understand the sentence, the intention of the speaker to determine the context-relevant sense of the expression in question. But in the process the meaning of the sentence, the fact it describes or the R^* it asserts; gets inferred too.

Thus at least where the linguistic utterance contains one or more ambiguous expressions, the hearer must first infer the intention of the speaker, that is to say, he must infer the particular sense (among the possible senses) to convey which the speaker had uttered the sentence in question. If the utterance is "Please bring me a repeater", the hearer first infers, say, that the speaker

must have uttered the sentence to convey the request that he should be given a watch. The hearer could infer this because he knew the context of this utterance: the speaker is in a hurry to catch the train for Delhi and as such he must be wanting to ascertain the exact time. While thus inferring the intention of the speaker the hearer cannot help knowing the meaning of the sentence. In his inferential belief about the speaker's intention, the meaning of the sentence figures as what determines the belief to be the belief it is. Anyway, (i) since intention is what it is, (ii) since the given sentence contains an ambiguous word, (iii) since without first knowing the intention of the speaker his utterance cannot be understood, (iv) since this intention is to be inferred on the basis of the knowledge of the context of utterance of the sentence, and finally (v) since the meaning of the sentence figures as determinant of the inferential belief about the speaker's intention, it follows that at least in case of sentences containing ambiguous expression the hearer gets to know what the sentence means, what fact or relation it asserts or describes, through inference. Understanding a sentence is entertaining an inferential belief about some relevant R^*.

This line of argument, which tends to reinstate the inferential apprehension theory of sentential understanding advocated by the Vaiśeṣika-s, is being rejected in this passage by Gaṅgeśa. He discards this line of argument "for reason such as this" meaning, the argument he has offered in the preceding passage $\acute{S}_{24}$ against the Vaiśeṣika-s. The argument is that if the belief a hearer derives from a sentence is construed as (inferential) belief about (the speaker's) belief or intention relating to some relevant R^*, on the ground that both the beliefs have R^* as object, then the way a mistaken man behaves would be indistinguishable from the way in which one who knows this to be a mistake behaves. If on the other hand it is admitted that though the inferential belief of the hearer has R^* for its object yet only that belief about R^* causes appropriate volition or action as has R^* as its epistemic pridicate[10], then no one can act on the basis of the belief he derives inferentially from the ordinary or scriptural utterances. None of these consequences of the *IA* theory can be acceptable even to a Vaiśeṣika. Therefore, there must be something wrong with the

theory which has such consequences. In other words as a theory of sentential understanding the verbal apprehension theory of the Naiyāyika-s is to be preferred to the inferential apprehension theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s. But then language is to be admitted as a separate source of knowledge yielding verbal apprehension for the hearer. This style of rejection is essentially the one which Gaṅgeśa used in the previous passage. In the next passage $\acute{S}_{26}$ Gaṅgeśa offers one additional argument for rejecting the *IA* theory.[11] But we shall first suggest a line of transition or development which will link up passage $\acute{S}_{26}$ with $\acute{S}_{25}$.

III

The rejection of the argument from ambiguous expression as stated by Gaṅgeśa in $\acute{S}_{25}$, is, a Vaiśeṣika might say, misplaced or unsound. The same perhaps can be said of the similar rejection offered in $\acute{S}_{24}$. The main point of the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika reductionism, in question in $\acute{S}_{24}$ and of the supporting argument from ambiguous expression[12] offered in $\acute{S}_{25}$ is this. The hearer of a sentence or sentences containing ambiguous expressions first infers the speaker's belief or intention. The fact or R^* which constitutes the meaning of the sentence in question is the object of the inferential belief about the speaker's belief or intention. Now the herer's belief about the speaker's belief or intention cannot account for the volition or action of the hearer that results from the latter's understanding of the sentence in question. But it is a truth of the theory of action which even a Vaiśeṣika would admit that one is found to act on being told to do so or on the basis of some relevant information one derives from the utterances of some speaker.

A Vaiśeṣika may try to defend his position in either of these two ways. (I) On the reductivist theory or *IA* theory a hearer has an inferential belief about another (man's) belief or (about some one's) intention. This does not prove that he does not have the belief about R^* or that he does not act on his belief about R^* but only on the belief about belief about R^*. For a Vaiśeṣika might maintain that a hearer first has an inferential belief about the belief about R^* and then [13] he has a belief about R^*. Derivation of this belief about R^* involves some additional principle which

distinguishes it from the belief about belief in question in which it is embedded. This belief about R^* is none the less an inference. What is more, this belief may have R^* as its epistemic predicate. Now a Vaiśeṣika can explain how on his theory a hearer can act on hearing some linguistic utterance or instruction. It is not true that the Vaiśeṣika-s cannot explain such actions or that their theory of language or sentential understanding conflicts with some established truth of theory of action. (II) The Vaiśeṣika-s may as well offer an alternative defence. The hearer of a sentence does understand the sentence even in the sense of deriving a verbal apprehension of the relevant R^*. But he does so only after he understands the belief or the intention the speaker had behind his utterance. This prior understanding is inferential in nature. What is more, this inference of the belief or intention of the speaker is at the same time, though somewhat indirectly, the inference of R^*. Thus the verbal apprehension of an R^* is necessarily preceded by an inference of R^*. In his verbal apprehension a hearer apprehends what is already known through a commonly admitted and recognised accredited source of knowledge, namely, inference. So language as a means gives us no new truth; it gives us some old truth. It is, so to say, repetitive in nature; it is *anuvāda*. None the less this subsequent and repetitive (*gṛhitagrāhī*) verbal apprehension (*śādbabodha*) of R^* has R^* as its epistemic predicate and suffices for action to be undertaken on the basis of the instruction or information communicated by the utterance in question. Though in this way language can yield the belief which can cause action yet this belief, having no novelty, cannot warrant our postulating a seperate source for it; linguistic utterance cannot be accepted as an independent source of knowledge. In this way a Vaiśeṣika can retain somehow his reductionism even in the face of the objection that such reductionism cannot explain action or distinguish between the agent who is mistaken and an agent who is aware that a mistake has been committed. This second line of defence will come up for discussion in the passage $\acute{S}_{27}$. In $\acute{S}_{26}$ Gaṅgeśa offers an additional argument for rejecting the *IA* theory which however can be found to be connected with what has been said in $\acute{S}_{25}$ under the defence (I) noted at the beginning of this paragraph.

[$\acute{S}_{26}$]

Kiñca vyāpakatāvacchedakaprakārikānumitirataḥ smāritapadārtha saṃsaragajñānapūrvakāṇītyanumitiḥ syāt na tu rajatajñānapūrvakāṇīti; tasmāt pravartakaṃ jñānaṃ śabdādeva.

[pp. 54-55]

Further, an inferential belief has for its epistemic predicate (the property) which determines the *vyāpaka* character (of what is being inferred); hence [here] the inference shall be of the form '...... preceded by the awareness of the relation obtaining between the things recalled [and signified by the words in question]' and not of the form '...... preceded by the awareness of silver'. Therefore the belief which causes action is yielded by nothing other than words.

Our volition or action is always directed towards some definite and determinate object like a piece of silver. If we ask a man "Please bring me that piece of silver" or if we utter audibly the sentence "Here there is a piece of silver", then the man may adopt a definite practical attitude. He may will or move to collect that piece of silver. But if in a similar situation we said "Bring me something" or "Here there is a material object" no definite action on the part of the hearer could perhaps be expected, at least, not the same action. Thus the appropriate volition or action of a man who wants to have silver (*rajatārthi*) would be caused by his belief to the effect that here there is a piece of silver. He can have this *verbal* belief on hearing the sentence "Here there is a piece of silver" or "*Idaṃ rajatam*". But those who deny that language is an independent accredited source of knowledge cannot admit that the hearer could have this verbal apprehension in question. They on the other hand would admit, according to *IA* theory, that the hearer shall have the appropriate *inferential* belief on hearing the sentence in question; he will infer, say, in the way formulated in the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I. Subject of this inference will obviously be the words of the sentence viz; "here", "there". "is" etc. The ground of the inference are the features of syncategorematicity etc. of these words. Now these features are inferentially connected

with the fact that these words have been preceded by the (speaker's) awareness of the relation that obtains between the things in so far as they are signified and recalled by these words. These features of syncategorematicity etc. are not exclusive properties of the words of the single given sentence in question. So they are not inferentially connected with the singular fact that *these* particular words are preceded by the particular awareness of there being a piece of silver here. They are connected with this fact no doubt, but only in so far as it has, what it shares, with many such facts described by many other sentences; some general aspect or description. To ensure adequate power of a single type of inference it is required, according to the Nyāya theory of inference, that the ground of an inference should prove the object or event being inferred not as that particular object or dated event but as members of a certain class of objects or events. Smoke, as appropriate ground for the purpose, proves fire on the basis of its especial relation with fire. But no smoke is related with fire as that smoke; no smoke is inferentially related with that particular fire. It is related with anything having firehood or fire-character. Similarly the features of words occurring in sentences are connected with the respective fact or sentence meaning in a general way. The features of the present sentence in question prove the fact of silver not as silver but only as (in so far as silver etc. are) the thing signified and recalled (*smāritārtha*) by the words, in question. The relation which figures as the predicate of the inferential cognition yielded by the inference of the type Vaiśeṣika Inference-I, that is to say, the R^* which is being inferred, is taken in that aspect of it in which it has the ground of inference related to it. In this case though the relation being inferred is the one which obtains between the things, space and silver or silver and silverness, yet the things are not so much taken as those particular things as things signified and recalled by the words in question. According to the reductivist theory therefore a hearer derives from the sentence he hears an inferential belief about R^* where R^* is the relation which obtains between things as (in so far as they have or are taken to have the (their general) aspect of being) signified and recalled by the words in question and not in so far as they are the specific things they are— silver, silverness, space in the vicinity and so on. While for his action

a hearer requires to have a belief about things as, say, a piece of silver, the inference of the reductivists yields only an inferential belief about R^* being the relation that obtains between the same things but only in so far as they have the general feature of being recalled by the words. The same silver which we perceive as silver is being inferred here not as silver but as thing signified and recalled by the words being uttered. For syncategorematicity etc. do not bear relation of inference to silver etc. in their specific aspect of silverness but in their general aspect of being recalled by words (having syncategorematicity etc). But what causes volition is not the general truth that things recalled and signified by the words stand related but the particular truth that here there is a piece of silver. Where from does then the hearer derive the belief which causes the action which he admittedly performs? He must be admitted to derive it from the utterance and nothing else. The belief which causes volition or action is thus verbal and not inferential. For such belief, at least, language must be admitted as a spearate and independent source.

This argument from a general truth of theory of inference i.e., about the nature of inferential predicate, is an additional argument to show that we cannot dispense with language as a separate means of knowledge, nor can we make do with the inferential means only. In $\acute{S}_{24}$ an argument from the nature of the predicate of the action causing belief— that the epistemic predicate of the belief must be the property of the thing towards which the action is directed—was given. Both these arguments show that we cannot afford to deny language as a means of knowledge or at least of action causing belief. In $\acute{S}_{24}$ it was shown that a volition or action which is directed towards a particular thing having certain character is caused by that belief in which the property of the thing in question figures as epistemic predicate. In $\acute{S}_{26}$ it is said that the predicate of an inferential belief is a thing (property) viewed under the aspect of having the (more general) property which determines the character of the thing (property) as *vyāpaka* or as being inferred i.e., as that to which the ground of the inference is related by way of the inferential relation (of *vyāpti*). Whereas a practical belief needs to know a thing taken in more or less narrow and specific, concrete and particular aspect; the inferential predicate is (a thing

taken in its) more generic aspect. This aspect or property determines the thing not as that thing or as the thing towards which the action is directed, it determines the thing as *vyāpaka,* i.e., as having the feature which every epistemic predicate of every inference displays.

IV

The Vaiśeṣika-s might offer, as we suggested, the defence (II) following the Prābhakara Mīmāmsaka-s. They might hold that the *vaidika* sentences are really *pramāṇa* or are sources of novel truth. But what one knows from an ordinary utterance is what one already knew when one inferred that the utterer made the utterance on the basis of his knowledge of the relevant fact. This inference of the relevant belief (or intention) of the speaker is a part of the inference of the character of the speaker as an authoritative person. It is sometimes maintained that we cannot derive knowledge from an ordinary sentence without first knowing that the speaker of the sentence is an authoritative person. But it is through inference that we can ascertain the authoritative character of a speaker. Now when the hearer of an ordinary sentence infers that the speaker is an authoritative person, he infers what is a part of the meaning of 'an authoritative person', that the speaker possesses the knowledge of the fact or the relation which the sentence describes or conveys information about . It is the belief about this fact or the relation, which one is supposed to derive from the sentence itself. If one does derive the belief or the truth about an R^* from the sentence (particularly when the sentence is an ordinary sentence and not a *vaidika vākya*) only after inferring that the speaker knew this R^* before he made the utterance then the sentence as a means of belief does not yield any novel information. The hearer knew this R^* already at the time of inferring the speaker's knowledge of the fact or his authoritative character.

By failing to yield any novel information, failing to make us aware of something which was not known already the alleged linguistic means fails to satisfy the test of a *pramāṇa* or accredited source of knowledge. Language as a source of information is repetitive. It reiterates the truth already yielded by inference. So even without denying that language yields for hearers belief about

R^* we can and we should deny either that this belief is a *pramā,* a novel truth, or that the source of it, the given sentence, is a special means— the linguistic means— of this distinctive kind of *pramā.* In short *Śabda* is not a distinctive *pramāṇa.* This then is the Vaiśeṣika defence. With the rejecion of this defence in the following passage $Ś_{27}$ Gaṅgeśa concludes his criticism of the Inference-I of the Vaiśeṣika-s and also of the reductionism in question in so far as it is based on the Vaiśeṣika-s Inference-I.

[$Ś_{27}$]

Ataeva pravṛtyartham anuvādakatā sabdasya ityapāstam. Śabdānumityorbhinnaprakārakatvāt ekaviṣayatvābhāvena ananuvādakatvāt tasyaiva pramāṇatvāt.

[pp.55-57]

Therefore, [the view] that in order to account for action language is to be admitted as a source of known truth is discarded. [In the context of sentential belief] it is the language [and not inference] which is the source of novel truth; for epistemic predicates of the inferential and the verbal beliefs are different; and without having the same thing as its object [a belief] cannot be a reiteration [of an old truth].

The expression "therefore" refers to the argument and the conclusion, based on the argument, which can be found in the passage $Ś_{26}$ and explained in the previous section. Towards the end of the last but one paragraph of that section we arrived at the conclusion that a hearer derives his action causing belief (*pravartakajñānam*) from language and nothing else. Therefore, or if that conclusion is correct then it follows, that language should be admitted to yield for the hearer a belief about R^* even though he had this belief before as a part of his inferential belief about the speaker's intention or belief regarding R^*. For otherwise the hearer cannot, though he admittedly does, act on the basis of what he hears. The conclusion in question was supported in the previous passage by an argument from the rather general character of the

inferential predicate. In continuation of that it is being said now that the fact that the inferential belief and the corresponding verbal belief which can cause action have different epistemic predicates, these beliefs themselves are different; there cannot be original and reiteration relation between the two. For a belief can be said to reiterate (*anuvādāka*) in relation to another belief if the two beliefs have (identically) the same content. Now a judgemental belief has three sorts of object. It has a subject, a predicate and a relation. A verbal belief, which allegedly reiterates the corresponding inferential truth, is known to have a different epistemic predicate and hence different object. If thus the verbal belief does not have the same predicate which the inferential belief has and, so far, it does not have the same object which the inferential belief has, then the verbal belief cannot be said to be a mere reiteration of the inferential belief. For a reiterating belief must have the same object. If a belief does not have the same object as another belief then in relation to that another belief the belief in question cannot be a case of reiteration. So a verbal belief carries novel information. It is a case of *pramā* or *knowledge* in its own right; and the source that yields it, the language or *śabda*, is a *pramāṇa*, or an accredited source of knowledge proper. Inference of the type of Vaiśeṣika Inference-I yields, for the hearer, at most a belief to the effect that the speaker had the belief or intention ragarding the relation between word-meanings *qua* word meanings. But our actual action depends on more specific belief, say, the belief about R^* obtaining between word-meanings not *qua* word-meanings but *qua* their more specific character of being a silver and the like. Language which yields this action causing belief yields a belief having a different and more specific, epistemic predicate. So far language as means does not simply reiterate the truth already yielded by inference. Hence language must be admitted to be a distinctive source of knowledge. We should add to our scheme or *pramāṇa*, linguistic means as an additional accredited source of knowledge.

Notes and References

CHAPTER ONE

1. Edwards, P. (ed.), 1967, Vol. 4, p. 389.
2. Edwards, P. (ed.), 1967, Vol. 6, p. 221.
3. Edwards, P. (ed.), 1967, Vol. 4, p. 389.
4. Those who advocate the study of language as a means of determining the ontology which the users of the language accept, differ among themselves in important ways. And there are those who do philosophy of language more or less for its own sake. We should keep all these three distinct— linguistic philosophy, contemporary ontology (both Quinean and Strawsonian variety) and philosophy of language (in both its pure and impure form).
5. The Philosophers, Grammarians and Linguists have different orientations even when the areas of their interest and study overlap. And where there is no compelling reason to deny, a philosopher of language can accept the views of the linguists on relevant matters.
6. *cf.* Mukhopadhyay 1984, pp. 78-79, p. 246.
7. *cf.* Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya 1982, p. 12.
8. There is a lot of confusion about the exact connotation of the expression 'grammar' *cf.* Palmer, 1971, pp. 11-13 and Lyons 1973, p. 23. Grammar, however, is usually, distinguished from both phonology and semantics. *cf.* Palmer, 1971, p. 13 and Lyons 1970/73, p. 23. It is also viewed in standard recent literature as having to do with sentences; grammar of a language consists of a set or sets of rules which generate (a finite or infinite) set of sentences *cf.* Smith and Wilson 1979, p. 277. In India, however, *vyākaraṇa* is thought to relate to sub-sentential linguistic expression *pada* (roughly word)

rather than *vākya* (sentence). It chiefly studies word construction. However there is no single notion of *vākya* or *pada*.

In the *Parāśarapurāṇa* one finds "*Pāṇinīyaṃ mahāśāstram padasādhutvalakṣaṇam*", quoted by Pandit Sadāśiva Śāstri in p. 3 of his Introduction to *Parama Laghu Mañjuṣā* edited by himself and published by The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office, Benaras 1946. In p. 13 of the same edition *padasādhutva* has been defined with reference to Pāṇinīya *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* of Patañjali. Definition of *vyākaraṇa* attributed to Gaṅgeśa by Jhalkīkāra in his *Nyāyakośa* cannot be found in verbatim in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Gaṅgeśa holds the view that though grammar especially relates itself to the question of *sādhutva* and *asādhutva* yet it is not so much a source of *sādhutva*. And it is only one of the means of knowing the same. *cf.* *Tattvacintāmaṇi* 1897/1990, Vol. IV, Part II,pp. 648-49. Before Gaṅgeśa, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa had thoroughly discussed the issues relating to *padasādhutva*. *cf.* Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, 1936, pp. 374-378.

9. *cf.* Jayanta 1936,p. 374, Gaṅgeśa 1897/1990, pp. 649-650.
10. Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya 1982, p. 16; Gurupada Haldar p. 438; Cardona 1988 p. 1. Gurupada gives references of Pāṇini *Sūtra* where all the ten predecessors have been named. Rāmājñā names the same ten but gives, obviously mistakenly, the number as eleven. But as a matter of fact there were as has been noted by Haldar many more *pūrvācārya*-s.
11. Examples of *prakriyāvyākaraṇa* are *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣit, *Prakriyākaumudī* of Ramacandra. There are many such works. I am inclined to include *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini in this group. But Paninian *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is itself grouped together with *Prātiśākhya*, *Śikṣā* and *Nirukta* under the single head *Vyākaraṇa*. *cf.* Rāmājñā 1982,p. 15. That *Nirukta* is the concluding part of *Vyākaraṇa* is ascertained from the words of Yāska himself. *cf.* Yāska 1985,p. 41 "*Tadidaṃ vidyāsthānaṃ vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyaṃ svārthasādhakaṃ ca.*" Yāska flourished much later than Pāṇini. *cf.* Damodara 1904, *śāka* pp. 1-4. *Prātiśākhya*-s under reference are also post Paninian works. So far as *Śikṣā* literature is concerned, all works in the field may not belong to post Pāṇini period though some works do. Rāmājñā 1982, p. 15.
12. Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* is a very good example of philosophy of grammar. Both technical grammar (*prakriyā-vyākaraṇa*) and philosophy of grammar (*vyākaraṇasya darśanam* or *vyākaraṇadarśanam*) concern themselves with all or some of the five special topics of *vyākaraṇa* viz. *prakṛti, pratyaya, sandhi, samāsa* and

kāraka. cf. Rāmājñā 1982, p. 1. Best example of philosophical grammar (*vyākaraṇameva darśanam*) are *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari and *Śabdacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is a blend of philosophy of grammar and philosophical grammar. Clear distinction between these two types cannot be made or expressed very easily. What we mean by philosophical grammar does not presuppose *prakriyāvyākaraṇa* in a way in which philosophy *of* grammar does. Philosophical grammar can very well be a part of a standard philosophical work. Certain part of discussion contained in portions of *Mahābhāṣya* could have easily formed part of *Nyāyabhāṣya* or *Śabdacintāmaṇi*.

13. *Suptiṅantaṃ padam cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.14. The portion of *Mahābhāṣya* beginning with "*kaḥ śabdaḥ*" etc. could have figured in the *śabdaprakaraṇa* of any standard text of Philosophy. Incidentally Gurupada Haldar has said following Jayāditya 4/3/88 that *Vākyapadīya* is a *prakaraṇagrantha*. This seems to be an inaccurate description of such comprehensive a work as *Vākyapadīya*.
14. Chomsky's distinction between linguistic competence and performance is best done from single point of view of the speaker. Competence consists in *speaker's* knowledge of language whereas performance consists in the speaker's use of the same. *cf.* Smith and Wilson 1979, p. 14. More precisely linguistic performance is the use of language in speaking and *understanding* utterances. Use of language in communication presupposes speaker's knowledge of language, linguistic competence on his part, in addition to the knowledge of the thing being sought to be expressed in language. If we distinguish between knowledge of language and knowing from language then the latter presupposes a speaker hearer context. The speaker needs must know the language if he is to use language competently in the sense of producing grammatically correct linguistic expressions. (In point of fact the speaker must know something more also, as we have said earlier) A hearer, if he is to understand what some one else tells him, must know the language in the sense of having competence but must also know the meaning of the sentence or words therein. Thus performance model include competence model. However in the theory of linguistic performance we are primarily concerned with knowing from language as means and not knowing the language itself. *cf.* Bhartṛhari *Brahmakāṇdam* 53.
15. Discussions of whether *śabda* is eternal or not, whether it is a quality of *ākāśa* or not etc. seem to fall in the area of ontology.
16. *cf.* Bhartṛhari 1988, p. 200 verse 131; Sometimes it is held that as

ancilliary to the *Veda*, *vyākaraṇa* would serve the same purpose, or lead to the same goal, as the former; and that goal is evidently liberation. Thus even if it has not been said in so many words by Pāṇini (or Patañjali) that *Vyākaraṇa* can enable us to attain liberation in addition to *abhyudaya* yet one can argue that it does in the way explained in the previous sentence or in the sentence that follows. In *Praśnoponiṣat* in the section relating to the fifth question it seems to have been said more directly that the result of the study of *vyākaraṇa* is liberation. Some have argued that *śabda* itself being the same as self *vyākaraṇa* which yields correct knowledge of *śabda* yields correct knowledge of self, and as such it leads to *mokṣa*. *cf.* *Kālikā* 1961, Introduction p. 4.

17. Doubts have been raised by Shrimati Uma Bandyopādhyay whether the reasons are good enough. For some of the materials of this section I am indebted to what she has written in her unpublished paper "The Anomalous Nyāya Scheme of Pramāṇa-s."
18. The expression 'passage' will be used in this work to signify any short or long portion of the text of *Śabdacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa which can be treated as a unit in the sense of expressing fully a point whether of the author or of some of his opponents. Such passages have been numbered by adding different subscripts to the letter '*Ś*' standing for '*Śabdacintāmaṇi*. Thus $Ś_{14}$ will be read as passage number 14 (from the beginning) of *Śabdacintāmaṇi*. A passage has sometimes been divided into sentences, which have also been numbered. Thus $Ś_{10(2)}$ will mean sentence 2 of passage 10 of *Śabdacintāmani*. The passage 1 of *Śabdacintāmaṇi*, or $Ś_1$ however, contains a single sentence.
19. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1967, p. 365 or Gaṅgeśa 1897/1990, Vol. IV Part I, p. 1.
20. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1967, p. 355, Gaṅgeśa 1897/1990, Vol. III,p.1.
21. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1897/1990, Vol. I,p. 538
22. *cf.* Jayanta 1936, p. 128.
23. The word *śabda* is ambiguous. In such context as "*Pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ ityucyate*" (Patañjali 1987, Vol.,I p. 19. *See* also Nāgeśa (a) p. 19) or in the context of the expression "*Śabdaśakti*" the word "*śabda*" usually means such subsentential expression as a word (*pada*) or parts thereof. On the other hand the same word standardly means a sentence or *vākya* when it occurs in the context of the expression "*śabdapramāṇa*".

    In the present work the use of the expressions "*śabda*", "knowledge", "belief", "*bhāṣā*", "*jñāna*" are meant to be

understood (differently) with reference to the exact and particular context of their occurrence. Thus both the words "*jñāna*" and "knowledge" have been used sometimes in the sense of *pramā* or true belief and sometimes in the sense of just *buddhi* or belief. The word "language" has rarely been used in the sense of totality of all actual and potential sentences. It has often been used in the sense of a single sentence. Sometimes words in the plural has been used in place of sentence.

24. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1987/1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 649.
25. *cf.* Mathurānātha (a) in Gaṅgeśa 1897/1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 7 *Icchaiva kramaniyāmikā.*
26. The word "*pramāṇa*" is ambiguous in a way in which "perception" is ambiguous. "Perception" is sometimes used to signify a source of knowledge (Chisholm 1977, p. 122) and sometimes it is used to signify the (type of) knowledge which this means yields viz. perceptual belief or knowledge. "*Pramāṇa*" sometimes means source of knowledge in general. Thus perception (*pratyakṣa*) is a *pramāṇa*, inference (*anumāna*) or words of trustworthy persons (*āpta*) is a *pramāṇa*. Sometimes again "*pramāṇa*" is used to signify knowledge in general. It may be called *pramā* sense of "*pramāṇa*". Perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge etc. are all alike knowledge or *pramāṇa* (i.e. *pramā*). Thus while perception, inference etc. are types of *pramāṇa* or individual sources of knowledge so also perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge are particular types of knowledge.

    Between the two senses of *pramāṇa* the source (*karaṇa*) sense is derivative. The fundamental sense of the word *pramāṇa* is (the resulting state of) knowledge. But even when *pramāṇa* means knowledge it means non-recollective knowledge only. A memory belief even when it is true is not usually counted among *pramāṇa* (=*pramā*)-s. Sometimes we have used the expression "knowledge proper" to mean true and non-recollective belief (*pramā* or *pramāṇa*) acquired through some accredited source of knowledge (*pramāṇa* = *pramākaraṇa*).
27. Sometimes it is held that the meaning of the word "*aṭha*" is *maṅgla*. This does not seem to be strictly true. Unless one over interprets the frequently quoted · verse "*Oṁkāraścāthaśabdaśca dvāvetau Brahmaṇaḥ purā; Kaṇṭham bhitvā vinirjātau tena māṅgalikāvubhau*" or fails to note the guarded statement of Śamkarācārya (Śaṃkara 1835, p. 35; also Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 102) one would not have held such a view. Strictly speaking it is auspicious to utter or hear the word. *cf.* Apte 1970, p. 12. Compare Nāgeśa 1987 under Pāṇini Sūtra 1.3.1.

Sm. Parboti Chakraborty brought to my notice that *Amarakoṣa* does give *maṅgala* as the meaning of the word "*atha*".

28. Gaṅgeśa's discussion of *maṅgla* constitutes the first self-contained section of the book *Tattvacintāmaṇi* taken as a whole. This section is known as *Maṅglavāda* and is included (pp. 1-114) in the Volume I of the Asiatic Society edition. This portion has been edited by Gaurinath and published separately (Gaurinath 1979).

29. In the section *Maṅgalavāda* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Gaṅgeśa has recorded his act of performing *maṅgala*; he has critically discussed and rationally defended the practice of performing *maṅgala* in the beginning of writing a book. The practice is very old. Patañjali has noted the value of the act of *maṅgala* at the time of writing a book (*cf.* Patañjali 1988,p. 51). He is also of the opinion that *maṅgala* should be performed not only in the beginning but also in the middle and at the end. In his *Bhāṣya on Pāṇini sūtra* 1.3.1 he writes "*Mangalādini maṅgala madhyāni mangalāntāni hi śāstrāni prathate...*". So Gaṅgeśa can perform *maṅgala* in the beginning of the last part of his book which is almost a book by itself, even though he had earlier performed the same act at the time of writing the first part of the text. Gaṅgeśa was well aware of the fact that this practice had a long history. He had quoted *Manusmṛti* 4/146 besides adducing many independent arguments in favour of this act in the section *Maṅgalavāda*.

30. *cf.* Kṛshnakānta Vidyāvāgīsha 1990, p. 3.

31. An example may be cited where the word "*atha*" was used to signify that the thing to the name of which "*atha*" was prefixed constituted the subject matter of the discourse. Patañjali begins his *Mahābhāṣya* with the words "*Atha śabdānuśāsanam*". He later himself explains "*athetyayam śabdo adhikārārthaḥ prayujyate*".

32. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1988, pp. 83-85. Gautama and, following him, Vātsyāyana perform in their respective works each of these separately; but Jayanta did not follow the same practice (Jayanta 1936, p.11), Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that there is no necessary order between division and definition (*cf.* Vātsyāyana 1985, p. 85)

33. *cf.* Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1.

34. *cf.* Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.3.

35. *cf.* Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 1.1.6 and 1.1.7.

36. *cf.* Gautama, Nyāya *sūtra* 1.1.3 and *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana thereon.

37. A short list of topics may be found in the contents of part IV of Gaṅgeśa 1990, and in Subrahmanya Sastri's *Upodghāta* in Maṇikaṇṭha 1953, pp.79-80.

38. The idea of *sahakārin* (auxiliary) or *sahakārikāraṇa* (auxiliary causal condition) and the attended division of causal conditions (*kāraṇa*) into principal and auxiliary is difficult to formulate or clarify satisfactorily. Kālikāprasād in his introduction to Nāgeśa 1961 holds that a *sahakārikāraṇa* is the condition which is different from the principal condition and yet contributes to the production of the effect of the principal condition. *cf.* Nāgeśa 1961, p. 32.
39. For descriptions of the process of speech production, speech reception and deriving knowledge of things from speech produced one may read Dāmodara 1904 (Ś) p. 19f; Mathurānātha 1897/1990, Vol. IV, Part I,p. 8f; and Gaṅgeś'a 1897/1990, Vol. I,p. 350f.
40. It is practically impossible to state briefly and in English what these factors are the awareness of which a man must have (in addition to his auditory perception of words (spoken) and memory cognition, which follows, of the corresponding things) if he is to derive any information from what he is told. There is, however, no unanimity among the thinkers as to the meaning of the terms which are commonly used to refer to these factors, namely, *ākāṅkṣā*, *āsatti*, *yogyatā,* and *tātparya*. This creates unsolvable problem of translation particularly at this stage when we are reporting and explaining a debate between different school of philosophers who may not understand these terms in the same way. Again there is controversy as to whether the properties these terms signify are syntactic properties of words of a sentence uttered (of words even outside such context) or of things which correspond to these words. *Ākāṅkṣā* is sometimes viewed from psychological point of view. *cf.* Coward and Raja 1990, p. 84. There is a third problem also. If one must have awareness of these features also before one can come to know what the sentence in question informs, then the resulting knowledge of the fact described by the sentence must be preceded by altogether six episodic cognitions each of which is a causal condition. But the Nyāya view is that, barring certain exception, a cause and its effect cannot be separated by more than two *kṣaṇa*-s (roughly moments). Thus only two successive congnitions can (causally) precede a linguistic belief. These two are held to be hearer's auditory perception of the words spoken by the speaker and hearer's subsequent memory of the corresponding things. How can one accommodate the awareness of each of these other four factors within the span of these two *kṣaṇa*-s preceding the moment of the occurrence of the resulting knowledge of the hearer? These are some of the difficult problems which have been discussed in the relevant literature. But there is no scope here to reproduce them nor

is it possible to take side with only one group of thinkers.

Anyway, that these four factors of *ākāṅkṣā* etc. or awareness of them, are necessary (causal) condition is fairly commonly agreed (*cf.* Sadāśiva 1946,p. 33, Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV,Part I,p. 182; Śālikanātha 1961, p. 384). But as to the second of the three problems noted above there seems to be this broad division among the thinkers. The Vaiyākaraṇa-s hold that *ākāṅkṣā* etc. are features of words. It seems that some Vedāntin-s think that they are properties of things (*cf.* Madhusūdana 1980 p. 33 foot note; Sadāśiva 1946, p. 35; Dharmarājā 1883, (Ś) p.147). Sometimes *ākāṅkṣā* is understood to be a certain form of desire (*cf.* Nāgeśa 1949 p. 33). This desire is a property of self (according to the Naiyāyika-s and Vaiyākaraṇa-s) or of *antaḥkaraṇa* (according to the Vedāntin-s). (*cf.* Kālikāprasad p.78). This is then transferred to words or to the things the relation between which a sentence asserts. There are usages which seem to support respective transfers. Nāgeśa is of the opinion that transfer should never be made to thing (*artha*) but to word (*pada*). *cf.* Nāgeśa 1948, p. 34. Gaṅgeśa's final view (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I,p. 208) is that *ākāṅkṣā* consists in the incompleteness of the speech or in such unfulfilled or arrested utterance of words which if fulfilled there would have been a complete utterance. It cannot immediately be made out whether *ākāṅkṣā* in this sense is a feature of words or of the things. The standard view of the post Gaṅgeśa Naiyāyika-s in the matter seem to be somewhat different from though not incompatible with the view of Gaṅgeśa. According to these Naiyāyika-s certain definite order (*ānupūrvī*) among the constituent words of a given sentence is *ākāṅkṣā*. This order characterizes words of a sentence and not what things correspond to them. *Yogyatā*, which has been translated here as semantic compatibility or semantic propriety is a feature which characterizes extra-linguistic things that answer to the words of a well formed sentence. Thus strictly speaking all the four features of *ākāṅkṣā, āsatti, yogyatā* and *tātparya* cannot be the properties of either things (*artha*) or words (*pada*). *cf.* Jagadīśa 1973, pp. 12-13.

The word *ākāṅkṣā* is often translated as expectancy. A word like "Socrates" expects another word such as "flies" to make a complete (sentential) sense. I have translated the expression "*sākāṅkṣa śabda*" as syncategorematic word or word having the character syncategorematicity. Syncategorematic expressions include not only words like 'if', 'all' and 'the' but also adverbs and adjectives (*cf.* Lacey 1976, p. 28); what is common to all types of syncategorematic

expressions is certain sort of semantic incompleteness. They are somehow incomplete in meaning. If we understand by complete meaning the meaning which only a (complete) closed sentence has, then any part of such a sentence, that is any subsentential expression is incomplete in meaning as otherwise the rest of the sentence would have been redundant. It is for this reason that nouns or names have been grouped as *sākāṅkṣa*; in respect of sense they fall short of a sentence. This is one reason why I have extended the use of the word syncategorematic beyond even adjective and adverb. Any word or phrase considered as part of a potential sentence is a syncategorematic expression. But considered as items of a mere list of words such as horse, man, elephant, cow, vulture, etc., the listed words are not syncategorematic but *nirākāṅkṣa*. *cf.* Patanjali 1987, Vol. I ,p.10.

See below Chapter 3,note 18.

. . This point needs to be very clearly borne in mind. Here there is real danger of confusion. Much of the discussion about language in the contemporary West by the philosophers of language and linguists concern theory of meaning or theory of understanding. It seems that each of these concerns is intended at least in theory (though it has not been possible in practice always) to be kept separate from discussion about knowing at second hand. This last is the central concern of the theory of language (*śabda*) as viewed by the Indian philosophers. In the eyes of the contemporary analytic philosophers of the West this may appear to be a concern of epistemology; concern as to if and how a person's utterance can function as evidence, for "the generation of *evidence* through testimony is a pre-requisite for the generation of *knowledge* through testimony" where testimony is "any verbalized reporting of a purported state of affairs where the reporter intends that the hearer will take it on his report that the state of affiars is *as* reported" (Ross 1975, p.38, 36). Elsewhere I have discussed elaborately how best to distinguish as well as relate the two theories of meaning and *śabdapramāṇa*. Here it suffices to say that an utterance is viewed, in the context of the theory of *śabdapramāṇa*, mainly as a special means to a certain type of belief or knowledge. As resulting from linguistic or verbal means the belief that results may be called verbal or linguistic knowledge. This convention is consistent with the practice of describing the belief that results from perception or sensory evidence as perceptual.

But a sentence may also be viewed (and it is so viewed more often) as constitutent of language considered as infinite number of actual and potential sentences or as unit of meaningful discourse. But

understanding language (sentence) or understanding the meaning of a sentence in question does not result from the sentence in question, but from certain grammar or certain theory of meaning as the case may be.

42. Gaṅgeśa in the same chapter has also discussed the nature of *prāmāṇya* or truth of different types of knowledge including linguistic knowledge. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol.I, p. 350f.

CHAPTER TWO

1. As a matter of fact some of the controversies regarding *śabda* relate to definition of *śabda pramāṇa.* "*Iha śabde trividhā vipratipattiḥ -prāmāṇyato, bhedato, lakṣaṇataśceti*"; (Udayana 1967, p. 372). Udayana has also argued there that a genuine and serious disagreement about *prāmāṇya* is not equally possible. He has argued to similar effect elsewhere also. *cf.* Udayana 1941, p. 66
2. *cf.* Mukhopadhyay 1981. Some of the alternative ways of defining *śabdapramāṇa* are (i) "*Śāstra śabdavijñānāt asannikṛṣṭe'rthe vijñānam*"; Sabara 1883, p. 12. "*Śābdatvam ca jātiviśeṣaḥ. Tathā ca yathārthaśābdajñānakaraṇatvam (śabdapramāṇam)*"; Viśvanātha 1985; p. 176. *Samayavalena samyakparokṣānubhavasādhanam śabda, śabdatva samavāye sati samayavalena samyakparokṣānubhavasādhanam vā śabda pramāṇam. cf.* Udayana 1967, p. 372.
3. Many confusions and unclarity are there about the nature of definition, its role in theoretical study and the like. There are again uncertainty about what exactly is the definiendum in the definition of *śabda* as given by Gaṅgeśa. This second problem has been extensively dealt with in this text which was written some five years back. Though my views in this matter remain substantially the same yet I now see Gaṅgeśa's point more clearly. Readers may consult relevant portions of the Introduction. So far as the general problems about definitions as such are concerned, one problem is the paradox of analysis. Though this problem arises more naturally in the context of explicating the meaning of a linguistic expression by means of definition yet it poses a problem for real definition also in so far as this type of definition is to be formulated in a sentence. For the standard way in which a *navyanaiyāyika* tackles this problem one may be referred to Viśvanātha 1985, p. 176 and Sivadatta Miśra 1961, p. llf. Another problem is there which is peculiarly a problem of Indian philosophy. How are definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

related to each other and what role do they respectively play in a theoretical study. Such study aims at providing theoretical understanding (or knowing that) of the subject matter discussed. When we know a certain thing through some of the accredited sources of knowledge we know, say, (that the thing is and) what thing it is. We may know it to be an *F* or a *G*. Similarly through *pramāṇa* we can know many more things in the same sense. Some of these things we may know as *G* or *F* again. So in an important sense a *pramāṇa* does not enable us to distinguish a (kind of) thing it makes us know from many other (kind of) things which also we come to know by its means. So to know a thing as distinct from things of similar and dissimilar kinds we are to resort to definition. But a definition comes to be operative if both the definiendum and the defining property are already known independently of the act of definition in question. This at least is the requirement of a real and realistic definition.

4. Before Gaṅgeśa, Gautama chose to have as definienda of his definition of *śabdapramāṇa* utterances of both common men and God; in his own words, *dṛstārtha*(*ka*) and *adṛṣṭārtha*(*ka*) words. (*cf.* Gautama 1985, aphorism 1.1.8). He also defined *śabdapramāṇa* or *pramāṇaśabda* as words of *āpta* and any one can be an *āpta* if he honestly and sincerely speaks about what he knows directly and does not mean to harm the addresee (*cf. ibid* 1.1.7). Definition of Śabarasvāmin on the other hand has more limited definiendum. He defines *śāstra* and not any correct utterance. (*cf.* Śabara p. 12) Kumarilā had anticipated objections against śabrasvāmin on this count and refuted them. *cf.* Kumārila 1978, pp. 287-290. But even ordinary imaginative utterances can be *śāstra* for the word means such sentence which induces action (*pravartakam vākyam*). It therefore follows that the word "*Śāstra*" used to denote the definiendum is to be understood as a *yogarūḍha śabda cf. Pārthasārathi* 1978, p. 289.
5. Palmer 1971, p. 8.
6. "*Samayavalena samyak-parokṣānubhavasādhanaṃ śabda* ......" Udayana 1967, p. 372.
7. Here there are two major problems for the interpreter: (i) is *pramāṇaśabda*, the definiendum or (ii) *śabdapramāṇa*? Viśvanātha (1985, p. 174) takes (i) to be the case. Even so he interprets the *Sūtra* in two different ways. In none of these he follows Viśvanātha. In his first interpretation he interprets the *sūtra* to yield the definition of Gaṅgeśa under reference as if Gaṅgeśa had followed Gautama very closely; Gaṅgeśa's definition of *Śabda* under reference is actually Gaṅgeśa's interpretation of Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7. Viśvanātha

first analyses the word "*āptopadeśa*" as *āptasya upadeśa*. He then interprets the expression "*āpta*" to mean one who has correct knowledge of what the sentence under reference means or says. Then the whole *sūtra* is interpreted to yield as definition of *pramāṇa śabda* words (*śabda*) which are due to (*prayukta*) correct knowledge of what the sentence under reference means. This interpretation seems to be forced; it is reading Gaṅgeśa's definition into the *sūtra* of Gautama. The second way in which Viśvanātha interpreted the *Nyāya Sūtra* in question seems to be more natural and in the line of Viśvanātha and his commentators. Viśvanātha has also raised and solved a problem of circularity. *cf.* Viśvanātha 1985, pp. 374-76.

8. It is natural but not necessary. For the same word may appear in the definitional statement to constitute both the definiendum and the definiens, if there is some way to avoid circularity. But it is not the question of circularity only. In the first place if the same word *Śabda* is to play the dual role in the definitional statement then it should occur twice. single occurence of a word can convey one single sense only. In Gaṅgeśa's definition under reference, the word *śabda* occurs only once. Compare this definition as it is and how Viśvanātha interprets *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.7. in the light of Gaṅgeśa's definition. Viśvanātha shows that one way of interpreting the *sūtra*, *Āptopadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ* is *prakṛtavākyārthayathārtha jñānaprayuktaśabda pramāṇa-śabdaḥ.* First, in this interpretation the word occurs twice. In its occurrence as part of the expression "*pramāṇāśabda*" the word constitutes (a part of) definiendum. On this interpretation Gautama *Sūtra* means the following "knowledge-yielding words or sentence (*pramāṇaśabdaḥ*) is a sentence which results from (speaker's) true belief about the meaning of the sentence in question. *cf.* Viśvanātha 1985, pp. 174-75. In this interpretation Viśvanātha takes the word *śabda* which occurs in the *sūtra* to mean *pramāṇa śabda.* Then he interprets the word *upadeśa* which occurs in the *Sūtra* in such a way as to show that it contains the word *śabda*. In its first occurrence, that is as constituting part of definiens the word by itself does not mean knowledge producing words but any words. In its second occurrence the word *śabda* is not to be taken separately. Definiendum is *pramāṇaśabda*.
9. First, in his interpretation Vācaspati Miśra has taken the word *śabda* alone to constitute the definiendum. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 367. Secondly, Gautama used the word "*anumāna*" rather than *anumānapramāṇa* as the definiendum when he defined in 1.1.5 *anumāna*.

10. For another justification of including "*pramāṇa*" as part of the definiendum see the last paragraph of the section III below.
11. *cf.* Chapter I,note 26.
12. The occurrence of the word in this sense in the definiens part was perhaps felt necessary to exclude a type of experience known as *vikalpa*. In the yogadarśana *Vikalpa* is generated by words or awareness of words (*cf.* Damodara 1904 S,p. 267) even though the thing, the words in question are about,does not exist.
13. When in a very familiar verse of his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Viśvanātha writes *padajñānam tu karaṇam* (*cf.* Viśvanātha (b) 1989,p. 263) the expression *pada* should not be understood in the way it is understood when it is used in the singular or in such context as *padārtha* ; it should not be understood as word which is a type of sub-sentential linguistic expression. Our knowledge at second hand is derived not from (hearing) any single word but from words which constitute sentence. Vācaspati Miśra is explicit here. What yields knowledge at second hand according to him is *Vākyajñāna*. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967,p. 367. Accordingly we should be told that the expression "*pada*" as occurring in the passage of Viśvanātha (b) under reference should be read as *vākya* (sentence) or what comes almost to same thing *pada*-s in the plural. But surprisingly neither Viśvanātha (c) 1989 nor Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa 1989 nor Ramarūdra Bhaṭṭa 1989 tells us anything about this. Pañcānan Śāstri did note the passage of Vācaspati we referred to above ; but what he writes there (*see* Pañcānan Śāstri 1984 (ś) p. 193) carries the suggestion that both awareness of word (*padajñāna*) and awareness of sentence (*vākyajñāna*) is *śabdapramāṇa*.

    It should be further noted that while we can have auditory perception of a single word we cannot ordinarily perceive a (spoken) sentence considered as a finite sequence of (spoken) words. Awareness of a sentence means memory of a sentence or at least an awareness where memory disposition plays some role. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967,p. 191 Udayana 1967,p. 195.

    One last point to note is that what answers as definiendum to the definiens *Vākyajñāna* is *śabdapramāṇa* in the sense *śābdapramākaraṇa bu. not pramāṇaśabda*. Udayana prefers to take *vākya* itself to be *pramāṇa* in so far as it is being known. *cf.* Udayana 1967,p. 373. But Gaṅgeśa's own definition of 'śabda' seems to have as definiendum (certain) *śabda* itself ; the definiendum is *pramāṇaśabda*. (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV,part I, p.1). Viśvanātha (a) has interpreted Gautama's sūtra 1.1.7 as definition of *pramāṇa śabda*. *cf.* Viśvanātha (a) 1985,p. 174.

14. Vācaspati Miśra has explicitly said both that the words remind us of the respective things which are their meanings (*svārtha i.e. padārtha*) and that they give us (non-recollective) awareness (*bodha*) of the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*) which (sentence) they constitute. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 372. While interpreting Gautama's *Sūtra* 1.1.7, in the light of Gaṅgeśa's definition of *Śabda* (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, part I, p. 1) Viśvanātha says that *upadeśa* means such *śabda* (words) as are due to the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence under reference, *Prakṛtavākyārthayathārthajñānaprayuktaḥ śabda* (*cf.* Viśvanātha 1985, p. 175). Such *śabda* is *Śabdaprāmāṇā*. It follows that a (trustworthy) speaker must have knowledge of the meaning of the sentence to be able to utter the sentence. While commenting on the relevant passage of Gaṅgeśa, Mathurānātha elaborately discusses the problems which such a view gives rise to (*cf.* Mthurānātha 1990, pp. 7-13). One problem which I would like to emphasize is that linguistic creativity is not restricted only to the understanding of sentences, it covers production of sentences also. Since we can produce unheard sentences, it is better not to insist that a speaker must have *prior* knowledge of the *sentence* meaning in question. It should be enough if he has (not even non-linguistic knowledge of sentence meaning but only) some sort of awareness of word meanings. Another problem is that if *vākyārtha* also could be known by other means then there would not have been any necessity of admitting *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa*.
15. The word "*śabda*" in the *Mahābhāṣya* passage "*Atha śabdānuśāsanam*" denotes *śabda*. In other words Patañjali in that passage mentions rather than uses the expression "*śabda*". There are other examples also. When one formulates in the standard way the inference which is deemed to prove non-eternal or non-permanent nature of (the thing) *śabda*, "*Śabdaḥ anitya, kṛtakatvāt*", the expression "*śabda*" in the formulation of the inference means *śabda*.
16. *cf.* Viśvanātha (b) verse 3-5. Thus *śabda is one of the guṇa*-s listed by the (*Nyāya*) Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Another criterion of *śabda* is "*śrotragrāhya ākāśaguṇa*" or "*śrotragrāhyatve sati guṇānyavṛttiguṇa*".
17. Actually however a sound is distinguished from mere noise by the fact that it has meaning. Even so we must note that a *varṇa* or sound value of an alphabet i.e. *akṣara* does not have meaning in the sense in which an one letter *word* may have it. Difference in their origin also may not always distinguish sound (*varṇa*) from noise (*dhvani*) for we can vocally produce meaningless noise.

18. We are still to distinguish a word and its constituent. Take "I" in "I am happy" and "I" in "It (is raining)"; are they same or different? In the first use it is meaningful independently, in the second use it is the constituent of a word. In *Tantra* there are words which name so to say individual *varṇa*-s.
19. *cf.* Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Vol. I; elucidation of *Sūtra* 1.1.7 foot note. However see Pañcānan Śāstri (c) p. 160. But see also Udayana 1967, p. 373.
20. The word "*Prayoga*" has different senses from utterance of linguistic expression (*cf.* Bhimācārya 1928, p. 569) to what is being uttered, the *varṇa* (*cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I p. 9).
21. Barring perhaps a solitary exception it has been so understood in the tradition at least from the time of Vācaspati Miśra.
22. Or if true, it will be a happy accident (*kākatālīya*).
23. Though each word of the sentence as uttered is perceived, all the words or the whole sentence cannot be preceived. For by the time successive words are uttered most of the words uttered previously are past and gone. Thus awareness of the form "This is a sentence" is either a memory cognition or cognition which involves memory. Vācaspati has said both *pratisandhānātmakam* and *smārtam cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 191.
24. Though Udayana says words being known at the moment constitute *śabdapramāṇa* yet such a view is not generally favoured. For when a person remains silent but writes a sentence we first become aware of the corresponding (spoken) sentence from the inscription; then we derive second hand or linguistic knowledge. Here the linguistic knowledge is had from the awareness of words (*padajñāna*) and not from words themselves. For no words have been spoken here. *cf.* Pañcānan Śaṣtri (a) p. 193.
25. "*Prathamato yena kenāpi sambandhena vakturvākyārtha jñānam*". Mathurānātha 1990 Vol. IV, Part I, p.7, *see* also Pañcānan Śāstri (c) p. 159.
26. This is straightway contrary to Mīmāṃsā position that *pramāṇaśabda* is uncaused *śabda*. This contrast brings out clearly one salient feature of Nyāya conception of *śabdapramāṇa*. In fact a Naiyāyika does not believe that there is or could be a *śabda* which is uncaused.
27. One cannot be sure. Desire to utter words having certain sense may be induced by one's awareness of the meaning of the words.
28. For somewhat different interpretation one may consult Mathūrānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 9 and Rucidatta 1871.
29. "....*Padāni kṛtasaṃketāni svārthān smārayanti, ākāṅkṣāyogyatā-*

sattisadhrīcīnāni adrstapūrvam bodhayanti." Vācaspati 1967 p. 372. *See* also Gangeśa 1990,Vol. IV,Part I, p. 77, 247.

30. Reference to *Sūtra* 1.1.1 can be of little help. For there *pramāṇa* has been contrasted with *prameya*. On the one hand everything including *pramāṇa* is *prameya* and on the other hand with *prameya* both *pramāṇa* and *pramā* may be contrasted.
31. Provided we take the expression "*sabdaḥ pramāṇam*" as the definiendum part of the difinitional statement S_2 and understand by it *pramāṇaśabdaḥ*. It is not unlikely that Mathurānātha found some manuscript/copy where the last part of ($\acute{S}_2$) read "*pramāṇaśabdaḥ*". *cf.* Mathurānātha in Gangeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I,p.7 : "*Pramāṇam śabdaḥ iti lakṣya nirddeśaḥ*". In his *Vṛtti* Viśvanātha took *pramāṇaśabdaḥ* as the difiniendum of Gautama's definition of *śabdaḥ*.
32. Here the word "hearer" may be taken in the strict sense. For what a reader reads is letters (*akṣara*-s) and not sounds. A letter or string of letters constitutes what is called *lipi*. *Lipi* directly yields only knowledge of themselves (and memory of corresponding sounds).
33. Put crudely *pramāṇaśabda* and (linguistic) means or *śabdapramāṇa* should not at least be incompatible with each other.
34. *cf.* Viśvanātha (b) verse No. 81.
35. Gangeśa did show a way of defining a kind of *pramā* noncausally which must be done if a non-circular causal definition of the respective means (*pramāṇa* = *pramitikaraṇa*) is to be possible. *cf.* Gangeśa 1990, Vol. III,p. 98.
36. *See* note 34 above.
37. Gangeśa himself will resort to some such view in $\acute{S}_3$. But the source can be traced to Vācaspati 1967. It is interesting to note that Vācaspati Miśra explicitly described the condition of memory of word meanings (*padārtha*-s) as *sahakārin*; *cf. ibid* p. 191. Udayana, while commenting on Vācaspati Miśra's view, also describes this condition in the same way (*cf.* Udayana 1967,p. 195). None of them makes any reference to such factor as syncategorematicity or awareness of it. Nor did any one of them writes in the pages in question anything about *vyāpara*. In p. 368 of the same work, however, Vācaspati refers to the same condition of memory of word meanings as intervening factor (*antarālika itikartavyatā*). When he explains this passage (*ibid* p. 374) Udayana uses the word *dvāra*. But just as Vācaspati counts among *antarālika itikartavyatā*, factors other than memory of word meanings so also Udayana takes (*ibid* p. 374) him to have indicated the inclusion of such factors as syncategorematicity. But none of them

distinguishes between factors like the perception of words and the memory of word meanings on the one hand and (awareness of) syncategorematicity on the other. Mathurānātha in his commentary on the relevant passage of Gaṅgeśa writes "*ākāṅkṣājñānantu na padajñānavyāparah....tasya pṛthaknirddeśaḥ* [*kṛta Gaṅgeśena*]"; (Mathurānātha 1990 Vol. IV, Part I, p. 18). Gaṅgeśa in the relevant passage has used the description *vyāpāraḥ* for memory of word meaning etc. But he does not mean to include with this memory syncategorematicity etc. indicating thereby that he considers them to be factors of a different type. In fact Gaṅgeśa says later that these factors are of the type *shakārin*; *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990 Vol. IV, Part I, p. 182.

38. While commenting on Gautama's *Sūtra-s* 1.1.4, 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 Viśvanātha either said that the *sūtrakāra* had defined respective type of knowledge (*pramā*) or showed how definition of both the respective knowledge and means thereof (*pramākaraṇa*) could be derived. In case of *sūtra* 1.1.7 he only showed how definitions of '*pramāṇa śabdaḥ*' and *yathārthaśābdajñānakaraṇa* could be derived from the *sūtra*. He did not show if at all or how definition of *śābdapramā* could be derived. Nor did he say anything about the possible reason as to why Gautama did not give us in the first place or at all the definition of *śābdapramā*. Before Viśvanātha, Gaṅgeśa himself did not try to find out which might have been Gautama's reason. He simply followed Gautama and provided in the first place a definition of *pramāṇaśábdaḥ*.

39. The author of *Vṛtti* said "*prakṛta vākyārthyathārthajñāna prayuktaḥ śabdaḥ*" *pramāṇaśabdaḥ*. (Viśvanātha 1985, p. 175). In this he agrees with Ruchidatta 1871, Vol. VI, p. 128). But here there are some grave difficulties (see note 40 below). It is generally agreed that what is known in the knowledge that occurs in the hearer when he hears and understands a sentence is *vākyārtha* (which happens in many cases to be *abhedasaṃsarga*). If the same *vākyārtha* is presupposed as a cause of the utterance of a sentence then every speaker would have to have linguistic knowledge of what he intends to communicate linguistically. It is both counter intuitive and rationally indefensible. So it has been noted (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 46 : *tāvat padajñānādeva* etc.) that a sentence may be framed or uttered if one knows only the words and, Mathurānātha makes it further explicit, not *vākyārtha* also (*cf.* Mathurānātha 1990 Vol. IV, Part I p. 46). But this seems to conflict with the way Ruchidatta interpreted the word *artha* to mean *vākyārtha* when he explained the very first

sentence of *Śabdacintāmaṇi*. Rucidatta perhaps realised this. So instead of revising his earlier account of *artha* or acknowledging that that interpretation does not fit well with the later passage in *Śabdacintāmaṇi* noted just above, Rucidatta simply ignores this later passage. He adds no explanation. Mathurānātha is more perceptive. He could see that not only it would be counter intuitive and logically indefensible to interpret the word '*artha*' as occurring in $Ś_2$ as *vākyārtha* but it would further be inconsistent with what we find in page 46 of *Śabdacintāmaṇi.* Mathurānātha says one can produce a *vākya* (sentence) without knowing *vākyārtha*. And consistently with this future passage Mathurānātha does not interpret the word *artha* as occurring in $Ś_2$ as *vākyārtha*. For in $Ś_2$ *artha* occurs in the context '*arthajñānajanya śabdaḥ pramāṇam*''. Now *pramāṇa śabda* is nothing less than a *vākya*. If '*artha*' were interpreted to mean *vākyārtha* then Gaṅgeśa would be taken to have said *vākyārthajñānajanyavākya*. But in page 46 Gaṅgeśa or Mathurānātha would write *vākyārthajñāna* is not the cause of *vākya*. So while commenting on $Ś_2$ Mathurānātha (page 9) interprets the expression "*arthatattvajñānajanya śabdaḥ pramāṇam*" to mean *tatvatviśeṣyakatatsaṃsargaka-tatprakāraka yathārthajñānanjanya yaḥ* etc. Even here Mathurānātha does not identify *saṃsarga* as it is here with the *saṃsarga* which will form a part of the content of the knowledge which this *yaḥ* (*śabdaḥ*) will produce. Not only in this but also in the subtle distinction he draws here between *pramāṇśabdasāmānya* and *kasminnarthe kiṃ vākyaṃ pramāṇam,* ingenuity and insight of Mathurānātha are evident.

40. We have used the word fact and not *vākyārtha*. In a given context *vākyārtha* is necessarily a fact but not conversely. The fact which the speaker knows such that the knowledge of it causally determines his utterance of the sentence is not a *vākyārtha*. But the fact which a competent hearer is informed of by this sentence is necessarily, and so far, a *vākyārtha*. ***See*** also note 39 above.

41. The expression 'linguistic means' is used here as synonym of *śabdapramāṇa* or *pramāṇaśabda.* A single word hardly ever causes a complete belief, the sort of which a sentence produces. Such a sentence whether it is defined as collection of words (*padasamuha*) or *nirākāṅkṣapada samuha,* involves more than one word. So whenever the expression "*śabda*" has been used in the sense of *vākya* or sentence I have translated *śabda* as words in the plural.

42. Many points are involved here. In the first place the expression *vākyārtha* or *vākyārthajñāna* has been used by men like Rucidatta

in two different senses and they think Gaṅgeśa had so used it. "*Vākyārtha*" has been used to mean the content of the belief of the speaker which somehow causes the utterance of the sentence which produces appropriate belief in the hearer. Now the content of this latter belief has also been described as *vākyārtha* ; in the strict sense of the term and naturally speaking, this seems to be correct. For the content here is the content of the belief derived from language as means or *vākya*. But if the expression "*vākyārtha*" is strongly interpreted to mean the content of the belief of a hearer *in so far as* he derived the belief from a *vākya* then the content of the belief of the speaker which causes the (utterance of the) sentence or *vākya* cannot be called *vākyārtha*. For the belief of the speaker in question need not be and usually is not derived from (another token of) the same or similar sentence. It may be derived from any means. Mathurānātha says "*Prathamato yena kenāpi sambandhena vakturvākyārthajñānam...*" (Mathurānātha 1990 Vol. IV, part I,p.7). If the belief of this content is derived from any means of knowledge whatsoever, including non-linguistic means, why then call this content *vākyārtha*? Even if some explanation is there for calling it so we must find out such two senses of the term that one of them applies exclusively to only one of the two contents– the content of the hearer's belief derived necessarily from linguistic means and the content of the speaker's belief which is not necessarily derived from where the hearer derives his belief. Secondly there must be something to distinguish *vākyārtha* (S) or the content of speaker's belief from *vākyārtha* (H) or the content of the hearer's belief.

43. If the relevant knowledge of the speaker were also a case of knowledge at the second hand in the same sense in which hearer's knowledge is so, then an appeal to the speaker's knowledge for an explanation of hearer's knowledge of *vākyārtha* would have been useless.
44. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 353.
45. If is often believed that only in modern times and primarily by the linguists that our attention have drawn to this fact about language learning and language use. But this fact about language use has been recognized at least since seventeenth century (*cf.* Chomsky 1977, p. 74). By creativity is ordinarily understood the ability of a man to understand an arbitrary sentence (never heard before and which does not physically resemble any sentence heard before) of some familiar language and to produce an appropriate sentence on a given occasion. Though this formulation is not wrong yet an important

aspect of this creativity gets emphasized if we say not only that a new sentence is understood or produced but also it is understood or produced *immediately* (*cf. ibid* 74). One implication that has been drawn by the Western thinkers of our time is that man, the language user, has already within him the necessary mechanism which defines this competence. The task of grammar and linguistics is to make this mechanism explicit. Another way of interpreting it is that a sentence itself tells us what we know when we hear it. There is no need for or dependence on a theory. The fact that we immediately understand a new sentence is explained by saying that language is an autonomous and irreducible means of knowing the meaning. Creativity in production is to be understood in the same way. No explicit theory nor even any implicit knowledge is necessary. Beyond awareness of what is to be expressed/described and (not even that perhaps but only) knowledge of words can enable us to produce appropriate sentence when there is desire to do so.

Gaṅgeśa was not only aware that there was general agreement that many sentences are apprehended as novel *apūrvārtha* but he had also used the novelty thesis to prove some important point about *śabda-pramāṇa* besides advancing arguments to show why this thesis is to be admitted. cf. Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 137. *See* also Vacaspati 1967, p. 372. But when a modern linguist speaks of novel sentences in the context of creativity he does not only mean that such sentences have some content hitherto unknown. He means to say also that a novel sentence does not have any physical resemblance with any sentence known previously.

46. If a sentence could stand to something extralinguistic which corresponds to it in the same way in which a word stands to the corresponding thing then it would become a kind of name. One should not take too literally the sentence "*vākyaśaktigrāhakatvena ākāṅkṣayā upayogaḥ*" (Kalika 1961, p. 32).

47. In the strict sense of the term that alone can be the 'meaning' of a linguistic expression to which the expression stands in the relation called *śakti* or *vṛtti*. The test of whether an expression stands to something by this relation or whether that something is a meaning of that expression is whether the expression causes us to remember that thing. But *vākyārtha* is not remembered or at least a sentence does not produce in the hearer any memory of what it 'means'. Sentence meaning is not remembered but it is revealed, so to say, by the sentence itself in virtue of its property called syncategorematicity. "*Padārthadvayasya yaḥ saṃsargaḥ sa*

śābdabodhe ākāṅkṣāvalena bhāsate'' (Sudarśana 2041 (V),p.2). But Nāgeśa has said *ākāṅkṣā* is the means of knowing the relation of *samaya* (a term usually used to denote the sort of meaning relation a word bears to the object which corresponds to it) which supposedly obtains between a *vākya* and a *vākyārtha*. (Nageśa 1946, p. 33).

48. He cannot know the meaning of a sentence prior to its utterance. It is more so if the sentence in question is a novel one or unique to the occasion. For in one sense nobody can know the meaning of a sentence till the sentence is (uttered and) heard. It is true that uttering a sentence (say an indicative one) in standard cases is a rational act; it involves certain definite purpose and choice of right means. It is believed that such choice is indicative of or is determined by prior awareness of the content of the hearer's belief to be produced. It was said earlier that a speaker may have a non-linguistic belief having the same content as the belief of the hearer; that is he may have a belief with the same content and structure (*tatviśeṣyaka-tatprakāraka jñāna*) as the belief which the hearer would have if the linguistic act turns out to be successful. Now it is being argued that just as for the interpretation of a novel sentence hearer needs to have prior awarenes; of the relation of the relevant individual words and their meanings so also it is enough if the speaker has, prior to uttering a novel sentence, the awareness of the same relation. Only difference is that the speaker, just before he utters the sentence, would be reminded of the *words* by his non-linguistic knowledge, at the moment, of the corresponding things; but the hearer would be reminded of the *things* (the word meanings) by his non-linguistic knowledge at the moment of the relevant words.

49. It is admitted by many that a hearer must have the awareness that he has heard a sentence and not just some isolated words, but the nature of this awareness has been differently conceived. Sometimes it is believed that this awareness is of the nature of perception. But Vācaspati seems to hold that it is of the nature of memory or some cognition involving memory (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p.191).

50. Even if the speaker had the same sort of knowledge i.e., *arthatattva-jñāna*, meaning thereby knowledge of word meanings, this knowledge would produce, in his case, words and not knowledge of fact or sentence meaning. Thus *arthatattvajñāna* is *prayogahetu* in case of the speaker and *vākyārthajñānahetu* in case of the hearer.

51. The first is known to be the standard way in which the Navyanaiyāyika-s define *śabdapramāṇa* (*cf.* Viśvanātha 1884,(s) p. 193). But following Uddyotakara who said "*śabdaviṣayā pratipatti*

śābdaṃ pramāṇam" (Uddyotkara 1967, p. 185), Vācaspati said that by *śabda* one should understand here *vākya*; one should also note that knowledge of words functions as *śabdapramāṇa* when it is associated with the auxiliary condition of memory of word meanings. He further said that (according to one alternative) the resulting knowledge has for its content the relation among these word meanings (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 191 and Vācaspati 1985, p. 538).

52. By 'words of *āpta*' one is to understand words of *āpta* being known at the time *jñāyamāna-āptoccarita-śabdaḥ*.
53. Even when the belief is followed, by the memory of word meanings it is inadequate.
54. "*Padārthasmaraṇāvantaravyāpārāt śabdādevārthaṃ pratyemityanenollekhena*" etc. (Vācaspati 1967, p.371). This however seems to be a stronger formulation. Gautama also says "... *śabdāt arthasampratyayaḥ*" (*cf.* Gautama 1985, p.536). "*Śabdādevapratyemityanuvyavasāyāt*" etc. (Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p.861).
55. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1967, p.365. It seems that Vātsyāyana rightly noted that Gautama had used *āpta* not only in the sense of one who has knowledge, but also in the sense of an honest speaker. In other words, if we are to define *pramāṇa śabda* in terms of *āpta* it is not sufficient for an *āpta* to have either only true belief or only desire to state what is the case. For a person, say a deceiver, may know what happens to be actually the case but when he speaks he does not do so with a desire to reveal what is the case. Similarly one may be, unknown to himself, mistaken; even when he speaks with the honest desire to reveal what he believes to be the case, his words fail to achieve the goal. Gaṅgeśa makes no reference to this moral quality of the speaker when he defines *pramāṇa śabdaḥ* (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p.l). In fact he does not make any explicit reference to speaker. His definition is rather in terms of true belief about the state of affairs being described. But he too qualifies the *arthatattvajñāna* which causes the *pramāṇaśabda* as *prayogahetubhūta*. Thus words of the deceiver are excluded. Anyway whether or not *pramāṇaśabda* be defined with reference to *āpta*, *āpta* must be understood in terms of both cognitive and moral qualities.

    Gaṅgeśa anticipated earlier (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 352 f) an objection that without true belief about *vākyārtha* one can make linguistic utterance. He did not there offer any answer to this objection. Under the circumstance it seems inconsistent on his part to define *pramāṇaśabda* (in Vol. IV, Part I, p.1) in terms of that sort

of belief. Of course in the definition he speaks only of *artha* and not *vākyārtha*. But if he meant by *artha* anything other than *vākyārtha* he could have meant *padārtha*. The awareness of *padārtha* does not seem to be either necessary or sufficient for production of speech. If to exclude such *arthatattvajñāna* he qualifies the condition further by *prayogahetubhūta* then also it is not clear.

In any case though Gaṅgeśa, unlike Gautama, drops the word *āpta* from the definition of *pramāṇaśabda* yet he does not thereby make the definition wide enough. For he includes the word *janya*.

There is a way of interpreting the word *āpta* or at least *aptopadeśa* so widely as to satisfy the Mīmāṃsaka-s also. *Āptopadeśa* is an utterence which has not been made by one who is *anāpta* where *anāpta* is one who is subject to the defects of *bhrama, pramāda, vipralipsā,* and *karaṇāpātava*. Thus one can understand by *āptopadeśa* such utterances which have not been caused by these defects. And this condition will be vacuously true, so far as the Mīmāṃsaka-s are concerned, in case of *vaidika* sentences which are according to them, uncaused. It now begins to emerge why Vātsyāyana preferred a positive interpretation of *āpta* in terms of possession of positive qualities.

Gaṅgeśa has advanced two arguments in favour of such positive interpretation while similar discussions are not found explicitly in the writings of direct and indirect commentators of Gautama (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, pp. 342-343).

56. Viśvanātha 1985,pp. 174-75.
57. *cf.* This clarification in terms of a distinction between condition of truth and condition of ascertaining truth is widely believed to be due to the *navyanaiyāyika*-s. But the view can be traced to Vācaspati (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 371).
58. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990,Vol. II, Part I, p. 1.
59. Mathurānātha says that this rival view is the view of the Bauddhā-s (*cf.* Mathurānātha 1990,Vol. IV, Part I, p. 14). There is some doubt if the difference in the matter between the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s lie in this that the former do not admit *śabda* to be a *pramāṇa* at all and the latter think it is a *pramāṇa* even though it is reducible to *anumāna*. The author of *Tātparyaṭīkā* attributes to Diṅnāga the view that *śabda* is not an irreducible (*atirikta*) *pramāṇa* and not the view that *śabda* is no *pramāṇa* at all (*cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 177). Even Gautama did not find it necessary to defend Nyāya view about *śabda* by rejecting a view to the effect that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa*. He, however, considered the view that

śabda is reducible to or can be included into *anumāna* (*cf.* Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.49). The author of *Nyayavārttika* first considered the view that *śabda* is not a *pramāna*. "*Na śabdaḥ pramāṇam*" (Uddyotakara 1985, p. 532). But Vācaspati seems to understand it as a logically possible view. That is he does not think that Uddyotkara quotes or notes this objection as a Bauddha objection; he considers it because it is logically prior to the rival view which Gautama or Vātsyāyana actually discussed, namely, that *śabda* is not an irreducible *pramāṇa* or that it is a *pramāṇa* though only a special case of *anumāna*. Whether *śabda* is an irreducible *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇāntara*) or not cannot arise if it is not *pramāṇa* at all. Anyway, whether or not Mathurānatha is right in attributing the view which Gaṅgeśa states in ($\acute{S}_3$) to the Bauddha-s, Gaṅgeśa's statement of the view or the objection follows very closely the formulation of the same to be found in Uddyotkara 1985, p. 532 and Vācaspati 1985, p. 532.

60. Thorough knowledge of a thing seems to require both *pramāṇa* and *lakṣaṇa*. To put it otherwise our knowledge of a thing remains lamentably incomplete from theoretical point of view so long as we do not know, in addition to knowing every other property, the defining property. To know the defining property and to know it to be the (a) defining property is all that one can do to define a thing in a theory. Now a *pramāṇa* can know a thing *x* and can even know it as F, where F is a set of property. This set is either too rich or too poor considered from the point of view of adequately rich knowledge we require in theory. In a theory we aim at knowledge which is adequately general and adequately specific. If we know Socrates just as a being our knowledge is too general to serve any theoretical purpose. But if I know him as different from another single individual say Plato, then also our purpose is not served. While a *pramāṇa* is neutral between insignificant and significant generality (individuality), definition compensates for that. It distinguishes a thing belonging to a class *K* from things which belong to other co-ordinate classes as well as from things which belong to classes which are distinct from the class under which *K* is only one co-ordinate class.

61. To cite an example chosen at random, in the literature of *advaita Vedānta* one finds the word "*jñāna*" to have been used in three different senses. Again the advaitins will oppose the sort of definition of *pratyakṣa pramā* we find in Gautama. For such a definition presupposes as valid the division of *jñāna* into *vyabhicāri* and

avyabhicāri. But the conception of *jñāna* which the *advaitin*-s have entails that this presupposition is wrong.

62. This is somewhat imprecise but easily intelligible definition of a substance. The account of definition which immediately follows is also oversimplified. But for our purpose here this account will suffice.
63. Also *cf.* Vyomaśivācarya p. 653.
64. More familiar view which is not incompatible with the present one is that a definition is a variety of inference called *kevalavyatireki* which yields knowledge to the effect that the definiendum in question is different from whatever is other than itself. This view can be traced to Vācaspati Miśra (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 186).
65. A definitional statement is a factual and not a linguistic statement; it tells us that the thing being defined has such and such property but not that a certain linguistic expression behaves in the language in such and such a way.
66. This is not meant to be a definition of *pramā*. Secondly the fact that a certain belief has been practically successful can at best prove *samavāda* (factual corroboration) but not *prāmāṇya* in the strict sense of the term.
67. We have earlier discussed the implication of the saying "*mānādhīnā meya siddhi māna siddhiśca lakṣaṇāt*.

CHAPTER THREE

1. In disputed or doubtful cases where intuitive criterion is of no help, we need a formal criterion, some explicitly formulated definition. Even after a definition is formulated and range of agreed cases is adequately widened, we may happen to meet some other doubtful cases. On such occasions we are left to judge between two possible alternatives of denying on independent ground that the cited case is one which is recalcitrant or liberalising (radicalising) the (formulation of the) definition in question.
2. One may doubt whether there is enough textual or other justification to attribute the views stated in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ to the Bauddha-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s respectively. But these two views are so related that in a logically ordered discourse, $\acute{S}_3$ (or the view stated therein) should be discussed before $\acute{S}_4$.

   It is not Gaṅgeśa who first distinguished these two views or noted the relation of logical priority of the view $\acute{S}_3$ over $\acute{S}_4$. Many of the things Gaṅgeśa said in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$ seem to have been quoted by him

from Classical literature, from the sub-commentaries by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra on (or relating to) *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.49.

3. Nāgārjuna is known to have admitted four distinct sources of knowledge. Phaṇibhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa has quoted the relevant passage. *See* Phaṇibhuṣan 1981, p. 101 foot note.
4. The expression syncategorematicity is not very elegant. But there are reasons why I prefer it to the expression "expectancy" which is more commonly used to translate the expression "*ākāṅkṣā*" even when the latter occurs in technical philosophical literature. But expectancy is not a term of logical or philosophical literature in English whereas in some of its philosophical uses the expression "*ākāṅkṣā*" has nothing to do with a psychological state of expectancy. Philosophers in India generally agree that "*ākāṅkṣā*" is a property of such linguistic expressions which occur in sentences, or are themselves only sub-sentential expressions and can form a complete sentence jointly with other suitable expressions. According to this criterion even a name occurring in a sentence is a syncategorematic or *sākāṅkṣa* expression. At this point correspondence breaks down. But an expression having partial correspondence in respect of sense is better than one which has no such correspondence.
5. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 370. The thesis that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa* at all is stronger or more radical. If it is true then not only no question of reducibility or irreducibility can arise, even the definition given earlier must be wrong. For if the no-*pramāṇa* thesis succeeds here then there would be no definiendum of any proposed definition of *śabda pramāṇa*.
6. *cf.* Udayana 1967, p. 377.
7. This division of passages and their numbering are not in the original; they have been introduced here for convenience of discussion and cross reference.
8. There may be many other similar situations when communication fails to materialize. Udayana has noted a few. *See* Udayana 1967, p. 195, also Uddyotakara 1985, p. 532.
9. In Indian Philosophical literature two principles are almost universally distinguished. One is *ātmā* and the other is referred to in different systems by such terms as *ahaṅkāra, manas, citta*; these terms are not, however, exact synonyms. Something corresponding to the Vaiśeṣika notion of *manas* seem to be there in the works of Lock— a notion which James Ward severly criticised in his *Psychological Principles*. Part of the meaning of the term "*manas*" is internal sense organ and it is in this sense, according to Ward, mind is a misnomer.

Generally this seems to be the standard view in the world of English philosophy. It has now become customary to use two almost exactly synonymous words "self" and "mind" to refer to two distinct entities denoted respectively by two non-synonymous *Saṃskṛita* expressions— "*ātmā*" and "*manas*"

10. The expression *karaṇa* goes with *kriyā* and in some of its uses *kriyā* means action as distinct from state. But hardly there is anything in perceiving besides the contact of sense organs with respective objects on the one hand and the resulting state of (perceptual) belief on the other. By perceptual means therefore is meant actual and effective sense-object contact.
11. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1970, Vol. II,p.1460; Gadādhara 1970 Vol. II,p.1462, 1463 and Mathurānātha 1990, Vol.,II Part I,p. 694.
12. It would be more accurate if instead of the "opponent stated" we wrote, "Gaṅgeśa represented (and not reported) the opponent as saying." For in most of the cases the credit for the statement and defence of the rivals' positions should go to Gāṅgeśa. Thus in other cases also similar adjustment should be taken as intended.
13. It is not disputed that almost every effect is the last term or moment in a certain causal chain. This chain consists of a temporal sequence of causal conditions. It is also not disputed that there is one last condition in the sequence which is immediately followed by the effect. But the property of calling this last condition *vyāpāra* or *dvāra* derives, it seems, from the usual practice of calling the condition just preceding it as *karaṇa*. A *karaṇa* according to more standard interpretation is that condition in the temporal sequence of causal conditions which is separated from the effect by just one intervening condition. This intervening condition of an effect is produced by the *karaṇa* in its way to producing the effect. Thus in an important sense the *karaṇa* produces the effect *through producing* (*dvāra*) that condition of the effect which immediately precedes the latter. The condition through which the *karaṇa* produces the effect is the *dvāra* or *vyāpāra*.

    This distinction is often viewed as motivated by the desire to distinguish different causal conditions in terms of the principle of independence. Though both of them are causal conditions yet *karaṇa* is dependent on *vyāpāra* and not *vice versa*. Thus the principle of division may also be viewed as distinction between necessary and sufficient condition. But to be accurate sufficiency and independence may not go together. There is a sense of dependence in which even *vyāpāra* is dependent. In short if we take independence in the absolute

sense of the term then only the totality of causal conditions (*sāmagrī*) can be granted independent causality or *nirapekṣotpādakatva*. Every condition within that totality including the *karaṇa* and *vyāpāra*, has only, let us say, dependent causality or *sāpekṣa utpādakatva*. In fact *sāpekṣotpādakatva* and *sāmagryantargatatva* are one and the same thing. Totality of causal conditions alone is therefore the sufficient cause. If we distinguish sufficient causal condition from sufficient cause then the former can be said to be one which is *sāpekṣotpādaka* and *phalāyogavyāvacchinnakāraṇa*. This latter characteristic of being immediately followed by the effect is shared by *sāmagrī* and only one condition included in that *samagri* and known as *vyāpāra*.

Now *sāpekṣotpādakatva* characterizes both *karaṇa* and *vyāpāra* as it does every causal condition. Yet we can distinguish *karaṇa*, *vyāpāra* and other conditions if we note that the nature of this dependence or *apekṣā* is not the same in each case. Accordingly we may formulate as criterion of *karaṇa* that which depends on some other effect of its own (*svakāryantara*) in order to produce (*utpattau*) the effect in question (*abhimatakārya*); *yena abhimatakāryotpattau svakāryāntaraṃ apekṣyate tat karaṇam*. *Vyāpāra* accordingly may be defined as *Yaḥ kāryotpattau svajanakakāraṇāntaram apekṣyati* etc.

14. Conditions which belong to the causal set (*sāmagrī*) but is neither *karaṇa* nor *vyāpāra* do not necessarily form any temporal sequence among themselves. None of the causal conditions which belong to this third category forms any causal/temporal sequence with any other conditions belonging to the causal set. Such conditions stand in causal temporal priority only in relation to the effect.

Thus it is not necessary for a causal condition to precede or succede in the temporal or causal sense one or more conditions, included in the same causal set with it. Even a *karaṇa*, which necessarily forms a temporal sequence with *vyāpārah* just before producing the effect, can exist as an item of the furniture of the universe without actually producing its *vyāpāra*. Till the moment before the moment it actually produces its *vyāpāraḥ*, a *karaṇa* exists, if it exists at all, not in association with its *vyāpāra*. We therefore should distinguish two different phases of the history of a *karaṇa*: the phase when it is not (actually) *vyāpāravat* and when it is (actually) *vyāpāravat* i.e. in actual union or association with its *vyāpāra*.

This distinction which Gaṅgeśa utilises in answering certain objection against some aspect of the Nyāya theory of linguistic performance, is traceable to Vācaspati. "*Sabdapratipatti ná tāvat*

svarūpataḥ pramāṇam, vyāpāravataḥ kāraṇaviśeṣasya pramāṇatvāt" (Vācaspati 1967, p. 195). "*Na ca śabde satipramābhavatyeveti nāyam śabdaḥ pramāṇam.... vyāpāravataḥ pramāṇatvena tathābhūtāt pramotpatterāvaśyakatvāt*" (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 16-18). "*Padānāmeva padārthasmaraṇāvāntara vyāpāranām vākyārtha pramām prati karaṇatayā pramāṇatvāt.*" (Vācaspati 1985, p. 537).

15. The authors of Nyāya texts are found of have minor differences among themselves even when they agree about the conditions of linguistic knowledge. Thus where Viśvanātha enumerates *padajñāna* or awareness, usually perception, of the words as a condition (*cf.* Viśvanātha 1884 (Ś) p. 193, verse 81). Vācaspati Miśra writes "*yat khalu Caitra gām vadhāneti vākyamidamityanusandhānātmakam smārtam vijñānamupajayate tat... viśiṣṭrthaviṣayam vijñam prasūte, tacchābdam pramāṇam*" (Vācaspati 1967, p. 191). Again while Vācaspati Miśra says *padārthasmaraṇasahakāri*" (*ibid* p. 191), Viśvanātha says "*padārthasmaraṇavyāpāraḥ*" (Viśvanāth 1984 (Ś)), p. 193) and Gaṅgeśa says "*padārthasmaraṇādi vyāpāraḥ*" (Gaṅgeśa 1990 Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 18). Vācaspati Miśra himself said elsewhere "*padārthasmaraṇāvāntara vyāpārāt*" (Vācaspati 1967, p. 371). Viśvanātha says "*śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī*" (*op. cit.* p. 193), Gaṅgeśa replaces it by more inclusive formulation "*ākāṅkṣādikam sahakārītī*" (*op. cit.* p. 182). These are some of the differences; there are many more.

16. The expression verbal or linguistic knowledge has been used here to signify knowledge from words rather than knowledge of words. What this knowledge from words is knowledge about or what sort of knowledge it is is one of the major topics of a theory of linguistic performance. But there is no dispute that people learn from language and that we have experience to that effect; "*vākyādarthaviśeṣāvasāya ityavivādam*" (Udayana 1967, p. 378) "... *śabdādartha-sampratyayaḥ*" (Gautama 2.1.52). *See* also Vācaspati 1967, p. 381.

17. *See* note 15 above.

18. There are two words *āsatti* and *ākāṅkṣā* which between them seem to exhaust the sense of sequence. Mere succession or *ānupūrvi* may not define sequence in the required sense. Thus succession may be interrupted. In such a case a word does not stand in the relation of *ākāṅkṣā* to what immediately succeeds it and it stands in that relation to which does not immediately succeed it.

    The standard example of the former given below is an adaptation

of the example given by Vācaspati Miśra. "*Ayameti putro rājñaḥ puruṣo'pasāryatāmitytra putra sambandhena nirākāṅkṣo rājā na puruṣeṇa sambadhyate*" (Vācaspati 1985, p. 537 under *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.52). To give another example, one wants to draw our attention to the dangerous character of the habit of flying an aircraft and utters with that intention the sentence "Flying aeroplane is dangerous". It may be thought that the utterer will fail in his purpose because the construction (as it is and if we disregard the suggestive fact of non-occurrence of an article) is ambiguous; even if it sometimes communicates the right thought to some persons, at other time and to other persons it may carry the sense that an aircraft in a state of flying, that is, when it is being flown, is dangerous. But a Naiyāyika will say that *ākāṅkṣā* defines the semantic scope of an expression. An expression occurring in a finite string or sequence of expressions should be read with just as many other expressions which follow it (immediately) as are required to make a self contained meaningful expression (not necessarily in the sense that it in its turn cannot be read with some other expression with which it forms a whole, but) in the sense that no part of this whole expression can any longer be taken separately and read with or related to some other expression (occurring in that string). In the cited example the expression "Flying" has, to begin with, the whole or any unspecified portion of the string of expressions which follow it, within it scope. But the moment it is read along with the very next word within its scope we get an expression which is a self contained unit of meaning in the sense defined. We get the expression "Flying aeroplane" where the first word has been used attributively. To this whole expression something can be related pradicatively. But nothing can be pradicated to any part of the combined expression "Flying aeroplane". So "is dangerous" must be treated not as related predicatively to "Flying" but to "Flying aeroplane". Of course the intention of the speaker was that "Flying" should be taken in relation to "is dangerous". From that point of view the word aeroplane as it occurs interrupts the sequence as intended, that is, sequence determined by such semantic scope of "Flying" which includes "is dangerous". A clearer example will be "Water fire flows burns". The first word does not stand in the relation of *ākāṅkṣā* to the second which immediately follows it in the string but to the third which does not follow it immediately. The standard example of cases of interrupted semantic sequence is "*Girirvahnimānbhuktaṃ Devadattena*"

19. *See* note 13 above. *cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 537
20. "*Ādinā avāntara vākyārthabodhaparigrahaḥ.*" Mathurānātha in Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 18.
21. Many important problems are involved here. Some of these have been clarified elsewhere. One rather remotely connected with the present discussion is the problem whether and how can we distinguish a speaker from a hearer with reference to the knowledge which results from hearing a sentence. Since some speaker may be deaf it cannot be a condition that in order that a hearer can have knowledge from hearing a sentence, the speaker must have similar knowledge from the same sentence. The same must be true from the other side also, for a hearer may be a dumb (though not born dumb). But the question is different. Does there occur in a speaker who is not deaf the same or similar knowledge which is produced in the hearer when the speaker utters a sentence audibly? Objective condition of auditory perception seems to have been realized alike in both the cases. And if such preception is a sufficient condition for recalling the things which are meanings of the words heard, then the relevant memory would also occur, under normal circumstances, in both the speaker and the hearer, provided both of them are relevantly similarly placed as members of the same speech community. Presumably non-occurrence of knowledge in the speaker is to be accounted for in terms of some counter-acting or preventing condition. The second problem is more important. "Knowing the meaning of a word" is an ambiguous expression and is often used rather indiscriminately to translate diverse expressions of philosophical literature in *Saṃskṛta.* Sometimes the word is used to signify knowledge of the meaning-relation that obtains between a word and the thing which corresponds to it. At other times the expression is used to signify just the knowledge of the thing meant. It may suffice here to note that the word "meaning" is used in place of three distinct *Saṃaskṛta* expressions *artha*, *padārtha* and *śakti.* The expression "*artha*" is used both independently and as embeded in such compound word as "*puruṣārtha*". The sense of the word "*artha*" in the latter use may be unambiguously rendered in English as "utility", "value", or "result in view" and in *Saṃskṛta* as "*prayojana*". This shows that when used in the sense of *prayojana* or when used as a synonym of "*prayojana*" the word "*artha*" cannot be accurately translated as "meaning". There are occasions when we may ask some one "Why have you addressed that sentence to him?" It will be a good reply if the person says "*svābhipretārthaprakāśārtham*

tat vākyaṃ mayā uktam"—I have uttered that sentence in order to (with this result in view) express my intended sense. The word "*artha*" in its first occurrence in this *Saṃskṛta* sentence has been rendered as intended sense, to distinguish *abhipretārtha* from merely linguistic or strictly semantic sense. A better expression for the last kind of sense would perhaps be *śabdārtha* or *yathāśrutārtha*. These two types of *artha* viz., *abhipretārtha* and merely *śabdārtha* are not necessarily distinct. But they may be. The word meaning is often used to translate "*artha*" in each of these two senses. Again "*artha*" in the sense of linguistic meaning is believed to cover both *padārtha* and *vākyārtha* often rendered respectively as word-meaning and sentence-meaning. But "*artha*" in the sense of linguistic meaning has different connotations when it occurs in the expressions "*padārtha*" and "*vākyārtha*" respectively. There are no comparable different senses of the expression "meaning". Something is the meaning of a word in the sense *padārtha* if the word stands to it in the relation of *vṛtti* including *śakti*, which is often translated as 'meaning-relation'. But a sentence or a *vākya* does not, according to the Naiyāyika-s, stand to anything in the relation of *śakti*. Thus there cannot be a *vākyārtha* in the sense in which there can be and is *padārtha*. The test of if and what meaning, in this sense, an expression, a word, has is whether and what thing it reminds us of when we hear it. This is only a test; this does not constitute the nature of *śakti*. But while a word has the capacity to recall the thing associated with it by way of *śakti* (or such meaning relation as obtains between a subsentential linguistic expression and the item in the world which corresponds to it), it does not actually recall except when a person hears the word and had known earlier the relation of *śakti* which obtains between the word in question and what corresponds to it.

Now we are to distinguish between knowing the meaning (*padārtha*) of a word and knowing the word-meaning relation. Knowledge of the meaning in the sense of the meaning relation or *śakti* is a condition for the knowledge of meaning in the sense of thing meant. But when one knows the relation, R, i.e., *śakti*, one has the awareness of the form R(w, t). Subsequently when on hearing w we are reminded of t, how is this knowledge different from the earlier knowledge of *śakti* or R (w, t)? To have the earlier knowledge is already to have knowledge of the thing t, or the meant.

Three things are usually said. (1) The first knowledge or the knowledge of *śakti* is non-recollective and has the form $R(w, t_n)$.

One who has this knowledge come to have a recollective knowledge of the form *'t'*, provided one hears the word w. To put it differently on hearing *w* one would remember *t* provided one had earlier known the relation of *śakti* between the signifying word and the thing signified. There is a general principle viz. knowledge of one of the two terms of a known relation reminds the knower of the other term. The knower here knew the relation *R* (*w, t*). Now he hears *w* and is accordingly reminded of the *t*.

It may be objected that the auditory preception of *w* cannot cause memory of *t* in case of one who had earlier known the relation *R* (*w, t*), in spite of the said principle. For there is no convincing argument to show that the principle is sound. If preception of a term of a known relation can remind us of the other relatum, why can it not remind us of the relation itself ? If it can remind us of the relation then after hearing *w* we shall have memory of *R* (w, t).

One argument may be that a thing being perceived (or inferred) cannot cause memory of itself. Non-recollective awareness of a thing prevents the occurrence at the same time of the recollective awareness of it; Or, better still, if the conditions of the non-recollective cognition of a thing obtain at a moment then they prevent the occurrence of the memory of that thing at the next moment. But the relation to be allegedly remembered includes the thing being perceived at the moment. Since we cannot have memory of that thing we cannot have memory of the relation which includes that thing. Thus of the two things that could be remembered— the relation and the other term or *sambandhi*— one, the relation, gets excluded. As a result perception of a word yields, in case of a person who had earlier known the relation, here, the meaning relation, the knowledge of the other term.

The justification offered just now to defend the agreed principle, that when we apprehend one term of a known relation we are reminded of the other term and, what seems to be its corollary, that when apprehended a term of a previously known relation does not remind us of the relation itself, seems to be inconsistent with the theory of inference of the Naiyāyika-s. For the theory contends that when one perceives one term, the *vyāpya*, of the relation of *vyāpti*, one is reminded of the relation of *vyāpti* itself. In reply we may say that not much of Nyāya theory of inference is lost if memory of *vyāpti* is not admitted to be necessarily there right at the time when some one makes an inference. Even so we should be required to explain, why is it then said that memory of *vyāpti* is required or does result

from perception of the *hetu*? Secondly, how otherwise could we have *parāmarśa* which is an indispensable concept of the *Nyāya* theory of inference?

One standard maxim used by the Naiyāyika-s is "posit only as much as is warranted by the result to be explained". In case of inference our perception of *hetu* is followed (not immediately though) by another perception of the same hetu, qualified, this time by *vyāpti*. In other words, the second knowledge involves predication of *vyāpti* to the (perceived) *hetu*. But in the first act of knowledge in which *hetu* was perceived the idea of *vyāpti* was not entertained. How can we then have a knowledge involving predication of *vyāpti*? The Naiyāyika-s think that this case warrants us to posit between these two acts of knowledge another cognitive act where we entertain the idea of *vyāpti*. There are reasons, into which we cannot go here, why we are permitted to postulate memory of *vyāpti* to intervene between perception of mere *hetu* and *parāmarśa* or, partly, perception of the *hetu* as qualified by *vyāpti*.

In the case of knowing from words, our perception of words is followed by the cognition of things meant. So far the case may seem to be similar to inference where perception of *hetu* is followed by *parāmarśa*. There is further similarity. This perception of word is preceded (though not immediately) by non-recollective knowledge of *śakti* (*meaning*) relation; the perception of the *hetu* or ground of inference is preceded (though not immediately) by the non-recollective knowledge of *vyāpti* (inferential) relation. But while *parāmarśa* apprehends the *hetu* as qualified by *vyāpti*, [the first knowledge of *hetu* did not apprehend it that way. So a (memory) cognition of the relation of *vyāpti* has to be and is postulated to intervene] the knowledge of the thing meant apprehends the thing not as qualified by the relation of *śakti* (i.e., as *śakya*), but as what it is as an item of the world in its own right. Our perception of the word "table" is followed by the cognition of the table not as a term of the relation of *śakti* but as belonging to the class of things called table. It must have been the case that when we learnt first the meaning of the word "table" or known the relevant relation of *śakti*, we knew table as belonging to the class of things which are (or known as) table. Anyway, since we do not come to know the table as *śakya* we need not have to postulate at the previous moment any act of cognition which apprehended this relation of *śakti*.

The account sketched above also answers the question "Can we apprehend a relatum independent of knowing the relation?" The

answer is obviously, yes. Both before and after we know a relation between any two terms, any one of the terms can be known independent of knowing or remembering that relation. But if after once we have known certain relation between two terms we happen to know one of the terms themselves, can we be reminded of the other term without first being reminded of the relation? And even if we are reminded of the other term would we remember the term not as a term of the relation but just as a thing or what thing it is? In other words, can memory of the thing meant follow immediately our auditory perception of the word (the *śakti* relation of which to the thing we had known earlier)? And even if it is possible, how is the thing remembered? Is it remembered just as that thing or as the significate (*śakya*) of that word? The opinion of the Naiyāyika-s seem to be that it is remembered just as that thing. This relieves them of the obligation of postulating a memory cognition of the relation itself. But since the conditions for the memory of the relation of *śakti* must be admitted to be there, (for otherwise even the thing meant could not be remembered), they should have held that perception of word led to the memory of the relation of *śakti* just as perception of the *hetu* led to the memory of the *vyāpti* relation.

It is understandable why the Naiyāyika-s resist postulation of an act of memory apprehending *śakti* relation as resulting from the perception of the word. But they cannot defend their refusalg to admit this memory unless they can convincingly argue why the thing singified by a word must be remembered just as that thing (or as possessing the feature which determines its being the signficate in the relation between the signifying (expression) and the signified (thing). Besides they cannot place in the distant past knowledge of the features syncategorematicity and the like. If these knowledges intervened between perception of words and final belief of the import of the sentence without rendering impossible the causal account of this final belief then perhaps the memory of *śakti* could as well be admitted to occur after the perception of the words.

One of the reasons which count against postulating, after the auditory perception of the words, memory of *śakti*, is that, the words or the knowledge of them would be too distant (temporally) from the sentential knowledge to be the cause of the latter. Before we state the second reason lët us consider again the case of inferance. It is a requirement of the inferential belief, the occurrence of which marks the termination of the process of inferring, that this belief should be preceded by *parāmarśa* or a belief to the effect that the

subject of the inference (*pakṣa*) has such *hetu* (ground of inference) as stands to the thing being inferred (*sādhya*) by way of the relation of *vyāpti*. One could not have this belief or predicate *vyāpti* unless one entertained the idea of *vyāpti*. Since one could not have any other kind of knowledge of *vyāpti*, whereas conditions for the memory of *vyāpti* obtained, a memory of *vyāpti* is postulated or inferred to occur before the belief called *parāmarśa*. So far as the process of sentential understanding is concerned, the process terminates with the occurrence of the sentential belief. Now this belief invoIes relating different *padārtha*-s as *padārtha*. The "as *padārtha*" is meant to be unpacked thus : as recalled by word in virtue of the relation of *śákti* it bears to the thing. Anyway, the act in which *padārtha*-s are related must be preceded by another act in which the *padārtha*-s are presented as unrelated (at least not related the way they are to be related in the final sentential belief). Thus we are not warranted to postulate belief of the *relation* between words and their meanings, but belief of the meanings or *padārtha*-s. And since this belief could not be of any other type and conditions for memory of *padārtha* obtained, we should admit that the occurrence of the final sentential belief is preceded by memory of *padārtha*-s and not of the relation between *pada*-s and *artha*-s.

It is now clear that knowing a *padārtha* or *padārtha*-s is distinguished from knowing the relation between *pada*-s and *padārtha*-s on the one hand, i.e. *śakti*, and knowing the relation between *padārtha*-s i.e., *anvaya*, on the other. *Śaktijñāna* and *anvyaya buddhi* are both distinguished from *padārtha smaraṇa*. This last is not believed to be a cognition of relation, even if it is a cognition of a determinate thing. This is the unsolved problem which may be shifted elsewhere but since it is *smaraṇa* or memory and since we can remember only what we have known non-recollectively and as we have known that thing, how can we now remember a *padārtha* ? We have not (at least not necessarily) known it previously. We of course knew the relation which obtained between it and certain word. But there we knew it only as one of the two terms of the meaning relation. We did not know it separately. The answer seems to be this. When we know a relation between two things we know each thing as related with the other thing and not as related with the relation itself. There did obtain some relation between each term and the relation, and this could be known in some separate act of knowledge. But the act in which we know a relation we know one thing as related to the other thing. And since the principle is that what was known to be related

to a thing is remembered when that thing is known, the condition for remembering the relation is not there necessarily where there obtains the condition for remembering one of the two things.

Granted, but what about the question, Can we remember a thing except only as we had known it non-recollectively? We knew one thing as related to another, we can now remember the thing in that way only. The implication is, since we have not previously known a *padārtha* separately we cannot now remember it. If condition for remembering the relation did not obtain, then there did not obtain the condition for the memory of the *padārtha*-s separately either. But there is one difference. Memory is a way, though not independent way, in which things can be known. Memory is a recognised type of knowledge. And a *padārtha* qua (extra-linguistic) thing can in principle be known separately and non-recollectively. But how can the queer relation of word to its meaning be known? In standard case the meaning is something non-linguistic where as word is linguistic. We cannot perceive this relation. For the perception of relation would require that terms should be perceptible and perceptible together in the same act and (in case of perception) by the same sense organ. But so far as word and its meaning are concerned, word cannot be perceived except by auditory sense organ which hardly perceives anything other than linguistic expressions; it does not perceive *padārtha*-s which are, and in so far as they are, extra-linguistic thing. Therefore we find no sense organ which can grasp both word and word-meaning; no sense organ can grasp relation between them.

22. Though this is generally true yet some precision may be necessary. We should distinguish between the features of words (constituting a sentence) which are (necessary but) auxiliary conditions (*sahakarī kāraṇa*) for the production of sentential understanding and the feature or features of those words in terms of which a sentence may be defined. The reason why we often fail to keep them distinct is that *Śabdapramāṇa* is necessarily some sentence. Viewed as a category of linguistic expression a sentence or *vākya* may be defined as a group or finite sequence of words which are syncategorematic (in the sense that each taken separately is incomplete while all taken together make a complete syntactico-semantic unity). Thus we can have an adequate criterion of a sentence, considered as a certain syntactico-semantic category of linguistic expression, in terms of *ākāṅṣā* alone (*cf.* Jagadīśa 1973, verse 12). But the conditions of sentential knowledge include all the four features of *ākāṅsā* etc. (*cf*

Nāgeśa 1946,p. 33) in addition to such other conditions as memory of word-meaning etc. (Gaṅgeśa 1897,Part IV, Vol. I p. 18). The author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, however, seems to have defined *vākya* in terms of all the four conditions of *ākāṅṣā* etc. (*cf.* Viśvanātha Kavirāja 1985, p. 27).

23. Thus the sequence of words cited by Patañjali (*cf.* Dāmodara 1904 (Ś),p. 8) as an example of *laukika śabda* viz., '*Gaurśvaḥ puruṣo hastī śakuni mṛgo brāhmaṇa*' is not well-formed, for the words here are not (mutually) syncategorematic. From this one should not jump to the conclusion that names are essentially complete expressions. For in the sentence "*gaurgacchati*" (or "*Daśarathaputro Ramaḥ*") the expression "*gau*" (or "Daśaratha" or "Rama") is syncategorematic.
24. Though the words of a sentence are usually said to be *mithaḥ* or *paraspara* (i.e., mutually) *sākāṅkṣa* yet the exact need for the qualification *mithaḥ* is not very clear. In the sentence "The tropical birds fly faster" the expression "birds" is syncategorematic in relation to "fly" in a sense in which it does not seem to be so in relation to "tropical". *See* Kriṣṇakānta 1973,p.64.
25. But *see* Dharmarājā 1883 (Ś) p. 147 and Nāgeśa 1961,p. 78. However, *see* Udayana 1941,p. 205.
26. Though there is no word like "*ca*" in the original text yet from the context it is clear that Gaṅgeśa means *samuccaya*.
27. In a sense these auxiliary conditions can be said to be independent of *karāṇa* even. For *karaṇa* cannot produce effect till it produces *vyāpāra*.
28. *See* note 22 above.
29. But if awareness of each of these conditions is necessary then either they must all figure together in one *samuhālambana jñāna* or the cognitions of them should form a linear sequence. For different cognitions cannot occur except in chronological order. If however one *samuhālambana jñāna* is admitted then also there is no horizontal or vertical line connecting the conditions.
30. The form of the awareness in question seems to be *samuhālambana*. *cf.* Damodara p. 19.
31. We had noted earlier that the Bauddha-s have stronger argument than the one attributed to them here. But Gaṅgeśa has propounded clearly the objection anticipated by Udayana. *cf.* Udayana 1967,p. 195.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. If continuity of exposition is adhered to then one finds a paradox here and is intrigued by the way the Vaiśesika position has been introduced by Gaṅgeśa. In order to convince one of the initial plausibility of the Vaiśeṣika position, we have offered some clarification.
2. To define a *pramāṇa* as *karaṇa* of the respective *pramā* is the familiar way with the traditional as well as modern Naiyāyika-s. *cf,* Vātsyāyana 1985, p. 91; Uddyotakara 1985 pp. 16-17; Krishnakānta 1990, p. 3.
3. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990 Vol. IV, Part II, p. 861, Uddyotakara 1967, p. 367, Vācaspati 1967, p. 371.
4. In case of one way inclusion, if the term for the class which includes the other is used for the included class then the description that results may be said to be too loose.
5. Thus a Vaiśeṣika may avoid the paradox of describing certain cognition as inference even though that is apprehended as verbal one. Just as a cognition which is caused by sensory apparatus is called *savikalpaka* only sometimes (when it is *viśeṣaṇajñāna janya*), so also when *śābda* plays certain special role in the genesis of an inference the latter may be called *śabda.* For the sake of clarity we may even say *sābdānumiti* just as some say *śābdāparokṣa.*
6. But following Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa one may say that according to the Vaiśeṣika-s every *śābda jñāna* is apprehended in second order perception as *anumiti* (*cf.* Phaṇibhuṣaṇa first edition Vol. 2, p. 280). A Naiyāyika, however, would still offer the argument which Jagadīśa noted in the passage "*Viśiṣṭamaterānubhavikatvāt anyathā anumiterapyapalapāpatteḥ*" (Jagadīśa 1973, p. 7). I would therefore suggest that a more reasonable formulation of the Vaiśeṣika position would be that we do indeed have *anuvyavasāya* or second order perception of the form "*śābdayāmi*". But since strong reasons are there to the contrary this experience (or the form of it) cannot be taken literally. It is to be carefully analysed before it can be accepted as an evidence for certain distinct objective property (*śābdatva*) of a distinct kind of experience (called *śābda*). Thus we do not admit darkness to have movement even though taken apparently and in its face value the experience "*Tamaścalati*", seems to reveal such a thing.
7. If, of course, we accept *anuvyavasāya* to be an evidence.
8. The Vaiśeṣika-s may point out that a Nāiyāyika too does not admit

pramāṇa corresponding either to *jñāna* or, say, *savikalpakapratyakṣa*. And since *pratyakṣatva* and *anumititva* are *jñānatvasākṣātvyāpya jāti* whereas *śābdatva* is *jñānatvavyāpyavyāpya*, no (separate) *pramāṇa* corresponding to the last one is admitted by the Vaiśeṣika-s.

9. At most we can distinguish within the class of inferential knowledge a certain sub-category.
10. There is a subtle difference between the two ways of arguing. If on independent grounds we can prove that *śābda* is not a distinct kind which comes directly under the kind (of quality of the self) *jñāna*, it will not be proved thereby that it is of the kind called inference. For there remains the possibility of its being a kind of perception (*cf.* Jagadīśa 1973, p.8, 10). But if on independent ground *śābda* is proved to be a case of inference then there remains no possibility of its being a kind of perception or any other knowledge. Thus to prove that *śabda* is not *pramāṇāntara*, it is not necessary to prove that it is inference. On the other hand that *śabda* is inference is sufficient to prove that it is not a *pramāṇāntara* (or otherwise there will be *pramāṇasaṃkara*; this again should be kept carefully separate from the issue of *pramāṇasamplava* and *pramāṇavyavasthā*). It remains to be discovered why did Gaṅgeśa use the expression "eva" in the passage $\acute{S}_4$. If the passage is taken to formulate the general argument of the Vaiśeṣika-s to show why *śabda* is not *pramāṇāntara*, then that word is not only not necessary, its omission is necessary. Gāṅgeśa may therefore be taken to formulate here no inference but the Vaiśeṣika position which is that not only *śabda* is no *pramāṇāntara* (which means it is *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*) but it is *anumāna* and *anumāna* alone. By implication he sets a task for the scholar that they should show why *śabda* cannot be said to be *pratyakṣa* or *smṛti* both of which have been enumerated among *vidyā* by the Vaiśeṣika-s. Jagadīśa very ably discharged this task in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*.
11. Sometimes it seems that the contention of the Bauddha-s is that *śabda* is reducible to *anumāna*. The impression finds support, it seems, from the writings of Kamalaśila and Ratnakīrtti. (*See* note 16 below).
12. To credit the Bauddha-s with the truism that any and every utterance does not necessarily convey information, let alone true information, is not to attribute to them any serious view. It is better to take the view discussed in $\acute{S}_3$ as logically possible alternative view which enjoys as (an objection) some logical priority over the view (objection) that *śabda* is not a distinct *pramāṇa*. The relation between the two views– that *śabda* is not a *pramāṇa* and that *śabda* is not a distinct *pramāṇa* seems to have been so understood by Uddyotakara

(*cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 532).

13. Nobody who has not lost his reason would admit the possibility of an utterance without any audience in view (*cf.* Uddyotakara 1967, p. 303; Udayanacharya 1967, p. 331 and Gaṅgeśa 1897, Vol. I, p. 352). It is to be noted that the philosophers do not quarrel with facts but they differ when questions of interpreting, classifying etc. arise. If facts of 'experience' were not accepted then philosophical examination would turn out to be non-starter.
14. *cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 370.
15. "*Śabdopi na bādhakamanumānānatirekāditi Vaiśeṣikādayaḥ*" Udayanacārya 1941, p. 204.
16. Ratnakīrtti holds that though *śabda* is not a source of knowledge of external objects it does inform us of things internal. But as source of our belief of some internal or mental states it is a form of inference. *cf.* Ratnakīrtti 1957, p. 94.
17. *cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 537 and Udyanācarya 1967, pp. 373-74.
18. He has not mentioned them in $\acute{S}_2$ because there he was defining *śabdapramāṇa*. *See* above Chapter 3 note 22. As we noted earlier the expression *sahakarikāraṇa* needs more clarification.
19. The problem arose because we found it difficult to accept either the distinction Gaṅgeśa made between the two rival views (rival in relation to Nyāya position), i.e., views stated in $\acute{S}_3$ and $\acute{S}_4$, or Mathurānātha's defence of Gaṅgeśa by attributing the frist view to the Bauddha-s (*see* Mathurānātha 1897, Part IV, Vol. I, p. 14).
20. The guarded way in which we formulated the point should not be construed as indication of our commitment to Udayana's theory of *pramāṇa* (excepting *pratyakṣa*) as *jñāyamāna karaṇa*. *See* Udayanācarya 1967, p. 338, 373.
21. It is a new question different from the paradox discussed above. Here the problem is how to interpret the two parts of the first sentence of $\acute{S}_4$— the part, even so, and the part, vocal sound(s) is not a distinct source of knowledge— so that $\acute{S}_{4(1)}$ turns out to be consistent. Incidentally since further explanations of the views that *śabda* is or is included into *anumāna* are pending we prefer this broad and non-committal statement, *śabda* is *used* to infer etc.
22. The expressions *śabdapramāṇa* and *śabdapramā* or what are sometimes used respectively as their English synonyms, viz., language as means of knowledge and knowledge as produced by language, are slightly misleading. The standard view is that not the words but the *awareness* of words is *śabdapramāṇa*. But when awareness of words succeeds in producing knowledge called *śābdapramā*, the words are

strictly speaking *pramāṇaśabda*. It will be assumed that whenever necessary the reader will make necessary adjustment and read *pramāṇaśabda* or *śabdapramāṇa* as the context strictly demands.

23. *cf.* Udayanacārya 1967, pp. 338-339.
24. To say merely that *śabda* is used to infer the relation between word meanings is not to commit to the view that the words uttered are themselves the ground of inferring that relation just in the strong way in which smoke is the ground of inference of fire. It does not seem that anybody ever seriously meant to infer in either of these sorts of ways: "*Ghataḥ guṇaḥ śabdāt*" or "*Etāni padārthasaṃsarga-bodhakāṇi śabdāt*".
25. For example construed in a certain way the relevant reference has as ground '*ākāṅṣādimatpada-(śabda)-tvāt.*' Here *śabda* forms a part of the ground.
26. "*Tasmāt padāni kṛtasaṃketāṇi svārthān smārayanti, ākāṅksā yogya-tāsattisdhrīcīnāni adṛṣṭpūrvaṃ vākyārthaṃ bodhayanti, na saṃgati-grahaṇamapi pratīkṣanta itidūre'numānāt bhavanti.*" (Vācaspati 1967, p. 372). This is a conclusive proof of what I believe to be true that most of the essential features of Nyāya theory of language have been discovered and formulated by Vācaspati. Gaṅgeśa knew this and drew much from that source. The commentators and students of Gaṅgeśa would have done a great job if they traced all relevant references to earlier works.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. It is important to keep distinct the two processes of learning language and using language (or performing with language). Learning a language consists mainly in learning the meaning of subsentential expressions and rules of sentence formation; and a theory of language learning is basically a theory of (word) meaning or *śakti vāda*. But when we perform linguistically– we convey information or issue command–we do so by using sentence. Use or utterance of a sentence or linguistic performance presupposes knowledge of (relevant) word meaning "*...pravṛttyādyartham hi prayojyasyā vākyārthajñānamuddiś- yaitādṛśapadebhyo vākyārtham jñāsyatīti budhyā vākyaprayoga...*". (Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 352). There is no such thing as prior learning or knowledge of meaning of sentences ("*vākyārthasyāpūrvatvāt*". *ibid* Vol. IV, Part II, p. 543); actually sentences have no meaning to be known (*Vākyenirarthakatayā...*" ibid p. 733). This also shows, as they have written explicitly elsewhe-

re, that according to the Naiyāyika-s we cannot set limit to the number of sentences as we can do in case of words. However, Quine seems to believe wrongly that even in 1983 the Indians are unfamiliar with or incapable of appreciating this 'revolutionary' idea. (*See* para 2 of p. 465 of Quine's *The Time* of *My Life*: *An Autobiography*).

2. For in that case there would be circularity.
3. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990,Vol. IV, Part II, p. 649.
4. "... *Viśiṣṭārthaviṣayam vijñānam prasūte, tat śābdam*": Vācaspati 1967,p. 191.
5. First the words of the sentence are to be produced. It is a complex procedure. *See* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I,pp. 9-10. *See* also Nāgeśa 1988, p. 14; Dāmodarāśarma has quoted the same passage without "*vā*", (*cf.* Dāmodara 1904,p. 19). Then again perception of the sentence itself is a complicated process; *see* Vācaspati 1967, p. 191. For the equally complicated process wherethrough the knowledge of the hearer is produced *see* Dāmodara *op. cit* p. 19 foot note 18 and Vācaspati 1967, p. 191 and 372.
6. Had there been any word for the relation also then the sentence would have been turned into a mere string of words. Compare the sentence which standardly (signifies roughly) the relation of conjunction in which fire stands to a hill, viz. *Parvato vahnimān* or The hill has fire, with the string of expressions "The hill, fire, conjunction". For further discussion whether we can say that the R^* is the meaning of some word one may be referred to Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 543f.
7. The exact import of saying that *śabda* is a case of *anumāna* is not very clear. It may mean that *śabda* acts as ground of the inference which a hearer of certain sentences is alleged to use to arrive at his belief about what the sentence signifies. But such formulation is untenable for *vakyatvāt* or *śabdatvāt*, let alone *vākyāt* or *śabdāt*, can hardly be the formulation of the ground of inference in question. Perhaps all that is meant is that when a hearer comes to know from an utterance what it means, he depends on his knowledge of a *vyāpti* relation in which both the words heard and the fact known figure. *cf.* Udayana 1967, p. 379 and Udayana 1941, p. 204f, *see* also Śrīdhara 1963, p. 512. Śrīdhara, however, discusses in the first place not how we come to know, depending on our knowledge of *vyāpti*, what a sentence signifies. He discusses if we can know on the strength of *vyāpti* what a word signifies. *ibid* p. 514.
8. An illustration may help. We infer (in the yonder hill) fire from smoke. When one infers on the basis of one's belief (or some such sentence)

that a certain hill has smoke, the resulting (inferential) belief or knowledge (or conclusion), has the form that hill has fire. The *sādhya* or the object being inferred, here, the fire, figures as the predicate of the inference (whether considered as a sentence or as a state of knowledge). What figures as the subject there (i.e., in that knowledge or sentence) is where that *sādhya* (the thing fire) is being inferred. Here it is the hill. Such subject of inferential judgement is called *pakṣa*. The smoke does not figure at all in the inference (considered as the resulting state of knowledge or the sentence which may express it). It however figures in the knowledge (sentence) which causes the inferential knowledge of fire.

9. In recent times Jorgensen has written sympathetically about non-linguistic view of inference. (*cf.* Jorgensen 1962).
10. It has been noted here that there is no unanimity on this point among the Indian philosophers.
11. Opinions differ as to what is the acceptable criterion or definition of a *vākya*. Quite a few illuminating points have been made by Gaṅgeśa with regard to the notion of *vākya* (roughly sentence). *See* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Volume IV, Part-I, pp. 476-482. Both Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* and *Bhartṛhari* in his *Vakyapadīya* discussed throughly the possible varieties of (sense of) *vākya*.
12. *cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 7.
13. It seems that it is slightly inaccurate to credit the speaker of a sentence with the knowledge of the R *, which knowledge the sentence causes in the hearer. For if, as Mathurānātha says, the speaker can derive his knowledge from sources other than *vākya*, he cannot be said to have *vākyārthajñāna* in the strict sense of the term.
14. *cf.* Madhusūdan 1980 Introduction p. 3; Gaṅgeśa 1990 Vol. IV, Part I, p. 476, pp. 480-81.
15. Unless we interpret "speaker" strongly enough so as to exclude utterances of, say, a parrot, this may seem to be not true. In other words this statement tends to impose a stronger demand on the speaker.
16. *cf.* Udayanācārya 1967, p. 379.
17. Without going into much greater details and scanning a very large amount of literature, the needed clarification is hard to achieve here. *Śabda* is said to be included into or reducible to *anumāna*. It may mean either that the belief we have when we hear certain utterance is an inference or is inferential in nature. Or it may mean in addition that the *śabda* which the speaker hears functions as logical ground just as smoke does in the inference of fire (from smoke). In either

case one may come to have an inferential belief the content of which is other than the R^*. If this were so then so far *śabda* as allegedly autonomous source of (non-inferential) belief of R^* remains unreduced to inference. So the reductionists are under compulsion to make R^* figure as *sādhya* (object being inferred) or part thereof in their construction of the process of inference to which the hearer of a sentence allegedly resorts. Next there remains two questions: (i) Since the thing or the property which is inferred is inferred as characterizing certain thing (subject of inference), what is that thing (or subject) as property (predicate) of which a hearer infers an R^*? (ii) What other property of that thing the speaker uses as the logical gound to infer R^*? So far as the question (i) is concerned it should be noted that anything can be a property of any other thing provided it stands to that other thing in certain relation. And there are all sorts of relation (including even identity). Now keeping the present context of discussion and the standard interpretation of R^* in mind, it is most natural to take R^* to be related to any of these three things: (a) it is related to (*padam*) the word (actually to words in the plural i.e., the sentence which the speaker utters on the basis of his prior knowledge of R^*); (b) it is related to the intention of the speaker who by his utterance intends to convey the R^*; (c) it characterizes the word-meanings (*padārtha*-s) between which it obtains. So far therefore the inference which in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy replaces the allegedly autonomous source of *śabda*, may be constructed in three different ways. But it is difficult for a hearer to infer R^* as characterizing the intention of the speaker. For he has no direct access to the internal state of the speaker. So he would be required to infer first the specific intention of the speaker. But in that same act R^* gets inferred. For it is this R^* as the content makes the intention the specific intention it is. So there will be no separate inference of R^*. Perhaps some such reason explains why Udayanācārya did not very seriously think of constructing the inference along the line (b).

The Inferential Apprehension Theory (IAT) of the Vaiśeṣika-s permits the construction of the inference which a hearer resorts to in either of the two ways. It is an inference constructed along (c), that is, as (II) an inference where R^* is inferred as related to or as characterizing the word meanings or *padārtha*-s; or it is constructed along (a), that is, as (I) an inference where R^* is inferred as related to or as characterizing the words or *pada*-s. The Vaiśeṣika Inference II is accordingly called *padārtha pakṣaka* i.e., in which *padartha*-s

constitute the subject of inference or *pakṣa*, and as property (predicate) of this *pakṣa* the R^* is inferred. The inference I is called *padapakṣaka anumāna*.

Inference-I again admits of two different constructions depending on how exactly we understand the relation between the words (*padāni*) and the R^* (*Padārthasaṃsarga*). If we take the relation to be direct one then we have inference of the form '(Ia) These words are characterized by R^*, because...'. If we may take certain indirect relation to contain between the words and the R^* then we have '(Ib) These words are preceded (caused) by the (speaker's) awareness of R^*, because...". *cf.* Udayanācārya 1941, p. 204, 205.

Now to know a thing inferentially there should have to be an inference with that thing as *sādhya* or the predicate of the inferential judgement. But if an inference of an R^* is to replace, in the radical sense, the claim that the corresponding sentence S_i is the autonomous source of the belief of R^* in question, then it is thought that the following stronger point is to be made. We derive our belief about R^* not from the words of the speaker but through certain inferential process. It may seem that to meet this demand the words must figure in the construction of inference of R^* in the role or position of the ground of inference. In the actual constructions given by Udyanācārya, the words somehow do figure in that way. But in inference-I the words as words (as words of a certain type i.e. as having *ākāṅṣā* etc.) figure as *hetu* or ground of inference. They do not do so perhaps in the case of the other inference.

One more point to note is that between I(a) and (Ib) the former appears to be better. And this satisfies the stronger demand also. But do we have anything to choose betwen (Ib) and (II)? If order of discussion is any indication then Udayana seems to consider Inference II first and then Inference I; though he has rejected both of them as defective. Gaṅgeśa, while agreeing with Udayana (though for different reason) that they are both defective, discusses first the Inference-I. It is interesting to try to guess what could have been the reason for this.

18. Specification of R^* as intended by the speaker marks a significant change or development in the history of the debate under reference. But that linguistic utterance is a purposive act is a matter of general agreement (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 352).

This passage S_5 begins with the word "*Tathāhi*" which may be taken to indicate that an example will follow. It may be understood slightly differently also. So understood the expression may be transla-

ted as "the reason being". The idea is this, what Gaṅgeśa (or the Vaiseṣika Philosophers whose view is being formulated in this passage) says here is an answer to the question which has just been put to the Vaiśeṣika-s. The claim of these philosophers put forward above—that the knowledge of R^* is derived from inference—should be taken to have invited a question, say, "But how?". This simple looking question may be a demand for a general defence in favour of that claim or actual construction of the sort of inference in question or the statement of the ground of such inference.

19. In addition to what has been written in the first paragraph of Note 18 above I would like to point out that there is some genuine difficulty in clarifying the notion of *tātparya* and also the notions of *akāṅkṣā, āsatti* and so on. For we cannot anticipate all that Gaṅgeśa has said about all these four notions in as many chapters. Further it is not known for certain if and what distinct sense the Vaiśeṣikā-s attach to these notions and whether Gaṅgeśa has used them in those senses here when he is formulating the views and arguments of the Vaiśeṣika-s.

20. It can hardly be denied that we owe a substantial portion of the total body of beliefs that we have to the utterances or writings of others. But language does not so prominently figure in the discussion or theory of knowledge in the contentemporary West where sometimes epistemology seems to form one part of "impure" Philosophy of language. How to explain this omission? Whether epistemology is conceived of as theory of epistemic evidence or as the study of the sources and scope of knowledge, language seems to have a claim to be accorded proper treatment in epistemology. Some people think that the beliefs we owe to the utterances of others can never pass for knowledge. There are others who would say that we owe a large number of our true beliefs to the utterances of others in the sense that we come to entertain those beliefs on the occasion of hearing the utterances made audibly and in a language which is familiar to us.

Some philosophers make a claim which is still more strong. The claim is that the true beliefs we come to entertain on the occasion as above are derived from those utterances themselves as source. It seems that only they can make this claim who have been successful in developing (or are in possession of) a suitable theory which can bridge the gap between the actual evidence—meagre imput, the event which when given a non-interpretative discription is hardly anything more than the movement of some one's lips emitting certain sounds,

on the one hand and on the other the episode of hearer's belief. In the absence of such a theory— whether, say, a casual theory of the Naiyāyika-s or a theory of interpretation as developed by Donald Davidson— one cannot say more (rather much less perhaps) than that on the occasion of hearing the 'utterance' one came to entertain a certain true belief. Some may think that such theories are either false or uncalled for. For nothing can defend the claim that the knowledge one has on the occasion of hearing certain utterance is derived from that utterance. Knowledge we have on such occasion is derived from inference as the source. In short, they will say that certain process of inference is involved in-between, which transforms, so to say, the hearing of a certain utterance into the belief or knowledge of certain definite fact. Though it is not a close question yet I am inclined to think that the question as to what is involved in between is not just an empirical but a theoretical question which can be solved by actually building certain theory which will enable us to derive the (true) belief we are found to acquire when we hear certain utterances of others. The answer which the Naiyayika-s offer mark them out as *VA* theorist or verbal Apprehension Theorists. The alternative theory which the Vaiśeṣika-s offer is *IA* theory. According to this theory a hearer's belief is a case of inferential belief which is derived through a process of inference. By contrast a *VA* theorist claims that the belief is derived from the verbal utterance of the speaker which therefore should be accepted as an autonomous source of knowledge.

Even when a *VA* theorist says that certain *pramāṇa śabda* yields as autonomous source the belief a hearer has, this account must fit in with the causal model of explanation which he generally uses. Accordingly if *pramāṇa śabda* is to be *pramāṇa* then it must be a cause and there cannot intervene more than one *kṣaṇa* (moment, say) between the utterance of *pramāṇa śabda* and the occurrence of the belief of the hearer. This in other words means that there can intervene (the occurrence of) just one factor between the utterance and the resulting belief of the hearer. But it is agreed that this belief is immediately preceded by the memory cognition of the word meanings. So this cognition must occur and there is no scope for any other event to occur without breaking 'the causal chain'. But there must occur hearer's perception of the words the speaker utters or there has to be speech reception. This shows that the utterances cannot be a cause, let alone special cause or *pramāṇa* in respect of hearer's belief. What can be and is admitted to be, by the

navyanaiyāyika-s like Viśvanātha, the *pramāṇa* is the hearer's own perception of the sound. But why should then the *pramāṇa* (source) is called *śabdapramāṇa* (linguistic source) ? It is sometimes said that what actually causes the belief of the hearer is neither just *śabda* or the (speaker's) utterance nor just the (hearer's) perception of the words, but the words themselves as perceived or as being perceived at the moment (*jñāyamāna śabda*). It is to be remembered, however, that even when *jñāyamānaśabda* or *śabdajñāna* is said to be the *pramāṇa* in this context and is therefore special cause, it is not suggested that any one of them or even the two together constitute sufficient cause. Each of them or their pair needs to be supplemented by some other conditions known as auxiliary conditions.

21. It is a fascinating study. I have written extensively elsewhere on how significantly the formulations differ. In the process I discovered that all the familiar formulations of the inference which is supposed, by the Vaiśeṣika-s to replace *śabda* as *pramāṇa* can be traced to the writings of Vācaspati Miśra. In fact one finds some other formulations which are not familiar. Besides I found how successive philosophers have introduced most subtle twists in the on going discussions and in their formulations. Some most decisive and original points which have been made by Gaṅgeśa can be discovered, behind so much of apparent repetitions, only if one reads the texts very closely.
22. Even through a process of inference the hearer cannot derive his belief from the utterance of the speaker unless the speaker has uttered a complete sentence. Compared to the completeness of the sentence every sub-sentential part of the sentence is incomplete. This negative formulation fails to capture the richness of the notion of *ākāṅṣā*. The feature of *ākāṅṣā* signifies that the expression is a potential sentence, it can be turned into a complete sentence. Any meaningful word is in this sense *sākāṅṣa* or has ākāṅṣā. If we take any two words from any two sentence contexts we may not be able to frame a new sentence with them. Thus words within the unity of a single sentence have the feature of being tuned into a complete sentence if we take them together or take any one of them with some other expression or expressions. What they have is not just general *ākāṅṣā* but *parasparākāṅṣā*. They are *mithaḥ sākāṅṣa* or mutually syncategorematic.

    This mutual syncategorematicity between the words within a single sentence should not be over interpreted to mean that *ākāṅṣā* is a symmetrical relation or that a sentence can be read in any direction whatsoever. Thus though the nominal stem of a word and the suffix

attached to it, both occurring in a sentence, are mutually syncategorematic yet there will be definite order in the relation as related by which the meanings of those parts can be known (from these words) by a hearer. To be specific the meaning of the suffix (*pratyārtha*) will be apprehended as characterised by the meaning of the nominal stem (*prātipadikārtha*). *See* chapter 3 note 24.

23. In addition to what has been written in note 19 above, I would like to point out that here we shall take certain expressions to have *tātparya* if they have been uttered by the speaker to convey certain intended sense. If some one utters the word "page" with the intention that we should take him to refer by uttering that expression to the boy servant then the expression has *tātparya* or *tātparyārtha* (intended meaning).

24. If a comparison with what Udayana did in his *Nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ* 3/13, is suggested then one should note that Udayana also included *ākāṅṣā* as part of the logical ground of the Vaiśeṣika inferences as he formulated them. He takes it to be the view of the Vaiśeṣika-s that *ākāṅkṣā* is a part of the hetu and hence awareness of it is necessary if the hearer is to derive his belief about R^* inferentially. While criticising the Vaiśeṣika view Udayana said that awareness of syncategorematicity is not needed. An argument along this line is certainly possible. But so far as the text *Śabdacintāmaṇi* is concerned Gaṅgeśa does not repeat this particular criticism of Udayana. Besides when they propound their VAT the Naiyāyika-s at least the navyanaiyāyika-s tell us that awareness of syncategorematicity is a necessary, though auxiliary, causal condition. *cf.* Madhusūdan 1980, p. 13. There, however, remains lot more to be discussed here.

25. The points raised and discussed in $\acute{S}_6$ and $\acute{S}_7$ relate directly to Vallabhācārya's very brief treatment of the claim that *Śabda* or language is an autonomous source of knowledge. It is interesting to note that about two hundred years after Udayana (10th century A.D.) extensively criticised and refuted the Vaiśeṣika reductionism—according to which the allegedly distinct source of knowledge called linguistic means is really a case of inferential means— Vallabhācārya (12th Century A.D.) wrote in favour of it. But he cannot be credited with a new defence of the Vaiśeṣika position which takes note of and refutes the objections of Udayana; nor did he reformulate the Vaiśeṣika position in the light of the criticisms made by Udayana. This strikes us as somewhat, strange particularly in view of the fact that Śridharācārya, another great Vaiśeṣika and

a late contemporary of Udayana, both responded to the latter and revised some of his own views in the light of what the latter wrote on the relevant points. (*cf.* Gopinath Kaviraj 1982, p. 24). Vallabha shows no awareness of Udayana's contribution to the literature on *śabda*. And Śrīdhara has not discussed as extensively as Udayana the claim of *Śabda* to be regarded as an autonomous source. Śrīdhara did not clearly separate the question about if and how the words mean what they are alleged to mean and if and how a sentence informs us of what it is said to tell us about.

Śrīdhara is most expected to state clearly and definitely that *śabda* is not a separate source (*pramāṇa*) but is a case of inference when he comments on the statement of Vaiśeṣika reductionism in question in the writing of Praśastapāda (5th-6th Century). Praśastapada writes "*Śabdādīnāmapyanumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt*". He further specifies, by way of explaining this statement, the points of analogy between inferential process and the process through which a hearer comes to entertain his belief. But he does not hint at the form of the inference to which the hearer resorts. (*cf.* Praśastapāda 1963, p. 512). Śrīdhara in his elucidation takes Praśastapāda to mean that a word like "*mṛga*" (deer) stands to the belief the hearer of the word comes to have, in the same way in which the thing smoke stands to the inferential belief of fire which one who infers arrives at. The smoke is the ground of inference, so also the word heard by the hearer, here "*mṛga*", is the ground of inference. The form of the inference a hearer resorts to is this. "This person (the speaker) has the intention to refer to the thing which has horn etc, because he utters the word 'deer', we too do the same when we have a similar intention." Once thus the intention of the speaker is inferred, the object he intends to refer to can be inferred with that intention as ground of inference. (Śrīdhara 1963, p. 515).

A few points of interest should be noted. Śrīdharācārya does not betray any explicit and clear awareness of the distinction between two questions— (i) How do we come to know a thing when we hear the word (*pada*) for it? and (ii) How do we, as hearer, come to arrive at the belief we do arrive at when we hear a sentence (*vākya*)? If actual words of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara are read together then it appears that the Vaiśeṣika-s are concerned to establish that individual words enable us to be aware of the respective things which correspond to them in the sense that we use them to infer in the first place the uttere's intention and then from that intention as the

logical ground we further infer the thing. Secondly, Śrīdhara takes no note of the works that have already been done on the subject from the time of Gautama and up to the time when his older contemporary Udayanacārya, obviously following the Nyāya tradition, wrote so extensively on the subject. In the Nyāya tradition there has been, at least from the time of Vācaspati Miśra, explicit awareness that understanding a sentence or the genesis of the belief a hearer has when he hears certain utterance in familiar language poses a distinct problem. This problem about knowledge of *vākyārtha* or sentence meaning is altogether different from the problem of knowing a *padārtha*. Besides while dealing with the question of reducing *śabdapramāṇa* to inference Gautama and, following him, Vātsyāyana explicitly rejected the suggestion that such imperceptible things as *svarga* etc. are inferred from *śabda* or word. Gautama said that these are known from words as spoken by trustworthy people. (Gautama Sūtra 2.1.52). Though words of such persons (the *āpta*-s) mean here utterances of sentences yet even up to the time of Vātsyāyana (*cf.* Vātsyāyana 1985, p. 536) it was not clearly stated that what we knew from a *vākya* was altogether different from what we knew from words. We know from a sentence not things but relation between things; in the words of Vācaspati, "*Yo hyatyantādṛṣṭapūrva svargāpūrvadevatādiḥ sa vākyārtharūpaḥ*" (Vācaspati 1985, p. 536). Even when he speaks of mistaken or deceiving speaker Śrīdhara does not clearly distinguish between word and sentence as source of information. I shall not go into further detail but it remains strange that on the point of reduction of *śabda* into *anumāna*, a major point of debate with the Naiyāyika-s, the Vaiśeṣika thinkers did not pay very serious attention to the important works done by the Naiyāyika-s in the field. A substantial portion of the total contributions on the subject by the Naiyayika-s from Gautama (2nd Century) to Jagadīśa (17th Century) is devoted to the elaboration and defence upto a point of what is essentially the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the allegedly autonomous linguistic source is really the familiar source called inference.

Śrīdhara writes on *śabda* primiarily in the sense of *pada* and endeavours almost exclusively to demonstrating that it is only through certain inferential process that a word can enable us to know the *thing* which corresponds to it. This itself can be a separate issue and point of debate with the Naiyāyika-s if one particularly keeps in mind the way Gautama and Vātsyāyana discussed the question of reduction of *śabda* to inference. But this awareness which was

already there in Gautama and Vātsyāyana became quite clear and explicit by the time of Uddyotakara and, particularly, Vācaspati Miśra. Not the separate words but a sentence is what constitutes *śabdapramāṇa*. So in the debate over the reducibility of *śabdapramāṇa*, sentence and knowledge allegedly derived from sentence should centrally figure. But the author of *Nyāyakandalī* neglects sentences and prefers to confine his discussion mainly to words.

Vallabhācārya does just the opposite when he very briefly discusses the question of reduction. He speaks with sentences alone in mind. But he does little beyond (i) expressing his belief that sentences do not constitute a separate *pramāṇa* (*Śabdastu na mānāntaram*. Vallabhāchārya 1934, p. 526) and (ii) giving us the exact formulation of the inference which a hearer is supposed to resort to when he derives whatever information he does from some utterances addressed to him. This formulation of the inference can be traced to Udayana's writing on the subject. But Vallabha does not only take no note of the other type of inference, the *Padārtha Pakṣaka* inference, he does not also show even any awareness of the critical points made by Udayana or any one else about the attempted reduction of *śabda* into *anumāna*. Could it be that Vallabha relied on, for the formulation of the inference, what was also Udayana's source, Viz, Vācaspati Miśra! Vācaspati gave the formulation "*Ayaṃ padakadambakaviśeṣaḥ smāritapadārthasaṃsargavān, ākāṅkṣādimattve sati padakadambatvāt, gāmabhyājetipadāvalivaditi*" (Vācaspati 1985, p. 538). Vallabha's formulation is "*Padāni smāritārthasaṃsargavijñaptipūrvakāṇi, yogytāsattimattve sati saṃsṛstārthaparatvāt, gāmabhyajeti padakadambavat*" (Vallabha 1934, pp. 526-28). Vallabha's formulation is however free from certain defect from which some inference answering to Vācaspati's formulation, as has been shown by Udayana, suffers. This may be a very slender even insignificant evidence that Vallabha took note of Udayana's contribution. For Udayana brought devastating charges against inference having the same form which it has in Vallabha's construction. Secondly not only Udayana, even Vācaspati before him noted a second variety of inference, the *padārthapakṣakānumāna* (*cf.* Vacaspati 1985, p. 537).

Though I do not have any supporting evidence to offer immediately, yet I guess that Vyōmaśivācārya came after Vācaspati Miśra and revised the earlier Vaiśeṣika stand based on questionable interpretation of Kaṇāda's Sūtra 9.3.3 and Praśastapāda's remark

noted above, that *śabda* was not an autonomous source of knowledge. But since his view did not change the opinion of Śrīdhara or Vallabha who were aware of Vyomaśivācārya's work, and since the two-*Pramāṇa* theory continued to enjoy support from the Vaiśeṣika-s, some prefer to say that Vyomaśivācārya did not revise the traditional Vaiśeṣika stand but he only deviated from that tradition. Be that as it may, one is certainly justified if one expects that a Philosopher of Śrīdhara's or Vallabha's stature would display their awareness of the heavy burden of obligation to answer the long list of criticisms of long standing that were already there against the thesis they were going to advocate. It is one of the unsolved problems of history of Vaiśeṣika philosophy and also perhaps of the psychology of these two great Vaiśeṣika thinkers, why they did not leave any evidence in the style or content of their respective writings that they discharged this obligation or were even aware of it. On the other hand if, at least, Vallabha were, for whatever reason, completely unaware of the earlier works of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Udayana, to whom did he owe his formulation of the inference which is supposed to replace the alleged *śabdaprmāṇa* ? Is the formulation absolutely new and his own ? (There is clear evidence that Vallabha was acquainted with Udayana's work.) Things may clear up if the commentarial works of some Jaina philosophers are consulted. It is now an established fact that some works of very high order and belonging to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tradition received the attention they deserved not so much in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika tradition as in the Jaina tradition. Thus it is another mystery why *Kanadalī* was practically ignored by the scholars of Bengal.

But Gaṅgeśa wanted to be fair in his criticism of the Vaiśeṣika or better, standard Vaiśeṣika view that *śabda* as *pramāṇa* is not essentially different from *anumāna*. So inspite of his intimate knowledge of the writings of Vācaspati and Udayana, Gaṅgeśa writes here extensively on Vallabha's formulation. And in doing so he allowed his philosophical imagination to read many more additional things in the expression "*saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva*" than was perhaps there in the mind of Vallabha. Vallabha had on all probability, used the expression *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva* as a varient of *sākāṅkṣa*. But Gaṅgeśa's inimitably novel treatment introduces delightful logical subtlety. It has not been possible to bring out in the text all these subtleties even after easy intelligibility has to some extent been compromised.

26. It would have been more literal if I said instead of R^*, things related

by R^*. But where the context did not demand emphasis on a particular aspect, *padārthasaṃsarga* and *saṃsṛṣṭārtha* have been interchangably used in the sense of *vākyārtha*.

27. If we assume of course that the copyist who copied the manuscript or the printer who published the text based on certain manuscript is not responsible for the omission.

28. If however we read this passage, not in the context of the formulations of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I i.e. *Padapakṣakānumāna*, as have been given by Udayana or Gaṅgeśa himself; if rather we read it as Gaṅgeśa's examination and rejection of the formulation due to Vallabhāchārya (*see* note 25 above) then very deep significance of the order of occurrence will be apparent. In that inference Vallabha had used as ground of inference *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva*. This expression admits of two interpretations, "*saṃsṛṣṭo yo'rtha tatparatva*" or "*saṃsṛṣṭatva prakārakapratītiparatvam*". If the second interpretation is accepted then Vallabha's inference becomes vitiated by discrepancy. For when a mistaken person utters a sentence, a hearer who does not know him to be mistaken will resort to some such inference as Vallabha has given; certainly the sentence has been uttered with a view to produce in the hearer a belief which has the form of a predication where what is being predicated is the property of relatedness of the things. Thus the *hetu* (or the part there of) *saṃsṛṣṭārthaparatva* in its second interpretation is available. However the property to be inferred is not there in the *pakṣa*, the words of the mistaken speaker. Thus Vallabha's inference becomes vitiated by *vyabhicāra*. This *hetu* cannot be taken in its first interpretation because then it cannot be known before the process of inference has been concluded. But if inference has already been made independently then the knowledge of the *hetu* taken in this sense is useless. The famous, post Gaṅgeśa scholar Śaṃkar Miśra has noted that the critical points Gaṅgeśa had made in the passages $\acute{S}_6$ and $\acute{S}_7$ hold against Vallabha's inference. (*cf.* Śaṃkar Miśra 1934, pp. 527-28).

29. It happens with certain kind of inference that the object or the feature F being inferred as the feature of the subject of inference t_1 had earlier been known as feature of some other thing of a similar kind t_2. In the instance of this other thing t_2 that special relation which forms the basis of the present inference had earlier been ascertained. Thus as feature of t_2, F had perhaps been perceived. But as feature of t_1 it is now being inferred.

30. Discussion of this topic forms part of the section *Śaktivāda*

(*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Part IV, Vol. II, pp. 460-729).

31. It seems that Gaṅgeśa is convinced by the sort of answer Vallabha offered to similar charge which he anticipated against his formulation of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I.
32. Another example may be constructed. Sentences uttered in succession are "He is the officer who Ram met" and "The murderer escaped before the officer reached the place." The hearer heard or is made to think that he heard the sentence "Ram met the murderer".
33. The standard example of *nirākāṅkṣa vākya* found in Navyanyāya literature is *ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṃ ānayanaṃ kṛtị*. But this is only a string of words having not even an appearance of a sentence. The example given by us here has the support of Vācaspati Miśra. (*cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 537). Preference for different examples may even be indicative of different conception of *ākāṅkṣā*.
34. Actually in the text there are two or two versions of one (the third) logical ground considered by Gaṅgeśa. We should also understand Mathurānātha to mean two versions of one ground when he says as, if Vallabhācārya offered two logical grounds. (*cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Part I, Vol. I, p. 31.)

CHAPTER SIX

1. Strict accuracy demands that we should be explicit as to whether *sādhya*, the *thing* in question or the *sādhyapada*, the *expression,* used in the linguisic formulation of the inference of the *sādhya* in question, is what we are taking about. We freely talk both in the linguistic mode and thing mode because close correspondence between these two modes are there. The employment of words in the formulation of an inference is taken, in such discussions on them, as instance of their use and not mention. And when we apparently talk about certain expresions in use we talk about the things which the expressions haye been used to signify.

   It should be noted here that without any announcement Gaṅgeśa has introduced a major change in the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika inference-I. Hereto before *tātparya* did not figure as any part of the *sādhya*. Secondly, in earlier time question of intended meaning used to be discussed only in the context of word-meaning. The same is mostly the case, even today. Gaṅgeśa has credited the Vaiśeṣika-s with one perception or worry which has not been thoroughly understood or answered. I have dicussed this extremely important point in my paper "Autonomy Vs. Rationality".

2. It is generally agreed that an awareness, on the part of the hearer, of the sense intended by the speaker (or of the context sensitive sense of the words used or of the context of utterance in question) is necessary if the hearer is to arrive at the belief about what the sentence says. In the context of the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika inference also *tātparya* is sometimes made a part of the ground of inference. *See* Vallabha's own account of the inference and Śaṃkara Miśra's elucidation on it (*cf.* Śaṃkar Miśra 1934, p. 530). The point here is different. Once we bring in reference to the speaker in our account of hearer's belief it is not enough to know in a general way that the speaker uttered the sentence to convey that the relevant things are (somehow) related. We must also know which particular relation the speaker wanted to convey in that context of utterance. For the same things may be related in various ways. We cannot any longer discover the content of the speaker's intention because that may be different from what the words uttered mean by themselves or along with objectively verifiable commonly given context.
3. *cf.* Udayana 1967, p. 378.
4. In the Asiatic Society edition there is a printing mistake in this passage, which has been corrected here in our transliteration. The Pandit edition with *Prakāśa* commentary has the correct reading. *cf.* *The Pandit* Vol. VI, No. 66, November 1871, p. 130.
5. *cf.* Vācaspati Miśra 1985, p. 538.
6. *cf.* Vīrarāghavācārya 1941, p. 204.
7. So attempt has been made to change the relation or discover a new and appropriate relation in the interest of the correctness of the inference. "*Tadiha saṃsargavattvaṃ padānāṃ tajjñānajanakatvam...*" (*cf.* Vācaspati 1985, p. 538). *See* also Udayana 1941, p. 204 and Vīrarāghva 1941, p. 204.
8. *cf.* Udayana 1967, p. 379.
9. *cf.* *See* Note 7 above.
10. Many intricate points are involved here. Śrīdhara made it clear that according to a Vaiśeṣika when the individual words are heard the hearer comes to know the respective word-meanings through inference. It is also the standard Vaiśeṣika view that our belief about what a sentence signifies is arrived at through inference. To say any of these things is not necessarily to say that word or *vākya* figures as the logical ground in the respective inferences which inform us of word meaning or sentence meaning. In the formulations of the Vaiśeṣika Inference-I which we are considering, the ground is not *pada* or *vākya*. Mathurānātha says as much in his elucidation of $\acute{S}_{10}$

(*cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 35).

11. Mathurānātha points out difficulties in understanding this passage $\acute{S}_{10}$. Rucidatta closely follows Mathurānātha's solution. But Mathurānātha's first attempt at making the passage intelligible by taking the word *liṅga* to mean *pakṣa* may lead one to think that Mathurānātha takes excessive liberty. But one may find some sort of support in favour of the present interpretation in Vācaspati 1985, p. 537. Mathurānātha has said in the next place that if, however, the expression *liṅga* is to be taken literally then the only way in which *pada* (words) can exist as *liṅga* (ground of inference), in the subject of this inference, which again is *pada*, is by way of identity.

    But more important point that he has raised is whether Gaṅgeśa really needs to say *liṅgatayā jñāpakatva* rather than only *jñāpakatva*. He thinks that so far as the view of the Vaiśeṣika-s is concerned and so far as we are formulating this view the relation of *sādhya* to *pakṣa* should be construed as *Jñāpakatva* only.
12. Punctuation in the Asiatic Society edition is slightly different from what it is in the Pandit edition. I have deviated from both and have taken advantage of semicolon in addition to comma and stop.
13. *cf.* Udayana and Vīrarāghava 1941, p. 204.
14. The defence Gaṅgeśa offers in favour of the relation (*liṅgatayā*) *Jñāpakatva* and against the charge of circularity may be traced to the following passage of *Tātparyatīkāpariśuddhi. Na ca liṅgasya svātmano laiṅgikajñānajanakatvamevānumeyaṃ, tasya liṅgāntaraviṣyatvāt.* Udayana 1967, p. 379.
15. Strictly speaking, the formulation should be in terms of *liṅgatayājñāpakatvasambandhena saṃsargavanti.*
16. Proving R^* inferentially and proving R^* as existing in the relation of *liṅgatayā jñāpakatva* are different. Even before the second proof can even be constructed or conceived there should be a prior inference where R^* was made known by the words as *liṅga*. And there again *sādhya* should be related to *pakṣa* and if again the relation is *liṅgatayājñāpakatva,* then circularity cannot be avoided.
17. Mathurānātha has pondered over the question whether the words can themselves be said to be *liṅga. cf.* Note 11 above.
18. Even if understood in context one should not forget the general principle, that in case of *kevalavyatireki* inference, prior knowledge of *sādya* is neither necessary nor possible.
19. These can be traced to Udayana 1941, pp. 204-5.
20. If the formulation is something like *Etāni padāni, liṅgatayā jñāpakatvasambandhena tātparyaviṣayasmāritārtha saṃsargavanti*

ākāṅkṣādimat padatvāt, gāmabhyājetivat.

21. Mathurānātha has brought out how the whole point is related to Udayan's text and his conception of *Yogyatā. cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 37.
22. Our choice of the example, which is not the standard one, has been determined by our inability to make easy sense of the relevant portions of the text of *Prakāśikā* and *Makaranda. cf.* Udayana 1957, pp. 389-390.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. We may, for example, know about some one else's internal state if he happens to make relevant report. But whether the knowledge one has on the basis of hearing such verbal report or utterance is a case of an inference is yet undecided. What, however, both the parties admit is that we can infer internal states of others.
2. The expression 'knowledge' has often been used here in a broad sense, as synonym of *jñāna.* Again we have spoken of both knowledge of things and knowledge of propositions.
3. The choice of the singular form, "*Veda*", when plural form '*Veda-s*' is normally used, is deliberate. Any single sentence of the *Veda* is called *Veda.* Again the entire corpus of the Vedic literature is a unity, is one *Veda.* Divisions are for convenience and similar other reasons.

   The *Veda* is not originally understood as a written text. There are thinkers who believe that in its original form it was not even words spoken by any one, any *puruṣa.* But the *Veda* is admitted in all the schools of Indian thinkers as linguistic or verbal in nature. It is *śabdātmaka.* Here there arise two questions. How exactly would a. Mīmāṁsaka understand or prove the nature of the *Veda* as linguistic? What is the test of the linguistic character of whatever is a language or is linguistic? Secondly is it at all necessary for the Mīmāṁsaka-s to say that the eternal *Veda* in its original form is linguistic? It may be thought that if something is audible then that is a sufficient justification for regarding it as linguistic. But it is difficult to find a single example other than the Veda which is audible but which has not been uttered. It is difficult but not impossible. The properties like *śabdatva, varṇatva* or *katva* etc. are objects of auditory perception. But they are not linguistic. Therefore some one may say that the very fact that the Veda lacks the property of having been uttered is sufficient to prove that it is not linguistic in nature. A

suggestion may be made here for the consideration of the readers. The Veda is linguistic not in the literal sense but in the sense that it is manifested (*vyaṅgya*) by the linguistic utterances through which the preceptors transmit (and manifest) the Veda to their respective disciples. As to the nature of the *vyaṅgya Veda*, as distinct from the *vyañjaka* (manifestor) *Veda* which are necessarily human utterances of certain sort, we cannot suggest that it is what the Vaiyākaraṇa-s call *sphoṭa*. For the Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit *sphoṭa*. But it can be just eternal knowledge or wisdom, *nitya jñāna*. The use of the expression "Veda" in the sense *jñāna* is quite in line with the traditional practice and usage. But unowned knowledge is no less difficult to understand than un-uttered sentence.

4. There is some doubt as to whether a human utterance ever at all yields knowledge and, if it does, whether it is not inferential in nature. The Mīmāṃsaka-s disagree among themselves. In their exposition of the Mīmāṃsā view in the matter the Naiyāyika-s also do not seem to have any unanimity. Udayana appears to maintain that according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s ordinary utterances are *anuvādaka* and that a hearer first comes to know R^* through inference (*cf.* Udayana 1941, p. 212). But Jagadīśa seems to think differently (*cf.* Jagadīśa 1973, p. 20).

   But what we call human utterances of the *Veda* should not be confused with the ordinary human utterances. If an utterance of a man is to be an utterance of the *Veda* then he must just repeat exactly what he had heard from his preceptor and as he had heard it. The same holds true of that preceptor and the preceptor's preceptor. This remains valid however back we go into the past. This beginninglessness of the line of preceptors and disciples of *vaidika* recitation and, for that matter, the *vaidika sampradāya* lends peculiar sanctity to the *vaidika* utterances and as such they are taken to manifest the eternal *veda* and, in this sense, yield knowledge.

5. Or we could infer what intention God had only if we could decide first what the sentence in question means. This is the greatest difficulty in *IA* theory whether the inference of R^* is believed to be routed through the inference of the belief of the speaker or the intention of him. Irrespective of whether the intention is God's or of an ordinary man there seems to be no way of identifying or individuating it except through prior decipherment of the significance of the sentence.

6. It may appear to be a truism; if not, it is an unusually stronger demand that a sentential understanding (that is the understanding of R^*)

cannot be had through any other means. God can, if he so chooses, convey to us what we would otherwise learn from the *Veda*. Udayanācārya has considered such objection against the Nyāya position. (*See* Udayana 1941, p. 223). Besides, according to the Nyāya conception *pramāṇa* is a special cause; and the result of a cause can be produced only by that cause. If therefore sentences are *pramāṇa*-s in respect of certain kind of knowledge, then knowledge of that kind cannot be produced by any other means.

7. For R^* may be interpreted as *abheda sambandha* or as *viśiṣṭārtha*. This distinction becomes extremely important when one asks the question why the *upanaya vākya* cannot quite do the job of a *mānasparāmarśa*. (*See* the *Avayava prakaraṇa* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*).
8. This needs to be stated and examined in detail. The author has done this elsewhere. It may be noted also that there are on the other hand so much of repetition of old points and arguments that the really novel and penetrating suggestions which have been dropped in between escape our notice.
9. "*Svargo vākyārthaḥ*" (Vācaspati 1985, p. 536). This also shows that mere look of it cannot always enable us to distinguish a sentence from a word.
10. The Vaiśeṣika-s do not find any difficulty in admitting that individual things are made known to the hearer by the individual words. For we can give definate sense to 'knowing' the word-meanings from the corresponding words. Here knowing means remembering; and knowing from words means to be recalled by words. Here there is no difficulty because not only a word for each thing recalled has been uttered by the speaker but also words stand to respective things in the definite relation of *vyāpti* or *śakti*, as the view may be. But no word for R^* is ever uttered by the speaker as part of the sentence he speaks. No question of such word standing in definite relation to R^* can arise. Therefore no sense can be given to the claim that hearer's belief about R^* has been derived from words or that such belief is linguistic.

    But it is to be admitted that the hearer has the belief about R^*. So R^* stands to this belief in the relation of 'content of'. It is also generally agreed that the utterance of a sentence has for its cause certain belief. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika-s seem to think, that if from the utterance of a sentence we could infer the belief about R^*, then that would solve the problem. And there is a general criterion by which we can decide which words have been caused by the speaker's belief of R^*. We can easily distinguish ramblings or utterly incoherent

words of a deranged man from those uttered by a person who can be independently known to be a sane man. (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 371). There are certain features of the words themselves which enable us to find out unmistakably if some (connected) words have been uttered on the basis of the belief about R^*. How the speaker comes to know R^* is not a matter of controversy. For his belief is not claimed to be necessarily linguistic. Once one can infer the speaker's belief no separate effort is necessary to explain one's own belief about the content of that other belief, i.e., the R^*, in this case. "*Sa cet Jñānasiddhāvāntarbhūtaḥ kimaparaṃ tena sādhanīyam?*" (Udayana 1967, p. 379).

Apart from the question how a hearer comes to have the belief he has on the occasion of hearing a well formed sentence of a familiar language, there is another question. What does the hearer come to believe? Does he come to believe R^* characterised by the word-meanings (*padārthasaṃsarga*) or the word meanings as related (*saṃsṛṣṭārtha*)? In the former case the belief will have the form 'x has relation which obtains between word-meanings.' In this formulation *x* cannot be replaced by the (name of) word-meanings which form part of the predicate. In the latter case the subject place marked by *x* is filled by the (name of) things or word meanings themselves. The form will be 'word-meanings have R^*.

11. *See* note 10 above.
12. The property of being a *vyāpaka* is a contextual property. What functions in one inference as *vyāpaka*, may function as *vyāpya* in another inference.
13. The word proposition may be taken in this use as neutral between sentence and statement. Strictly speaking the concept of Indian philosophy which comes closest to the notion of proposition is *viśiṣṭārtha*.
14. In a sense it is a truism and a Naiyāyika will also accept this principle. For it will be paradoxical to say that we know the knowlege of a table (in the sense we know what the knowledge known is knowledge about) but do not know the table. The sole point of the Naiyāyika in rejecting this principle seems to be the following. To utter the sentence "whoever knows the knowledge of *x* (or has the knowledge of knowledge of *x*) knows (has the knowledge of) *x* also" is to indulge in using "knows" or "of" in the expression "knowledge of", equivocally. When one knows a belief of one's own, having *x* for its object, the perception generating relation that may be operative is *saṃyukta samavāya*. But so far as the knowledge of the *x* is

concerned *Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* will have to be resorted to as operative relation.

15. *See* note 10 above.
16. *cf.* Udayana, *Nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ*, 4.4.
17. The inference of the speaker's belief about R^* is turned into an inference of R^* by appealing to the other subsidiary principle. What however turns an inference of R^* generally into an inference of certain specific R^* say R_i^*, is the principle of or argument from *Pakṣadharmatā*.
18. Causing knowledge is short for knowledge which causes the inferential knowledge of R^*. Predicate of this causing knowledge or belief has been called here causing predicate.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. What follows can be put more strongly and paradoxically. The error which a person happens to know turns that knowledge of his into an error.
2. This formulation needs some clarification. 'x believes that x believes that p' may not be the only type or form of believing a belief. Belief of another belief may as well be an instance of 'x believes that y believes that p', where $x \neq y$. Where the second belief is preceptual there one who believes and the one whose belief is being believed i.e., perceptually apprehended, are necessarily the same person. But where the second belief is inferential there one who infers and the one whose belief one infers may not be the same person rather they will be usually different. Thus perceptual or introspective model of BBx and inferential model of BBx are different in important ways. Accordingly it may add to clarity, if we represent perception or introspection of a cognition as BxBxp and inference of a cognition as BxByp. We also should not normally substitute the two individual variables in the second formula by the same constant.

   The second point is that some may find it unwarranted to formulate Indian or Nyāya theory of belief about belief in terms of that clause which standardly signifies proposition. For it is doubtful whether the Naiyāyika-s admit proposition. There is uncertainty if and what exact connotation the expression "proposition" has. I believe, however, in many of its standard occurrences English sentences involving the expression proposition, can be rewritten by replacing that term by the word *viśiṣṭārtha*. Be that as it may, for our present purpose one may, if one wants, replace *p* by *a*, where

a would be the name for any individual thing or person.

3. This should happen even where the owners of the two beliefs— one, the apprehending belief and the other the belief being apprehended— are different.
4. The whole context of discussion is object language. The exact procedure of interpreting a metalinguistic statement needs careful elaboration.
5. In this sentence the word "knowledge" has the wider connotation of "belief". But in the context of detection of error, the awareness in which detection of error consists is knowledge in the usual and narrower sense.
6. At least there is a theoretical possibility, one may think, of this secondary belief being verbal. One may insist that when we are told about what another person (the speaker himself or a third person) believes, our secondary belief about the primary belief of the (second or) third person is indeed linguistic. The reason why we have disregarded this alternative is that whether there is a distinct variety of cognition to be called linguistic as distinct from inferential is the very point at issue. It is yet to be settled and we cannot prejudge the issue to the disadvantage of the Vaiśeṣika-s.

It is to be noted in the second place that the structure of the primary belief about *R** is differently conceived by the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s. Part of the structure of the primary (inferential) belief of *R** according to a Vaiśeṣika is, roughly 'x believes *R**'. For a Naiyāyika it is '*R**' or, if you like 'that *R**' The problem of the Naiyāyika-s is, say, how would we know that we ourselves or any one else *believes* that *R** and that we ourselves or any one else *has* linguistic belief to the effect that *R** ? If we do not have any means of knowing this then the Naiyāyika-s cannot justify their claim that there is a distinct kind of knowledge called *śābda*. The problem which the Vaiśeṣika-s in particular and the Communication-Intention theorists in general face is how to *recover*, so to say, from a belief of the form 'x believes that p', the belief that p. Gaṅgeśa has convincingly shown that such recovery is necessary. Thus he has supplemented Udayana's criticism of the IA theory of the Vaiśeṣika-s. Udayana had shown that the inference which on IA theory is supposed to replace *śabda pramāṇa* cannot be legitimised. Gaṅgeśa has shown that even if that (those) inference (inferences) were legitimate, it could not quite do the job of *śabda pramāṇa*. For to do that it should be possible for the hearer to derive belief of the form that *R**. But for that to be possible, recovery of 'that *R**' should be possible. But

how that can be possible is a problem.

7. The principle P' is not a necessary truth. To begin with it derives some of its pursuasive force from the consideration that it sounds somewhat paradoxical to say that I know that I know *x* but I do not know *x*. But since it is not a necessary truth we need to argue for its truth. Where such argument is available, we can directly rely on that argument and say that in this instance one's belief that one has belief that *x* is at the same time one's belief that *x*. In case of introspective awareness we have such an argument in the sense-object contact called *jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti* which obtains between *manas*, the internal sense organ, and the object of the belief being introspected.
8. One may correctly know that another man is mistaken and yet he may commit mistake in that very same act of cognition in respect of some other detail. It is still more difficult when one's detection of another man's mistaken belief that here there is a snake (when there is only a tangled root of a tree) takes the form 'That man is mistaken, he mistook a rope for a snake.'
9. The expression "*rajatajñāna*" is somewhat ambiguous. It may cover both *rajata viśeṣyaka rajatatvaprakāraka Jñāna* and *rajatā-nyaviśeṣyaka rajatatva prakārakajñāna*. If one wishes to signify this first type of silver-belief (*rajatajñāna*) exclusively then one can do that by using the expression "true silver-belief." Such belief is necessarily one in which silver (*rajat*) figures as the epistemic subject and silverhood (*rajatatva*) as the epistemic predicate.
10. Not necessarily. It would be a case of detection of error if the cognition "*śuktau rajatajñānavān ayam*" is itself true. If he had really mistaken a piece of *raṅga* to be *rajat* then "Raṅge rajatajñānavān aym" would be detection of the error in a sense in which "*śuktau rajatajñānavān aym*" would not be. (*See* note 8 above).
11. Because he is, in the theory infallible, and as such he knows that 'some one (He) believes that something is a piece of silver in respect of what is actually a shell', in the case when it is really a shell which that man mistook for silver.
12. Thus a person who is merely conscious that someone (not necessarily distinct from himself) has committed a mistake, may himself be mistaken about the nature or some detail of the mistake he thinks he has detected. For example, he may think that the other man had mistaken a rope for a snake while he had actually mistaken a trangled root of a tree for snake. An error-knowing person will have knowledge to the effect "that man had mistaken a root for a snake'.

13. Omniscience and infallibility jointly ensure that God has available to himself independent means of knowing (or truly believing) every thing. But whether God knows or will know a particular thing *a* will depend on whether *a* has existence or is real. So formulated omniscience does not entail knowledge of a square-circle. This explains why in the explication of the notion "*bhrāntijña*" in the strict sense one should include a condition like (iii).
14. By direct access is meant access not through some prior belief. For example when, according to Nyāya, one entertains a mistaken belief, the believer has no direct access to that thing (silver, say) as which a thing (shell) is apprehended. The believer's only access to silver at the moment is through some previous act of belief of silver. In plain language if one had never before entertained any silver-belief one cannot now have mistaken silver belief, i.e., cannot mistake something else as silver.

    Here in the context of the debate between *VA* theorists and *IA* theorists of India, the expression direct access may be understood in this way: a person *x* has direct access in respect of an object *a* if *x* has some means of apprehending *a* which is distinct from his belief about (some one else's or of his own) belief about *a*. If a hearer is to apprehend R^* not just as what the speaker (believes or) is held to believe, then the hearer must have at his disposal a separate and independent means of knowing R^*. To admit this is to accept *VA* theory provided this independent means is believed to be language or *śabda* itself. Anyway, the *VA* theory contends that there is an independent linguistic means (*śabdapramāṇa*) through which a hearer apprehends R^*.
15. A Naiyāyika may also in principle agree that R^* may be known both through perception and through inference. But having inferential belief that some one else believes R_i^* does not, according to him, amount to believing R^*. Secondly even when a man believes that a certain person believes that a particular thing is a piece of silver, in this form, the belief of the man will be true, no matter whether the belief of the other person being apprehended is true or not.
16. What is said here will also hold in case the secondary belief is an inference.
17. It is a vast topic for discussion. It cannot be ruled a priori that we never can go wrong at the stage of *anuvyavasāya* or secondary perception of some prior act of belief.
18. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 176.
19. The major points are clear. In the preceding section attempt was

made to refute the Vaiśeṣika reductionism in question on the ground that by appealing to the principle P^1 the Vaiśeṣika-s play down or obliterate in their *IA* theory the distinction between a false belief and the knowledge of it. But neither this charge nor an answer to it can be understood or accepted till the sense of the predicate 'is false' is made clear. So the major issue being discussed in this and a few subsequent passages ($\acute{S}_{13}$-$\acute{S}_{15}$) is "What sense of falsity is involved in the objection, in its generalised form, that one who subscribes to the Principle P^1 does necessarily play down the distinction in question?". Though the general trend of thought contained in the passages concerned is thus clear from the context, the connections between these passages or between the thoughts expressed therein is not very clear. These connections may be differently conceived and the passages maybe differently interpreted.

20. Whereas the followers of Madhvācarya are *saduparakta-asatkhyātivādin*-s, we do not find any discussion of *asatkhyātivāda*, as it is normally understood, in the writings of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. There is another group of thinkers known in the literature as *ānupalambhika*-s. Besides, it does not seem to be accurate to describe the view of the Mādhyamika Bauddha-s as *asatkhyāti*.
21. *cf.*. *Yoga Sūtra* 1.6 and 1.9. It is to be noted however that the Philosophers of the *Yoga* school distinguish between the two.
22. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1967, p. 1. Also in some uses *asat* means everything other than *dravya guṇa* and *karma cf.* Jhalkikar.
23. *cf.* Udayana *Nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ* 3.2; Vācaspati 1967, pp. 160-61.
24. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, Section *Anyathākhyāti*, particularly pp. 535-37.
25. Perhaps those who accept *asatkhyāti*, more or less literally, admit a special capacity of cognitive state such that even non-existent things can be grasped (*cf.* Vācaspati 1967, p. 160). Similarly if one has the appropriate desire one can even 'know' things which are ordinarily to be regarded as having self-contradictory nature. Think of *āhārya jñāna*.
26. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 535.
27. Against this context it should now be clear which of the possible interpretations of the passages has been adopted and where.
28. Suitable adjustments may be made for reading such sentences as being uniformly in the linguistic mode or in the ontological mode.
29. Here also there are many necessary points to be discussed. In the first volume of Gaṅgeśa 1990 this is a recurring theme. One may be referred, say, to p. 387 of that volume.

30. Where the erroneous primary cognition is 'This is (a piece of) silver' the second order cognition, in which detection of that error consists, has the form 'He (z) knows/knew a shell to be silver' (*śuktau rajatajñānavān ayam*). This form of the secondary cognition clearly shows that *rajata* or *rajatatva* did not figure in the primary cognition as epistemic subject. But it was an epistemic predicate (*rajataprakāraka jñānavān ayam*). If the second order cognition of *x* is known by *y* in a third order cognition then the latter cognition will have some such form: 'He (*x*) knows that *z* has *rajatatvaprakārakajñāna*'; '*Ayam* (x) *parātma* (z) *samaveta rajatajñāna viṣayaka jñānavān*. This shows that the epistemic predicate of the secondary cognition, in this case is, roughly, *rajatajñāna* itself. It is different from *rajatatva*.
31. Perhaps this is a stronger requirement or formulation. To be able to derive (vi) it would have been enough if instead of (v) one asserted (va) i.e. a cognition that apprehends a belief apprehends also what is or is represented by the (epistemic predicate) *prakāra* of that belief. But (va) may appear more *ad hoc* than (v), though (v) is also controversial.
32. Can there be a second order *anuvyavasāya* (that is, *anuvyavasāya* of another *anuvyavasāya*)? Can we take indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) which precedes almost every determinate perception, to be a primary act of perception? These are also questions which received attention of the Indian thinkers.
33. A secondary perception is secondary in a sense in which certain inference can be secondary or second-order. But *anuvyavasāya* is both second order cognition and is perceptual.
34. This is so till at least *śabda* (language) has not been proved to be an independent source of belief and we are otherwise, operating the Nyāya scheme of *pramāṇa*-s.
35. If knowingly or unknowingly a speaker misinforms his hearer then the latter will derive even on Nyāya theory a false belief. But it is one thing to say that false utterences are utterances of a person who is mistaken about the state of thing he is talking about and it is another thing to say that to apprehend a belief about an x, which happens to be a false belief, is to have a false belief about x.
36. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1973, Vol I, pp. 181-82. *See* also *Prakāśa* there under. The elucidation of the author of *Prakāśa* seems in this place to be somewhat better than the elucidation of Mathurānātha.
37. *cf. ibid* p. 182 and also Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. I, p. 176.
38. We are not using here *anuvyavasāya* in the extended sense which

includes desire (of certain kind) also.

39. This is not to suggest that there are no differences. Vaiśeṣika division of cognitive experience into *vidyā* and *avidyā* would be unacceptable to a Naiyāyika.
40. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol I, p. 784f.
41. *See* note 17 above.
42. The distinction involved here is comparable to the familiar distinction between the use and mention of the same expression as they occur in the relevant parts of the object language and meta language respectively. The primary act of cognition is diaphanous, we see the thing and the structure of the thing through it. We do not see it or its structure independent of seeing the thing and its structure. To apprehend the act of cognition itself we are to change to some extent our objective or object word orientation. We are to turn consciously to the apprehension of the cognition itself.
43. A fourth subdivision of *vyavahāra* is often included *cf.* Panchanan 1392(B), p. 94.
44. We can imagine a born blind man who had never before touched a silver but who now moves forward and collects a piece of silver following the instruction of another man. The standard example would however be one of first order perception.
45. We are using here the term *anuvyavasāya* in the more standard and narrower sense. *See* note 38 above.
46. This is not to suggest that an object which has been revealed by one type of cognition cannot be or never need be revealed by another type of cognition. *cf.* Vātsyāyana 1967, pp. 182-83.
47. It apprehends the owner of the primary act of cognition.
48. (a) It would be a better convention to write (shell) silver.
    (b) *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 533.
49. Here by indirect we mean mediated by some other cognition. So when we perceive through complex but ordinary (*laukika*) sense object contact it is not a case of knowing indirectly.
50. In this broad formulation the remark applies to inference of some one else's belief.
51. One possible variety of predication is where we predicate more than one independent predicate (*khalekapota nyāya*). We also have predication where the predicates themselves are related, as it were, as subject and predicate. (*viśeṣye viśeṣaṇam tatrāpi ca viśeṣāntaraṁ iti nyāya*).
52. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 230f.
53. *ibid* p. 529.

54. *ibid* p. 230.
55. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1973. The printing of the same text in the edition Gaṅgeśa 1990 is somewhat defective.

CHAPTER NINE

1. A parrot may not be said to utter a sentence in the literal sense of the term. It also cannot be denied that the parrot can simulate human utterances in a sense in which perhaps no other bird can. Even so we can at most say that the bird knows in its own way the words. But we have no compelling reason to think that the parrot knows what these words mean. To credit the bird with this knowledge we are to credit it first with the ability to make inference. But this seems still more indefensible.
2. Each particular sentence is related to a certain R^* to which any arbitrary sentence is not so related. On the other hand a sentence S_i will cause in the hearer a belief about R_i^*, provided it itself has been caused by the knowledge of R_i. So we can say R_i^* is appropriate if a hearer comes to believe it on hearing a sentence S_i; and this can happen if S_i has been uttered by the speaker on the basis of his knowledge of R_i^*.
3. *cf.* Gadādhara 1970, *see Sāmānyaniruktiprakaraṇam.*
4. Some relevant discussion may be found in *Vīrarāghavācārya* 1941 p. 219, Gaṅgesá 1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 551f.
5. For example we cannot formulate the relation of epistemic opposition without making provision for *āhāryajñāna.* If one so desires one can have awareness of Fx even when he already knows that *x* is not F. An awareness of the form '*x* which does not have fire has fire' is called *āhārya Jñāna*. This type of awareness or possibility of it shows how strongly a desire can be effective.
6. Here there is no logical improbability in the sense that there is nothing in the conception of definition of a sentence that a parrot may not utter it. We have not defined a sentence, say, as what is produced by human utterence. Whatever may be the history of its production if it is a finite series of words which are mutually syncategorematic then it is a sentence.
7. *See* note 1 above.
8. *cf.* Vīrarāghavācārya 1941, p. 219.
9. Two questions are there and these should be distinguished. How does a poet (or a parrot) manage to utter certain otherwise well-formed sentence? The second question is, 'How do we come

to derive any definite belief from hearing such sentence?' These are different but related questions. The idea is that if we can come to believe, on hearing a sentence S_i, only that R_i^* a belief about which we ascribe to the speaker (for the theory is that the speaker's utterance must have been caused by this belief) then in case of poetic utterance we can never come to have any belief about any R^*. For what a poet imagines may not be there. He therefore does not first know an R^* and then utters a sentence. So far as the first question is concerned one may be referred to Udayana and Vīrarāghava 1941, p. 219. As to the second question it has been said at one place in *Tattvacintāmaṇi* "*Kāvyasthale ca padārthajñāna vyāpārakam utpreṣādisahakṛtaṃ mana evānvayānubhava- kāraṇam.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 551.

10. Alternatively we speak of *yogyatā* as property of words as well as of word meanings. With suitable adjustment both can be said. The semantic compatibility or the compatibility of semantic category may even be said to be rooted in the appropriateness of the underlying ontological categories.
11. We take it after Jagadīśa that a sentence is defined in terms of *ākāṅkṣā* and not in terms of *yogyatā* also. For if *yogyatā* enters into the very definition of a sentence, then it would be difficult perhaps to take a deceiver's utterence as sentence.
12. It seems that a Prabhākara would not say as much. He would explain such cases in terms of *asaṃsargāgraha*.
13. It seems that different interpretation of what the Vaiśeṣiks-s say and somewhat different interpretation and arrangement of passages $Ś_{22\text{-}23}$ are possible.
14. Perhaps here also his mistakes compensate for his desire to deceive.
15. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, p. 352. Some of the points discussed here are extremely important and the entire portion between p. 341 and 355 may be carefully read.

One important point that emerges is that when a *svataḥ prāmāṇyavādin* would give a causal definition of *pramā*, he would be in the same act giving (almost a complete) a causal account of *prāmaṇya* which characterizes that *pramā*. For generally speaking according to this *svataḥ* theorists both are produced by the same set of conditions. In case of a *parataḥ prāmāṇyavādin* causal conditions which produce a true belief and those which produce the truth of this true belief are necessarily different. And this has important consequence also. What would be the result if there obtained, say, condition of a true belief but not of the truth of that

belief ? The so-called conditions of true belief which are distinct from conditions of truth are really conditions of belief (*jñāna*) but not of *pramā*. When the factors like sense organs or contact of a sense organ with its object is said to be the cause of (or *pramāṇa* in respect of) *pratyakṣa pramā* there is no emphasis on the word *pramā*. What is meant is that there results a belief which subsequently causes the awareness "I perceive or had perceived" i.e., "*sākṣātkaromi.*" In his definition of *pratyakṣa pramā* therefore Gautama mentioned a property which independently (independent of what causes the belief) characterizes the resulting belief. In other words he said both : perceptual knowledge is caused by sense object contact and is non-discrepant with or is regularly connected with the thing it reveals. As compared to this the definition of *pratyakṣa* which Viśvanātha has first discussed in his text (*see* Viśvanātha 1884 Ś, p. 121) and which the present author defended as inescapable (*see* Mukhopadhyaya P. K. 1981, pp. 19-51) is a definition of perceptual belief only and not of perceptual knowledge. A perceptual belief can be described as a perceptual *pramā* only in the loose sense of being a possible seat of *prāmāṇya*. Lot of clarity would be achieved and confusion that arises from want of explicitness would be removed if we adopt either of these two measures : we use *pratyakṣa* or *pratyakṣa jñāna* (or perceptual belief) when we do not mean to refer specifically to the *prāmāṇa* or truth of such awareness or we use *pratyakṣa pramā* or *avyabhicāri pratyakṣa* i.e. perceptual knowledge (same in case of *anumāna* etc.) when we mean to emphasize the *prāmāṇya* aspect. Or we continue to use loosely the expresion *pratyakṣa pramā* and use the expression *pramāna pratyakṣa* when we mean to refer particularly to perceptual knowledge. One difficulty with the first alternative is we shall have to resort to two expressions respectively for the special cause of perceptual knowledge and perceptual belief. We may be required to use *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* and *pratyakṣamāna* or *sādhana*.

Unless there was or was apprehended to be special reason for confusion it was customary to use *pratyakṣa/ anumāna/ upamāna/ śabda pramāṇa*. Sometimes one would use just *prtyakṣa/ anumāna/ upamāna/ śābdajñāna*.

So far as Gaṅgeśa is concerned, he thought there was reason to be particularly careful about the last two of the four *pramāṇa-s*. For these two are more disputed and admitted in less number of philosophical schools (*cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. II, Part I, p.1). He is therefore very explicit and emphatic when he introduced the

discussion on *śabda*. Beginning with the words "*Atha śabdo nirūpyate*" he, in the very next sentence, gives us the difinition of *pramāṇa śabda*. He knew quite clearly that he was stating in this second sentence the cause of the *prāmāṇya* which characterizes *śābda pramā*, whereas *śābda pramā* is the knowledge which a hearer has when he understands a sentence consisting of words which have been caused by the conditions of *śābdaprāmāṇya*. The conditions of *prāmāṇya* of the words are different from those of *śābda pramā*. As such conditions stated in the second sentence of *Śabdacintamaṇi* or $\acute{S}_2$ as we marked it here. And Gaṅgeśa was careful enough to indicate that he was defining *pramāṇa śabda*. Defining *pramāṇa śabda* and specifying the sufficient and necessary conditions of the *prāmāṇya* as characterizing *śabda* are one and the same thing.

These add a lot more clarification to our treatment, in earlier part of the book, of $\acute{S}_2$. But the central worry remains. If the utterence or the words uttered cannot be regarded as *śbdapramāṇa* how certain property of it can be regarded as *pramāṇa guṇa*?

16. *cf.* Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. I, Part I, p. 352. To deny that knowledge of R^* on the part of speaker is the cause of "*pramāṇa vākya*" is not necessarily to block the way to the inference of God. *See ibid* p. 353.
17. (a) We have earlier referred to the passages in the writings of Praśastapāda and Vallabha, for example where this process has been described.

    (b) Comparison with smoke should not be taken too literally. *Ākāṅkṣā* etc. cannot be said straight way to have R^* as their cause.

CHAPTER TEN

1. "*Na caivaṃ śabde'pyabhiprāyānumānādeva pravṛtyādyastu iti vācyam. Śabdādevapratyemityanuvyavasāyāt tadanubhāvakatve sthite.*" Gaṅgeśa 1990, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 861.
2. *cf.* Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. I, Part I, p. 176.
3. This is slightly misleading, It would be more accurate to say that by the content of a belief we mean either the subject content or the predicate-content or the relation-content.
4. The epistemic subject of the apprehending belief is usually the *aham* (or I).
5. *See* Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha 1990, Vol. I, Part I, p. 784f.
6. "*Rajatārthi pravṛtau rajatajñānam heturna tu tadavacchedakamityuktatvāt.*"

7. What is meant is that the standard view of the Naiyāyika-s is different from that of the Vaiśeṣika-s. For not only the great Vaiśeṣikācārya admitted *śabdapramāṇa* there is also reason to believe that one section of the Vaiseṣika philosophers were doubtful if Kaṇāda meant to deny *śabdapramāṇa* *cf.* Gopinath Kaviraj 1982, p. 22.
8. In the sense that here there is no *anvayānupapatti* or no violation of semantic or syntactic rule of sentence construction. But a Naiyāyika who holds that *tātparyajñāna* is a necessary condition of *śābdabodha*, would consider non-realization of the speaker's intention to be a sufficient vitiating condition so far as the genesis of hearer's belief is concerned.
9. Context or *prakaraṇa* is only one of the many ways through which we can get to know the intention of the speaker *cf* Bhartṛhari 1980, Part II, pp. 382-83; Kārikā 2/315-316. Even the way to knowing *tātparya* and the nature of this are to be differently formulated if the background theories are different.
10 If one apprehends a piece of silver in a cognition having the form '(This piece of) silver is different from a (golden) jar' then the cognition will have *rajat* as content but *rajat* or *rajatatva* will not be epistemic predicate there.
11. This argument can be understood independently. But it will be better if we relate it to the previous passage and argument from ambiguity.
12. This argument was thought to reinforce the Vaiśeṣika reductionism.
13. This order of priority may not be chronological but logical.

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Visvanātha Nyāyapancānan (Kṛsnadas Sārvabhauma)
(1) (*Nyāyasūtra*) *Vṛtti*? see Gautama 1985.
(2) *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī,* (ed.) Harirāma Shukla, Chowkhamba, fourth edition, 1989.
(3) *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* see *Pancānanaśāstrī*, 1884(s).

Vyomaśivācārya, *Vyomavatī* in Praśastapāda (b)

— *Vyomavatī*, (ed.) in two volumes by Gaurinath Satrai, Sampurnāanad Sanskrit Vyomaśivācārya, 1983-84

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